

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

(THIRD EDITION)

By
SUSIL KUMAR MAITRA



UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

1963

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SUSIL KUMAR MAITRA

GEORGE V PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY
(1946-53), ACHARYA BRAJENDRA NATH SEAL PROFESSOR OF
PHILOSOPHY, CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY (1953-55)



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PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

There is no addition in the Third edition excepting a fuller and more detailed statement of the contents which will be useful both to teachers and students. The author's approach is analytical and not historical. The main ethical ideas of the Hindus are stated and explained with texts from authoritative Sanskrit works. Jaina and Buddhist ethics have only been occasionally referred to more by way of contrast than as an explication of the Hindu point of view.

The author expresses his thanks to Sri Gopinath Bhattacharyya, his old student and the present Acharyya Brojendranath Seal Professor of Philosophy, Calcutta University for going through the proofs of the book.

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THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

INTRODUCTION

The Ethics of the Hindus is based on a three-fold scheme of the spiritual life comprising the stages of sociality, subjective morality and the life absolute and transcendental. Hindu Ethics is thus social ethics and psychological ethics and culminates in the philosophy of the Absolute which is the consummation of the Spiritual life.

The social Ethics of the Hindus is represented in a scheme of *varṇāśramadharmas*, i.e., duties relative to one's *varṇa* or social class and one's *āśrama* or specific stage in spiritual discipline. The duties of *varṇa* and *āśrama* together constitute the code of relative duties, the duties of station in life, the duties obligatory on the individual in consequence of social status, temperament, specific powers and capacities. They are to be distinguished from the *sādhāraṇadharmas*, the common duties of man, the duties that are obligatory on all men equally, irrespective of individual capacity, social status, nationality, or creed.

The *varṇāśramadharmas* thus represent a code of relative duties and constitute the relativistic ethics of the Hindus. It comprises the ethics of sociality as well as the ethics of individual capacity and is thus fuller and more comprehensive than the Platonic scheme which is the ethics of sociality only. The basis of the classification according to *āśrama*, it will be seen, is the genetic view of the moral life, and the importance, psychological as well as ethical; of such a view cannot be too much emphasised.

The *varṇāśramadharma*s, as will be seen, constitute the sphere of the hypothetical imperative, but this does not imply that they are conditional on a subjective choice of the individual. On the contrary, they are all obligatory without condition in their respective spheres. Thus the duties of the Brahmin are obligatory without condition on whoever is a Brahman, and the duties of the married life on whoever has married and has a family. Only the duties of one class or of one stage of life has no authority over another class or over another stage. Some however think that there is room here for individual freedom, specially in regard to the order of the several *āśramas*. Thus it is urged that though the order from *Brahmacarya* through *Gārhasthya* to the later stages is true for the majority yet there may be exceptional cases, men with special powers and capacities, who may attain to the later stages without going through the earlier.

These relative duties however do not constitute the entire field of the moral life. Besides these there is also a code of common duties or *sādhāraṇadharma*s which every man must observe whatever his social position or individual capacity. The *sādhāraṇadharma*s are thus the duties of universal scope and validity and are to be distinguished from the merely relative duties. The idea underlying this classification is that two kinds of service are obligatory on every individual for the protection and help, spiritual as well as material, accorded to him by his fellow beings. In the first place, it is necessary that he should pay off his debt to his particular community in a specific way according to his capacity for the special advantages and opportunities of life it provides. But this is not all. Besides his community he is also indebted to mankind in general by whose culture and experience through the trials of life he hourly profits in his career through the world. It is therefore necessary that he should

pay off this larger debt, in however small an amount, by assisting the cause of humanity in general and seeking the common good as distinguished from the good of his own community. This is the inner significance of the scheme of *sādhāraṇadharmas* which is thus a check to communal egoism seeking as it does an equitable adjustment of the relative claims of communities in a larger ethics of humanity.

From what has been already stated it is clear that the *sādhāraṇadharmas* constitute the foundation of the *varṇāśramadharmas*, the limits within which the latter are to be observed and obeyed. For example, the Brāhmin in performing his religious sacrifice must not appropriate another's property for the purpose, non-appropriation being one of the common and universal duties. In this way he serves his own community, as well as, though in a negative way, the cause of humanity as a whole. It should be noted however that the *varṇāśramadharmas* are not directed merely to the good of the community—they also, though in an indirect way, subserve the purpose of the common good of humanity. Thus the individual of a specific community who observes the duties of his class does not serve his own community merely, but also and in the same process, all other communities according to their deserts and needs and in this way the whole of humanity itself. This, it will be seen, is also the view of Plato whose virtue of justice is the common good which is to be realised by each class through its specific duties, but this is to be distinguished from the common good which constitutes the object of the *sādhāraṇadharmas* of the Hindu classification. The end in these common and universal duties is not the common well-being which is being concretely realised in specific communities, but the common good as the pre-condition and foundation of the latter; it is not the good which is common-in-the-individual, but common-as-the-prius-of-the-individual. Hence the *sādhāraṇa* duties are obligatory equally on

all individuals, irrespective of their social position or individual capacity.

The *sādhāraṇadharma*s and the *varṇāśramadharmā*s together constitute the objective morality of the Hindus, i.e. morality as represented in a code of external acts and requiring outward conformity. But objective morality is not sufficient by itself and it is necessary that the individual after a period of discipline in objective co-operation and self-restraint, should look inwards into himself and aim at subjective purity and inner excellence of the will. This constitutes subjective morality and gives us the psychological ethics of the Hindus. It is assumed that *cittasuddhi* or purification of the mind is an indispensable condition for the higher stages of the moral life. Objective morality represents the stage of the moral tutelage of the individual after which however he must be left to his own freedom. But even then it is necessary that he should not be led away by the mere intensity of the impulse of the moment. A certain equanimity of the mind, a sort of mental equilibrium and impartiality is the precondition of the proper and right use of one's freedom. It is only in this impartial and undisturbed frame of mind that the rival claims of competing impulses and moral values can be rightly appreciated and adjudged. To this end it is however necessary that the natural man should be purified and spiritualised and should learn, through a proper understanding of his inner nature, to subordinate the lower to the higher impulses and to maintain the balance and tranquillity of the soul which are the pre-conditions of proper ethical valuation. This constitutes the problem of the Psychological Ethics of the Hindus which thus includes not merely the analysis of the will and its inner springs and their psychological as well as their ethical classification, but also a part of their practical ethics as embodied in the various practical schemes of *cittasuddhi* through external and internal aids.

Even subjective morality however is not the highest stage of the spiritual life. It is itself a means like sociality which together with the latter must lead to the ultimate end or goal which is the life absolute and transcendental. Here sociality as well as subjective morality must be merged in the end thereby either to be annulled and transcended or to reappear in a new light and charged with absolute significance. This is the underlying intent of Patañjali's scheme of *Yoga*, Śankara's view of *Mokṣa*, Rāmānuja's doctrine of *Bhakti* and the Buddhist theory of *Nirvāṇa*. All these agree in recognising the transcendental as the limit of the empirical life, the timeless as the truth of all that is in time. This timeless, transcendental life is therefore the culminating stage of the spirit, the sphere of its consummation and fruition. It is in a certain sense a supermoral plane of being, a level of spiritual life in which the individual, as consciously participating in the eternal reality of the Absolute, is free from the sense of mere striving as well as from that of mere duty or obligation. It is the stage of the spirit, in short, in which the good is not presented as something *to be accomplished* but as an accomplished fact from eternity which the individual therefore does not realise but merely reveals in his own life as participating in the life of the Absolute.

This absolute life however has itself been variously conceived by the Hindus, being in some systems regarded as the negation of all that is empirical (Nyāya), in some as a kind of intuition (Śankara), in some again as intuition culminating in devotion, worship and love and enriching and enlivening the empirical life of activity and thereby filling it with absolute significance and worth (Rāmānuja). This intuition again is conceived either as the intuition of the Self, or as the intuition of *Puruṣa* as well as *Prākṛti*, or again as pure intuition or knowledge without either locus

(*Jñātā*) or object (*Jñeya*) which is the philosophy of pure experience.

One special point of interest in this connection is the difference between Śankara and Rāmānuja in the significance they respectively attach to the empirical life of Duty after the emergence of the intuition of the Absolute. According to Śankara the moral life is at an end at this stage and there is *Karmasanyāsa* or freedom from the bond of *Karma* or duty in consequence of the lapse of the individual into the eternal reality of the Absolute. The moral bond here falls off as do other bonds and a state of absolute freedom is reached which is the Freedom of Reality itself. According to Rāmānuja however the moral life is not annulled in this mediating process of absolute intuition, but only transfigured, shorn of its character of mere subjectivity, and filled with absolute significance and value. The sense of duty therefore persists even after the intuition of the Absolute and the obligations of the empirical life continue to be binding in all stages of the spirit ; only at this plane they cease to appear as merely empirical or subjective and are recognised instead as the self-revelation of the transcendental reality, the temporal manifestation of what is itself timeless and eternally real. The moral life therefore receives now an entirely new meaning : it is no longer the service of man merely, but also of God as revealing Himself in suffering humanity, the Eternal Absolute as accomplishing itself in time through the temptations, the struggles, the successes and failures of men, that is, through the history of the world.

PART I

THE OBJECTIVE AND SOCIAL ETHICS OF THE HINDUS THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE DUTIES

The objective morality of the duties is the groundwork of Hindu Ethics. As constituting their concrete moral life it furnishes the positive basis of Hindu ethical concepts and norms. It also is preparatory to the higher morality of self-purification which necessarily presupposes the mediation of an objective code of right and wrong actions. We shall therefore first consider the Objective Ethics of the Hindus, *i.e.*, their enumeration and classification of the *Dharmas* in the objective sense of 'duties'.

N.B.—The term '*Dharma*' is also used in the subjective sense of *virtue* as well as in the sense of *religious merit*. Here however we are concerned only with its objective meaning of 'duty'.

Manu's Classification of the Duties

Manu's classification of the Duties is one of the earliest attempts at a systematic treatment of this subject. Manu distinguishes between relative duties (*varṇāśrama-dharmas*), *i.e.*, duties relative to one's station in life, and common duties (*sādhāraṇadharmas*), *i.e.*, duties of universal scope and validity. The relative duties are the specific duties relating to one's station in life, *i.e.*, one's station as determined by one's *varṇa* or caste and one's *āśrama* or particular stage of life. The universal duties are the duties irrespective of one's age, caste or creed, *i.e.*, duties obligatory on man as man and not as a member of a particular

community or social class or as being at a particular stage or period of life.

Under the class of the *sādhāraṇadharmas* or common duties Manu enumerates the following ten :—

Steadfastness (*Dhṛti*).

Forgiveness (*Kṣamā*).

Application (*Dama*).

Non-appropriation, *i.e.*, Avoidance of theft (*Cauryābhāva*).

Cleanliness (*Śauca*),

Repression of the Sensibilities and Sensuous appetites (*Indriya-nigraha*).

Wisdom (*Dhī*).

Learning (*Vidyā*).

Veracity (*Satya*).

Restraint of Anger (*Akrodha*).

A glance at the above list shows that nearly all the duties have reference to the attainment of the individual's perfection. There is practically no recognition of the social duties proper, *i.e.*, of the duties of social service in a positive sense as distinguished from negative toleration (*Kṣamā*) and non-appropriation (*Cauryābhāva*). Even veracity does not necessarily imply positive social service in this sense : it aims at negative non-interference rather than positive service and it may be practised purely as a dianoetic virtue of self-culture, *i.e.*, as absolute self-dedication to Truth. In any case there is no necessary implication of any positive social service in veracity any more than there is in the other enumerations under the common duties. It follows therefore that Hindu morality primarily aimed at the autonomy of the individual, *i.e.*, at making him self-sufficient and self-dependent and free from all external bonds, physical and social. This is the underlying purport of the ascetic virtues of steadfastness, application, repression and self-restraint. The dianoetic

virtues of wisdom, learning and veracity have also this end of self-culture in view, and the omission of the virtues of positive social service from the list is also significant when viewed in the light of this ideal of a non-social self-autonomy and self-sufficiency. In fact, it is this ideal which dominates the Hindu Doctrine of the Law of *Karma* which apportions to each individual what he has himself earned by his own deeds or *karma*. According to the Hindu idea there can be not only no vicarious sin and punishment but also no vicarious redemption. No man can help another in the attainment of his end; just as he cannot reap what another has sown so also he cannot help another to his fruition. A free spirit is a law unto himself and is arbiter not only of his own natural lot but also of his higher end or destiny as spirit. There are thus no duties which are not strictly speaking duties to self, and duty in the sense of positive moral aid to others is self-contradictory in its very conception. One's natural lot is itself a result of one's *karma* or freedom, and one can no more conduce to the betterment of another's natural life than one can conduce to his moral life.

Praśastapāda's Classification of the Duties

Praśastapāda also classifies the duties, like Manu, into common, generic, or *sāmānya-dharmas*, and relative, specific, or *viśeṣa-dharmas*. Thus the Duties (*dharmas*), according to him, are :—

- (i) either generic, *sāmānya*, i.e., common to all *āśramas* or stages of life and all *varṇas* or social classes and communities;
- (ii) or specific, *viśeṣa*, i.e., relative to one's particular station in life as constituted by one's particular *varṇa* or social class and one's *āśrama* or particular stage of life.

1. The Generic or *Sāmānya* Duties are :—

Moral Earnestness, Regard for the Spritual
(*Dharme Śraddhā, Dharme Manahprasādaḥ*).

Refraining from injury to living beings (*Ahiṃsā*).

Seeking the good of creatures (*Bhūtahitatva*).

Speaking the truth (*Satyavacana*).

Refraining from theft (*Asteya*).

Sexual continence (*Brahmacarya*).

Sincerity, Purity of Motive (*Anupadhā*).

Renouncing or restraining anger (*Krodha-varjana*).

Ablution, Personal cleanliness (*Abhiṣecana, Snāna*).

The eating of linseeds and other specified substances on special occasions for the object of Śuci or purification of the body (*Śucidravya-sevana*).

Devotion to the Deities recognised by the Vedas (*Viśiṣṭa-Devatā-bhakti*).

Fasting on specified occasions (*vpavāsa*).

Moral watchfulness (*apramāda*), i.e., the unfailing performance of the unconditional duties (*nityanaimittikāṇaṃ karmaṇāṃ avaśyambhāvena karaṇam*).

It is pointed out that in every case the agent's positive resolve (*saṃkalpa*) must be an antecedent condition of the accomplishment of the duty as in mere external cessation or forbearance (*nivṛtti*) there is only avoidance of sin (*adharma*), but no positive virtue (*nivṛtte adharmo na bhavati, na tu dharmo jāyate*).—The “Nyāya-Kandali” on Praśastapāda's *Bhāṣya*. Hence

Refraining from injury (*Ahiṃsā*) is a duty not simply in the negative sense of mere cessation from harm or injury (*hiṃsābhāva*) but also in the positive sense of a

definite resolve not to hurt a living being (*bhūtānām anabhidrohasaṁkalpaḥ*).

Similarly, refraining from theft (*asteya*) as a duty is not the mere cessation from appropriating what belongs to another but implies, besides the outward cessation, an internal *saṁkalpa*, resolve or attitude of the will, viz., the resolve to disapprove and disdain all acts of misappropriation as unrighteous (*aśāstrapūrvakam parasvagrahaṇam mayā na kartavyam, na tu parasvādānanivṛttimātram*).

Thirdly, *Brahmacarya* as a duty is not the mere refraining from the outward act of sexual indulgence, but also implies the internal resolve of the will not to long for such indulgence even in thought (*Brahmacaryam strīsevāvarjanam tadapi saṁkalparūpam*).

Again sincerity (*Anupadhā*) in the sense of *bhāva-suddhi* or purification means purification of the motive, i.e., the resolve to be free from all impure feeling of pride, self-esteem, etc., in the discharge of one's duties in the consciousness that duties done only with a pure motive are conducive to morality (*viśuddhena abhiprāyeṇa kṛtānām karmanām dharmasādhanatvāt*).

This holds good also in the case of restraint of anger (*krodhavarjana*) which is to be observed not merely outwardly but also as regards the inner will (*so'pi saṁkalparūpaḥ*).

II. The *Viśeṣa* or Specific Duties are :—

- (1) The Duties relative to the different castes or social classes (*varṇa*), and
 - (2) The Duties relative to the different stages of life (*Āśrama*).
- (1) The Duties of the castes are divisible into :—
 - (a) The Duties common to the three castes of *Brāhmaṇa*, *Kṣātrā* and *Vaiśya*. These are :—
Sacrificial ceremonies (*Ijyā, yāgādi*), Acqui-

sition of knowledge by study (*Adhyayana*),
Charity (*Dāna*).

- (b) The Duties obligatory on the *Brāhmaṇa* only.

These are :—

Acceptance of gifts (*Pratigraha*).

Teaching (*Adhyāpana*).

Performance of ceremonial sacrifice (*Yājana*).

The way or mode of life prescribed for a *Brāhmaṇa* (*Svavarṇavihita saṃskāra*).

- (c) The Duties obligatory on the *Kṣātra* only.

These are :—

Protecting people from external aggressions and internal disturbances, as well as governing them with a view to peace and prosperity (*prajāpālana*).

Chastising the wicked (*asādhunigraha*).

Not retreating from battle (*yuddheṣu anivartanam*).

The way or mode of life prescribed for a *Kṣātra* (*svakīyasamskāra*).

- (d) The Duties obligatory on the *Vaiśya* only.

These are :—

Buying (*kṛaya*), i.e., procuring commodities from others after paying their proper price (*mūlyam dattvā parasmāt dravyagrahaṇam*).

Selling (*vikṛaya*), i.e., bartering away commodities to others after realising from them their legitimate price (*mūlyam ādāya parasmai svadravyadānam*).

Agriculture (*kṛṣi*).

Breeding and rearing of cattle (*Paśupālanam*).

- (e) The Duties obligatory on the *Śūdra* only.

These are :—

Being subservient to the other three castes (*Pūrva-varṇa-pāratantryam*).

Observing such rites as do not require the utterance of the sacred *mantras* or incantations (*Amantrikakriyā*).

The above are the five divisions of the Duties of *Varṇa* or Social class. These *Varṇa* or caste duties constitute only one of the two main classes of the specific Duties. The Duties of *Āśrama* or different stages of life constitute the other class of these specific duties.

(2) These Duties of *Āśrama* or different stages of life are likewise divisible into several sub-classes. These are :

(a) The duties of the unmarried student (*Brahmacārin*) practising sexual abstinence. These are :—
Serving, and attending to, the comforts of the preceptor (*gurū-śuśrūṣā*).

Collecting fuel (*indhan-āharaṇa*).

Offering incense to the sacrificial fire (*Agnau homaḥ*).

Collecting alms (*Bhāikṣya*).

(b) The Duties of the married person living with his family (*kṛtadāra grhastha*). These are :—

Performing the five sacrificial ceremonies or *Yajñas* (*bhūta-manuṣya-deva-pitṛ-brahmayajña*) every morning and evening by means of one's own earnings. (*Upārjitairarthairbhūtamanuṣyadevapitṛ-brahmākhyānām pañcānām mahāyajñānām sāyamprātaranuṣṭhānam*). *Bhūtajajña* is the offering of sacrifice to the *bhūtas* or elements (*bhūtebhyah balipradānam bhūtajajñah*). *Manuṣyayajña* is the serving and entertaining of guests (*atithipūjanam manuṣyayajñah*). *Devayajña* is the offering of incense to the sacred fire (*homaḥ Devayajñah*). *Pitryajña* is paying respect to the dead by observing the funeral rites and other allied ceremonies (*Śrāddham pitryajñah*). *Brahmayajña* is the reading of the sacred texts, i.e., the *Vedas* (*Vedapāthah Brahmayajñah*).

These are the five *yajñas* or sacrifices (*pañcayajña*) prescribed for the married person and their observance is binding on him only if he has the necessary strength or capacity (*śakti*) to undergo the hardships involved.

Over and above these sacrificial ceremonies it is also the married man's duty to beget children by cohabitation with his wife, but it should be in proper season, *i.e.*, there must be periods of abstinence after cohabitation and procreation of a child (*Rtvantareṣu brahmacaryam apatyot-pādanamca*).

- (c) The Duties of the recluse (*Vānaprastha*) and of the *Brahmacāri-grhastha*, *i.e.*, of the house-holder who after having completed the duties of his married life is living a life of conjugal abstinence or celibacy at home. These are :—
 Wearing the bark of trees (*Valkalādidhāraṇa*),
 Letting the hair, etc., grow (*Keśādidhāraṇa*),
 Living on the roots and the fruits of the jungle (*vanasya phalamūlasya bhojanam*).

Dining on the surplus of the meal after entertainment of all the guests (*atithiśeṣabhojanam*).

- (d) The duties of the *Yati*. A *Brahmacāri-grhastha* or *Vānaprastha* becomes a *Yati* or mendicant-seer on the attainment of *śraddhā* or *cittaprasāda*, *i.e.*, mental serenity and equanimity. Such a man is known not only by his self-possession and serenity of mind but also by his gentleness and harmlessness to all sentient creatures, by the destruction of his works (*karma*) and their potencies, by the absence of any lapse through carelessness in the performance of the acts of self-discipline as laid down in the *Yamas* and *Niyamas*, and by the *Yogika* trances which he produces in himself by meditation on his knowledge of the six categories of the *Vaiśeṣikas*. *Śraddhāvān* (*śraddhā = citta-prasāda*) *sarvabhūtebhyo nityam abhayam dattvā svāni karmāṇi*

saṁnyasya yamaniyaśeṣapramattasya ṣaṭpadārthaprasaṁkhyānādyogaprasāadhanam (*yogaprasāadhanam* = *samādhivīśeṣasya utpādanam*).

The *Yamas* are :

Harmlessness (*Ahiṁsā*).

Veracity (*Satya*).

Refraining from theft (*Asteya*).

Sexual abstinence (*Brahmacarya*).

The *Niyamas* are :—

Cleanliness (*Śauca*).

Contentment (*Santoṣa*).

Arduous application and devotion (*Tapas*).

Reciting Vedic texts (*Svādhyāya*).

Meditation on the glories and the perfections of the Lord (*Īśvaraprañidhāna*).

The *Yamas* are thus duties of self-restraint, even veracity implying restraint in this sense, *i.e.*, restraint of the self's tendency to exaggeration and misrepresentation in the interest of momentary self-advantage. The *Niyamas* on the contrary are rules of self-realisation, *i.e.*, the realisation of the self's true essence as Spirit. Thus while the *Yamas* are negative and restrictive, the *Niyamas* are positive and objective rules of self-expansion and development.

Comparing now *Prasastapāda*'s list of the Generic or *Sāmānya* duties with *Manu*'s enumeration of the *sādhāraṇa-dharmas* we notice that *Prasastapāda* adds Moral earnestness (*dharme śraddhā*), Refraining from Injury (*Ahiṁsā*), Goodwill to creatures (*Bhūtahitatva*) and Moral Watchfulness (*Apramāda*) to *Manu*'s list, while he omits Steadiness (*dhairya*), Forgiveness (*Kṣamā*), Endurance of Physical pain (*Dama*), Wisdom (*Dhī*) and Learning (*Vidyā*). As regards *Prasastapāda*'s addition it will be seen that *Ahiṁsā* and *Bhūtahitatva* are not the equivalents of *Manu*'s *Kṣamā* (Forgiveness). Forgiveness as a duty is not incompatible with the ethics of self-autonomy which aims at individual self-sufficiency and independence as the highest ideal of the

moral life. *Ahiṃsā* (Harmlessness) and *Bhūtahitatva* (seeking the good of creatures) however represent the negative and positive aspects of a more inclusive and humanitarian ideal of life in which the individual can achieve his moral end only by going beyond himself instead of remaining confined within the stone walls of independent neutrality. This is a relieving feature in Praśastapada's view of the moral life which appears also in his treatment of the Springs of Action. Similarly the addition of Moral Earnestness and Moral Watchfulness and the omission of Learning (*Vidyā*) and of Wisdom (*dhi*) are significant as emphasising the ethical in place of the dianoetic virtues and thus teaching a non-intellectualistic view of morality as distinguished from the intellectualism of Sāṅkhya and Śāṅkara-Vedānta. Thus Moral Watchfulness and Moral Earnestness represent respectively the negative and positive aspects of the ethical training of the will, the first of which consists in the cultivation of alertness of moral consciousness which will prevent a moral lapse through mere carelessness or inadvertence and the second in that earnestness of moral feeling and impulse which is inconsistent with levity or frivolousness of any sort.

Secondly, as regards Praśastapāda's classification of the duties into generic and specific, it is to be observed that while it provides a basis for the distinction between conditional and unconditional obligations, on the other hand it brings out the close connection between the moral life and its positive basis as constituted by social status and individual psychological capacity of the moral agent. In this respect the Hindu classification is fuller and more complete than the Platonic classification of the virtues according to the different social classes only. In the latter we miss not only a list of *sādhāraṇa* or common duties but also the distinctive Hindu classification according to *Āśrama* or moral capacity relative to one's particular stage of life.

There is indeed a common duty even according to Plato, viz., the virtue of Justice which is to be realised by the soldier, the artisan as well as the legislator, but it is not an independent duty which is to be realised in itself but is only a function of the proper discharge of its specific duties by each particular social class. Thus the soldier realises justice by protecting the State while the legislator realises it by wise legislation and administration, *i.e.*, each realises it in specific form through the discharge of his specific duties. Hence justice is a common duty only in the sense of being common-in-the-specific. But the *sādhāraṇa* or common duties of the Hindus are common in a different sense. They are common as being independent duties of all the social classes alike. Thus *asteya* or non-appropriation is an independent duty to be discharged by every man, be he a *Brāhmin*, *Kṣātra*, *Vaiśya* or *Śūdra*, it being obligatory on him as man and not as a member of a community. It is laid down that the common duties cannot be transgressed in the discharge of the specific duties, the idea being that there are certain general relations between man and man which cannot be discarded in the interests of particular communities. The common duties are thus the preconditions of the specific duties, *i.e.*, they are not the common-in-the-specific such as Plato's Justice is, but the common-as-the-prius-of-the specific. In this sense the *sādhāraṇa dharmas* of the Hindus are a safeguard against communal egoism and intolerance. They provide, through a code of universal duties, a basis for a much more humanitarian treatment of the *Śūdra* than the Platonic scheme would permit in respect of the barbarian and the helot who lack civic status. For Plato the barbarian is without any moral standing : there are not only no duties to be fulfilled by him but also no duties to be fulfilled *in respect* of him. The Hindu, however, in spite of the social degradation of the *Śūdra*, does not exclude him altogether from moral protec-

tion, but shelters him from persecution through a code of universal duties which are obligatory on man as man. These duties are to be observed by all alike, being the duties obligatory on everybody in his dealings with everybody else. They are thus to be observed not merely by the *Śūdras* but also by members of the higher castes. The Hindu classification is also fuller, as we have said, in another respect, *viz.*, in respect of the classification according to *Āśrama* or spiritual capacity of the different stages of life. It implies a genetic view of the moral life and anticipates a genetic ethics with an ascending scale of moral codes corresponding to the progressive unfolding of spiritual powers. The far-reaching import of this classification when considered in this light of a progressive morality of ascending stages cannot be too much emphasised.

The Mīmāṃsaka classification of the duties.

The Mīmāṃsakas also classify the duties, but not into generic and specific as Praśastapāda does, but on an entirely new principle. According to the Mīmāṃsaka, the duties (*karmas*) are divisible in the first instance into secular (*laukika*) and scriptural or transcendental (*Śāstrika*, *Pāramārthika*). The secular duties are the *dr̥ṣṭārthaka* duties, *i.e.*, duties of sensuous or empirical import while the scriptural duties are the *adr̥ṣṭārthaka* duties, *i.e.*, duties of non-sensuous or non-empirical import. The sanction in the secular duties is merely human, while the sanction in the scriptural duties is religious or scriptural. The secular duties therefore have not the evidential value or validity of the scriptural duties. The latter are the duties of unquestionable moral authority while the former have only a derived authority depending on human experience.

The scriptural duties again fall into the two classes of
(1) *kāmyakarmas* or duties conditional on subjective desire

and (2) *nityanaimittikakarmas* or duties of unconditional validity. The *kāmya* or conditional duties are scriptural injunctions that are authoritative only when there is desire for a particular end. Hence they are scriptural duties presupposing a subjective prius of a pathological motive. The unconditional duties on the contrary are obligatory in themselves independently of any pathological motive. These again fall into two classes, *viz.*, (1) the *nityakarmas* or duties which are unconditionally obligatory for all time and (2) the *naimittikakarmas* or duties which are unconditionally obligatory only when their *nimittas* or special occasions arise. Thus the daily prayer (*sandhyā*) is an unconditional, *nitya* duty : it must be done every morning and evening without fail. Bathing in the Ganges in a solar or lunar eclipse, however, is an unconditional *naimittika* duty : it is unconditionally binding only on the occasion of the eclipse. In either case, however the duties are unconditionally binding, *i.e.*, obligatory independently of any pathological motive of the agent.

The scriptural duties are also either negative or positive in significance, *i.e.*, are either *Vidhis*, positive injunctions, or *Niṣedhas*, mere prohibitions. The injunctions which are conditional suppose a prius of subjective desire in the agent. The object of such injunctions is to define the agent's duty or proper course for the realisation of his desire. The negative prohibitions also imply a subjective prius, *viz.*, a forbidden impulse in the agent, but the object in this case is to indicate the means of checking or subduing it.

This therefore is a classification of the duties on an entirely new principle, being based in the first instance on the presence or non-presence of a scriptural sanction. The significance of the classification consists in its insistence on a non-natural sanction of the duties and the consequent separation of the moral life proper from the merely natural

life The secular duties are only inductions from experience as to what is beneficial or injurious and as such inductions are not infallible, only a problematic and relative authority attaches to these *laukika* or human institutions and conventions. The scriptural duties however are of unquestionable and absolute authority. They thus constitute a higher morality which is specifically distinct from the problematic and relative morality of human creation. It is assumed that morality truly so-called must be of indubitable authority and must therefore have a non-empirical source or origin. Hence there must be a radical difference between the indubitable morality of the scriptural duties and the doubtful morality of the customs of men.

Within scriptural morality itself a further division is recognised in accordance with the presence or non-presence of a non-scriptural motive as a conditioning factor. Thus the *kāmya* or conditional duties are the duties that arise in consequence of the agent's choice of particular ends. They are duties conditional on his desiring particular ends, though the desiring itself is not a duty, but a result of free choice. It is assumed that there are ends which are not in themselves morally authoritative, but they are to be accomplished in the proper way so that whosoever chooses these ends is also under specific obligations to seek them in the proper manner. As distinguished from these we have the unconditional obligations of the *nitya-naimittaka* duties : these are authoritative in themselves irrespective of the subjective desires of the moral agent. The idea is that there are some obligations that arise from the very nature of man as man and these do not admit of exceptions or limitations. There are other obligations however which arise only in relation to a contingent situation, and these are relative to the subjective freedom or choice of the agent. In the latter case the duty is not to seek the end which is freely chosen, but to see to the proper seeking of it, *i.e.*, to seek-

ing it by the right means. (It is to be observed that this category of non-morally conditioned moral duties raises an important ethical question, viz., the question of the possibility of moral motivation in spite of a non-moral or pathological impulse. A rigorist like Kant cannot admit such non-moral motivation and therefore cannot recognise any conditional duties. The Prābhākara School of the Mimāṃsakas also comes to a similar conclusion from the standpoint of ethical disinterestedness, but the Bhāṭṭa School finds a place for them in the moral life by the distinction of contingent and truly moral ends as explained above.)

The Rāmānujist classification of the duties.

There is also another classification of the Duties in Hindu Ethics which deserves notice here, the classification or rather deduction of the duties obtaining amongst the school of the Rāmānujists. The Duties according to this classification or deduction are to be regarded as representing certain perfections which must be ascribed to God as the Moral Ideal. From the nature of these perfections in God man's duties are to be derived or deduced; i.e., the latter are to be defined as being ontologically implied in these ideal perfections of the Divine Personality.

Now the conception of God as the Moral Ideal includes the ascription of certain auspicious qualities (*Kalyāṇa-guṇa*) to the Lord. God as *Bhagavān* or Lord is conceived as *akhila-heya-pratyanīka*, i.e., as actively cancelling or removing all evil and imperfection of finite beings even as light cancels darkness. It is this that constitutes the life of God which is a personal life in incessant and inseparable relation to other persons. Thus knowledge conceived as absolute knowledge in God means the active enlightening of his creatures who are ignorant of their own good and evil (*Jñānam ajñānām ceṣṭanānām hitāhitanirūpaṇopayogiguṇatvāt*—Lokācāryya's

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“Tattvatraya”). Similarly might in the Almighty consists in enabling weak, helpless creatures to eschew evil and attain the good (*Śaktiḥ aśaktānām hitāhita-prāptiparihāropayogiguṇatvāt*). Forgiveness in the Lord is again for the *sāparādha* or person guilty of lapses who has since repented and seen the error of his ways. Compassion in the Lord is likewise for suffering creatures, just as straightforwardness (*ārjavam*) is for the crooked, gentleness (*mārdavam*) is for the shy and the timid etc. (*Jñānam ajñānām, śaktiḥ aśaktānām, kṣamā sāparādhānām, kṛpā duḥkḥinām, vātsalyam sadoṣānām, śīlam mandānām, ārjavam kuṭilānām, sauhārdam duṣṭahrdayānām, mārdavam viśeṣabhīrūṇām*.) These are the ideal or absolute perfections in the Divine Person. The human virtues are to be conceived after the pattern of their absolute archetypes. It is these latter that represent the natural human powers in their ontological nature and the right use of these powers in man must therefore consist in exercising them according to their ontological essence, *i.e.*, as they are exercised by God. For example, absolute knowledge consisting in enlightenment of ignorance, all human knowledge can have no other end or goal than the enlightenment of ignorant fellow-creatures. Similarly, power in the Absolute Person being only an enablement and furtherance of the weak, human power can have no other meaning or justification than putting the weak in the way of achieving their own good. Clemency (*kṣamā*) similarly is the proper attitude towards the morally guilty (*sāparādha*), tenderness (*vātsalya*) towards the imperfect and deficient (*sadoṣa*), straightforwardness (*ārjavam*) towards the crooked (*kuṭila*), etc. The exercise of these powers, it is to be noted, implies certain moral conditions in the persons towards whom they are directed, *e.g.*, repentance in the moral delinquent is a necessary condition for the exercise of forgiveness, humility in the uncivil (*manda*) for the exercise of civility (*śīla*), etc. It may be further added that, in the

Rāmānujist view, the success of finite creatures conduces to success of God's purpose and of God himself

This therefore is an ethico-theological classification or deduction of the duties as ontologically implied in the perfections of the Divine Personality. It is distinct alike from the socio-ethical classification of Manu and Praśastapāda and the ethico-psychological classification of the Mimāṃsakas. Man in this view is the image of the Divine Person and his highest destiny is to realise his true being as an image of God and as an essential factor in God's personal life. The duties of man are thus the realization of the divine perfections in him, *i.e.*, the accomplishment of himself in God and of God in himself.

Considering now these various classifications of the Duties we find that a special feature of the Hindu treatment is the recognition of a list of common or transcommunal duties as distinguished from the communal duties or the duties of self-culture in the various stages of life. Here we have therefore the foundation of a universal ethics of humanity as the prius of an ethics of communal good and mere self-culture. The idea of a common human life as the basis of communal as well as individual life, every community being itself regarded as a differentiation of Universal Humanity, is the reason which underlies this conception of the common or universal obligations as distinguished from the obligations to one's community. The latter arise from *Pitṛ-ṛṇa* or *Kula-ṛṇa*, *i.e.*, from our indebtedness to the socioplasm from which we have emerged into being. The former arise from *Ṛṣi-ṛṇa*, *i.e.*, from our debt to humanity, *i.e.*, to the larger experience of the race whereby we profit in the struggle for life. This is a much larger and therefore more important debt which must not be ignored in the fulfilment of the narrower obligations to oneself or to one's community. This is however not itself everything : it constitutes only the

general framework which must be concretely filled in by the communal and individual duties. Through the education of the *Āśrama* duties the individual becomes a useful member of his society or community and as there is a progressive unfolding of the powers of the individual, the code of self-education also varies in the different stages. This therefore is not only an abstract ethical scheme of merely general duties which apply nowhere because they seem to apply to every case, but also a plan of the concrete moral life of specific duties within a framework of common or universal obligations to humanity. This tri-dimensional classification of the duties thus represents the attempt at a synthetic scheme of the moral life which combines in itself the individual-genetic, the communal and the universal aspects of morality in organic unity. The distinction between scriptural and secular duties and between conditional and unconditional ones is also characteristic of this synthetic spirit of reconciliation of different aspects. While it represents the attempt at a reconciliation of the ethical life proper with the standpoint of ceremonial morality and formalism, it also seeks to combine ethical consequentialism with ethical disinterestedness in a complete scheme of conditional as well as unconditional morality. Recognising the value of ethical purism on the one side in its code of unconditional duties, it also seeks to provide through the conditional duties a moral significance for those interested actions which lead to fruition without entailing any evil. It thus embodies in one synthetic scheme the admissibility of non-moral motivation alongside of the need of disinterestedness. (It must be remembered however that Hindu morality primarily aimed at self-autonomy. Even the communal duties have in fact this end of self-autonomy in view ; they are debts to the community by the discharge of which the individual gradually qualifies for freedom and self-sufficiency.)

PART II

THE SUBJECTIVE OR PSYCHOLOGICAL ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

The Objective Ethics of the mediation of external duties constitutes the foundation or groundwork on which is raised the Subjective, Psychological Hindu Ethics of *cittaśuddhi* or purification of the mind. The latter is a necessary supplement to Objective Hindu Ethics as being the treatment of the moral life from the internal standpoint of the spirit as a free moral agent. A free spirit is moralised only through his freedom and not by compulsion or external conformity. The inwardisation or subjective realisation of the external moral content is thus a necessary sequel to the objective morality of the duties. We shall therefore consider now the Psychological Ethics of the Hindus as the explication of the conditions and principles of self-purification. Our exposition will comprise :

- I. The Analysis of Volition.
- II. The Analysis of Conscience.
- III. The Analysis and Classification of the Springs of Action.
- IV. The Classification of the Virtues.

We shall consider each of these topics in a separate chapter and we shall consider the general trend of Psychological Hindu Ethics on the basis of the Hindu treatment of these topics in a chapter of concluding remarks.

CHAPTER I

THE ANALYSIS OF VOLITION IN HINDU ETHICS

The analysis of *pravṛtti* or volition constitutes the psychological basis of Hindu Ethics. Of particular ethical significance in the analysis is the interpretation of the psychological motive with reference to considerations or absence of considerations of utility or advantage. The distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary actions is also ethically significant: it raises the vexed question about the moral significance of unintentional and accidental actions. Lastly, the analysis of the consciousness of freedom in willing furnishes the psychological basis of the ethical treatment of responsibility and obligation.

The psychological analysis of the will is a special feature of the Nyāya-vaīśeṣika systems of Hindu philosophy. The subject is treated not only by Praśastapāda in his commentary on the Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, but also by Viśvanātha and the Neo-Naiyāyikas. Praśastapāda's treatment is confined merely to a presentation of the essential differences between voluntary and non-voluntary action. The Neo-Naiyāyika treatment however goes far beyond Praśastapāda in its analysis. It not only distinguishes between volition proper and actions which are automatic and reflex but also enters into the most acute analysis of the motive from the utilitarian and non-utilitarian standpoints. In the following exposition we shall first consider the distinction between Voluntary and Non-voluntary Action from the standpoint of Praśastapāda and of the Neo-Naiyāyikas. We shall next consider Viśvanātha's analysis of volition in the "Siddhāntamuktāvalī" along with the notes, the explanations and comments of the "Dinakari" thereon.

I. *Voluntary and other forms of Activity.*

The essential difference between volition or ethical action proper and non-moral or automatic action was noticed by the Hindus as early as the time of Praśastapāda.

A. *Praśastapāda's distinction between Volition proper and the Automatic Activities of the organism.*

Thus in the *Guṇagrantha* of his commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* Praśastapāda classifies *prayatna* or conation into—

(1) *Jīvanapūrvaka*, i. e., having the life of the organism as its cause or antecedent condition, and

(2) *Ichhādveṣapūrvaka*, i. e., having *icchā*, desire, and *dveṣa*, aversion, as the cause.

Hence *Jīvanapūrvakaprayatna* designates the organic activities proper, i. e., the reflex and automatic activities of the organism, while *Ichhādveṣapūrvakaprayatna* represents voluntary action or action with conscious foresight and choice. It is pointed out that each of these kinds of activity has its proper effects. Thus the organic activities serve certain specific ends (*kām arthakriyām karoti*), i. e., the ends of the organism. Similarly, voluntary action serves a definite purpose, viz., selection of the good (*hitapṛāpti*) and rejection of the evil (*ahitaparihāra*) besides *śarīra-vidhāraṇa* or maintenance of the erect posture of the body.

It is to be seen that in the above analysis of conation organic activities are not only attributed to the life of the organism as their antecedent condition or cause but are also regarded as subserving the ends of the organic life. This teleological conception of activity is extended also to voluntary action where the purpose or end is regarded as being consciously aimed at and chosen. The ascription of *śarīra-vidhāraṇa* to voluntary effort becomes significant when

viewed in the light of this essential character of volition as conscious aiming and choice, for the physical straining or innervation represents this self-conscious direction of the will in its psychophysical aspect as alertness of the body and the mind as the necessary pre-requisites of conscious action. This will be clear when we remember that with the lowering of consciousness (as in reverie or sleep) there is a corresponding relaxation of attention as well as the bodily posture.

B. The “*Dinakari*” on the Distinction between Voluntary and Automatic action :

The “*Dinakari*” (commentary on Viśvanātha’s “*Siddhāntamuktāvali*” by Mahādeva and his son Dinakara Bhaṭṭa) also distinguishes between volition or voluntary action and automatic and reflex actions of the organism.

Thus *Kṛti*, which in the wider sense is identified with *prayatna* or conation in general, includes, according to the “*Dinakari*.”

(1) *Pravṛtti*, i.e., volition in the positive sense as conscious selection of the good.

(2) *Nivṛtti*, i.e., volition in the negative sense as rejection of the evil, and

(3) *Jīvanayoniprayatna*, i.e., activities arising from the *jīvana* or life of the organism, in other words, the automatic and reflex activities proper. But *kṛti* in the narrower sense stands for *pravṛtti*, volition or voluntary action including willing in its positive and negative aspects, i.e., including *nivṛtti*. This excludes *Jīvanayoniprayatna*, the organic activities, from volition proper : there is no volition in these organic activities (*prāṇasañcāra*) because they are not *svecchādhīnamakṛtisādhyā*, i.e., cannot be brought to pass by my free will.

It is to be seen that by insisting on *svecchādhīnatva* or freedom as a necessary condition of volition the “*Dinakari*” excludes from volition proper not only the automatic and

reflex activities of organic life but also all actions under blind impulse. It also follows from Dinakara's analysis that to constitute volition it is not sufficient that the action should be determined by conscious choice, in volition proper there being not merely conscious choice, but also the consciousness that the choice has been free (*Svecchādhīna*), i.e., determined by my own will.

II. Analysis of Volition

In the foregoing we have considered the distinction between voluntary action and non-voluntary and automatic actions. In this section we shall consider the Hindu analysis of volition itself as set forth in the "Siddhāntamuktāvalī", the "Dinakarī" and other works.

Analysis of Volition in the "Siddhāntamuktāvalī" of Viśvanātha :

The "Siddhāntamuktāvalī" of Viśvanātha is of particular interest in this respect. Its analysis of volition and its conditions from the Prābhākara and the Nyāya stand-points is remarkable at once for its subtlety and acuteness.

(a) The view of Prābhākara

The Prābhākara view of the will otherwise known as the Gurūmata is set forth in the "Siddhāntamuktāvalī" as follows :

The consciousness of something to be done (*kāryatājñāna*) together with the desire for it (*cikīrṣā*) as the auxiliary condition (*sahakārī*) causes volition (*pravṛtti*, *kṛti*). The volition produces organic reaction (*ceṣṭā*) which produces *kriyā* or the act regarded objectively. Hence the steps are :—

- (1) *Kāryatājñāna*, the consciousness of something to be done,

(2) *Cikīrṣā*, the desire to do it which implies *kṛtisādhya-tājñāna* or the consciousness that it *can* be done,

(3) *Pravṛtti*, *kṛti*, the act of volition.

(4) *Ceṣṭā*, the motor impulse in the organism,

(5) *Kriyā*, the act regarded objectively.

As regards the nature of *kāryatājñāna*, it is pointed out that it is not the bare consciousness that something is to be done but the consciousness of something to be done as produced by the representation (*pratisandhāna*) of the thing as *svaviśeṣaṇa*, i.e., as specifying the self. That, it will be seen, implies a distinction between appropriated and unappropriated ideas; it is assumed that the idea of an act does not of itself stimulate the will except in so far as the self has ideally appropriated, or identified itself with, the as-yet-unrealised objective content represented by the act. Hence we may have what may be called the bare idea of something to be done and this is incapable of inciting to active decision, but we may have also the consciousness of the thing to be done as produced by the representation of its being appropriated by the self and in this case there is desire and choice.

This distinction between the bare idea of an act and the idea of it as specifying the self and thus inciting to will is very clearly brought out by Gāgā Bhaṭṭa in the "Bhāṭṭacintāmani." Gāgā Bhaṭṭa distinguishes two kinds of *kāryatājñāna*. Thus I may have *kāryatājñāna*, the idea of a thing to be done simply in the form of the consciousness that it lies in my power to accomplish it if I choose. But I may also have *kāryatājñāna* in the more peremptory form of the consciousness that I must do it. The first of these, according to Gāgā Bhaṭṭa has reference merely to the inherent practicableness of the act in question (*padārthanaiṣṭhayogyatā*) and is thus not the determinant of volition, but the second being itself the effect of the anticipation of

a good which is strengthened by the consciousness of the good being unassociated with any serious evil consequences is the cause of volition through the desire (which it arouses), and it is this specific form of consciousness—the form which takes this peremptory character of *must*—which is signified by *svaviśeṣaṇavattāpratisandhānajanakāryatājñāna*, i.e., by the cognition of duty as produced by the representation of the act as qualifying the self. (*Kāryatājñānam dvividham ; mayā idam kartum śakyate ityevam rūpam ekam, mayā idam avāśyam kartavyam ityevam rūpam dvitīyam. Tatra ādyam padārthanaiṣṭhayogyatāgamyam iti na pravṛttim prati hetuh. Dvītyam tu sveṣṭasādhanatvabalavadanaiṣṭhananubandhitva-svaviśeṣaṇavattāpratisandhānajananyatvam*).

It is to be seen that *kāryatājñāna* in the first form as explained by Gāgā Bhaṭṭa in the foregoing analysis is only the consciousness that the thing can be done and is therefore identical with the *kṛtisādhyatājñāna* which in the Prābhākara analysis is regarded as implied in desire or *cikīrṣā*. Hence according to the Prābhākaras *kāryatājñāna* is always to be taken in the second sense, i.e., in the sense of the consciousness that something *must be done*, while *kāryatājñāna* in the first sense as the bare consciousness that the thing can be done is nothing but the *kṛtisādhyatājñāna* or consciousness of capacity which is an implicate of *cikīrṣā* or desire for the thing. It is to be seen also that while Gāgā Bhaṭṭa will not recognise the bare consciousness of the act as capable of being accomplished as a determinant of volition (*napravṛttim prati hetu*), the Prābhākaras by making it an implicate of desire include it among the conditions of willing.

Some however explain *kāryatājñāna* as the bare-cognition of an act, and they interpret *kṛtisādhyatājñāna* as signifying not only the consciousness of bare subjective capacity but also the cognition that it is to be done.

According to them, *kāryatājñāna* as well as *kṛtisādhyatājñāna* in both senses are involved in desire.

The significance for psychology of the distinctions set forth in the foregoing analyses cannot be too much emphasised. In the first place the cognition which constitutes the conscious antecedent of a volitional process is distinguished from the simple cognition of a fact. It is the cognition of an act and not of a *given* matter of fact, the consciousness of something to be *done* and not of something which already *is*. Again within this active consciousness of an act the distinction is recognised between the bare consciousness of its practicableness and the more active consciousness of self-determination with reference to it, *i.e.*, the consciousness that it is to be accomplished by me. The validity of these distinctions is obvious enough though they may appear overnice and scholastic to superficial critics.

(2) *The meaning of cikṛṣā*

Kāryatājñāna, the cognition of duty leads to *pravṛtti*, will, through *cikṛṣā*, desire, which is defined by the “Siddhāntamuktāvalī” as *kṛtisādhyaprakārikā-kṛtisādhyakriyāviṣayin-icchā*, *i.e.*, as the desire which has the form (*prakāra*) of something to be accomplished by the will or *kṛti*—the something to be accomplished being an act (*kriyā*) which is *capable* of being accomplished by the will. Hence *cikṛṣā* is the desire to accomplish an act which is cognised as capable of being accomplished by the will.

It will be seen that among the *conditions* of *cikṛṣā* the Prābhākaras recognise *kṛtisādhyatājñāna*, *i. e.*, the consciousness that the act is to be, implying also that it can be, accomplished by the will, but not *iṣṭasāadhanatājñāna*, *i.e.*, the consciousness that it is conducive to my good. It is in this respect that the Nyāya analysis differs from that of the Prābhākaras, the Naiyāyikas insisting on *iṣṭasāadhanatājñāna*

as being an indispensable condition of all desire. It is to be noted also that *cikīrṣā* is the *icchā*, i.e., the wish to do what I recognise as *kṛtisādhyā*, i.e., as I am to, and therefore as what is in my power to, do or accomplish. Hence it is something more than mere *kṛtisādhyatājñāna*, i.e., something more than the cognition that something can be done. The latter is a necessary condition of *cikīrṣā* but is not itself *cikīrṣā* which is conative and not merely cognitive in nature.

(3) *Pravṛtti* or *kṛti*

Hence in *kṛti* or volition we have according to the Prābhākaras—

(a) *Svaviśeṣaṇavattāpratisandhāna*, the representation of something as *svaviśeṣaṇa*, as specifying the self.

(b) *Kāryatājñāna* or the cognition of it as something to be done implying *kṛtisādhyatājñāna* or the cognition that what is to be done, *can be done*.

(c) *Cikīrṣā* or the *desire* that it be done.

it will be seen that the Prābhākara analysis does not recognise it to be necessary for volition that the action should be represented as *iṣṭasādhana*, i.e., as conducive to the good of the agent. In place of *iṣṭasādhana*, conduciveness to pleasure, happiness or satisfaction, the Prābhākaras will merely have *svaviśeṣaṇavattāpratisandhāna*, i.e., the representation of the act as *puruṣaviśeṣaṇa*, as specifying the self or as appropriated by it. This implies that the real motive to volition is not anything external, but the self itself as specified by or identified with something to be done. According to the Prābhākaras this holds good not only in the case of the *nityakarmas*, i.e., acts which are always binding (such as ablution, the daily prayer, etc.) and the *naimittikakarmas*, i.e., acts which are obligatory only when their *nimittas* or specific occasions arise (such as river-bath on the occasion of an eclipse or expiation for one who

has sinned), but also in the case of the *kāmyakarmas* or acts from sensuous inclination or material motives of gain. It is to be seen that the distinction between *nityanaimittikakarmas* and *kāmyakarmas* lies in that the former are non-dependent on the agent's subjective desire for pleasure, happiness or fruition while the latter imply such subjective motive as their necessary condition. Hence the *nitya-naimittikakarmas* may be described as the unconditional duties or acts non-conditioned by subjective or empirical motives while the *kāmyakarmas* may be designated hypothetical duties or acts constituting the content of the empirical will. According to the Prābhākaras however even in the sphere of the *kāmyakarmas* the real motive is not the sensuous inclination or desire for the external pleasure, but the self itself as qualified by or identified with this desire or inclination. In other words, though in empirical willing we have *iṣṭasāadhanatā* or the material motive of gain as a necessary condition for the desire or *kāmanā*, this desire is an incentive only as *svaviśeṣaṇa*, i.e., as specifying the self and appropriated by it. In the case of the *nitya-naimittika* or unconditional duties on the other hand, the acts (ablution, prayer, etc.) as enjoined by the imperative imply no material prompting or *iṣṭasāadhanatājñāna* and are motives to will as *purely* determining the self without reference to anything extrinsic to themselves.

It is to be noted that the *kāmyakarmas* or conditional duties may be either *Vaidika*, i.e., of scriptural origin, or *Laukika*, i.e., of social origin. The scriptural duties are *adṛṣṭārthaka*, i.e., of non-sensuous or non-empirical consequence, while the *Laukika* duties are *dṛṣṭārthaka*, i.e., of sensuous or empirical import. Thus there are religious sacrifices and the like (*yāgādi*) enjoined in scripture on persons desiring non-natural objects such as happiness in heaven, etc. These constitute the *kāmya* duties of non-sensuous import. Similarly, cooking and the like

(*pākādi*) are recognised as being required to ensure specific empirical results. These constitute the *kāmya* duties of sensuous import. In either case there is *kāmanā* or desire for a consequence, *i.e.*, for a consequence other than the act itself, but this desire moves the will only as *svaviśeṣaṇa* *i.e.*, as specifying the self. There is thus *iṣṭasāadhanatājñāna*, *i.e.*, an extraneous purpose in all empirical volition whether enjoined by scripture or recommended by society, but this extraneous purpose moves the will by being identified with the self and appropriated by it for the time being.

The material motive implied in *kāmyakarma* has a negative as well as a positive side. Positively it is the consciousness of the act as being conducive to a specific good of the agent, but this positive consciousness of a prospective good is incapable of inciting the will except in so far as it is unaccompanied by the apprehension of any serious undesirable consequences spoiling the value of the anticipated good in question. It is the absence of these deterrents such as the anticipation of any serious loss or injury (*balavadaniṣṭānanūbandhitva*) that constitutes the negative side to the positive consciousness of *iṣṭasāadhanatā* or material advantage, in the motive in empirical willing.

If we compare the Prābhākara with the Nyāya view we shall find that the essential difference arises from the Prābhākara insistence on the element of self-reference in all motive which the Naiyāyika does not consider to be necessary. Thus for the Naiyāyika what is essential in the volitional process is *iṣṭasāadhanatājñāna* or consciousness of the object desired as being conducive to my good, and there need not be any representation of this as specifying or enriching the self. With the Prābhākaras however it is this self-reference that constitutes the essential part of the motive while the consciousness of good may or may not be

present. As a matter of fact such consciousness exists only in empirical willing which implies *kāmanā* or desire for pleasure. Even here however the consciousness of good is a motive only as *puruṣaviśeṣaṇa*, i.e., as being referred to and appropriated by the self. In *nityakarma* however there is no material motive involved and the act moves the will as *purely* determining the self, i.e., in so far as the self identifies itself with it. The Prābhākaras contend that what is *anugata*, present in all cases of volition, is *kāryatājñāna*, the consciousness of a thing to be done—the consciousness which is produced by the representation of the act as specifying the self. Hence this consciousness being present in all cases, while *iṣṭasāadhanatājñāna* or consciousness of good being sometimes present and sometimes not, the hypothesis of the former being the true cause of volition has the merit of simplicity (*lāghava*) :—*evam ceṣṭasāadhanatva balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva-śuci tatkālajīvitvajñānajanyānām kāryatājñānānām kāryatājñānatvena anugatānāmpravṛttau hetutvamiti lāghavam* (“Bhāṭṭācintāmaṇi”).

It will be seen that the Prābhākara analysis of the will constitutes a very important and substantial contribution to the ethics of rigorism. While the Kantian rationalism does not provide us with an adequate psychological basis of rigorism, the merit of the Prābhākaras lies in removing this serious defect by founding moral theory on the positive basis of our inherent psychological constitution. Kant no doubt admits at least one feeling which is not pathological, viz., love of duty or reverence for the Moral Law, but he does this at the sacrifice of pure ethical rationalism. But the Prābhākaras point out that the element of self-reference is the only essential part of an act of will, and the desire for an extraneous end (as in *kāmyakarma* or empirical willing) appeals only as identified with the self and appropriated by it for the time being. The psychological basis of rigorism has been developed in this line by

Green who holds that the motive is not the strongest desire but the desire which the self has identified with itself. While with Green however the motive as determining the self and determined by it is always presented as a good, with Prabhākara and his followers the act is presented as *iṣṭasādhana*, good or advantageous to the self only in the case of empirical willing or *kāmyakarma*. In the case of the *nityakarmas* or unconditional duties, the agent is impelled by no such consciousness of anticipated good, but is prompted to action merely from the sense of *preraṇā*, duty or obligation. Thus while Kant inconsistently admits a nonrational factor, *viz.*, reverence for the Moral Law which makes the realisation of the Law psychologically possible, the Prabhākaras avoid such inconsistency by their psychological theory of volition which they explain independently of feeling and of the consciousness of good.

The Prabhākaras go beyond Kant also in another important point. With Kant it is the nature of the Moral Law that ensures the truth of the idea of freedom. The "Ought," the imperative character or obligatoriness of the Law establishes the power, the freedom in the agent to obey it. Hence the idea of freedom is implicated in the idea of the Moral Law, and the reality of freedom follows from the validity of the latter. With the Prabhākaras however *kṛtisādhyatājñāna* or the consciousness of power is a *psychological* implicate in *every* act of will and therefore also in the desire for duty. The Prabhākaras generalise into a necessary psychological condition of *every* desire what Kant would confine to the mere desire for duty, *viz.*, *kṛtisādhyatājñāna* or the consciousness of freedom. Hence with the Prabhākaras the proof of freedom lies in the psychological conditions of volition—it is psychological. With Kant freedom is an ethical implicate of our consciousness of the Moral Law : hence its reality stands or falls with the

ultimate validity of the consciousness in which it is implied. The proof of freedom with Kant is therefore *ethico-metaphysical* and not psychological. It may be remarked however that the Prābhākaras also give what may be called the *moral proof* of freedom as arising from the obligation implied in the imperative character of the Moral Law, but they develop this proof in connection with the code of Vedic injunctions and prohibitions which they regard as constituting the Moral Law. The Vedic prescriptions, they argue, are of an impelling character and this establishes the power, the freedom in the moral agent to accomplish them :

Pravartanārūpo hi vidhih arthāt samāhitasādhanaśaktim bodhayati (Pārthasārathi-Miśra's "Śāstradīpikā.")

B. *The Nyāya View*

In the foregoing exposition we have confined ourselves to the Prābhākara analysis of the will as set forth in the "Siddhāntamuktāvali". We shall now deal with the Nyāya view as presented in the same work—the view which we may note is also accepted by the Bhāṭṭas and the Śāṅkara-Vedāntists as regards the psychology of volition.

A special merit of the Nyāya analysis lies in the fact that it analyses will not merely in its positive aspect as *cikīrṣā* desire or attraction for the good but also in its negative form as *dveṣa*, aversion and avoidance of the evil. While with the Prābhākaras with their doctrine of the pure will and self-reference the consciousness of good or evil is of no consequence and therefore the distinction between the two kinds of will is immaterial, with the Naiyāyikas with their consequentialist theory of the motive this is a very essential distinction which cannot be psychologically insignificant as the Prābhākaras hold,

(a) *The conditions of Cikīrṣā, Icchā or Desire according to Nyāya :*

The conditions of *cikīrṣā*, *icchā* or desire according to Nyāya are :—

Kṛtisādhyatājñāna or the cognition that something can be done and *Balavadaniṣṭānanubandhīṣṭasāadhanatājñāna*, or the cognition that this thing is not only conducive to my good but also incapable of causing any serious loss or harm outweighing the good to which it leads.

Hence *cikīrṣā* implies

(1) *Kṛtisādhyatājñāna* or the consciousness of a thing as capable of being done by me.

(2) *Iṣṭasāadhanatājñāna*, or the cognition that this thing is my *iṣṭasādhana* or conducive to my good.

(3) *Balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva-jñāna* or the consciousness of this good being unaccompanied by a stronger evil.

About the exact nature of the third of the above conditions there has been divergence of views.

(1) According to Viśvanātha it is not the consciousness of the absence of evil but the absence of the consciousness of evil. Thus according to Viśvanātha's interpretation *Balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitvajñāna* is something negative and means *aniṣṭajanakatvajñānābhāva*, i. e., the absence of the knowledge of its being *aniṣṭajanaka* or productive of evil.

(2) Others hold however that *Balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva* as a condition of volition cannot be something negative. To say that it is the mere *absence* of the consciousness of evil is to make it psychologically unintelligible as a condition of willing. The absence of the deterrent can be psychologically operant only as the positive consciousness of absence. Hence it is *Balavadaniṣṭa-ajanakatvajñāna*, i. e., the positive cognition of its being unproductive of a *balavat* or deterrent evil.

Viśvanātha however rejects this latter interpretation. His objection to this view is that if desire (*cikīrṣā*) follows

immediately without *vilamba* or interval where there is consciousness of good (*iṣṭasāadhanatājñāna*) together with the absence of the deterring consciousness of evil (*balavadaniṣṭa-janakatva jñānābhāva*), then an intervening consciousness of the absence (*aniṣṭa-ajanakatva-jñāna*) is not necessary.

The question raised here is : What is the precise significance of the absence of deterring motives which is said to be presupposed in every act of volition ? Some hold that as a psychological determinant of volition it must be of the nature of a positive consciousness of the absence of a stronger evil. This however raises the difficult question about the nature of this consciousness of absence as distinguished from the simple absence of the consciousness of evil. Moreover Visvanātha's appeal is to the actual experience of men which certainly supports his contention that in a great many cases at least there is nothing of this *positive* consciousness of absence though there is volition. Viśvanātha's contention seems therefore to be that an absence of the consciousness of deterrents, or, if this is unintelligible as a *psychological* condition, an indefinite subconscious sense of the absence, suffices for volition, though also in special cases it may become a positive consciousness of the absence.

In this connection there is also an interesting discussion as to the nature of the *pratibandhaka* or deterrent. The question is raised whether the deterrent is to be conceived as the *cognition* that a certain thing is injurious or productive of undesirable consequences (*dviṣṭasāadhanatājñāna*), or whether it is to be conceived as the *feeling* of aversion or *dveṣa* which arises from this cognition of injury or harm. Some hold that mere cognition is sufficient while others contend that the cognition must produce the feeling of aversion before it can act as a deterrent. It will be seen that the dispute is about the significance which is to be attached to our emotional and instinctive

life in the causation of volitional process. Those who consider the bare cognition to be sufficient are accused of underrating the affective and emotional life while over-estimating the importance of thought. As against these it is contended by others that the idea itself cannot move the will except as influencing feeling. The farreaching import of this psychological controversy will be obvious if we remember that it is on similar issues with regard to the emotional life that the philosophy of life has opposed itself at the present day to the abstract intellectualism of Hegelians.

(b) *The conditions of Dveṣa, Aversion.*

Just as in the case of *cikīrṣā* or Desire there is not only a positive but also a negative side consisting respectively of the consciousness of a good and the absence of the consciousness of a stronger evil, so also in the case of Aversion or *Dveṣa* there are the corresponding positive and negative factors. Thus Aversion implies as a positive condition the consciousness of evil or harm and as a negative condition the absence of the consciousness of a greater good. Thus *dviṣṭasādhana-tājñāna* or the cognition of a thing being conducive to injury or harm together with *balavadiṣṭasādhana-tājñānābhāva* or the absence of the consciousness of a compensating good produces *dveṣa* or aversion to an object. It is significant that in this case there is no mention of *kṛtisādhya-tājñāna* or the consciousness of power as a condition.

With reference to the precise nature of the negative condition—

(1) While Viṣvanātha holds that it is merely the absence of the consciousness of a compensating good (*balavadiṣṭadhanatājñānābhāva*),

(2) Others contend that a mere absence is psychologically unintelligible and that there is here a positive consciousness of the absence of good and not merely the absence of the consciousness of good.

The question of the *pratibandhaka* or deterrent to aversion is also discussed in this connection. It is pointed out that the absence (*abhāva*) of the consciousness of a compensating good being the negative condition of aversion, a positive cognition of such good will act as a deterrent. Others however hold that such cognition by itself is not sufficient ; the cognition of good must lead to desire (*icchā*) in order to counteract the aversion, it being assumed that a feeling is overcome only by the opposite feeling and not by mere idea.

(c) *The conditions of Volition (Pravṛtti, kṛti)*
according to Viśvanātha.

After discussing the conditions of Desire (and Aversion) Viśvanātha next considers the conditions of volition (*Pravṛtti*). *Pravṛtti* or volition in the positive sense implies, according to Viśvanātha,

- (1) *Cikīrṣā*, desire to do something.
- (2) *Kṛtisādhyatājñāna*, the cognition that it can be done.
- (3) *Iṣṭasāadhanatājñāna*, the cognition that it is conducive to my good with *balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitvājñābhava* or the absence of the cognition of a stronger evil.
- (4) *Upādānapratyakṣā*, the perception of the *upādāna*, matter or stuff out of which the thing is to be produced.

It is pointed out that since every one of these is a condition of volition, therefore any one being absent, volition will not follow. Hence

(1) Where *kṛtisādhyatājñāna* or the confidence in one's power is lacking, there is no volition. This is why there is no willing of impossible things such as producing rain (*vr̥ṣṭikaraṇa*) or bringing the moon down to make it serve

the purpose of a lamp (*candramandalānaya*). There is no volition for such things for they are recognised to be beyond the agent's power. While however the consciousness of power is thus a necessary condition of willing, this consciousness must exist *at the time of the willing* as otherwise there will be no volition. Thus the *kṛtisādhyatājñāna*, or consciousness of power, must be *tadānīmkṛtisādhyatājñāna*, must exist at the occasion of the willing: there will be no volition if this consciousness is lacking at the time of willing though it may exist before or after it. This is why the sexually immature boy does not care for the future pleasures of youth: *bhāvi yauvarāje bālasya na pravṛttiḥ*. The boy is lacking in the capacity of indulging in these pleasures though he may acquire it in a maturer age. Hence it is that as a boy he does not care for what as a young man he will desire afterwards. This, it will be seen, implies that our powers and capacities unfold themselves in a certain order, which appear not *all* at once but *each* in its proper time and circumstances, and as our freedom is itself dependent on the exercise of these powers and capacities it is also a thing that grows with ourselves and expands and deepens with the broadening and deepening of our lives.

(2) Similarly, where *iṣṭasāadhanatājñāna* or the consciousness of good is lacking, there is no volition. How, then, are we to account for acts of self-injury such as suicide? What is the motive to suicide? What can be the consciousness of good in these acts of self-destruction? The answer is, even in these there is *iṣṭasāadhanatājñāna* or consciousness of good, for what happens in such circumstances is this. On account of abnormal mental conditions there is lapse of judgment for the time being and the individual resolves on taking poison under the erroneous consciousness that suicide is not a great evil: *rogadūṣiṭacittah viśāḍibhākṣaṇe pravartate tadānīmbalavadaniṣṭānānubandhivajñānāt*.

According to another view the abnormal conditions induce the act of suicide not through any *positive* consciousness of the act being not an evil but only through the absence of the consciousness of its being an evil, *i.e.*, by suppressing the consciousness of evil which would be present in normal conditions—*rogadūṣitacittah viṣādibhakṣaṇe pravartate tadānimbalavadaniṣṭānubandhitvājñānāt*.

The difference between the two interpretations centres round the way in which the deterring motives are to be conceived as being suspended. While some recognise a mere negative operation in the nature of a temporary suspension of the counteracting considerations as being sufficient, others think that there is a *positive* judgment that such considerations are unavailing. It will be seen that in the actual conditions of life the negative as well as the positive forms operate. Thus in the case of ordinary suicides it is the negative form that generally suffices, there being in these cases nothing but a temporary suppression of the deterring motives. But in the case of martyrs and suicides who act from deliberation or morbid self-consciousness it is the positive form that holds good.

(3) While there is thus consciousness of good (including the absence of the deterring motives) in all volition it is also necessary that the anticipated good *iṣṭasāadhanatā* must be *tadanīm-iṣṭasāadhanatā i.e.*, must be relative to the time and circumstances. Thus what is good in one condition of life may not be a good in another condition and thus may cease to be desired in the altered conditions. This is why the meal which is greedily desired by the hungry man only disgusts him after appeasement: *tripto bhojane na pavartate*. The reason is that the condition of the desire, *viz.*, hunger, having ceased in the changed circumstances, the meal (*bhojana*) is no longer felt as a good.

N.B.—It follows from the above that good and evil as depending on subjective conditions like attraction (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) in the individual, must always be relative and conditional. But this contradicts the *Nyāya* doctrine of an absolute and unconditioned good as being the highest end. The *Naiyāyika* solves the difficulty by conceiving the highest good not as positive happiness but as the absolute cessation of suffering. According to him the highest good conceived negatively as absolute freedom from suffering does not imply either *rāga*, attraction, or *dveṣa*, aversion, in the agent, for this negative state being not positively favourable (*anukūla*) but merely not unfavourable (*apratikūla*) cannot inspire any pathological feeling such as *rāga*, attraction in the agent in order to be desired.

(4) If there is thus consciousness of good in all cases, the question rises, how is moral evil possible? The essence of moral evil lies in the conscious choice of the evil course in preference to the good. How then is such deliberate choice of the evil possible which constitutes moral evil? As a matter of fact we find that crimes are perpetrated by believers (*āstikas*) who believe in hell as well as by persons who know the penalty they have to pay. Thus men often yield to temptation such as forbidden sexual indulgence (*agamyāgamana*), the destruction of the enemy (*śatruvadha*) even though they are fully alive to the penalty attached. How is all this possible if consciousness of good is a necessary condition of volition in all cases?

The answer is : under the influence of strong passion there is a temporary suspension of the consciousness of the penalty. Thus the seductions of the pleasure sometimes succeed in driving out the consciousness of punishment in hell and volition takes place as a consequence in spite of the presence of the counteracting motives as a rule. (*Ūkṣa-rāgādinā narakasāadhanatā tirodhānāt.*)

(d) *The View of the Navyas.*

Amongst the *Navyas* or New Naiyāyikas there are followers of Prabhākara as well as of orthodox Nyāya. The New Naiyāyikas who hold the Prabhākara view demur to the old Naiyāyikas as regards their views as to the conditions of *pravṛtti* or volition. According to the orthodox Nyāya view the conditions which are required for volition are *balavadaniṣṭānanubandhīṣṭasāadhanatve sati kṛtisādhyatājñāna*, i.e., *kṛtisādhyatājñāna* or confidence in one's power or capacity and *iṣṭasāadhanatājñāna* or the consciousness of the agent's good together with *balāvadaniṣṭānanubandhitvajñāna* or the absence of deterring motives of evil. The *Navyās* however point out that the confidence in one's power is not always a condition of volition. As there cannot be an original consciousness of competency in regard to future acts which have never been willed before, the individual would never will them if the sense of competency were a necessary condition of all volition. The truth is that these acts are in the first instance an imitation of what has been observed to be done by other persons. Hence it is only in the later and more developed stage of self-conscious willing that the consciousness of power can enter as a determining factor of the volitional process. The old Naiyāyikas however argue : there can be no question of imitation in such acts. As a matter of fact there is imitation neither in new constructions (prompted by constructive imagination) nor in the spontaneous unfolding of the life of instinct such as sex-gratification.

N.B.—It is to be seen however that the real point at issue is whether the sense of competency is to be included among the conditions of volition. The instances of instinctive, spontaneous or impulsive actions which the old school cites against the new views may disprove the

theory of imitation but do not establish the traditional view as regards consciousness of competency being required as a necessary condition. As a matter of fact there is some confusion here which obscures the real issue as neither imitative, nor spontaneous and instinctive acts come strictly within the class of volitional actions which they are supposed to illustrate.

(e) *Comments of the "Dinakari."*

The "Dinakari" makes some very interesting comments on the Nyāya view as expounded in the "Siddhānta-muktāvali". Thus :

(1) With regard to the condition of desire (*icchā*) it points out that this may exist *svarūpatah*, i.e., on its own account, without being known or consciously referred to the self. This means that volition need not be self-conscious though of course a conscious desire for some good must be present. It is the presence of such a desire that distinguishes volition proper (*pravṛtti*, *prayatna*) from automatic, reflex or instinctive acts (*jīvanayoniprayatna*) in which there is no conscious desire. But this merely means that the desire involves the consciousness of the future good towards which it strives and not that there is also a consciousness of the desire itself or of the self as so desiring. *Iṣṭasāadhanatājñāne icchā svarūpatāh viśeṣaṇam, tena icchājñānaśūnyakāleapi cikīrṣā-nirvāhaḥ.*

N.B.—It follows from the above that according to Nyāya view conation includes,

(a) Automatic, reflex and instinctive activities which are characterised by the absence of conscious desire, and

(b) Volition proper involving conscious desire for a future good.

The latter again is—

(i) Either simple volition as implying nothing more than the effort to realise a future good aimed at,

(ii) Or self-conscious willing implying not merely the conscious desire for a future good but also a consciousness of this desire or of the self as so desiring.

The distinction between volition and self-conscious volition is possible only in the Nyāya view according to which self-reference is not a necessary condition of the volitional process. For the Prābhākaras however, as all desire must specify the self in order to move the will, volition is necessarily self-conscious in all cases.

(2) Again as regards Aversion (*dveṣa*) the "Dinakārī" points out that this may be either direct or transferred. It is direct in regard to pain (*duḥkha*) while in regard to all that is a cause of pain (*duḥkhasādhana*) the aversion is indirect, derived or transferred. Even the natural fear of a snake (*sarpa*) is in this sense transferred or derived.

(3) As the presence of a strong aversion (*balavaddveṣa*) stands in the way of volition, the question rises : how is the absence of the deterrent to be conceived in order to be regarded as a condition of volition ? The view of *Viśvanātha* is : the consciousness of a preponderating evil (*balavaddviṣṭasāadhanatājñāna*) being the deterrent, the absence of such consciousness is a condition (*hetu*) of volition. But this raises the question as to what constitutes the counteracting or deterring force of the deterrent and several other questions. (i) Thus we have first to ascertain what constitutes the deterring strength (*balavattā*) of the aversion. According to Nyāya this is not a question of the sheer intensity of the pain involved. As a matter of fact the agent is not deterred or moved to act by mere consideration of the greatness or smallness of the pain involved. Considerations of *bahutara* or *alpataraduhkha*, i.e., of quantitative differences in the pain, do not decide the question here, even an intense pain sometimes proving unavailing while even a comparatively feeble one being observed to be effectual. This shows that the deterrent

force of the pain is a peculiar quality which is not easy to describe. *Kvacit bahutarasya dukkhasya abalavattāt. kvacit alpasya dukkhasya balavattāt, anugatasya balavattvasya abalavattvasya durvacattvāt.* According to Nyāya this deterrent force of the aversion (*dveṣa*) is a specific quality independent of quantity, aversion (*dveṣa*) in certain forms and certain occasions being deterrent, *i.e.*, falling within the class (*jāti*) of feelings characterised by the mark of being deterrents—*dveṣe balavattam jātivīśeṣah.*

The ordinary Nyāya view of a *balavadaniṣṭa* or deterrent evil is as follows :—A deterrent evil (*aniṣṭa*) is that *aniṣṭa* or evil which is other than whatever is entailed as a necessary accompaniment or consequence of the act in the interval before fruition : *balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitvam ca iṣṭotpattināntariyadukkhādhikadukkhā-ajanakatvam.* *Iṣṭotpattināntariyadukkhādhikadukkhā-ajanakatvasya balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitvasya vidhyamśasya akhyateh* (*Vijñānabhikṣu's "Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya"*). If therefore there be any pain arising from the act even after the realisation of the end, such pain will act as a deterrent. It may be noted that the pain which is entailed by the act *before* fruition, either as an accompaniment or as a consequence of it, may or may not deter. The pain however which comes *after* fruition is always a deterrent, the idea being that the presence of pain at this stage is the negation of the fruition which is the real incentive to the act. Some point out however that the absence of pain which is other than what is involved as a necessary accompaniment or consequence of the process leading to fruition cannot be a condition of volition as this will imply that there is always *nāntariyakadukkhā* or intervening pain accompanying the process of realisation of the end. As a matter of fact there are also *sukhamātrajanakakarmas* or acts which produce pleasure only without causing pain and such acts do not imply the absence of pain other than that involved in the

intervening process as a condition, there being no intervening pain at all in such acts. The Nyāya meets this objection however by showing that pain cannot be altogether got rid of in any case as it will always be present at least in the form of the effort or exertion (*śrama*) which must be put forth by the agent in realising his end.

The above is the ordinary Nyāya view of the deterrent as being the pain which is apprehended as likely to come after fruition. *Vacaspatimiśra* however interprets the deterrent to mean *narakaduhkha*, the fear of punishment in hell or theological penalty. He thus imports psycho-ethical considerations to explain the psychological process of arrested will in the presence of the object of desire. In this respect the ordinary Nyāya view as being a purely psychological explanation is not only deeper in its analysis but also profoundly original there being nothing corresponding to it even in modern Western psychology. The Cārvākas no doubt offer also an explanation on a purely psychological basis, but they emphasize only the quantitative differences of pleasures and pains as the determining factors in selection and rejection. Thus according to them there is selection when there is a balance of pleasure over pain as contrarywise there is rejection when the amount of pain exceeds that of pleasure. The Naiyāyika however points out that quantitative differences are not always effectual in determining the result, but there is one factor which is always potent as a deterrent to volition, *viz.*, the existence of pain *after* fruition. Hence the pleasure which is to be potent as a motive must always come *at the end* of the process, just as the pain which comes after the pleasure of fruition must always act as a deterrent. There is, in other words, a certain *order in time* in which the pains and pleasures must follow one another in order to move the agent to act, an order which may be said to be a specific quality in pleasures and pains like Mill's quality which

decides the question of their strength as motives and deterrents. It will be seen that this is an entirely new element or factor which is not included in the Benthamite calculus according to which distance and proximity in time affect only through variations of the intensity or *quantity* of pleasures and pains and not through their order in time in the process leading to fruition.

(ii) Secondly the question arises : what is it that acts as a deterrent ? Is it the subjective aversion of the agent, or the object which inspires the subjective feeling ? The "Dinakari" observes : it is not the object of aversion (*dviṣṭa* or *aniṣṭaviṣaya*) but the feeling of aversion in the object that acts as the deterrent in volition. Here is therefore a question of subjective value, the deterring strength of the feeling being relative to the person, the time and other circumstances. *Tattatkālīnatatpuruṣīyecchām prati pravṛttim pratica tatkalīnatatpuruṣīyabalavaddviṣṭa-janaka-jñānasya pratibandhakatvam kalpyate*. Thus, *naraka*, suffering in hell, is a deterrent evil (*balavadaniṣṭa*) to *Caitra* and he abstains from sinful self-indulgence as a consequence, but as such suffering has no influence as a deterrent on *Maitra* he does not abstain from such self-indulgence.

(iii) The force of the deterrent may also be overcome in another way. Thus one and the same act may be capable of producing intense pleasure (*utkatasukhajanaka*) and intense pain (*utkataduhkhajanaka*) at the same time. Here neither desire (*icchā*) nor aversion (*dveṣa*) will be produced. But there may also be competition between the two states of desire (*icchā*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) resulting in an oscillation between the two antagonistic conative attitudes which may culminate at last in volition when the aversion (*dveṣa*) has been overcome or has subsided.

Volition may therefore be suspended in two ways : (1) when the desire has arisen but does not culminate in actual willing, being counteracted by a deterrent aversion,

(2) when the desire as well as the aversion are unproduced as a consequence of the act being cognised to result in intense pleasure and intense pain at the same time. In the latter case the pleasure being exactly balanced by the pain, the corresponding impulses do not arise being neutralised at the very beginning. But under certain circumstances there may be a state of oscillation instead of complete suspension or abeyance which may be said to constitute the non-intellectual basis of the intellectual process of deliberation. This state will cease when the indecision at last terminates into actual willing by the aversion being overcome or subdued or when it has otherwise subsided of itself.

As there are two forms of arrested volition, there are also two ways in which the force of the deterrent may be counteracted. Thus the deterrent may be simply unproduced being completely neutralised by an equally strong impulse to act generated by the consciousness of intense pleasure, as in states of complete suspension of conation. But the deterrent may also be overcome by the consciousness of pleasure after a state of oscillation between desire and aversion as in the case of final resolution of indecision and wavering into actual willing.

(iv) It should also be noted that consciousness of impending evil is a deterrent only in the sense that the agent is practically certain about the consequences of the action he contemplates. In cases however where the consequences are uncertain and problematic and the apprehension of evil is merely speculative, desire and volition are not necessarily counteracted. Thus men are not prevented from risking the dangers of costly and wasteful wars merely by the speculative apprehension of possible evil consequences to themselves. *Tuddhādan balavadaniṣṭasāadhanatvasandehe'pi icchā-pravṛttih udayāt.*

Note.—Hence with regard to the deterrent it is to be observed that it is always a *feeling* of aversion arising from the conscious apprehension of evil and not the simple cognition of an object of aversion. Secondly, the evil apprehended is some painful experience which is cognised as marring the fruition aimed at by the act of volition either through theological penalty believed to be associated with the action or by entailing suffering on the agent after fruition and thus negating the fruition. Thirdly, the force of the deterrent is relative to the person, the time and the circumstances, so that what is sufficient to deter one person or under one kind of circumstances, may not deter another or in a different set of conditions. Fourthly, the deterrent implies some degree of certainty about the evil consequences on the agent. For example, where the possibility of evil is a matter of mere speculation the deterrent is not necessarily effectual. Fifthly, the deterrent may also fail either by being simply unproduced as when the feeling of aversion is neutralised by an equally strong feeling of attraction the result being the complete suppression of conation, or by the attraction of pleasure at last overcoming the aversion and resolving itself into action after a temporary state of oscillation.

(4) It is to be seen from the above that volition includes positive as well as negative conditions which again imply intellectual as well as conative and affective factors. The question thus arises : how are these intellectual and non-intellectual factors to be conceived in relation to the positive and negative conditions of volition? The “Dinakari” discusses five different alternatives in this connection.

(i) Thus, it may be supposed that the conditions which suffice to induce volition are cognition of the absence of any deterring evil consequences (*balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva-jñāna*) plus cognition of the action being conducive to the

agent's good (*iṣṭasādhana*tājñāna) plus resulting desire, etc. It will be seen that the emphasis here is on a *positive* cognition of the absence of the deterrent, *i.e.*, the negative condition of the absence of deterrent motives is conceived as a positive consciousness of security.

(ii) It may be supposed that the deterrent is itself a cognition, being the consciousness of the act as entailing serious evil consequences on the agent. Therefore, the absence of such cognition, being the absence of the deterrent or *pratibandhaka*, is the real ground (*hetu*) of the volition. The negative condition is therefore conceived here negatively as *balavadaniṣṭānubandhitvajñānābhava*, *i.e.*, absence of the cognition of serious evil consequences, in response to the logical demand for parsimony of hypothesis and the inadmissibility of unnecessary and superfluous assumptions. It is assumed that volition being psychologically possible even without a positive cognition of the absence of a deterrent in many cases, a positive cognition is not a real determining factor even where it may be felt to be present.

(iii) In the above the deterrent is conceived as a simple cognition of possible evil consequences on the agent. It may be supposed however that the deterrent, *pratibandhaka*, is not mere *balavadaniṣṭajanakatvajñāna*, *i.e.*, not the simple cognition of the act as entailing serious evil consequences, but *dveṣaviṣṭasya balavadaniṣṭajanakatvajñāna*, *i.e.*, the cognition of the act as a source of evil by an agent who entertains a feeling of aversion for it. In other words, the deterrent, *pratibandhaka*, is not a simple cognition but a compound made up of the two components of the feeling of aversion (*dveṣa*) and the cognition of evil (*aniṣṭajñāna*). Hence mere aversion is ineffectual just as mere cognition of evil. (a) Thus suppose there is aversion (*dveṣa*) without any *jñāna* or cognition of evil. Such aversion is powerless as a *pratibandhaka* or deterrent, *i.e.*, there may be volition

inspite of such groundless aversion. (b) Similarly, suppose there is cognition of evil but no aversion, *i.e.*, suppose the cognition (*jñāna*) exists without the feeling of aversion (*dveṣa*) which it should ordinarily produce. Such cognition is also ineffectual as a deterrent, *i.e.*, there may be volition inspite of such cognition of the evil associated with it. (c) Again, suppose there is not only the cognition but also the feeling of aversion. Here we have everything that is necessary to constitute the deterrent or *pratibādhaka*, and the presence of the deterrent renders volition impossible. (d) Lastly, suppose both the cognition and the feeling are absent. Here the factors of the deterrent being all absent, the negative conditions are fulfilled. Hence where the positive conditions are also fulfilled, volition follows without fail. Thus while in the case of (a) and (b) volition may or may not take place, in the case of (c) it is impossible as in that of (d) it is inevitable.

Note.—It will be seen that (a) and (b) illustrate the conflict between the intellectual and non-intellectual factors of the mind from two opposite points of view. This conflict is writ large on modern life where intellect and instinct are struggling simultaneously for victory. (a) illustrates the impotence of mere feeling which inspite of heredity and transmission has often to give way to the light of knowledge. This is how race-prejudice and race-habit yield gradually to enlightenment and higher moral outlook. (b) illustrates the tragedy of the overdeveloped intellect “sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought,” of the intellect which grows at the expense of the other factors and thus cannot translate itself into the life of feeling and willing.

(iv) In (iii) above we have discussed the alternative which conceives the deterrent as a compound in which the feeling of aversion as well as the cognition of evil enter as essential components. There is a fourth alternative which

remains to be considered, *viz.*, that which conceives the deterrent as consisting essentially in a feeling of aversion, a feeling however which is itself induced by the cognition of the evil consequences on the agent that may be entailed by the action contemplated. In this view it will be seen a causal relation is assumed between the cognition and the feeling, the latter being regarded as an effect of the former. It is not clearly shown however whether the cognitive element continues in the effect, or ceases with the appearance of the feeling. If the first of these is meant we have only, it will be seen, another variety of (iii), the deterrent being conceived as a compound of components which are causally related to each other. It will also be noted that in this view in either of its two forms we have an analysis of volition from the intellectualist standpoint which ascribes primacy to the cognitive factors and does not admit irrational feeling to have any influence over conscious choice and will. It however follows from this view that cognition is also ineffectual without feeling, though it may have primacy as the causally determining factor and therefore priority over the other factors of the mind. Thus according to it there may be cognition of evil (*doiṣṭa-sādhana-tājñāna*) but it will not of itself prevent willing till there is feeling of aversion produced by such cognition. This is illustrated in the case of suicides. Thus when a suicide resolves on self-destruction by means of poisoning (*viṣabhakṣaṇa*) it cannot be supposed that he has no idea of the evil consequences on himself of the act of taking poison which he resolves upon. What therefore happens is that the cognition of the evil consequences fails to produce the feeling of aversion which it will in ordinary circumstances. As a result of this his cognition has no influence on his decision and fails to act as a deterrent to the action.

Note.—We have thus three different explanations of suicide, etc.,

(1) We may explain such acts as being due to the cognition of their evil consequences being overpowered for the time being.

(2) We may suppose also that the agent under the influence of strong feeling and abnormal mental conditions has a *positive* consciousness or conviction that the act will not entail serious evil consequences on himself as ordinarily believed.

(3) Lastly, we may suppose that the agent has cognition of the evil consequences but the cognition fails to produce the feeling of aversion (*dveṣa*) which alone can act as a deterrent.

(4) Dinakara however does not accept any of the four alternatives discussed above. According to him the deterrent is neither the mere cognition of evil nor the simple feeling of aversion, but is either of these according to special circumstances. Hence in some cases the cognition is sufficient and in some again the feeling of aversion is required. But as primacy belongs to cognition as the causally determining factor, the absence of the deterrent as the negative condition of volition does not mean the mere absence of the affective factor of aversion but also the absence of the cause of the aversion, *viz.*, the cognition of evil. Hence the negative condition of volition is always the cognition of the absence of evil consequences (*anānu-bandhitvājñāna*) and not the mere absence of *dveṣa* or aversion. It follows therefore that the absence of aversion (*dveṣābhāva*) without cognition of the absence of evil consequences will not suffice to cause volition even when the other conditions remain.

The five alternatives explained above represent the various ways in which volition can be regarded from the positive and negative standpoints. The implied hypotheses in the five alternatives are all tested by application to certain specific cases and the appeal is to the solemn

testimony of a person who is asked to report what passes in his mind, *i.e.*, other people's introspection is used as objective material. It will be seen that the entire analysis is based primarily on the Nyāya conception of volition. The Nyāya recognises in all volition consciousness of some good to be attained which in its negative aspect means the absence of serious evil consequences marring the worth or value of the good aimed at. The Prābhākaras however do not recognise any consciousness of good as being necessarily implicated in volition. Therefore the analysis of volition from the Prābhākara standpoint must differ essentially from that of the Nyāya which conceives willing as a pursuit of some good desired or aimed at. The "Dinakri" therefore next analyses the Prābhākara conception of volition discussing its bearings and implications particularly with reference to the question of freedom of will.

(5) In all volition according to Prābhākaras the psychological process is as follows :

(i) In the first place, there is *svaviśeṣaṇavattāpratisandhāna*, *i.e.*, the representation of a certain act as *viśeṣaṇa* or specific determination of the acting agent or *pravartamāna puruṣa*.

(ii) Secondly, there is *kāryatājñāna* or cognition of something to be done.

(iii) Thirdly, there is *cikīrṣā* or desire which is a desire for things capable of being realised by the will—a desire which is itself characterised by the *consciousness* of power or competency with reference to the object to be realised or achieved by the will *kṛtisādhyaprakārikākṛtisādhyakriyāviśayātūcchā*). Hence the desire is not merely about *objects* that are capable of realisation by the will but also implies subjective consciousness of such capacity or competency on the part of the acting agent.

(iv) Lastly, there is volition, *pravṛtti* following on the desire—volition which completes the process.

It will be seen that the above analysis agrees with the Nyāya only in the last two steps. The first two however show an essential departure from the Nyāya view according to which the steps are :—

(1) Cognition of *kāryatā* or duty with reference to something which is recognised as conducive to good without entailing serious evil consequences—*balavadaniṣṭānanubandhiṣṭasādhanatāviṣayakakāryatājñāna*.

(2) *Cikīrṣā*, desire.

(3) *Pravṛtti*, will.

Hence according to Nyāya, the consciousness of good with its negative implicate is necessarily involved in all volition, but according to the Prābhākaras, this is not a necessary condition of volition which requires only the representation of something as a specific determinant of the self but not necessarily the consciousness of good. Thus the consciousness of good is present only in some actions, *i.e.*, in *kāmyakarma* or empirical actions from material motives of personal profit or gain. It is not present however in the performance of the unconditional duties (the *nityanaimittikakarmas*) This shows that volition is possible without the consciousness of good, *i.e.*, that the latter, where present, is only an inessential accompaniment rather than a necessary determining condition of the process of willing. In fact, the so-called consciousness of good in empirical prudential actions is not itself the real determinant of the process of willing—it determines will only as being a mode or modalisation of the representation of the act as *svaviśeṣaṇa*, *i.e.*, as specifying the self. It is thus the representation of the act as appropriated by the self which is the real cause of volition, and in empirical action it further presents itself as conducive to the well-being of the agent.

But this is not the only point in respect of which the Prābhākaras differ from the Naiyāyikas. They also differ materially from the latter in their conception of the *relation* between the first step and the second step in the process. Thus according to the Prābhākaras the relation between the first step and the second step is that of establisher and established, *i.e.*, the representation of the act as a *viśeṣaṇa* or specific determinant of the self is the *cause* which *produces* or generates the *kāryatājñāna*, *i.e.*, the consciousness that it is to be done. The Naiyāyika however *does not* recognise any causal relation between the consciousness of good and the cognition that it is to be done, the relation according to the Naiyāyika being a bare relation of the sameness of object, the *viśaya*, *i.e.*, the object of the consciousness of good, being also the *viśaya*, the object of the consciousness of duty with reference to it. In other words, according to the Naiyāyika there are not here two psychoses one conditioning the other but only one psychic compound with the two aspects of consciousness of good and the cognition of duty with reference to it.

N.B.—It is to be noted however that with the Naiyāyika also nothing is *iṣṭa*, desirable or good except in relation to a subject. It is the subject of volition that determines his own values and therefore there is no question of mere mechanical determination as may appear at first view. In fact, the Naiyāyika differs far less in this respect from the Prābhākaras than do the Cārvākas who believe only in mechanical attraction and repulsion of pleasure-pain. The Cārvāka view in this respect may be described as mechanical hedonism as distinguished from the self-deterministic Eudæmonism of Nyāya which ascribes valuation to subjective freedom. The only important difference between the Prābhākaras and the Naiyāyikas in this respect relates to the fact that while the latter conceive this subjective determination as a *consciousness of*

good in all volition, the Prābhākaras do not admit that this is always the case, volition being possible according to them without the act of self-determination taking the form of a specific consciousness of good. What is essential, according to the Prābhākaras, is subjective self-determination with reference to the act which appeals as *good* only in *kāmyakarmas* or empirical actions from material motives but which appears as Duty pure and simple in regard to the *Nityanaimittikakarmas*, *i.e.*, the non-empirical and unconditional obligations of the individual.

Hence the essential difference between the Nyāya and the Prābhākara views consists first in the importance which Nyāya attaches to the consciousness of *good* and secondly with reference to the relation between the self-reference of the act and the consciousness of duty with reference to it. For the Prābhākaras the latter relation, as we have seen, is a *niyāmaka* relation, *i.e.*, of establisher and established, the *svaviśeṣaṇajñāna*, the cognition of the act as a specific determinant of the self being the ground or cause of the *kāryatājñāna*, *i.e.*, the cognition of duty follows from the representation of self-reference as consequence from ground or *hetu*, as conclusion from premise (*Tasyasvaviśeṣaṇapratisandhānasya kāryatājñānaheturā lingajñānavidhayā*). Hence for the Prābhākaras we have here two distinct psychoses, one leading on to the other. For the Naiyāyikas however, the two cognitions, *viz.*, the cognition of good (*iṣṭasādhana-tājñāna*) and the cognition of duty (*kāryatājñāna*) are held together in a complex, the object (*viśaya*) of the two cognitions being the same. In other words, according to Nyāya, that which is cognised as *iṣṭasādhana* or good is also cognised as *kārya* or the thing to be done, so that the link between the two steps, *viz.*, the purely cognitive (the consciousness of *iṣṭa* or good) and the cognitive-conative (the cognition of duty with reference to it) is the simple one of community of *viśaya* or object, that which is the object of the value,

or *iṣṭasāadhanatā*-cognition being also the object of the duty-, or *kāryatā*-cognition. Hence for the Nyāya, though analysis reveals a distinction of aspects, yet there is only one psychosis with a dual nature—a cognitive and a conative one. For the Prābhākaras however there are here not two aspects of a single psychosis, but two psychoses, the link between them being that of establisher and established. As we have already noted, the Prābhākaras regard this relation as that of ground (*hetu*) and grounded, or premise and conclusion and they actually elaborate this into the form of an inference (*anumāna*) both in regard to *kāmyakarmas* or ordinary prudential and empirical actions as well as *nityanāimittika-karmas* or unconditional and non-empirical duties.

1. Let us first consider the case of ordinary empirical actions from material motives. Let us consider, for example, the act of cooking one's meal (*pākaḥ*) which is an empirical action (*kāmyakarma*) implying desire (*kāmanā*) for some good to be attained. For the Prābhākaras such an act involves inference amongst the psychological antecedents or conditions which determine it. The inference involved is this :

The act of cooking is to be accomplished by my will or *kṛti*—*pākaḥ matkṛtisādhyah* (Conclusion),

Inasmuch as

While the act is conducive to my good (*madiṣṭasādhana*), it is at the same time incapable of being accomplished except through my volition : *matkṛtimvīnā asattve sati madiṣṭasāadhanatvāt* (Ground).

The ground of the inference, it will be seen, is a specific determination of the self, *i.e.*, the determination of it by the act of cooking, which, in this case, takes the form of conduciveness to the agent's well-being, cooking being an

ordinary *kāmya* or empirical action. It is this subjective appropriation of the act which presents itself as conducive to the agent's good that acts as the ground or reason of the subjective cognition that it is to be done or accomplished by my will. It is this latter cognition which is thus determined or produced by the subjective appropriation of the act that leads to *cikīrṣā* or desire and finally to *kṛti* or will. It is to be seen that the act is self-appropriated not merely as being conducive to the agent's good but also as one which is incapable of being realised except through the agent's will. This latter qualification is added to exclude performances beyond the agent's power such as *vṛṣṭikarāṇa* or production of a rainfall and also results compassed by the volition of other persons such as *parakṛtapāka* or cooking done by others. In neither of these cases is there subjective self-appropriation though there is the consciousness of good, in the case of rainfall because of the consciousness of impotency or helplessness and in the case of cooking by other persons because of the absence of the necessity of exerting oneself for the result which is being realised without the agent requiring to will it. It is also to be noted that the qualification of *madīṣṭasādhanatva* or conduciveness to one's own good is negatively significant as excluding *śrama*, i.e., the fatigue of the muscles, etc., involved in the act of cooking. These are not subjectively appropriated as objects of volition or things to be accomplished by one's *kṛti* or will even though they are incapable of being accomplished except through one's own volition. The reason is that they lack the quality of being conducive to the agent's good—a quality which distinguishes the act of cooking and thereby makes it to be subjectively appropriated.

Some point out that there is here neither inference as the Prābhākaras suppose nor any compounded consciousness of duty and good as the Naiyāyikas hold. Thus there is no

compounding of the consciousness of duty (*kāryatā*) and conduciveness to good (*iṣṭasāadhanatā*) into a unitary complex experience through the unity of the *viṣaya* or object as the Naiyāyikas suppose nor are there two psychoses, one establishing the other, as the Prābhākaras think. The *pravartaka* or motive here, is a simple psychosis which involves neither any inference nor any duality of nature, there being nothing more in it than the simple cognition that something is to be accomplished by my will. It is this *kr̥tisādhyatājñāna* or cognition of something to be accomplished as *svecchādhīna*, i.e., as dependent on my pleasure or freedom which is the essential condition of volition. The motive is thus the consciousness of something to be accomplished by the agent's free will and is neither an effect of subjective self-appropriation as the Prābhākaras contend nor a component in a psychological compound as the Naiyāyikas urge. It is dependent on the agent's *svecchā* or undetermined will and is thus neither an effect of self-determination through self-appropriation of the act as a *viśeṣaṇa* or qualification of the self nor an implicate or moment in the consciousness of *iṣṭa* or good. In other words, the motive is the cognition that something is to be done by me by my free will and this is independent alike of hedonistic consideration of good or advantage to self and of any representation of the act as *puruṣaviśeṣaṇa* or qualification of the self. It is purely *svecchādhīna*, i.e., does not depend on any other condition than the agent's free and undetermined will so that it is a mistake to try to deduce or infer it or further analyse it into simpler components. Motivation, in other words, means the indetermination of the agent expressing itself in the resolution to accomplish a particular action—his absolute indetermination, *liberum arbitrium*, or liberty of indifference, as expressing itself in the cognition that something is to be accomplished by his will as freely willed. Hence there is here

not merely the cognition that something is to be willed or accomplished but also that this willing is itself freely willed, *i.e.*, is dependent only on the agent's pleasure. There is thus a will to will, *i.e.*, pure will in which the agent expresses his freedom of indetermination by willing, *i.e.*, signifying his assent to, the accomplishment of the act by his will. The bare consciousness that something is to be accomplished by my will does not therefore suffice to constitute the motive, there being also involved the fact that the accomplishment of the act as thus intellectually determined is itself freely willed, *i.e.*, is non-dependent on or undetermined by anything else than the freedom of the agent or subject. We may compare this with the pure will as conceived by Augustine—the will to will which he assumes even in cognition as the will to know, *i.e.*, as the spontaneity of attention which is not resolvable into interest, intensity of stimulus or any other natural condition. It is however not to be conceived as blind spontaneity in so far as it involves the definite *cognition* that something to be accomplished by the will is freely willed.

The Prābhākaras however urge that this indeterminism is itself a moment in their doctrine of self-determinism. They admit that the will to accomplish is itself freely willed, *i.e.*, depends on the agent's undetermined freedom, but they hold that this undetermined freedom is itself determined or established by a process of mediation through self-reference. Thus according to them also the cognition of duty implies *svicchādhīnakṛtisādhyatājñāna*, *i.e.*, the cognition of the will to will, but they contend that this freely willed will is itself established by a process of mediation through self-appropriation or self-reference. In other words, there is inference involved in the process of motivation even though the motive is *svicchādhīnakṛtisādhyatājñāna*, *i.e.*, cognition of duty as freely willed. This cognition of freely willed duty is itself the *sādhya*, the object established so that the *anumāna*,

the inference is a process of self-mediation through which freedom, instead of being arbitrarily posited, posits or establishes itself through itself, in this inferential form. Thus the inference is as follows :—

Conclusion

The act of cooking is to be accomplished by my free will—(*pākaḥ svecchādhīna-matkṛtisādhyah*),

Ground

Inasmuch as

It is incapable of being accomplished except through my will—(*svecchādhīnamatkṛtimvīnā asattve sati*),

And is at the same time characterised by conduciveness to my good (*madīṣṭasādhanatvāt*).

Hence the process is one in which freedom mediates itself through itself, freedom being involved in the ground (*hetu*) and involved in the established consequence or conclusion (*sādhyā*). Freedom thus establishes itself through itself, there being indetermination alike in the will which is cognised to be indispensable for the accomplishment of the act and in the will to accomplish it which follows as a consequence from this cognition. But this self-mediation of freedom is not pure indetermination but self-determination in so far as it implies an act of self-reference or self-appropriation in the form of representation of the act as a specific determination (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the self. Thus the process according to the Prābhākaras is as follows :—

(1) There is *svaviśeṣaṇavattāpratisandhānā* or representation of something as *svaviśeṣaṇa* or qualification of the self.

(2) This something which is represented as a qualification of the self is also cognised as incapable of being accomplished except through my free will.

(3) This conscious self-appropriation of what is thus cognised as depending on my free will leads to the cognition that it is to be accomplished by my free will.

II. We have so far considered the nature of the *anumāna* or inference involved in the case of an empirical action (*kāmyakarma*) such as cooking the meal. We shall now consider it in the case of the *nitya* or unconditional duties such as *sandhyā* or the daily prayer.

We have seen that in empirical actions the consciousness of duty (*kṛtisādhyatājāna*) implies the consciousness of good (*iṣṭasāadhanatā*) as a condition. But the latter produces the former only as *puruṣaviśeṣaṇa*, as a specific qualification of the self. Hence it is this self-qualification or representation of the act as specifying the self which is the essential condition of the consciousness of duty, though in empirical actions such self-qualification takes place in connection with the consciousness of an anticipated good. In the case of the unconditional or *nitya* duty, however, the self-qualification is not mediated through any such hedonistic calculations of advantage or profit to self so that the consciousness of duty or *kāryatājñāna* follows immediately on the consciousness of it, the bare cognition of the injunction necessarily inducing the representation of it as self-qualification or *puruṣa-viśeṣaṇa*. Hence the inferential process which establishes the *kāryatājñāna* or cognition of duty with reference to it is independent of any reference to any extraneous end such as is involved in an ordinary empirical action. Thus the inference involved in the case of a *nitya* or unconditional duty such as the daily prayer (*sandhyā*) is as follows :—

Conclusion

I am now to (or under obligation to) offer my daily prayer—*aham idanāntanakṛtisādhyasandhyāvandanah*.

Ground

Because belonging to the twice-born caste, I am qualified by the enjoined ablutions, etc., of morning and evening—*dvijātīve sati vihita sandhyā kālīna saucādimattvāt*.

Hence the steps in the inference are :—

(1) *Vidhi*, *Preraṇā* or command embodied in the scriptural imperative as revealing (*jñāpaka*) the enjoined ablutions and the like (*vihitaśaucādi*).

(2) The representation of these enjoined ablutions etc., of scripture as a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the self—the representation which arises from the consciousness of the injunctions revealed.

(3) *Kṛtisādhyatājñāna* or the cognition that the duties enjoined are to be accomplished by me, a cognition which results from the consciousness of the duties as qualifying or specifying the self.

In other words, the scriptural Imperative or *vidhi* reveals the particular acts (ablutions, etc.,) as obligatory on the agent in consequence of which they are subjectively appropriated by the individual as determinations (*viśeṣaṇas*) of the self and this self-determination or self-qualification leads to the cognition that they are to be accomplished by the agent's will.

It is to be noted that the command in this particular instance is relative to a particular time, *i.e.*, to the sensible present (*idānīntana*) as experienced by the individual. Hence the resulting cognition of duty or *kṛtisādhyatājñāna* is also relative to this particular time, *i.e.*, the cognition that it is to be accomplished is not a purely general consciousness that it is to be done at any time according to convenience but a specific cognition that it is to be accomplished *now i.e.*, within the felt present as experienced by the agent through his mental continuum which is in time.

Against this view of the Prābhākaras the Naiyāyikas urge : how can time be qualification of the *puruṣa* or individual (*kālasya katham puruṣa-viśeṣanatvam*) ? One may concede ablutions (*śauca*), etc., as qualifying the individual (*puruṣaviśeṣaṇa*) through their effects of cleanliness and the like, but it is difficult to conceive how the appointed time, viz., the sensible present (*idānīntana*) can also similarly qualify the individual.

The Prābhākaras answer : *puruṣa's jīvana*, i.e., the mental continuum of the individual is in time and the individual is related to time through his mental continuum. (1) *svavṛtti-jīvanavattasambandhena tasya (kālasya) puruṣa-viśeṣanatvāt*, (2) *vihitakāla-jīvitvitvādervā*. In other words, in the case of unconditional duties such as the morning or evening prayers, what qualify the individual are not merely the enjoined ablutions, etc. (*śaucādi*), but also the appointed time (*vihitakāla*), or rather the ablutions, etc., and *puruṣa's* experience as enduring in the time appointed (*vihitakāla-jīvitva*). Thus though time considered objectively may not be a qualification of the individual, it certainly determines the individual in so far as the latter endures in time. The individual as enduring in time is thus related to order in time and his experience as enduring in the appointed time (*vihitakāla*) is also an experience of the time in which it endures. In this way he becomes conscious of the appointed time through being qualified by it through his life-continuum which endures in time. His life-continuum as enduring in time thus constitutes the sensory basis of localisation in a time-scale and order.

Another objection which is raised in regard to the Prābhākara inference is : how can the act (ablutions, etc.) which is objective can be *puruṣaviśeṣanavat*, i.e., become determined as a *viśeṣaṇa* or qualification of the individual (*puruṣa*) ? How is it possible, in other words, for an objective act to appropriate to itself the character or form of

being a *subjective* determination or qualification of the individual? The Naiyāyika here objects: the acts (empirical such as cooking or non-empirical such as prayer) may possess *iṣṭasāadhanatva* or conduciveness to the agent's well-being as a mark from which one may infer that they are *kṛtīsādhyā* or to be accomplished by oneself, but they can in nowise be qualifications of the self (*svaviśeṣaṇa*). Some acts may be specially fitted to produce certain results there being *yogyatā* or suitability in certain acts for certain results. In this sense we may speak of an inherent *iṣṭasāadhanatā* in certain acts, *i.e.*, an inherent capacity to produce certain desired results. Thus we may speak of an inherent conduciveness to desired results or good in the acts of cooking, rituals and sacrifice, and the like—an *iṣṭasāadhanatva* or conduciveness to good being *yāgapākaniṣṭha*, qualifying, or being inherent in, *yāga* (religious sacrifice) and *pāka* (cooking). It is however absurd to conceive of these objective acts as thereby becoming *puruṣaviśeṣaṇa*, *i.e.*, becoming determined as qualifications of the individual or appropriating to themselves the character of being subjective determinations of the agent.

It may be argued, what qualifies the individual is not the act as such which is objective but the *icchā* or desire which is induced by the act. This desire is certainly a qualification of the self even if the mere act is not, and it is this desire as qualifying the self that serves as the mark (*linga*) from which results or follows the cognition that it is to be done. The Nyāya objection to this is: there is no *vyāpti* or invariable connection between *icchā*, desire and *yāgādikriyā* or particular acts such as rituals and sacrifice. Hence we cannot suppose that these acts will necessarily induce desire or *icchā* in the agent. Moreover even though there were invariable connection between such acts and the desire to accomplish them so that the desire might be treated as a mark or sign of the acts, yet such desire may

be mere blind impulse and thus would not account for the element of cognition (*jñāna*) in the cognition of duty (*kārya-tājñāna*) which is supposed to result from it. In other words, there is neither any necessary connection between the acts objectively considered and any conative impulse in the individual nor any proof that such impulse, even if there be any such necessary connection, is an intelligent impulse or desire implying the cognition that it is to be accomplished by the agent's will.

In reply to all this the Prābhākaras point out : when we say that the act to be accomplished is *svaviśeṣaṇavat*, i.e., determined as a *viśeṣaṇa* or qualification of the self, all that we mean is that there is either a cognition of the qualification (*tājñāna*, *viśeṣaṇajñāna*) or a cognition of relationship with the qualification (*tatsambandhajñāna*, *viśeṣaṇasambandhajñāna*). In other words, self-qualification means either the cognition of the act as a qualification of the self or the cognition of it as being connected with such a qualification. There is nothing objectionable or paradoxical in this as the Naiyāyikas themselves conceive the *viśaya* or object as qualifying the subject in one or other of these senses. Thus they speak of *kāmyasādhana-tā* or conduciveness to the agent's desire, in the *viśaya* or external object. Here therefore they admit something in the object which has a subjective signification or meaning. How is this subjective signification in the object to be conceived ? How are we to conceive of the object as being characterised by conduciveness to the subject's desire or want ? It must be by conceiving the *kāmanāviśaya* or object of desire as being determined or conditioned either by a cognition of the want or desire (*kāmanājñāna*) or by a cognition of intimate connection with the want or desire (*kāmanāsambandhajñāna*). As the Naiyāyikas thus admit a subjective determination in the desired object in the form either of a cognition of the desire as constituting it or a cognition of

essential relationship with the desire, so likewise do we, the Prābhākaras, conceive of the objective acts as becoming determined as qualifications of the self through the cognition either of these qualifications or of relationship with these qualifications as conditioning the acts. In fact, it is hardly consistent for a Naiyāyika to quarrel with a Prābhākara on a point like this. Both accept self-determinism and therefore for both alike the *Puruṣa* or individual is himself the conditioning or determining factor in volition. The only difference arises from the way in which the Naiyāyika would conceive the form of this self-determination which according to him is always a form of hedonistic valuation, *i.e.*, a form in which the act is cognised as conducive to the agent's good. But even for the Naiyāyika the acts themselves (cooking, etc.) considered objectively are external goods being suited for certain results and without any effect on the agent's consciousness till they are subjectively self-determined as worth striving for or deserving conscious realisation by will. They are not *antarbhūta*, internalised, internally or subjectively appropriated, till there is this subjective valuation and selection, *i.e.*, subjective self-determination with reference to them. The self thus must determine its own values for itself even according to the Naiyāyika and it is through the *sambandhajñāna*, cognition of relationship with itself, that it thus determines the merely external good or object as a good for itself. *Vastutah tadvattājñānam tatsambandhajñānam tajñānameva vā na tu pakṣo'pi tatrāntarbhūta iti kām yasādhanatā-jñānasyāpi kāmanāsambandhajñānātmakatayā kāmanājñānātmakataya vā anupapattyabhāvāt.*

Hence the essential difference between the Prābhākaras and the Naiyāyikas is not in regard to the question of self-reference and self-determination so much as in regard to the form of this self-reference which with the Naiyāyika is always a form of hedonistic valuation. Further accord-

ing to the Naiyāyika as *icchā* or desire may exist *svarūpatah*, i.e., as mere conscious desire without being self-conscious or involving consciousness of the self as desiring, the *sambandhajñāna* or cognition of relationship through which the external good is subjectively appropriated is the self's cognition of the *object* as good and not necessarily a distinct consciousness of the self whose good it is. In other words, according to Nyāya the object may be self-appropriated as good to itself without any distinct consciousness of the self to which it is cognised as a good, such self-consciousness being distinct only in special cases and being ordinarily at the background. For the Prābhākaras, however, there is no self-appropriation without definite self-reference and thus all desire is self-conscious involving a clear consciousness not merely of the act to be accomplished but also of the self as qualified by the act.

6. In the previous section we have considered the various conceptions of the relation of *kāryatājñāna* or cognition of duty to the other conditions of volition. Thus far we have considered three different forms of this relation—the Nyāya and the Prābhākara forms as well as a form of indeterminism which differs from both.

(1) According to the Nyāya form, the cognition of duty (*kāryatājñāna*) is a component in a psychological compound involving the cognition of good (*iṣṭasādhana-tājñāna*) as its other constituent.

(2) According to the Prābhākaras—the cognition of duty is a distinct psychosis which is *established* or produced by the representation of the act as specifying the self. Hence there is inference involved in the process of arriving at the cognition of duty, this cognition following as a consequence from the representation of the act as self-appropriated.

(3) According to others, however, there is neither a psychological compound nor any inference involved. The

cognition of duty is simply the cognition that it is to be accomplished by my will as depending on my *svecchā* or freedom. *Svecchādhina-kṛtisādhyatājñānameva kāryatājñānam*. This is indeterminism, the will through which the act is cognised to be accomplished being also cognised as undetermined, or as depending purely on the agent's freedom.

Some, however, consider this indetermination to be itself mediated. Thus they put this indeterminism in the form of an inference or *anumāna* as follows :—

(4) Take the act of cooking (*pāka*) for instance. The inference may be stated thus :—

Conclusion.—The act of cooking is to be accomplished by my free will—*pākaḥ svecchādhinamatkṛtisādhyah*,

Ground.—Because being distinct from mere exertion or effort such as the exercise of the muscles it is at the same time incapable of being accomplished except through my free will—*śramādibhinnatve sati svecchādhinamatkṛtim vina asattvāt*.

Or again thus :—

Conclusion—The act of cooking is to be accomplished by my free will—*pākaḥ svecchādhina-matkṛtisādhyah*,

Ground—Because being distinct from exertion as such it is at the same time that which is non-existent in the absence of my willing it—*śramādibhinnatve sati matkṛtivyatirekaprayuktavyatirekapratiyogivāt*.

Here there is no *svaviśeṣaṇavattva* or self-reference as a condition. Hence it is indeterminism rather than self-determinism, though it is not unmediated indeterminism as in the third form explained above, but a species of self-mediated indeterminism in which freedom realises itself through itself *in vacuo* as it were independently of any specific determination by the self. Thus the act of cooking is *asat*, unreal or non-existent but possible and the step

here is from possibility to actualisation, the transformation being accomplished by the will as dependent on the agent's freedom (*svecchādhīnamatkṛti*). There is no self-appropriation of the act either through any hedonistic calculations of advantage or profit or through any pure representation of it as a self-qualification. Hence sheer exertion has to be excluded to limit the sphere of the choice ; the value-cognition (*iṣṭasāadhanatājñāna*) being omitted from the conditions of the willing, the sphere of volition has to be definitely limited so as to exclude all mere *śrama* or exertion—willing for the sake of the effort of willing. The willing must have an object other than itself, *i.e.*, must be defined by being limited to something objective and external to itself.

The Prābhākaras and the Naiyāyikas both reject this form. According to them there must be either cognition of self-reference (*svaviśeṣaṇājñāna*) or cognition of good (*iṣṭasāadhanatājñāna*) in the motive. An action which is neither cognised as good or advantageous nor represented as a self-qualification, can have no impelling force. In fact, the above process is a pseudoprocess simulating a ground or reason where there is none. Thus my ungrounded freedom (*svecchā*) becomes the *hetu*, ground or reason, of the act being willed. But how can the groundless be itself a ground ? As a matter of fact there is here a specific ground surreptitiously introduced behind an appearance of indetermination or groundlessness. For the ground (*hetu*) which is *svecchādhīna matkṛti*, *i.e.*, my will as purely dependent on my wish or pleasure, contains *icchā*, wish, as an element. There is thus an antecedent *icchā*, wish or will, in the *hetu* or ground. How is this wish or will to be understood ? It may be a desire for pleasure (*sukha*) or for absence of pain (*duḥkhābhāva*) or may be pure desire implying nothing but self-reference or *svaviśeṣaṇa*. Thus in any case we cannot avoid either self-reference (*svaviśeṣaṇatājñāna*) or the cognition of good (*iṣṭasāadhanatājñāna*).

(5) There is yet another form in which the relation of *kṛtisādhyatājñāna* or cognition of duty is conceived with reference to the other conditions of volition—a form which Gāgā Bhaṭṭa notices in the “Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi.” In this form *kṛtisādhyatā* or cognition of duty is conceived to produce *pravṛtti*, volition, by being subject to *iṣṭasādhana* or cognition of good. In other words, the relation of the duty-cognition (*kṛtisādhyatā*) to the value-cognition (*iṣṭasādhana*) is not merely that of community of *viśaya* or object, the act which is the object or *viśaya* of the one being also the object of the other as conceived in the ordinary *Nyāya* analysis. There is besides a relation of dependence or subordination—a relation which makes the cognition of duty dependent on or subject to the cognition of the value. This is thus a compromise between the *Prābhākara* and *Nyāya* views recognising as it does a relation of dependence without admitting any inferential process or any absolute independence or distinctness of psychoses. (*Kecittu idānīntanamatkṛtisādhyajñāna hetuh, tat ca idānīntanamadiṣṭasādhana* *tājñānādhīnam iti tadabhāvāt na pravṛtīh ityāhuḥ*).

The objection to such a view is : even in the absence of the volition that should follow as an effect, there may be such cognition of subjective capacity or competency in the form : if it be willed by me the desired result will surely be realised. In other words, such cognition of subjective competency being present and yet volition being non-existent, the former cannot be the ground of volition. *Tadanukūlakṛtyabhāve api yadi mayā kriyate tadā idam bhaviṣyati iti etadṛśakṛtisādhyatājñānasya tadanīmapi sattvāt.* (“Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi”). It is to be noted, however, that in this objection *kṛtisādhyatājñāna* is not interpreted as the cognition that the act is to be accomplished but merely as the cognition that it is capable of being accomplished *if* I will it. The force of the objection being derived entirely from this interpretation, it is hardly a valid one as it can be easily

perceived that the propounders of the view understood *kṛti-sādhya*tājñāna only in the first sense.

Note on Iṣṭa in Iṣṭasādhana

What is it that constitutes the desired object (*iṣṭa*) an object of desire ? What is it that constitutes its worth or value as an object of desire ? What is the good the cognition of which is a condition or cause of desire ? We have already discussed the question partially in course of the previous exposition. We shall now conclude by comparing the Cārvāka and the Nyāya views on this question of the nature of the good. We omit the Prābhākaras for the obvious reason that the good is not, according to them, one of the essentials of the volitional process.

For the Cārvākas the good is either *sukha* or *duḥkhābhāva*. By *sukha* the Cārvākas mean empirical pleasure, particularly the pleasure of the senses and the body. They believe neither in spiritual, non-sensuous pleasure nor in any Transcendental Bliss or Ānanda such as the Vedāntists conceive. Similarly *duḥkhābhāva* signifies for the Cārvākas freedom from bodily suffering. Of course the Cārvākas do not believe in the possibility of unmixed pleasures in life. Pleasures are mixed up with pain, but this does not make them worthless. On the contrary pleasures are to be sought as being the only possible good in life and the highest good consists in the enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure with the suffering of a minimum of unavoidable pain. The highest good consists thus in a maximum of pleasure with a minimum of pain and all relative good consists in a balance of pleasure over pain just as all relative evil consists in the opposite. Hence for the Cārvākas all actions are empirical being the resultant of the two forces of attraction of pleasure and repulsion of pain and the highest good does not differ in kind or quality but only in degree from relative and empirical good.

According to the Naiyāyikas, however, there is a difference in kind or quality between empirical actions prompted by attraction (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) and the non-empirical impulse towards the highest good which is *mokṣa* or the Freedom of the Life Absolute and Transcendental. Thus in empirical actions the object of volition is either *sukhaprāpti*, attainment of happiness, or *duḥkha-parihāra*, the avoidance of suffering. Hence such actions depend on or presuppose the attraction of pleasure (*rāga*) and the repulsion of pain (*dveṣa*). Thus they are not *free* actions in the true sense of the term being under the sway of the two forces of attraction and aversion and thus cannot ensure the conditions of Absolute Freedom of the *Mokṣa* state which is the highest good. As a matter of fact happiness cannot be the highest good because it is always mixed up with pain. Nor can the avoidance of pain under the influence of *dveṣa*, aversion or repulsion be such a good, because aversion itself being of the nature of pain, or unhappiness, there can never be absolute and complete cessation of pain under its influence. Further, if a man were to be actuated by calculations of eternal happiness (*nityasukha*), he would never attain the Freedom of the *Mokṣa* state—his very motive to realise it for the sake of the possible happiness will be a source of bondage, for attraction (*rāga*) is the prius in consciousness of the state of bondage. It is true that *dveṣa*, aversion, as motive to *mukti* or liberation, will equally bind (*dveṣasya bandhana samājnānāt*), but *duḥkhadveṣa*, aversion to suffering, is not a necessary condition for *duḥkhaparihāra* or realisation of freedom from suffering. Such *dveṣa* or aversion is the determining condition of empirical actions which seek relative and not absolute freedom from pain, but it has nothing to do with the Transcendental Impulse towards absolute and complete freedom from suffering. Such impulse does not imply aversion (*dveṣa*) which is itself a

form of suffering, nor does it imply *rāga*, attraction, inasmuch as the absolute freedom from suffering which it aims at is not anything positive so as to be *anukūla* or positively favourable to the self. In fact, this absolute freedom can be conceived only as *apratikūla* or not unfavourable and therefore cannot either attract or repel as do ordinary empirical objects of desire. It follows therefore that there are two kinds of objects of desire or *iṣṭa* : (1) those that are relative and empirical implying attraction (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) in the agent, (2) that which is absolute and nonempirical and the desire for which is pure and not pathological. It is to be seen also that the relative goods fall into the two classes of (1) *positive* empirical pleasure which is relative and (2) relative and partial *cessation* of pain.

As regards these empirical pleasures it may be noted that they are recognised as differing not merely in degree but also in kind. Thus Gangeśa as well as Mathurānātha (author of "Māthuri") both refer to *vaijātya*, i.e., specific differences of quality, in the different kinds of *svargasukha*, happiness in heaven, promised as the reward of different religious sacrifices or *yajñas*, the alternative supposition being that these *sukhas*, amounts of happiness, differ from one another not qualitatively, but quantitatively, either in respect of duration or of number (*samkhyā*).

CHAPTER II

THE ANALYSIS OF CONSCIENCE OR CONSCIOUSNESS OF DUTY

In the previous chapter we have considered the psychological basis of Hindu Ethics, *viz.*, the analysis of *pravṛtti* or volition. We shall consider now the Hindu analysis of conscience or consciousness of duty. The Doctrine of Conscience constitutes an important part of psychological Hindu Ethics. It is elaborated in connection with the interpretation of the scriptural code of duties laid down by the Vedas. Since the moral code according to the Hindu primarily signifies the code of scriptural commands, the analysis of conscience necessarily involves the analysis of the *śāstrika* imperative as embodied in the code of Scriptural duties. We shall therefore have to consider the Doctrine of Conscience in the light of the analysis of the Scriptural Imperative.

The consciousness of duty implies not only *karma* or an act to be accomplished and the consciousness of it as duty or morally imperative but also righteousness, *dharma* or merit as accruing from the proper accomplishment of the duty. Since nothing is duty which does not conduce to *dharma* or righteousness, the question has to be first considered as to what is signified by *dharma*, righteousness or merit. We shall therefore first explain the conception of *dharma* or righteousness in Hindu Ethics and in particular its relation to *karma* or acts prescribed as duties. This is a necessary preliminary to the analysis of conscience or consciousness of duty which presupposes not only *karma* but also *dharma* or merit as resulting from the proper accomplishment of *karma*.

From the brief summary of the various conceptions of *dharma* in *Rāmakṛṣṇa's* "Siddhāntacandrikā" (com-

mentary on Pārthasārathimīśra's "śāstradīpikā") it appears that the term has not one identical connotation in the different systems of Hindu Philosophy. According to *Rāmakṛṣṇa*, *dharma*, righteousness, signifies—

- (1) For the Sāṅkhya, a specific function of the mind ;
- (2) For the Śākyas (Buddhists), an auspicious disposition of the mental continuum ;
- (3) For the Arhats (Jainas), certain subtle forces in atoms as the causes of specific consequences or effects ;
- (4) For the Vaiśeṣikas, certain specific qualities in the *Ātman* ;
- (5) For one school of the Mīmāṃsakas (the Prābhākaras), a transcendental energy or power (*Apūrva*) ;
- (6) For the Bhāṭṭas, the sacrificial acts and other ceremonies.

Sāṅkhyāstu manaso vṛttiviśeṣam dharmamāhuḥ
Śākyāstu cittasya śubhām vāsanām,
Ārhatāstu kāryārambhakān sukṣmān mūrtimataḥ
pudgalān dharmamāhuḥ,
Vaiśeṣikāstu ātmano viśeṣaguṇān,
Mīmāṃsakāstu ekadeśinah apūrvameva
dharmam āhuḥ,

Nāgādīreva dharmasabdavācyaṃ iti Bhāṭṭāḥ.

Hence according to Sāṅkhya righteousness and unrighteousness do not touch the individual (*Puruṣa*) in his transcendental nature, but appertain only to the mind which is a modalisation of *Prakṛti* in the empirical state of *pariṇāma* or transformation. It is *Prakṛti* which evolves under *Puruṣa*'s transcendental influence into the empirical world consisting of empirical subjects with mind and organs of experience on the one hand and objects of experience on the other, and it is only in relation to the empirical order in which empirical subjects stand mutually related in a common world of objects that the question of right and wrong and of morality and immorality has

any significance. Morality and immorality, righteousness and unrighteousness have thus only an empirical significance and therefore are functions of the mind (*manas*) which is the organ of empirical life rather than attributes of the Transcendental Self, *Ātman*, or *Puruṣa*. The individual in his transcendental nature is no more touched by righteousness and unrighteousness than the crystal is tainted by the colour of *Japā* (hibiscus) that stands near it. There is nothing but a 'transcendental shine' round about *Puruṣa* as a consequence of the empirical modes and forms which *Prakṛti* undergoes under *Puruṣa*'s influence. This is however no real enrichment of *Puruṣa*, no *bhoga* or experience of *Puruṣa* in a transcendental sense, but is only of the order of *pratibimba*, reflection or phenomenal appearance.

Thus for Sāṅkhya the Self in its transcendental nature remains eternally pure, untouched by righteousness and unrighteousness and the forms of experience. For the Vaiśeṣikas however (and also for the Naiyāyikas), the Self (*Ātman*) is not untouched by righteousness and unrighteousness, but is determined by both in its phenomenal, empirical life of *samsāra*. There are indeed a phenomenal and a transcendental life of the *Ātman* or Self, but the phenomenal life belongs as much to the Self or *Ātman* as the transcendental life, and does not appertain merely, as according to Sāṅkhya, to the mind or any special organ of experience. Thus according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas though the transcendental life is a supermoral plane of being of the *Ātman* in which it is free from righteousness as well as unrighteousness, there is also an empirical life of the Self—a life of *Samsāra*, in which the *Ātman* becomes implicated in the moral order and determined by righteousness and unrighteousness. But such determinations are not permanent modifications of the *Ātman* and can be removed by a process of spiritual discip-

line by means of which the Self may recover its transcendental purity of being free from the taint of experience or *samsāra* – a purity of being in which the *Ātman* becomes a pure spiritual substance without knowing, feeling or willing. *i.e.*, devoid of all experience.

Thus for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas righteousness is a quality of the *Ātman* or Self, *i.e.*, is a subjective category to be distinguished from the objective act (*karma*) as well as from any impersonal transcendental category (*apūrva*) which may be generated by it. Nor it is any objective quality of an act which has any such supersensuous category in its aid or support (*Apūrva-prakṛtikarmaguṇa*). In other words, according to them, moral merit has only a subjective significance there being no merit in the act itself or any other objective category, no objective right or wrong. This is why *abhisandhi* (intention) is necessary to constitute merit or demerit, the intention being pure (*viśuddha*) in the case of merit or righteousness. Thus righteousness (*dharma*), according to Praśastapāda, is *viśuddhābhisandhijah*, is born of the purity of the intention, *i.e.*, of the intention free from pride and the like (*dambhādira-hitasamkalpaviśeṣah*) so that there is no righteousness even in good acts prompted by impure or evil intentions, *e.g.*, by pride or vanity, etc. Similarly, in unintentional acts, *i.e.*, acts which are accidental and unpremeditated, there is neither merit or demerit though the consequences may be good or evil. There is thus no unintentional wrong in a strictly moral significance, the intention being absolutely essential to constitute moral right and wrong. According to Śrīdhara however there is sin (*adharma*) even in unintentional acts (*akāmakṛta*) in so far as they indicate *pramāda* or a lack of moral earnestness, *i.e.*, moral relaxation or carelessness in the agent. There are however cases of unintentional acts in which there can hardly be any ques-

tion of habitual carelessness and in so far as these are not exempted from moral judgment there is evidently a deviation from the subjective standpoint. It is however probable that Śrīdhara's view was largely influenced by the medieval system of *prāyaścitta* or expiation enjoined even for *akāmakṛta* or unintentional acts.

Just as righteousness is an effect of pure intention so also unrighteousness results from evil intentions (*duṣṭābhisandhi*). Hence where the intention is evil there is unrighteousness even if the actual result of the action be good or beneficial. Righteousness and unrighteousness are thus subjective categories, determinations or qualities of the *Ātman* or Self that result from the purity or impurity of its intentions in volition. Secondly, they appertain to the Self in its phenomenal life, *i.e.*, as participating in experience and therefore implying *puruṣāntaḥkaraṇasamyoga*, *i.e.*, the contact of the Self, *Ātman* or *Puruṣa* and the *Antaḥkaraṇa*, *i.e.*, the mind. It is in so far as there is this contact of the Self and the mind that there is experience and it is in so far as there is experience that there is righteousness or unrighteousness. Thirdly, righteousness and unrighteousness are *atīndriya*, *i.e.*, supersensuous. They are qualities or determinations of the Self, but not in the sense in which pleasure and pain are qualities of the Self. These latter are objects of internal perception—they can be perceived by means of the mind without the aid of the external senses. Not so however righteousness or unrighteousness. These are objects of *yogika* intuition only, *i.e.*, the intuition of the Sages and not of ordinary mortals who can perceive only their effects, namely, happiness and unhappiness. Fourthly, righteousness and unrighteousness are the effects of experience—they are born of the Self's participation in *Samsāra* or empirical life. Hence they are effects and have a

beginning in time. They are thus contingent phenomena and thus cannot be eternal. Being non-eternal they must also perish in course of time. How then do they cease to be? Righteousness is the cause of fruition or happiness and thus it may exhaust itself by the last fruition, *i.e.*, by the experience of the last happiness. Hence it is *antasukhasamviññānavirodhi*, *i.e.*, contradictory to or cancelled by the experience of the last happiness, the last fruition. Contrarywise unrighteousness is cancelled by the experience of the suffering due. But these are not the only ways in which righteousness and unrighteousness may wear away. They may also be destroyed by the knowledge of the true nature of things. Such knowledge by clarifying intellectual vision and removing all delusion destroys attraction (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) which are the causes of volition (*pravṛtti*.) and thereby of participation in experience and *samsāra*. In this way by inducing the individual to withdraw from empirical life it ensures his freedom from the moral order of *karma* and of right and wrong and thus prepares the way to his *mukti* or liberation. The fire of knowledge consumes his *sañcita* or accumulated *karmas*, meritorious and demeritorious, which are thus destroyed before maturing into their proper effects. There are also no *uttara karmas* or subsequent actions, *i.e.*, actions, right or wrong, subsequent to the awakening of such knowledge. In other words, knowledge of the true nature of reality is contradictory to any active participation in experience and thus there is no more any righteous or unrighteous action. It is only the *prārabdha karma* or acts which are already in the state of fruition, that take their course and consume themselves by the natural process of maturing into their proper effects.

Hence according to Sāṅkhya as well as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, righteousness and unrighteousness are subjective categories that appertain only to the empirical life.

But while according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas they are subjective in the sense of being qualities of the *Ātman* itself in the empirical state, for Sāṅkhya they are subjective in the sense of being functions of the mind which is the organ of experience in the empirical life. Hence for Sāṅkhya the empirical Self is an independent category, a modalisation or form of *Prakṛti* which is independent of the Transcendental Individual or *Puruṣa*. It is *Prakṛti* which evolves into the empirical self under the reflection of *Puruṣa* and it is this empirical self which functions in the acts of merit and demerit. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas however there is no such absolute dualism of the empirical self and the Transcendental Self, the *Ātman* which participates in experience and thereby is qualified by righteousness and unrighteousness being also the *Ātman* which through spiritual discipline becomes free from the dross of experience and thereby recovers its transcendental purity of being.

According to the Buddhists also righteousness is an empirical and subjective category. Thus it is *vāsanā* or disposition of the *citta* or mental continuum—a continuum which is annulled in the transcendental state. Hence *dharma* (righteousness) has only empirical significance and is subjective or mental in essence. But it is not a passing function, state or *vṛtti* of the mind. A function or *vṛtti* is a fleeting, momentary state; but righteousness (*dharma*) is essentially a *vāsanā* (trend or disposition of the mind). The disposition is much more than a momentary state or function of the mind—it is an enduring trait or tendency of the mind. Every righteous act conduces to such a tendency and every new one strengthens this tendency. And it is the cumulative effect of such acts transforming and modifying the entire personality and producing a disposition or inclination towards righteous acts that constitutes the righteousness of the mind. Every single righteous act, in other words, is more than a momentary func-

tion of the mind, fleeting over its surface—it implies a more or less permanent modification of the mind reaching down to the subpersonal and subconscious strata and thereby generating a definite tendency or disposition in a specific direction. It is no momentary function but the enduring disposition which is thus produced that constitutes *dharma* or righteousness of the mind.

Hence according to Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists, righteousness and unrighteousness are subjective categories. They have also only an empirical significance being relative only to the empirical life. But while for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas they are qualities of the Self or *Ātman*, for Sāṅkhya as well as for the Buddhists they belong only to the mind or mental continuum and not to the Self. For Sāṅkhya however they are mere functions (*vr̥ttis*) of the mind, and therefore nothing but fleeting and momentary states. According to the Buddhists however every such momentary function implies an enduring modification, a specific impetus or disposition of the mental life, and it is this more or less permanent trait, tendency or disposition of the mind which is so produced that constitutes righteousness and the opposite.

Opposed to these conceptions of righteousness (*dharma*) as a subjective category is the view of the Mīmāṃsakas according to which *dharma* is objective or external. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, *dharma* or righteousness is essentially of the nature of an *artha* or good, i.e., of the nature of something objective and not a subjective trait or state—a thing worthy of being aimed at or desired rather than a subjective quality or disposition to be acquired or cultivated. But it is not a mere *artha* but an *artha* which is sanctioned by *codanā* or *vidhivākya*, i.e., by scriptural prescription (*codanalakṣaṇah arthah dharmah*). What, then, is the nature of such *artha*? What is the nature of an *artha* prescribed by scripture as distinct from an *artha* of

non-scriptural significance ? This raises the question as to what makes an *artha* to be *artha*, a desirable object an object of desire. What then is it that constitutes an *artha* to be what it is ? What, in other words, is the essence or constitutive principle of the good ? The Mimāṃsakas answer this question in terms of pleasure and pain. According to them, whatever does not produce pain (*dukkha*) in excess of pleasure (*sukha*) is an *artha* or good and whatever produces pain in excess of pleasure is *anartha* or evil. (*Artham sukhādhikadukkhājanakatvaṃ*—“*Subodhini*”). Hence according to the Mimāṃsakas, we have *artha* or good not merely where there is an excess of pleasure over pain but also where the pain does not exceed the pleasure that may be derived. This is what constitutes the nature of *artha* or good in general and *dharma* or moral good is a specific form of this generic good, *i.e.*, the good or *artha* which is sanctioned by scriptural prescription or *vidhivākya*. The idea is that there are not only *arthas* of scriptural significance but also *arthas* which are *laukika*, empirical or non-scriptural in nature. The Mimāṃsakas extend this division not merely to *arthas* but also to *anarthas* or evils, *i.e.*, according to them there are not merely scriptural and non-scriptural *arthas* but also scriptural and non-scriptural *anarthas*. For example, certain forms of animal slaughter (*himsā*) are enjoined by scripture. Involving as they do the infliction of suffering on sentient beings they are evil or *anarthas*, but they are *anarthas* prescribed by scripture as distinguished from ordinary evils or *anarthas* of nonscriptural import. Thus we have scriptural *arthas* and *anarthas* as well as non-scriptural *arthas* and *anarthas*. The latter are the *dr̥ṣṭā**arthas* and *dr̥ṣṭā**anarthas*, *i.e.*, of empirical import or significance while the scriptural *arthas* and *anarthas* are *adr̥ṣṭa*, *i.e.*, of non-sensuous or non-empirical import. In other words, we have not merely empirical good and empirical evil but also non-empirical good and non-empiri-

cal evil. The latter are revealed by *Śāstric* prescriptions just as the former are determined by secular experience. *Dharma* or moral good is essentially non-empirical in nature and is revealed by scriptural prescriptions. As such it is distinguished alike from *dṛṣṭārthas* and *dṛṣṭānarthas*, i.e., from empirical good and evil. As essentially an *artha* or good it is also distinguished from *adṛṣṭānarthas* or non-empirical evil, i.e., evil enjoined by *Śāstric* prescriptions. There is no *dharma* in such evil even though prescribed by *Śāstra* because it is essentially evil or *anartha* while *dharma* is essentially *artha* or of the nature of good. *Dharma* must therefore satisfy two tests :—(1) it must be an *artha* or good, i.e., must not produce pain in excess of pleasure (*sukhādhikaduḥkhājanaka*), and (2) it must be sanctioned by *codanā*, or *Śāstric* prescription. *Dharma* is thus the *artha* or good which is of non-empirical or *Śāstric* import. This non-empirical character belongs also to the opposite of *dharma* i.e., to moral evil or *dadharmā*. *Adharma* is also non-empirical i.e. *adṛṣṭānārtha* or non-empirical evil and not an *artha*, good or desirable object. Hence there is no *adharma* in *dṛṣṭānārtha* or empirical evil just as there is no *dharma* in *dṛṣṭārtha* or empirical good. It is only in regard to the *adṛṣṭārthas* and *anarthas*, i.e., in regard to the nonempirical good or evil that there is any question of *dharma* or *adharma*, all empirical good and empirical evil being devoid of moral significance.

It is not clear from the above however as to what in particular constitutes a non-empirical good or a non-empirical evil. Is it the act enjoined by scripture that constitutes an *adṛṣṭārtha* or *adṛṣṭānārtha* in the sense of *dharma* (merit) or *adharma* (demerit)? Or, is it some effect or consequence of the act, something which results from, or is revealed by, it? The *Mīmāṃsakas* divide into two schools as regards their answer to this question—the school of *Prabhākara* and the school of *Kumārila Bhaṭṭa*.

(i) According to the Prabhākaras *dharma* is not a subjective category and therefore not a quality of the Self or *Ātman* as is conveyed by its rendering into such equivalents as righteousness, virtue, merit, etc. But it is also not for that reason to be identified with the *kriyā* or act enjoined by scripture. In fact, it is a new category distinct alike from any subjective condition or state and the mere external act enjoined by scripture. It is revealed by *niyoga*, i.e., the imperative or command involved in a Sāstric prescription, or more precisely, it is revealed by *preraṇā*, i.e., by the authoritative suggestion to the will implied in such a command or imperative. This *preraṇā* is a kind of *ātmākūṭa*, i.e., wave, excitement or impulsion in the *Ātman* or Self—an excitement which becomes *bhautikavyāpārahetu*, i.e., the cause of certain physical processes or effects. *Dharma* is thus an objective category, but is non-empirical or supersensuous in nature being revealed by the authoritative suggestion involved in the moral imperative or *niyoga*. In the Sūtra *codanālakṣaṇaḥ arthah dharmah*, the meaning is: even in certain scriptural prescriptions or *codanāvākyas* there is an element of evil or *anartha* and such *anartha* is a moral evil or *adharma*. Consider for example a scriptural injunction such as *śyenena abhicaran yajeta*—one who wishes to kill his enemy should perform the sacrifice of *śyena*. Here the form is that of a recommendation or injunction (*codanā*)—*yajeta* being in *vidhiliṇ*, i.e., in the optative or potential mood and thus implying a specific recommendation to him who wants to dispose of his enemy. But as the enjoined ceremony involves the infliction of pain on the enemy and therefore injury or *himsā*, it is essentially *anartha* or evil and is thus a moral wrong (*adharma*). To exclude such *anarthas* or evils in the Vedic prescriptions of *codanāvākyas*, the Sūtra defines *dharma* as consisting essentially in *artha* or good. Thus

artha in the definition excludes all *anarthas* or evils, even the *anarthas* involved in some of the Vedic prescriptions. Hence such prescriptions do not constitute *dharma* or moral right, though they may lead to specific results. It is only Śāstric prescriptions which lead to *artha* (and not to *anartha* or evil) that result in *dharma* through their supersensuous effects (*Apūrva*). These Śāstric prescriptions include *nityanaimittikakarmas* or unconditional duties as well as *kāmyakarmas* or acts from empirical motives. In either case there is *dharma* or moral good in so far as there is no *anartha* or evil involved in such prescriptions. But in the case of the *nityanaimittikakarmas* or unconditional duties there is no positive good or *artha* in a positive sense, *i.e.*, they do not produce pleasure, but they also do not produce pain (*duḥkha*) in excess of pleasure (*sukha*) and in this sense are *arthas* and therefore *dharma*. Through the proper accomplishment of these duties the mind is purified and thus the knowledge of reality (*jñāna*) is attained which leads to Transcendental Freedom or *Mokṣa* which is freedom from pain (*duḥkhābhāva*). In the case of *kāmya* or empirical duties however there is *artha* in a positive sense, positive *sukha* or pleasure and therefore also *dharma* in so far as there is no *anartha* or evil involved. In either case however the *dharma* or moral good is not the act itself but the *Apūrva* or supersensuous verity which it generates or involves and which is revealed by the *preraṇā* or impulsion in the *Ātman* produced by the *niyoga* or the command involved in a Śāstric injunction.

(ii) According to the Bhāṭṭas however *yāgādi*, *i.e.*, the ceremonial and sacrificial acts in themselves constitute *dharma* or moral good. *Dharma* is thus no non-empirical category, no supersensuous potency (*Apūrva*) with which Vedic prescriptions are charged but the prescribed acts themselves. In fact, *dharma* is *śreyaskara*, conducive

to good, *i.e.*, works for the agent's *nihsreyasaḥ* or highest good. These ceremonial acts (*yāgādi*) are conducive to good (*śreyaskara*) in this sense and therefore are *dharma*. In fact, there is no difference in this respect between *kāmyakarmas* or conditional duties with reference to something desired for empirical pleasure and the *nityanaimittikakarmas* or unconditional duties. The latter conduce to good quite as much as the duties prompted by empirical motives and are *dharma* only as thus conducive to good. Hence the Sūtra *codanālakṣaṇaḥ arthah dharmah* is not intended to exclude *codanālakṣaṇaḥ anarthah*. This cannot be the intended meaning as all Śāstric prescriptions are *dharma* and therefore are *artha* and not *anartha* or evil. The *anartha* or evil which comes within the scope of a Śāstric prescription is only by way of prohibition (*nivṛtti*) and thus constitutes the subject-matter only of *niṣedha-codanās* or prohibitory and negative prescriptions. The prohibition or negation of an *anartha* or evil thus prescribed is itself an *artha* or good and thus is *dharma*. We have thus *dharma* as constituting the content of Śāstric prescriptions in two forms. In *Vidhi codanā* or positive Śāstric prescriptions, the *dharma* is a positive good (*artha*), *viz.*, the good involved in the act enjoined; while in *niṣedhacodanā*, *i.e.*, prohibitory or negative prescriptions, the *dharma* is abstention or cessation from some *anartha* or evil, *i.e.*, from the sin and consequent punishment entailed by the *niṣiddha* or prohibited action.

Hence while according to Sāṅkhya, Bauddha and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems *dharma* is essentially righteousness or virtue and thus a subjective trait or disposition of the mind or the self, according to the Mimāṃsakaś it is an objective category consisting, according to the Prābhākaras, in *Apūrva* or a supersensuous verity involved in the Vedic prescriptions, and, according to the Bhāṭṭas, in the prescribed acts themselves, *i.e.*, the acts prescribed

by Vedic injunctions and prohibitions. But the question remains still to be considered as to how *dharma* or righteousness is related to *karma*, i.e., the external act of duty. If *dharma* is a subjective category, is it an effect of the accomplishment of the *karmas*? How is it related then to the scriptural and non-scriptural *karmas* respectively? If it is an objective category, is it the duty itself, or any objective accomplishment of the duty, or an objective effect of the accomplishment? Is it scriptural duty only? Or is it non-scriptural duty as well? Or is it mere ethical duty as conducive to the life of the spirit, not necessarily implying scriptural sanction? These are questions that necessarily arise in connection with the question of *dharma* or righteousness. As involved in the question of *dharma*, they are also implicated in the consciousness of duty. We shall therefore next consider those questions before we proceed to the analysis of conscience proper.

(1) What, then, is the moral value of *karma* according to the Bauddha? From what has been already explained it is obvious that for the Bauddha there is no merit in *karma* or duty in an objective sense and that it assumes a moral significance only as subjectively willed and accomplished and thus as modifying the subjective disposition of the agent. Hence according to him there is no inherent moral worth in *karma*, but only is its conduciveness to the purification of the mind. Thus the Śāstric *karmas* have no inherent worth or excellence, their moral value being conditional only on their conduciveness to spiritual perfection. In so far therefore as Śāstric and ceremonial acts fail to conduce to the life of the spirit, they are devoid of moral value and cannot be morally obligatory. There is no good making a fetish of Vedic prescriptions, and the exercise of proper discrimination is necessary in the ascertainment of true

moral duty. To be sure there are special moral codes even for the Bauddhas themselves. Thus there are different *śīlas* (virtues) and *caryyās* (duties), laid down for the *upāsakas* (devotees), and for the *śrāvakas* (learners), but they are so laid down not because they have any mysterious moral potency but only because they conduce to spiritual culture and thus are means to ethical discipline. Hence according to the Bauddhas even when *karma* is to be considered as having any moral significance, it is from the ethical standpoint as conducing to spiritual perfection and culture rather than from the standpoint of pure ceremonialism and formalism.

(2) The Sāṅkhya in some respects resembles the Buddhist in this ethical view of *karma*, but there are also important differences. Thus according to Sāṅkhya there is no special spiritual significance attaching to Vedic (*ānuśravika*) *karmas*. They involve *himsā*, i.e., injury to sentient creatures and thus cannot but lead to evil. Hence they cannot conduce to real spiritual good which is the agent's freedom from the taint of *samsāra* or empirical life. It is this freedom (*apavarga* or *mokṣa*), this freedom from the whirlpool of the phenomenal life, that constitutes the highest *puruṣārtha* or spiritual good. Compared with this even *svarga* or happiness in heaven is too insignificant a *puruṣārtha* to be worthy of desire. This *svarga* indeed comes often in the wake of the proper accomplishment of the Vedic prescriptions but as an effect that comes into being in time it is also bound to lapse and cease to be in course of time. It is thus contingent and perishable and thus can appear only as *duḥkha* or suffering in comparison with the imperishable or eternal good which constitutes the essence of Transcendental Freedom or *Mokṣa*. Vedic *Karmas* thus cannot lead to anything which is really good or worthy of desire. In so far as they are tainted by the impurity of *himsā* or injury to sentient

beings, they are bound to bring suffering to the agent according to the law of *karma* or moral justice, and even when they lead to *svarga* or happiness in heaven they conduce only to a transient and perishable good and therefore a good or *puruṣārtha* which can appear only as evil by the side of the imperishable Freedom which constitutes the essence of *Mokṣa* or *Apavarga*. And what applies to Vedic actions applies also to other empirical actions prompted by motives of gain or advantage. These also lead to suffering in so far as they involve the infliction of suffering, and even when they produce happiness, that happiness being perishable and liable to increase and decrease can appear only as evil (*Drṣṭavadānuśravikah sahyaviśuddhi-kṣayātīśayayuktaḥ*—"Sāṅkhyakārikā." *Kāmye-akāmye'pi sādhyato'āviśeṣāt*—"Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya"). In other words, according to Sāṅkhya, there is real spiritual value neither in *drṣṭa* and *kāmya karmas*, i.e., ordinary ethical actions but done from empirical motives, nor in *ānuśravika karmas* i.e., ceremonials enjoined by the *śāstras*. They may lead to *svarga*, happiness in heaven, but this being perishable is only *duḥkha*, i.e., a form of suffering. Besides, the impurity of injury (*himsā*), etc., involved in Vedic *karmas*, will lead to suffering in due course even though the religious merit acquired thereby may bring about happiness in heaven for the time being. Hence for the Sāṅkhya as for the Bauddhas the ceremonial is to be judged by ethical tests, but while for the Bauddhas there is no special significance attaching to ceremonials, i.e., no potency or power in them to produce specific effects, it is not denied by Sāṅkhya that ceremony has a certain efficacy in leading to *svarga* or happiness in heaven. Such happiness however being perishable, the desire for it is condemned as a form of *avidyā* or nescience, i.e., as arising from *aviveka* or absence of the proper discrimination of the true nature of reality. Such non-discrimination is the ground of all

impure actions and arise from a preponderance of the constituents of *Tamas* or Inertia and *Rajas* or Energy in the *citta* or empirical self. When the *Tama* and the *Raja Guṇas* will give way to the constituent of *Sattva* or Intelligence-stuff so that there will emerge in the empirical self a preponderance of *Sattva* over the other two constituents, non-discrimination will also give way to right discrimination or *vivekakhyāti* which will lead to *Mokṣa* or the true Freedom of the individual. It is the *Sāttvika Karmas*, not originating in passion or intellectual indolence, that conduce to this *sattva-vivṛddhi* or preponderance of *Sattva* in us, and such actions have thus real spiritual value, not the Vedic actions nor ordinary ethical actions from material motives of gain.

(3) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas however do not go as far as the Sāṅkhya in the condemnation of ceremonialism. According to them, righteousness, *dharma* is indeed a quality of the Self (*ātmaguṇa*) and therefore subjective in significance, but this subjective quality or trait is itself to be acquired through the proper discharge of an objective code of duties. These duties are the *sādharaṇadharmas* or duties of universal scope and application and the *Varṇāśramadharmas* or the duties of station in life. It is through the proper discharge of these common or universal duties and the special duties of one's *Varṇa* or social class and of one's *Āśrama* or specific stage in spiritual growth that one realises that special quality of the Self which constitutes *dharma*, virtue or righteousness. While the *sādhāraṇa* or common *dharma*s constitute his properly ethical duties, the *Varṇāśramadharmas* comprise both ceremonial actions as well as the duties of station in life. Hence ceremonial actions are not to be condemned as they are not devoid of moral significance as the Sāṅkhya supposes. They conduce to *dharma* or righteousness when duly accomplished and are

thus obligatory conformably to the social class, temperament and special powers of the moral agent.

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas therefore ceremonials are not to be discarded as morally useless. On the contrary, they are essential and indispensable for moral culture according to the social position and spiritual growth of the individual. But they are essential and indispensable not in the sense of being charged with any non-natural magical potency, but in the sense of being conducive to the moral perfection of the agent. Hence ceremonials have validity and justification only from the ethical standpoint, *i.e.*, as being conducive to moral improvement and culture, and are not obligatory *per se* nor as mysterious agencies of magical potency. This therefore is an attempt to vindicate ceremonials on rational grounds instead of simply accepting them on trust or on the authority of the Vedas. It thus stands midway between the unmitigated condemnation of ceremonialism on the one hand (as in Sāṅkhya) and its blind acceptance on the other (as in Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's school). According to it, ceremonials have moral value, but only because they conduce to moral well-being. It is only in this sense that even *Vaidha Himsā* is justified, *i.e.*, *himsā* or injury which is sanctioned by Vidhi or Vedic injunction. Such injunctions constitute a part of the moral code which is obligatory on every individual in accordance with his station in life. Such injunctions are thus authoritative as being conducive to moral well-being and moral training. This applies not merely to the beneficial part of these injunctions but also to *himsā* and the like which they may involve in special cases. Even these latter when enjoined in the Shāstric code cannot be really evil but must be conducive to real good though we may not perceive how this can be. Hence the injunctions of scripture, even those that enjoin *himsā* or injury to others, have authority, but not as arbitrary fiat

whose authority we must not challenge, but as conducive to the good of the individual.

(4) The view of the Pūrva Mimāṃsakas is the diametrical opposite of the view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in this respect. While the latter defend ceremonialism on ethical grounds and thus try to give a rational explanation of the ceremonial actions, the Mimāṃsakas resolve even the ethical into the ceremonial and derive their validity from Vedic authority or scriptural prescription. Thus according to them the duties *all* come under the class of ceremonial actions and are authoritative only as being prescribed by Śāstric injunction. This applies both to the *nityanaimittika-karmas* or unconditional duties and *kāmya-karmas* or ordinary ethical duties from empirical motives. They are obligatory only as prescribed by an external Śāstric code of injunctions and prohibitions (*vidhiniṣedha*) and not as conducive to moral well-being or perfection as Nyāya supposes.

The above is thus an attempt to vindicate even the ethical from the standpoint of the ceremonial. It is the view of the Pūrvamimāṃsakas and particularly of the Bhāṭṭa School of the Pūrvamimāṃsakas who represent the extreme externalistic conception of morality and accept ceremonialism in all its arbitrariness.

(i) Thus according to the Bhāṭṭas, the ceremonial and sacrificial acts in themselves constitute *dharma*. Since they are prescribed by Śāstra they must conduce to the agent's good and as thus conducive to good (*śreyaskara*) they are *dharma* whose nature is to conduce to the agent's highest good or *niḥśreyasa*. This applies both to the *nityanaimittika-karmas* or unconditional duties and *kāmyakarmas* or ordinary ethical duties from empirical motives, the former producing beneficial results (*phala*) just like the latter and thus being duties, *i.e.*, obligatory on the agent.

(ii) The Prābhākaras however do not carry externalism as far as the Bhāṭṭas. They do not impugn the authority of the Vedic injunctions and ceremonial actions. On the contrary they accept these as the content of duty just as the Bhāṭṭas do. But they give an altogether different explanation of their authority. It is derived according to the Prābhākaras not from their conduciveness to any ulterior end or consequence to be inferred from their being scripturally prescribed as the Bhāṭṭas suppose but from their intrinsic validity as self-positing Duty or Verity of the Moral Order. This constitutes their *Apūrva*, intrinsic validity as impersonal ontological verities of the moral order. It is revealed through a self-evidencing experience in the Self which constitutes *preraṇā* or moral prompting of the imperative. The Bhāṭṭas also assume *Apūrva*, but this is, according to them, only a certain conduciveness to specific ends in the prescribed acts or duties and not the intrinsic essence of these acts as self-validating, self-establishing realities of the moral order. Nor is it known, according to them, by any unique feeling of moral impulsion but only by implication (*arthāpatti*) from their being scripturally prescribed as duties. Since they are prescribed by Śāstra, they must be *dharma* or duty and since *dharma* is *Śreyaskara*, conducive to good, these duties must be conducive to specific ends such as happiness in heaven, etc. By implication it follows that there is *Apūrva* or objective potency in these acts for specific ends or consequences. This *Apūrva* however is not itself *dharma*, the acts themselves as scripturally prescribed being *dharma* and *Apūrva* being only an implication of their essence as *dharma* or moral duty. The Naiyāyikas also accept *Apūrva* but only as a subjective disposition or modification of the self, an *Ātmasamskāra* or specific subjective tendency which matures into consequences of happiness and suffering in a non-natural way according

to the principles of moral justice. It is thus a subjective tendency and not an objective *karmic* potency, and is known by inference from its effects. The Prābhākaras however accept *Apūrva* only in the sense of the intrinsic moral authority or validity of the prescribed acts as impersonal moral verities. It is known neither by implication nor by inference but is immediately revealed to the self in the unique feeling of moral impulsion or *preraṇā* which is self-evidencing like the Self. It is this *Apūrva* which appertains necessarily to the prescribed acts of scripture as duties that constitutes their moral authority or validity. Though the duties consist in the Śāstric prescriptions, their moral authority is independent of Śāstra being due to their ontological essence as duty which implies *Apūrva*. *Apūrva* is thus the *ratio essendi*, the reason or ground of their objective validity, while *preraṇā*, moral impulsion is the *ratio cognoscendi*, the reason or ground of the objective validity being subjectively known. The act has intrinsic authority on the moral agent as self-established moral verity which is its *Apūrva*. This is revealed to the Self through moral prompting or impulsion which every such act necessarily induces, and this is *preraṇā*. Through the conception of *Preraṇā* and *Apūrva* the Prābhākaras thus seek to get over the pure externalism of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā. By the conception of intrinsic moral authority of duty as duty they are also able to distinguish between a disinterested, non-utilitarian morality of the *nityanaimittika* or unconditional duties and the utilitarian prudential morality of the *kāmya* or conditional duties. For the Bhāṭṭas however there is no such disinterested morality in the strict sense, *dharma* necessarily implying conduciveness to good in the conditional as well as the unconditional duties. The Bhāṭṭas are also unable to get beyond ceremonialism and externalism as they regard Śāstric prescription not only as the only ground of the

moral authority of the duties but also as the only evidence of their conduciveness to good.

(5) In the preceding section we have considered the externalism of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, particularly the Prābhākara view which builds an ethical interpretation of conscience and duty on the foundation of an external code. In this section we shall discuss the views of the Uttaramīmāṃsā with regard to this question of the ethical value of ceremonials. Śankara's views are of special interest in this respect. In a synthetic scheme of the moral life as a gradation of ascending stages Śankara tries to find a place for ceremonialism as well as ethics proper by their demarcation relatively to the spiritual end aimed at. Rāmānuja however recognises only ethics proper, *i.e.*, the ethical duties only, as conducing to divine knowledge. Some Rāmānujists however recognise the ceremonial duties also, these being required, in their view, for the preservation of the body and other auxiliaries of the spiritual life proper.

(i) *Śankara's view.*—Thus according to Śankara there are two *mārgas* or paths of the spiritual life. (a) One is the path (*mārga*) of *pravṛtti* or desire. It is the path intended for the person who participates in empirical life and who is governed by the feeling of attraction and aversion. Duty, in this path, is what best subserves desire or *kāmanā*. Hence duty (*karma*) is here a means to the satisfaction of desire, *i.e.*, to the realisation of the desired ends or consequences. These ends may be empirical (*dṛṣṭa*) or non-empirical (*adrṣṭa*). Hence there are *dṛṣṭārthaka-karmas* or duties of empirical import and *adrṣṭārthaka-karmas* or duties of non-empirical import. The non-empirical duties are laid down in *Vaidika-karma-kānda*, *i.e.*, in that part of the Vedas which deals with the nature and significance of *karma*. The empirical duties are known from *vyāvahāra*, *i.e.*, from the customs and practices of

men, and also from empirical sciences such as *āyurveda*, science of medicine, *nitiśāstra*, science of the rules of conduct, etc. These empirical and non-empirical duties together constitute the moral code for the way of desire, *i.e.*, they are the duties of the person who desires to make the best of his empirical life. They however do not constitute the highest morality. Ensnaring man in the toils of the empirical life (*samsāra*) they ensure only a relative satisfaction and not the highest satisfaction of freedom from all limitations. They have indeed a moral significance since merit (*dharma*) and consequent possibilities of *karma* are generated thereby. But their real value is in preparing the individual towards the higher morality of cessation (*nivṛtti*). This latter is the other path or *mārga*. It is the path of knowledge and realisation in which the empirical life of duties becomes merged in the end. (*Sarvamkarmākhilam pārtha jñāne parisamāpyate*). Some Śāṅkarites hold that the life of duties is only an inducement, consequences like happiness in heaven being held out with a view to draw on the ignorant multitudes.

(*Ajñāprarocanārthatvāt*—"Advaita-Brahma-Siddhi"). These consequences attract them to the life of duties which is a precondition of the higher life of dispassion. (b) This latter is the higher life of the spirit. It is the life of absolute cessation from desire and therefore from duties prompted by desire. It thus is the sphere of the ethical virtues proper, *i.e.*, of the disinterested virtues practised without reference to any extraneous, empirical end. It is the sphere of the fourfold practice of the four disciplines (*sādhana catuṣṭaya*), the sphere of purely ethical or spiritual culture which leads at last to Self-knowledge (*Atmajñāna*) and through Self-knowledge to that Freedom-in-lifetime (*Jīvanmukti*) which is the highest consummation of the spirit. The highest end is therefore the realisation of Self-knowledge, *i.e.*, of the knowledge of the Self as

identical with Brahma. By realising this knowledge the Spirit shakes off its limitations and bonds of finitude and recovers its true essence as the unlimited and eternally accomplished being. The highest duty is that which conduces to this knowledge and the duties of the empirical life have moral significance only as a preparatory training for the discharge of the higher duty which leads to Self-knowledge. For Śāṅkara therefore the consummation of the ethico-spiritual ideal is a stage of the spirit towards which the perfection of knowledge is essential. The highest duties are those which conduce to this end of knowledge and all other duties are duties only as preparatory to the duties which culminate in true knowledge. Hence the highest duties are noetic rather than ethical and even the ethical duties are of moral significance as leading up to the noetic duties of the four disciplines, *i.e.*, to duties which are strictly speaking *jñānāṅgas*, constituent members or moments in the realisation of knowledge. According to Śāṅkara therefore the duties of the empirical life have no spiritual significance except as preparatory to the higher duties of contemplation on the ultimate essence of the Transcendental Reality so that we must distinguish between two planes or paths of the moral life—(1) the plane of Lower Ethics, *i.e.*, of the morality of worldly men which has only a worldly or empirical significance, or at best a mediate or indirect significance for the true ideal of the spirit which is a transcendent, non-empirical ideal, and (2) a plane of Higher Ethics, *i.e.*, of the higher morality of the dianoetic virtues which conduce directly to the realisation of knowledge and of freedom in knowledge. In this latter plane the ethical or worldly duties cease and only contemplation and its auxiliaries remain.

N. B.—In Manu and the Gītā however a third plane or path is recognised, *viz.*, *Nivṛttakarmamārga* or path

of disinterested duties. It is a synthesis of Śankara's two paths of desire (*pravṛtti*) and cessation (*nivṛtti*). Śankara's higher path of *nivṛtti* or cessation from activity presents only a negative ideal which leads necessarily to spiritual bankruptcy. It implies in its later stages the cessation of all duties including *nityanaimittika* or unconditional duties as well as the *kāmya* or conditional duties. It is therefore a condition of spiritual void without content, *i.e.* the negation or death of Spirit. Such *nivṛtti* or cessation according to Gītā cannot be an end-in-itself and can be recommended only as preparatory to the attitude of disinterestedness and detachment. The highest ideal is that which fills this void of *nivṛtti* or cessation with concrete content, *i.e.*, which brings disinterestedness to bear upon the accomplishment of the duties of life—the ideal or plane of *nivṛttakarma* or disinterested performance of duty for duty's sake. It is the plane of *karma* without material motive, *i.e.*, of the *nityanaimittikakarmas* or unconditional duties to be done simply from the sense of duty.

(ii) *Rāmānuja's view*.—The view of Rāmānuja furnishes a close parallel in this respect to that of the Gītā and of Manu. According to Rāmānuja also the highest stage of the spirit is not one of *karmasannyāsa* or freedom from duty as Śankara supposes, but one of moral obligations to be discharged disinterestedly without any desire for the consequence. But these duties have spiritual significance, according to him, not in themselves but in so far as they are conducive to divine knowledge. Thus according to him works are to be abjured when they are obstacles to divine knowledge and to faith. There are *puṇyakarmas* or works of religious merit. These lead to specific ends or consequences such as happiness in heaven (*svargādiphala*). There are also *pāpakarmas* or works of religious demerit. These lead to the opposite consequences, *viz.*, suffering and punishment. All *pāpakarmas* or

works of demerit are obstacles to divine knowledge. Meritorious works (*puṇyakarmas*) are also obstacles when accomplished from interested motives, *i.e.*, for reward or happiness. Only when the latter are accomplished disinterestedly from a sense of pure duty, are they conducive to divine knowledge. Even then however they are unable to accomplish this end through themselves, but such meritorious works disinterestedly accomplished are a means to that predominance of the power of enlightenment (*sattvavivṛddhi*) which qualifies us for the spiritual life. In fact, mere works cannot produce anything but impermanent and insignificant results. They thus conduce to ends which are only relative and insignificant and cannot themselves lead to Divine knowledge which is of absolute worth or value. (*Kevalakarmanām alpāsthira-phalatvajñānam ca karmamīmāṃsayāvaseyam—“Śrībhāṣya”*). Such works are to be performed throughout life, *i.e.*, in all stages or *Āśramas* of the spiritual life (*Evamrūpāyā dhruvānusmṛteḥ sādhanāni yajñādini karmāṇi. . . . tadutpattaye sarvānyāśramakarmāṇi yāvajjīvamanaṣṭheyāni*). Hence there is no supermoral plane of being, no plane of *karmasannyāsa* or freedom from the obligations of duty. Even the highest stage requires the due discharge of the unconditional duties (*anabhisamhitaphalakarma*) without desire for the consequence. Such duties are *sattvavivṛddhijanaka*, *i.e.*, they increase our power of enlightenment, and are obligatory throughout life, *i.e.*, in all stages of the spirit including the stage of absolute or divine knowledge (*jñānavirodhi ca karma puṇyapāparūpam. . . . Tasya ca jñānotpattivirodhitvam jñānotpattihetubhūtasattvavirodhirajastamavivṛddhidvāreṇa. . . . Tannirasanam ca anabhisamhitaphalena anuṣṭhiyena dharmena*).

(iii) *The view of Venkateśa (of the Rāmānujist School).*—According to Rāmānuja works are to be judged by their conduciveness to divine knowledge and therefore only works of religious merit accomplished without desire for

the consequence are to be recognised as of moral value. According to Venkateśa however works are to be judged by their conduciveness to the realisation of the good and the avoidance of evil. Works therefore which are means to the attainment of the good are right. Similarly works which ensure the avoidance of evil are also right. Now good and evil may be empirical or non-empirical and there are *laukika* or natural means as well as *alaukika* or non-natural means for the attainment of good and the avoidance of evil. But while the secular or natural means assure only empirical results, the non-natural or scriptural means accomplish both empirical and non-empirical ends. The *laukika* means are known either by induction based on observation or from the various sciences such as Medicine, Morals, etc. (*Laukika hitāhitayoh anvayavyatireka āyurvedanitiśāstrādikam pramāṇam*.—"Nyāyapariśuddhi" by Venkateśa). The *alaukika* or non-natural means are known from the Vedas (*Alaukikahitāhitayostu vedah pramāṇam*). Even the natural means are not to be neglected. They are required for the preservation of the body which even the devotee who aims at meditation cannot do without. But they are to be resorted to only in such ways as not to hinder or impede the non-natural means prescribed by scripture. *Tadapi yogasāadhanibhūtaśarīrarakṣaṇārtham mumukṣūṇāmapi śrutismṛtyādyavirodhena anuṣṭheyam*.) The scriptural prescriptions have only good and evil in view. Whatever is scripturally enjoined or forbidden is good or evil according to the scope and sphere of such injunctions and prohibitions : (*yacca śrutivihitam tadakhilamapi yathādhikāram hitam yacca tanniṣiddham tadakhilamapi ahitam. . . .adhikārivišeṣam apekṣya hi vidhirmiśedhāśca*). But how can there be conduciveness to good in all scriptural works ? Such works include unconditional duties as well as conditional duties for the accomplishment of relative ends. How can

these conditional duties be regarded as conducive to anything really and absolutely good? Further the scriptural duties also involve destruction of life. How is such destruction compatible with their conduciveness to good? The answer is that scriptural prescriptions always have reference to persons specifically coming within their application. There are persons who desire happiness and the cessation of unhappiness. For them the *laukika* means which may lead to suffering are undesirable in comparison with the scriptural means which produce the happiness without producing suffering. (*Nanu abhicārādikarmaṇām anarthaheturāṇāṃ kṣudrapuruṣārthasādhanaṇām ca kāmyāṇāṃ karmaṇām katham hitatvam? Ucyate—adhikariviśeṣam apeksya hi sarvo vidhiniśeḍhaśca... yo hi sukham duḥkhanivṛttim ca icchati tasya tatsādhanaṇapekṣamānasya laukikeṣu sādhanēṣu pravṛttasya teṣāṃ nirayādhietubhūtānarthaheturvena tatparihārāya anarthaheturvarahitah sukhādyupāyāḥ pratipadyante.*) In fact, there is a justification for the conditional duties not only from this but also from the higher standpoint of the spiritual ideal of liberation or freedom. The devotee who aims at spiritual freedom must practise the prescribed duties up to his death. For this he must look to the preservation of his body. It follows therefore that for the sake of mere self-preservation not only *himsā* such as destruction of the enemy by scriptural means but also conditional duties for such relative and minor ends as bringing about a rainfall or ensuring a good harvest, are necessary. In this sense there is a moral justification even for those conditional scriptural duties which aim at relative and natural ends such as rainfall, economic comfort, etc., just as there is a justification even for destruction of life for the sake of preservation of the Self. As regards conditional duties which are prescribed for non-natural ends, they are raised, by being done without desire, to

the position of the unconditional duties and are thus morally obligatory. Lastly, the unconditional duties are the means of avoiding evil and are thus good for all. In other words, the *himsā* which is prescribed by Śāstra is only for self-preservation necessary for devotion. Similarly the conditional duties are means to devotion either as conducing to *natural* ends such as the necessities of physical life or as accomplishing non-natural ends and thereby attaining the status of the unconditional duties through the attitude of disinterestedness. The unconditional duties are necessary for all for the avoidance of evil to which they are the means. The Śāstrika prescriptions are thus our benevolent guides on the path of life full of dangers and obstacles. We are the children of Śāstra and Śāstra's love to us is like that of a thousand parents. *Mumukṣorāpi rakṣakakṣatriyādyabhāve rākṣasādyabhibhave ca ātmarakṣaṇārtham abhicāraḥ kartavya eva... anyathā aharahānuṣṭheyasya prayānād anuvarttanīyasya karmāderucchedaprasaṅgenopāyānispatteḥ mokṣāsiddhiprasaṅgāt. Vṛstyannādi dṛṣṭārthāni sarvāṇi upāsanāniṣṭhotpattyaupāyikatayā tadapekṣamanuṣṭheyāni. Pāralaukikam tu tatphalābbhisandhivirahena karmayogānuṣṭhānadaśāyām nityanaimittikairekīkṛtya kartavyāni. Naimittikāni hi sarvāṇi praśaktānārtha-parihārārthatayā sarvahitāni eva. Evam nityāni... atah... "Śāstram hi vatsalataram mātāpitṛsahasratah" iti.*

Hence according to Venkateśa the natural means known from experience are to be resorted to only in such ways as not to conflict with the non-natural means of scripture. These latter are superior to the natural means for the accomplishment of natural as well as non-natural ends. The Śāstrika means do not bring suffering while the natural means may entail consequences of suffering and mischief. Further the natural means are of no avail for the accomplishment of non-natural ends, but the Śāstrika means accomplish both natural and non-

natural ends. Both natural and Śāstrika means however are instruments for the attainment of good and avoidance of evil. This is true even of the Śāstrika prescriptions which recommend destruction of life. Such destruction is prescribed only for self-preservation which even the pious devotee cannot do without. This also holds good in the case of the conditional prescriptions having empirical and relative ends in view. Such empirical ends are required for the natural life which the devotee has to live through the body to which he is attached. The conditional duties which have non-natural ends in view are however necessary in another way. By being done without desire they become the same as the unconditional duties which are indispensable for keeping out of harm's way.

With Venkateśa, therefore, the ceremonial code loses its magical character and becomes homogeneous with the known laws of conduct, *i.e.*, with ethics. The scriptural prescriptions are only better and surer means of attaining happiness and avoiding unhappiness and evil. Men, by following these injunctions, are prevented from running into devious ways of mischief and misery in the pursuit of the ends prompted by desire. There is a legitimate satisfaction, according to Venkateśa, even for *pravṛtti* or desire—a satisfaction which Rāmānuja will not allow. According to Rāmānuja all desires must be subdued as being obstacles to divine knowledge. According to Venkateśa even desires have their place in the ethical life, *i.e.*, as means to meditation and devotion which lead to spiritual freedom. Thus works from desire are not to be condemned altogether, neither empirical works nor the non-empirical works prescribed by scripture. Both are serviceable for the accomplishment of specific ends required even by the devotee, but as the non-empirical works are more effectively useful for these purposes, the

empirical secular works must always be resorted to subserviently to the non-empirical works.

The above is a fairly complete survey of the relation of *Karma* to the moral life as conceived in the different systems of Hindu Philosophy. We have seen that *Karma* includes, for the Hindu, both secular works based on experience and ceremonial duties prescribed by scripture. The secular works as conducing to relative empirical ends are regarded as having a certain value. But the greatest importance is attached to the scriptural duties which are either rationally justified or accepted on their own authority. The Sāṅkhya alone is an exception in this respect condemning as it does all ceremonial actions without exception because of the evanescent character of their effects and of the impurities of animal slaughter, etc., which they involve. Even the Sāṅkhya however recognises in the scriptural duties a certain efficacy to lead to consequences of happiness and the like.

Hence with nearly all Hindu systems the code of duty comprises not only the ethical code proper but also the ceremonial code of Vedic injunctins and prohibitions. The analysis of conscience or consciousness of duty thus resolves itself into the analysis of the consciousness of the authority which attaches to a scriptural imperative or prescription. What is the nature of this Imperative or Command? How does it present itself as authoritative to the consciousness of the Moral agent? What precisely is its relation to the motive of the latter? These are some of the questions which arise out of the imperative and impelling character ascribed to *Vidhiwākyas* or prescriptions of scripture. The answer to these questions gives us the analysis of conscience or consciousness of duty.

In the previous chapter we have dealt with the psychology of volition with special reference to the question of the motive to will. We have there considered two

principal views of the character of the motive. It can be seen that these different views of the psychological motive will lead in their ethical application to different views of conscience and of schools of ethics. The question of conscience is the question of the relation of the psychological motive to the moral imperative. Hence differences in the conceptions of the motive and of the moral imperative will lead to corresponding differences in the conception of conscience. We may suppose, *e.g.*, that all acts are done with a view to some *iṣṭa*, desirable end or good, that this *iṣṭa* or end is pleasure or happiness, or that it is some form of satisfaction other than pleasure, or again that it is an end other than either pleasure or satisfaction. Or, we may suppose that some acts are their own ends and do not stand in need of an *iṣṭa* or extraneous end. It is obvious that these different views of the motive will also lead to different conceptions of the moral imperative and thus to different views of conscience. Similarly we may also conceive *Vidhi* or Scriptural Imperative in as many different ways. We may suppose, *e.g.*, that it is only an additional motive appealing by means of *iṣṭasāadhanatā* or conduciveness to good. This will give us the hedonistic or Eudæmonistic view of conscience. We may suppose again that it is an independent source of authority which provides a new end, or again that *Vidhi* is its own end. It is obvious that our conception of conscience will differ in each case according to our conception of the Śāstric Imperative.

We have therefore to consider the nature of *Vidhi-vākya* or Scriptural Imperative and the character of its impelling force or obligatoriness, *i.e.*, we have to consider not only the general character of the Śāstric Imperative but also its relation to the empirical motive of the individual. We shall therefore first consider the general meaning or import of a Vedic prescription and we shall next consider the relation between the imperative or command in-

volved is such a prescription and the empirical will of the individual.

The meaning of Codanā, Vidhivākya or Vedic Prescription :—

What then is the nature of a *Codanā* or *Śāstric* prescription ? What is the special mark or function of a Vedic injunction which distinguishes it from an empirical imperative or command ? The question is considered in the “*Śavarabhāṣya*” on the Jaimini Sūtras where the nature of *codanā* is described. It is pointed out that a *Śāstric* prescription has evidential value and validity in regard not only to the present but also the past, the future, the supersensuous, the remote and the mediate. Hence it transcends all the limitations of the space and time and produces knowledge only of what is *artha*, *tattva* or reality. It is thus superior as a source of knowledge to sense-experience (*indriyas*) as well as the other sources of knowledge. These latter cannot cross all limits of space and time while *codanā* transcends all limitations. *Codanā bhūtam bhavantam bhaviṣyantam sūkṣam vyavahitam viprakṛṣṭam ityevam jātyam artham śaknoti adhigamayitum, na anyat kimcana indriyam.* *Codanā* thus bridges the gulf between the empirical and the non-empirical, the phenomenal and the transcendental. No other *pramāṇā* or means of knowledge is capable of this. Hence *codanā* has the highest authority as *pramāṇa* and this constitutes its obligatoriness on the moral agent as duty or *dharma*.

The question therefore is : how is such a *codanā* or Vedic prescription empirically known ? How is the authority of a Scriptural Imperative empirically revealed to the moral agent ? This leads us to the next question, *viz*

The Genesis of Vidhipratyaya, Conscience, or Consciousness of the Imperative.

The question here is ; how does this Moral Imperative as embodied in a Scriptural Prescription establish itself as authoritative in the consciousness of the moral agent ?

What is the nature of the process by means of which a *Vidhivākya* or scriptural prescription reveals itself as obligatory or morally binding ?

It may be supposed that we have here only a particular form of physical or psychological necessity, that the command establishes itself in consciousness just as will accomplishes itself in the action willed, *i.e.*, by a process in time. This is the view of the Bhāṭṭas according to which the Imperative is of the nature of *bhāvanā*, becoming. There is a moral order and there are facts relating to that order whose nature is that of causation. These are the moral causes which are analogous to physical causes.

The Prābhākaras here join issue with the Bhāṭṭas. Scriptural prescriptions are of the nature of *niyoga* which is indeed a fact of the moral order, but is a realised or accomplished fact and as such is not becoming but being. This distinguishes its relation to the moral agent from *kriyākartṛsambandha*, the relation of the doer to his deed. The latter is a relation of causation, of psychological determination by the will. Hence it is essentially process, becoming or *bhāvanā* in which the motive prompts or realises the act. Here however we have the revelation of something accomplished to the consciousness of the moral agent, a verity of the moral order revealing itself as self-established, self-authoritative Law to the individual. Hence we have here an original or unique relation—the relation of a command to the agent commanded (*praiṣya-praiṣa-sambandha*) which differs radically from the relation of *Kartā* or agent to his *kriyā* or action willed. The latter is a relation of causation while this is only a relation of revelation which makes known the Law (*pravartanām jñāpayati*). Revelation is not causation being merely illumination or enlightenment. *Niyoga* only reveals the Law but does not compel, moral prompting

being entirely different [from physical or psychological prompting.

The Bhāttas however contend that the assumption of two kinds of relation is uncalled for and unnecessary. The concept of becoming (*bhāvanā*) suffices to explain the authority of a Scriptural Imperative. When one hears a scriptural injunction one is conscious of two *bhāvanās* or operative processes. It is these two processes that account for the obligatoriness or moral authority of such injunctions. (*Iha hi liṅ-ādi yukteṣu vākyeṣu dve bhāvane pratiyete śabdabhāvanā arthabhāvanā ca.*) Thus one becomes conscious of a *śabdabhāvanā* or operative process of the imperative when one hears a scriptural injunction and one is also conscious of an *arthabhāvanā* or process of becoming in the self through which the imperative is realised in action. These two processes together constitute the mode of operation of the *Vidhi* or Scriptural Imperative in consciousness. One is a *vyāpāra* or operative process of the *śabda*, i.e., of the Imperative itself. It is *śabdabhāvanā*, the operative agency of the categorical Imperative which calls forth *puruṣappravṛtti* or volition in the moral agent. The other is a *vyāpāra* or operative process in the *puruṣa*, i.e., in the individual himself. It is *arthabhāvanā* or operative agency of the individual's will which brings about the act. The one is a process outside the individual, the other a process within him. The *śabdavyāpāra*, the causal operation of the Imperative induces *puruṣavyāpāra*, the process of volition in the individual, and this latter realises the act which is to be done.

Yo bhavanakriyākartṭṛvisayaprayojakavyāpāraḥ puruṣasthah so'rthabhāvanā yastu śabdagataprayojakavyāpāraḥ yatra puruṣappravṛttiḥ sādhyatayā pratipadyate sa śabdabhāvanā

("Nyāyamañjarī")

*Tatra puruṣappravṛtṭyanukulobhāvayituh vyāpāra-
viśeṣaḥ śabdabhāvanā. Sa ca līnamśena ucyate.
Līn śravāne ayam mām pravartayati, matpravṛt-
tyanukūlavypāravān ayam iti niyamena pratitiḥ.
Sa ca bhāvanā aṁsatrayam apeksate sādhyam,
sāadhanam itikarttavyatām ca—kim bhāvayet, kena
bhāvayet katham bhāvayet. Tatra sādhyākāṅkṣā-
yām ārthibhāvanā sādhyatvena anveti.*

(“Arthamimāmsā” of Laugākṣibhāskara,
a writer on Pūrvamimāmsā).

In Kantian language we may say there is an operation (*vyāpāra*) of the Pure Reason prescribing to the will, i.e., laying down a certain form for the guidance of the latter. This is [*śabdibhāvanā* or *śabdavyāpāra*. It is to be distinguished from *ārthibhāvanā* or *puruṣavyāpāra* which is the will realising something, i.e., seeking a particular satisfaction or accomplishing itself in a specific way.

How then are the two *bhāvanās* related? According to Kumārila, the relation of the two operations being that of *ekapratyayābhidheyatva*, i.e., being expressed in one and the same affix, there cannot be any priority or posteriority between them, logical or chronological. As a matter of fact, the *śabdabhāvanā* necessarily involves the *arthabhāvanā*. Thus the *śabdabhāvanā*, the operation of the Imperative, supposes three things: (1) *sādhya* or something to be realised, (2) *sādhana* or means whereby to realise this something, and (3) *itikarttavyatā* or manner of realising this something by the proper means. Now the *sādhyāmsā*, i.e., the object to be realised by the operation of the Imperative, is the inducement of *puruṣappravṛtti*, the volition of the agent. This inducement of the agent's will leads necessarily to the realisation of the empirical action which is *arthabhāvanā*. Hence *arthabhāvanā* is a necessary implicate of *śabdabhāvanā* being involved in its *sādhyāmsā* or part constituting the object to be realised,

Consider for example the case of any particular *Vidhi* or Imperative such as 'yajeta' (sacrifice in such and such ways). Here the injunctive or imperative consists of two parts—(1) the part which constitutes the *dhātu* or root expressing the nature of the act, viz., the sacrifice, and (2) the affix or *pratyaya* which expresses the act in the form of a command or imperative.

The latter, i.e., the *pratyaya* or affix again is divisible into (1) *ākhyātatva*, i.e., conjugational affix in general common to all tenses (*daśakālādhikarāṇa*) and (2) *līntva* which expresses the element of imperative or command.

Now what is expressed here by the affix or *pratyaya*, i.e., by the injunctive or *līn* of the *ākhyāta*? It expresses both *śabdabhāvanā*, i.e., the prompting force or operation of the imperative and *arthabhāvanā* or operation of the will which brings about the act of sacrifice. Thus the operation of the imperative (the *śabdabhāvanā*) consists in the inducement of the agent's will (*puruṣapravṛtti*), this being its *sādhya* or object to be realised, and the will which is thus generated necessarily leads to *arthabhāvanā*, i.e., the realisation of the act of sacrifice. Hence the operation of the imperative necessarily involves the operation of the empirical will which brings about the act, so that the two *bhāvanās*, processes or operations, are co-ordinate, the one necessarily implying the other.

Some Bhāṭṭas however differ from Kumārila in this respect, i.e., as regards the two processes being co-ordinate or same in rank. Thus some hold that as the *śabdabhāvanā* induces or leads to the *arthabhāvanā*, the former is primary (*pradhāna*) while the latter is auxiliary (*gauṇa*). Others again hold that as it is the *artha*, the object which is realised that determines the operation of the injunctive, the *arthabhāvanā* is the principal operation, the *śabda-bhāvanā* being only auxiliary or subservient.

The Prābhākaras however do not accept two *bhāvanās* or operations. We are not conscious of two *bhāvanās* or processes when we hear a scriptural injunctive or *Vidhivākya*. We are conscious only of one *bhāvanā* or process, *viz.*, the process of volition in the agent which realises the act. This is *arthabhāvanā* which is subordinate to the *Vidhi* whose essence is injunction, *i.e.*, revelation of the Law as authoritative as distinguished from causal determination or compulsion. The *liṅ* expresses this injunctive or imperative character of the *Vidhi* or scriptural prescription and not any causal operation (*bhāvanā*) nor the meaning of the root (*dhātvartha*). A scriptural command or *Vidhi* is obligatory by its very nature and necessarily reveals itself as authoritative or binding in the consciousness of the agent. It is cognised through a unique mode of consciousness, *ātmākūṭaviśeṣah*, *i.e.*, a specific wave, excitement or impulse in the Self which is *svaprakāśa* or self-luminous like the Self. *Codanāvākya*, the scriptural prescription, is the occasion, *nimitta* or *kaṛaṇa* which induces this feeling of impulsion in the Self. On hearing such a maxim or prescription one becomes conscious of this impulsion in oneself. It is a self-validating experience, this *Ātmākūṭa* or impulsion in the *Ātman* which validates the Moral Imperative in consciousness. This *Ātmākūṭa* is not however peculiar to moral impulsion or *preraṇā*. It exists also in *laukika preraṇā* or non-moral impulsion. For example, it is present in request, invitation and other non-moral experience. Psychologically this moral *preraṇā* and the non-moral or *laukika preraṇā* are the same. In both cases there is this *Ātmākūṭa* or impulse in the Self. This is a unique feeling which cannot be further analysed. If one has experienced it one knows what it is; if one has not experienced it one cannot understand what it is. It is a self-validating impulsion which is induced by

śabda or verbal command and has thus the latter as its *pramāṇa* or instrumental cause. We first know it in empirical, non-moral experience as in request, invitation and the like. In the case of *codanāvākyas* we have a certain *nirupādhika vidhi* or unconditional command which necessarily induces this feeling of impulsion. This is the knowledge-inducing or *jñāpaka* function of a scriptural maxim or *vidhivākya*. By producing this impulsion or *Ātmākūta* it becomes *pravartaka*, a motive to the will. The Imperative thus impels only in the sense of revealing the Law as duty, i.e., by inducing the knowledge of its authority. It is this sense of the authority of the Imperative in the form of the cognition that it is binding or obligatory on me as duty that constitutes the *pravartakatva*, the power of motivation of the *Vidhi*. *Prerito'ham iti tu jñānajanakatvam vidheh pravartakatvam.*

Līnādi vidhih pratiyate katham? . . . vyutpattiśca asya vyavahārāt avakalpate, gaccha, adhīṣva, iti śrūtvā vṛddha ceṣtamāno dṛśyate. Cestā ca svātmani pravarttikā āgamapūrvikā dṛṣṭā. Pratyakṣadr̥ṣṭe ca āmrādaḥ sukhāsādhanaḥ anavayavya-tirekābhyām avagate tadanusmaranāt pravarttamānaḥ kasmimści-dātmākūte samupajāte sati bhautikam vyāpāram ārabhate. Sa ca ātmadharmā ātmā iva svasamvedyah. Ahampratyayagamyo hi ātmā nāsau parasmai darśayitum śakyate, na ca na carayitum śakyate. . . Tathā ayam (ātmani) bhautikavyāpārahetuḥ ātmākūtavaiśeṣaḥ na pramāṇāntaravedyah bhavati. Na ca na vedyate. . . śabdebhyaḥ saḥ avagamyate tathā na anyataḥ iti ata eva na pramāṇāntaragocaradharma ityāhuḥ.

The *ātmākūta* is thus no subtle force acting on the agent. Its function is to move the agent by making the *Vidhi* known. This motivation by revelation of the Law is radically different from *bhāvanā*. The latter is causal determination or compulsion ; this is mere illumination or enlightenment.

The Naiyāyikas however reject the Bhāṭṭa as well as the Prābhākara conception of the Moral Imperative. According to them there is here neither any impersonal operation of the Imperative (*śabdabhāvanā*) nor any unique feeling of impulsion. The authority of the *Vidhi* is only the desire for the consequence presenting itself in the form of moral obligation or duty. There is nothing unique in this consciousness of authority, it being only a form of *phalecchā* or desire for the consequence. As *icchā* or desire it is *svasamvedya*, i.e., known through itself. It is not *śabdaikagocarah*, induced only by *śabda* or verbal command. Being a compound of *smṛti*, past experience, and *abhilāṣa*, desire, it may arise with or without a verbal command (*smaranāt abhilāṣeṇa vyavahārah pravarttate*—"Nyāyamanjarī"). The Imperative appeals through this experience of the consequence which it promises or holds out. Its validation in consciousness is therefore only *puruṣavyāpāra*, i.e., a process in the moral agent consisting in the impulsion of desire which arises from the expectation of the consequence. Scriptural Imperatives are of course personal commands being the prescriptions of the Lord to imperfect finite beings. There is compulsion implied in such commands but this is only because the Lord creates good and evil through His injunctions and prohibitions. Whatever the Lord commands is good and is good *because* the Lord commands it. Similarly whatever the Lord forbids is evil and is evil because the Lord forbids it. The authority of the scriptural prescriptions on the will of the agent is thus a *vyāpāra* or process in the agent himself: it is the desire for the good and aversion towards the evil involved in the injunctions and prohibitions of scripture as the Lord's commands. It is these desires and aversions in the agent that are the real operative forces and moral authority is the operation of good and evil through the agent's subjective desires and aversions.

Hence according to the Naiyāyikas *Vidhi* is a personal command which compels acceptance through *phalecchā* or desire for the consequence. It is thus compulsion, but only the compulsion of the subjective desire for good acting through the command of a Superior Person and compelling obedience through the promise of the result. It thus differs from *śabdabhāvanā* which is an impersonal operation of the Imperative on the consciousness of the agent and acts on the latter independently of *phalecchā* or desire for the consequence. It also differs from *nīyoga* which reveals the imperative as an end in itself through the feeling of *ātmākūta* or impulse in the Self. The *ātmākūta* only enlightens, revealing the Law as self-authoritative or obligatory in itself : it does not compel us according to the Naiyāyika nor act through the *phalecchā* or desire for the consequence.

Vidhi therefore may be conceived either as personal command or again as mere Impersonal Law without a personal source or authority. Again it may be supposed to act empirically through *phalecchā* or desire for the consequence or non-empirically either through the impersonal operation of the Imperative or by mere revelation of the Law. The consciousness of *Vidhi* thus involves *preraṇā* or sense of obligation in the agent which may be conceived either as obligation to a Superior Person or again as the impulsion of Impersonal Law realising or revealing itself in consciousness as authoritative. We shall therefore have to consider the nature and implications of this *preraṇā* or sense of duty or obligation which a *Vidhi* necessarily implies.

Analysis of Preraṇā or Sense of Obligation

We have seen that it is the very nature of *Vidhi* as Imperative to inspire the consciousness of duty or obliga-

tion in the agent. We shall therefore have to consider what is involved or implied in this impelling character of the Imperative. Hence we shall have to consider not only the nature of this impulsion or *preraṇā* but also the source from which it is derived. And we shall also have to consider how this obligatoriness or impelling character stands related to the act which is commanded. Lastly we shall have to consider whether such obligation implies the *subjective* freedom of the *moral agent* and any *objective* personal source of the Imperative. Hence the questions to be considered are :—

(a) Whence does *Vidhi* derive its *prerakatva* or obligatory force on the moral agent? What is it that determines the authority of the Imperative in the consciousness of the individual? Is it *iṣṭasāadhanatā* or conduciveness to good? In that case, what is this *iṣṭa* or good? Is it *sukha* or empirical pleasure? Or is it *duḥkhābhāva*, i.e., mere freedom from suffering? Or is the Imperative its own end which validates itself independently of any extraneous end?

(b) What is the nature of this impelling character or *prerakatva*? What is moral impulsion or moral prompting? Is it compulsion? Or is it inducement by mere enlightenment? Is there any difference between moral and psychological prompting?

(c) How is *prerakatva*, the impelling function of the Imperative, related to *anuṣṭheyatva* and *kāryatva*, its function of objective prescription of a duty? How is subjective obligation related to the objective act enjoined? What is the *objective* content of the subjective impulsion or obligation? Is it the imperative or command itself? Or is it something other than the command, i.e., some *iṣṭa*, end or good which is implied in the command?

(d) What does *Preraṇā* or obligation imply *subjectively* and *objectively*? Does it imply freedom in the *subject* who

feels the obligation? Does it again imply any *objective* personal source of the Imperative to whom the subject is to owe his obligation?

We have already partially considered the first two questions in connection with the genesis of *Vidhi-Pratyaya*. We shall here go over the same questions again from another point of view. This will be necessary as much for a complete analysis of *preraṇā* or obligation as for a fuller and more detailed consideration of these questions.

(a) *The source of the obligatoriness of Vidhi*

The first question to be considered therefore is : what is the source of the obligatoriness or impelling character of *Vidhi*? Is *Vidhi* or the Imperative cognised as authoritative because of its conduciveness to good? Or, is it authoritative in itself? It will be seen that the answer to these questions will depend on our conception of the psychological motive? If the motive is always the consciousness of some good, the Moral Imperative must also appeal through the consciousness of good. If the motive however implies no such consciousness, the Imperative will be obligatory independently of all considerations of utility. The question of the ultimate source or ground of moral obligation is thus intimately connected with that of the nature of the psychological motive.

In the "Analysis of Volition" we have seen that—

(1) For the Cārvākas, the motive is always pleasure and volition follows *necessarily* when there is a balance of pleasure over pain.

(2) For the Naiyāyikas, the motive is some *iṣṭa* or good, but this is not necessarily pleasure. It is either pleasure or the avoidance of pain in the case of *kāmyakarmas*; i.e., ordinary empirical actions from material motives. These suppose attraction (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) in the agent and thus have pleasure and the avoidance of pain as motives. But for the *mumukṣu*, the person seeking

Transcendental Freedom, the *iṣṭa* or good is *duḥkheṇa ātyantikāḥ viyogah*, total and absolute freedom from suffering. It differs essentially from the avoidance of pain which is prompted by aversion. Aversion is itself of the nature of pain and the avoidance of pain which it prompts is tainted by the pain of the aversion which prompts it. Hence freedom from pain thus attained is never absolute freedom. But the freedom which the *mumukṣu* seeks arises from dispassion or *virakti*. Hence there is neither attraction nor aversion here, the motive being the prompting of total and absolute freedom from suffering sought from a dispassionate contemplation of the vanity of all things temporal. We have thus according to the Nāiyāyika not merely the pathological motives of the attraction of pleasure and aversion towards pain, but also a non-pathological motive in the case of the person seeking his Transcendental Freedom, a motive which consists in the pure or dispassionate desire for *Mokṣa* as the total and absolute freedom from suffering. Further, according to the Nāiyāyika, motives are not given matters of fact which act mechanically on the agent. They are themselves the effects of subjective valuation or subjective self-determination, what is pleasure to one and therefore a motive, being not necessarily pleasure to another or a motive.

(3) For the Prābhākaras, however, the motive is not *iṣṭasādhana-tājñāna* or consciousness of a good, but simply the cognition of something to be done as produced by the representation of it as specifying the self. It is the act to be done as self-appropriated or self-referred which is the real motive and this need not present itself as a good in order to move the will.

The motive thus may be conceived either as the mechanical attraction of pleasure, or as a subjectively determined value or good, or again as the Self itself as

identified with the act to be done. These psychological differences in the conception of the motive will lead to corresponding differences in the conception of duty or moral obligation. If the motive, *e.g.*, is mechanical attraction, moral obligation will be only mechanical compulsion. If the motive on the contrary is the good as subjectively determined, moral obligation will be only the authority of the agent's freely chosen end or good presenting itself as duty to his will. Lastly, if the motive is simply the act as selfreferred, moral obligation will be only the Imperative presenting itself as Law to the agent.

(1) Thus, according to the Cārvākas the motive being nothing but the mechanical attraction of pleasure, duty or obligation is only the mechanical impulsion of an anticipated happiness. The consequence or end, *viz.*, a balance of pleasure over pain, constitutes, according to them, the essence of the psychological motive. Moral obligation is the operation of the psychological motive in moral action and is thus only the attraction of the possible pleasure or happiness to be derived therefrom. The obligatoriness of the Moral Imperative is therefore only the causal operation of a foreseen or anticipated happiness on the agent's will.

(2) According to the Naiyāyikas however, the motive being the consciousness of *iṣṭa* or good, the Imperative derives its force from a sanction, *viz.*, *iṣṭasāadhanatā* or conduciveness to good. The obligatoriness of the Imperative is thus the worth or excellence of its end appealing to the consciousness of the agent. But as this worth or excellence itself depends on the agent's *kāmanā* or desire for the good and therefore on subjective valuation or subjective preference, obligatoriness also depends on the subjective *kāmanā* or force of the agent's craving for the end or good. This *kāmanā*, subjective craving or conative impulse in the agent, may be pathological or pure. In the case of *kāmya-karmas* or actions from material motives,

it is pathological being either attraction for the good or aversion towards evil. In the case of the desire for *Mokṣa* or Transcendental Freedom on the contrary, it is pure, being free from all pathological attraction (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*). *Kāmanā* or subjective craving is thus a necessary factor in all action, being a determinant of the subjective worth or value of the end that constitutes the motive. In this sense it also determines obligatoriness of the Imperative just as does the worth of the end or good. A distinction however has to be made between the subjective and the objective aspects of the good as worthy or excellent. The fact that the good acquires subjective value or worth through subjective preference or self-determination does not imply that it is objectively neutral. On the contrary it has objective intrinsic worth or excellence though this is presented to the subject only through subjective preference. Without an objective value there cannot be a subjective value, though the latter implies, besides the objective value, an act of subjective valuation or preference. The moral value has thus authority in two senses. In the first place, it has objective intrinsic authority as worthy or excellent, independently of the agent's choice or preference. Secondly, it has subjective authority and this depends on the agent's *kāmanā* or desire for the particular value or end. Even in this case however the value itself is not created by the act of subjective valuation but only takes a subjective significance through it besides being a value in itself. Hence the authority in this case is not brought into being, but only *subjectivised* or presented to the consciousness of the agent through his *kāmanā* or desire. This constitutes obligatoriness or subjective authority of the moral value which is thus a compound of the objective authority of the end and the force of the subjective desire or craving. Hence according to the Naiyāyikas, obligatoriness is to be

distinguished from the objective authority of the Imperative. In either case the authority is due to the Imperative being conducive to some desired end or good. But the objective authority arises from the intrinsic worth or value of the end or good, while obligatoriness is due to this objective value being subjectively appropriated through a particular *kāmanā* or desire. In other words, there is an intrinsic worth in certain ends which ought to determine choice and this is their objective authority which is thus independent of our actually choosing them. When they are actually chosen, they acquire subjective in addition to their objective authority and this is their obligatoriness.

The Naiyāyikas point out that the nature of moral obligation would be inexplicable without the conception of an end, good or *iṣṭa* to be attained, there being no discrimination possible between virtue (*dharma*) and vice (*adharma*) without such a conception. *Itarathā (Phalābhāve) hi arthānarthaviveko na siddhati* ("Nayāyamanjarī"). It is through the *Phala* or consequence, for example, that the wrongness of an act, like taking a Brahmin's life, becomes intelligible. Take away the consequence and the negative injunction forbidding such an act loses its meaning. (*Evam punaḥ brahmahatyāderapi naivāstyadharmatā* ("Nyāyamanjarī"))

(3) According to Kumārila, the end, consequence or *phala* determines only the motive and the choice, but not the obligatoriness of the Imperative. The moral authority of the Imperative is thus independent of the end or consequence. The latter as constituting the motive is a psychological condition of the moral action, but does not determine the moral worth or excellence of it which has intrinsic authority on the agent as Law. The *phala* or consequence is only *pravarttaka*, i.e., a psychological motive but is not *vidheya*, i.e., the object of the moral imperative.

It is a *psychological* implicate of the moral action, an end as motive being necessary for moral as for all action, but it is not a *moral* implicate of the Imperative which is obligatory independently of the end or consequence. The *phala* may even be a metaphysical implicate of the *vidhi* or command, a command implying necessarily something to be accomplished, but it does not constitute its *moral* authority or obligatoriness.

This view of Kumārila differs from the Nyāya view in two essentials. In the first place, a *phala* or consequence has to be conceived, according to Nyāya, not merely because otherwise the Imperative will not be psychologically impelling but also because otherwise the distinctions of right and wrong will all be meaningless. According to Kumārila the *phala* or consequence has to be conceived because it is a logico-metaphysical rather than a moral implicate of the command or Imperative. Secondly, according to Nyāya, the consequence as good or excellent determines the objective authority of the Imperative though not its subjective obligatoriness which implies something more, *viz.*, the agent's subjective preference or *kāmanā*. According to Kumārila however the consequence enters only into the psychological motivation of the act, and does not determine its authority or obligatoriness on the agent.

Kumārila's view, it will be seen, provides a plausible ground for the distinction of *kāmyādhikāra* or relative application of the Imperative and *nityanaimittikādhikāra* or its unconditional application. Thus the imperative in the first instance is hypothetical being conditional on the agent's *kāmanā* or desire: if you desire the end or consequence, *e.g.*, *Svarga* or happiness in heaven, the Imperative binds you, embraces you within the scope of its authority. But even in this case, the authority is independent of the end, though coming into operation only

after the choice. In the case of *nityanaimittikādhikāra* or unconditional application of the Imperative, there is also *phalakāmanā*, desire for an end, viz., *pratyavāyābhāva* or avoidance of the sin that would follow on non-performance. Here throughout life the agent is *adhikṛta* or *niyukta*, i.e., under the authority of the Imperative. But it is not because of the *phala* or consequence, but because he is *niyuktapuruṣa* or morally appointed by the Imperative, that the Imperative binds him. There is indeed an end even in *nityanaimittika* or unconditional duty, but it is only the agent's motive that has reference to this end and not the authority of the duty. The Imperative would not have existed except for the *artha* or end to be realised by the act, but it does not derive its imperative character from the end, but has intrinsic, independent authority of its own. The end is thus a psychological implicate or accompaniment of the Imperative, and does not constitute its moral authority.

(4) For the *Prābhākaras* however there is no extraneous end in the *Vidhi* as Imperative, morally, psychologically, or metaphysically. The Imperative is its own end and constitutes the sanction, the motive as well as the moral authority of the *Vidhi*. It is the independent, intrinsic authority of the command which determines motive and choice. The very meaning of the *Vidhi* as a command implies this authority on the agent which thus determines choice because it *ought* to determine choice. The *Vidhi* thus constitutes its own end and does not imply any extraneous end as motive. The *Naiyāyika* who conceives an external sanction for the Imperative cannot explain moral obligation by this superfluous conception. Beyond the external end there must be another and thus the chain will drag on lengthening from end to end. Consequential or prudential morality thus leads to an indefinite series of ends that has no end. The external end to have moral

authority must lead to another, and that to another and so on indefinitely. We are thus in the *anavasthā* or instability of an endless regress which the Naiyāyika can avoid only by investing the external consequence with intrinsic independent authority. But such superfluous assumption of an extraneous end which is an end-in-itself is neither legitimate nor self-consistent. If an extraneous end were to establish the authority of the Imperative in consciousness, it must also itself be established likewise through another, and if an end-in-itself is to be conceived it is superfluous to assume any extraneous end of moral authority. The fallacy of the Naiyāyika consists in conceiving moral or Śāstric Imperative on the analogy of secular injunction. Since the latter appeals through an external sanction, there must also be a sanction for the scriptural Imperative. The Naiyāyika forgets that in the case of the latter we have something which is ultimate, irreducible and absolute, while in the former only that which is derived and relative. This essential difference between a Śāstric or scriptural and a secular injunction implies a corresponding difference between their respective authority. A secular injunction has only derived and relative authority : it is heteronomous. A moral injunction (*Vidhi*) has absolute and independent authority : it is autonomous (*svatantra*). *Śāstra* is not so weak as to be incapable of realising itself. In fact even in secular injunction the impulsion itself is a unique feeling and not a form of the desire for the consequence. A consequence may be ordinarily implied, but the prompting of the injunction is not the prompting of the consequence through a subjective desire. The Naiyāyika also makes the mistake of supposing that the psychological motive is necessarily the consciousness of some *iṣṭa* or good. It is this erroneous psychology which vitiates his conception of moral authority or obligation. The motive to will is

simply the consciousness of something to be done as produced by the representation of the act as a self-qualification. It is thus the self itself as identified with the act to be done which acts as motive, and not the consciousness of any good. In moral prompting, the real motive is thus not any consciousness of good but the Imperative itself as qualifying or specifying the Self. The real motive is thus not the prompting of any extraneous end or *iṣṭa*, but the prompting of the Imperative in consciousness, the consciousness of it as duty as arising from the representation of it as qualifying the Self. This *preraṇā*, subjective prompting or consciousness of obligation as produced by the revelation of the Law in consciousness is all that is required to move to action and not any consciousness of an extraneous end as the Naiyāyika thinks. As a matter of fact there is no such end or *phala* in *nityacodanās* or unconditional duties : these are obligatory throughout life and have to be accomplished without reference to any good to be attained. These therefore cannot be satisfactorily explained according to the Nyāya consequentialism. The *Naiyāyika* is wrong in conceiving an end or *phala* as a necessary accompaniment of the *Vidhi* or Command. A *Vidhi* does not imply more than two *anubandhas* or necessary accompaniments of itself, viz., (1) *adhikāranubandha* or *niyojya*, i.e., an agent or person commanded (*kasya niyogah*) and (2) *viṣayānubandha*, the act commanded or enjoined (*kutra niyogah*). The consequence or end is not one of these auxiliaries or necessary accompaniments of the Imperative. The *phalakaḥpanā* or conception of an end is *puruṣabuddhiprabhava*, a representation of the understanding of the individual. It is thus relative to the understanding of the individual and not *śāstrīya*, i.e., the intended meaning of scripture (*ataḥparam phalakaḥpanam puruṣabuddhiprabhavam na śāstrīyam*.—"Nyāyamanjari"). The scriptural meaning implies only

two conditions of the Imperative, viz., a *niyojya* or agent commanded and a *viṣaya* or act commanded. The command impels simply by revealing the act as obligatory. Where the agent is impelled by *lipsā* or desire for the consequence as in *kāmyakarmas* or duties from empirical motives, the Imperative becomes *udāsīna*, indifferent or morally neutral. Thus the Imperative in *kāmya* duties merely declares the act being a means to the end desired, its operation consisting only in the establishment of this *sādhyaśādhana* or end-and-means relation and not in the investment of the end with moral authority. The *Vidhi* thus does not derive its force from any extraneous end either in *kāmya* or in *nitya* or unconditional duties. In an unconditional duty, the Imperative is its own end and sanction and is thus self-authoritative or self-validating, while in *kāmya* actions it is without any imperative character, its function being merely to establish a relation of means and end between the act and the consequence desired to be attained thereby : *Bāhye tu pravṛttilakṣaṇe bhautike vyāpāre yatra lipsādi pravarttakānantaram asti tatra bhavantyapi vidheḥ prayokṛṣaktiḥ udāste.*

*Pratiṣedhādhikāre'pi pratyavāyo na kalpate
 Niṣedhyaviṣayādeva labdhatvādadhikāriṇaḥ
 Tatrāsau kalpyamāno'pi narakādīphalodayaḥ
 Avaidhatvam prapadyeta, na hyākāṅkṣedṛṣi vidheḥ
 Vidherapekṣe dve eva niyojyaviṣayau prati
 Tatpūraṇena tṛptastu na vāṇchati tato' dhikam
 Niyojyastāvadetāvān kruddho'rihananodyataḥ
 Viṣayastannivṛttiṣca niyogo yatra gamyate*

(“Nyāyamañjarī”).

What is true of *Vidhi* or positive injunction is also true of *Niṣedha* or negative prescription. Here also there is no extraneous end, the Imperative being authoritative in itself and constituting its own end. The conception of an extraneous end, e.g., avoidance of *pratyavāya* or sin and consequ-

ent penalty is *puruṣabuddhiprabhava*, a product of the understanding which has nothing to do with the intrinsic moral authority of the prohibition. The prohibitory Imperative has both the two necessary accompaniments (*anubandhadvaya*) without reference to any ulterior end or consequence. Thus the *adhikāra*, the scope of the Imperative, is given in the *niṣedhaviṣaya*, the prohibition of the act. Hence the Imperative does not need to point beyond itself to any extraneous end. What it prescribes is simply refraining from the act forbidden, *i.e.*, non-doing of what is not to be done. The doing here prescribed is thus non-doing or refraining from the doing of the not-to-be-done action. It is only avoiding or refraining from the doing and not the consequences of the not-to-be-done action which the Imperative has in view. There is thus no ulterior end, no pathological motive, the Imperative or doing which is non-doing or refraining from the not-to-be-done act being itself the end.

Hence the Imperative directly imports nothing but *Niyoga* or the command enjoined. This is true of the positive as well as the negative form of the Imperative, there being no direct implication of *phalasāadhanatā* or conduciveness to an end in either case. But the *phala* or consequence may be indirectly implied in some cases, *e.g.*, in the case of Imperatives which prescribe duties with reference to the satisfaction of particular desires. These are the *kāmyakarmas* or duties to be performed in view of some desired end or good. Empirical motivation being the essence of such actions or duties, there is necessary implication of an end or consequence. But such implication is indirect and not direct, the moral authority of the Imperative being independent of such implication. Thus (i) according to some, the *Vidhi* or Imperative being universally authoritative (*sarvatrapreraka*) cannot lose its imperative character (*vidhāyakatva*) even in *kāmyakarmas*.

Hence it has moral authority even in these duties for the realisation of empirical ends—a *quasi-obligatoriness* which does not come into full operation on account of the agent's subjective desire for the consequence. Hence its actual operation becomes restricted to the *itikartavyatāmsa*, to the manner of accomplishing the end and does not extend to the *phalāmsa*, the end itself. In other words, the Imperative merely reveals the act as a means to the end desired instead of establishing its authority or obligatoriness on the agent. Objectively the *Vidhi* indeed implies this authority as an Imperative or Command, but this fails to come into operation on account of the agent's subjective desire for the end. Since the agent is moved by his desire or *lipsā* the *Vidhi* becomes *udāsina*, morally neutral or inoperative. The moral Imperative can only be absolutely, independently authoritative. It thus necessarily loses its character of motivation where a pathological desire comes into operation. (ii) Others of the *Prābhākaras* hold however that the Injunctive (*Linādipratyaya*) directly imports only the Command, *Niyoga*, or the act as duty, but since the agent (*niyojya*) must also be actuated to the act commanded, it follows by logical implication (*sāmarthyā*) that the act in question must be conducive to the end which brings him under the scope of the Imperative. The direct meaning of the *Vidhi* is thus the act commanded and the *phala* or end enters through the *adhikārānubandha* or condition of its application: the duty can impel only as the agent comes under its scope, and as this *adhikāra* or application of the duty implies the agent's desire for the end, the end is logically implied in the duty or Imperative. In other words, the *Vidhi* as Imperative signifies mere *objective* duty, and since it can acquire subjective authority only through the agent's desire for the end which brings him under its application, the end must also be logically implied in the Imperative as being

involved in the condition of a proper *adhikārin* or agent under the Imperative. (iii) According to others again the *phala* or end is involved by implication in the very meaning of the sentence embodying the command. Thus there is *anvaya*, connexion by meaning or import, between the *niyojya*, the person commanded and the *viśaya*, the act commanded. Now the *niyojya*, the agent commanded, in the case of a *kāmya* duty for the satisfaction of a desire, is a person who is under the influence of the particular desire (e.g., desire for *svarga* or happiness in heaven). It follows therefore that there must be a nexus of meaning between the enjoined acts (e.g., the sacrifice and the like) and the agent under the injunction (e.g., the person desiring the happiness of heaven). But such connexion of meaning would be impossible if the sacrificial acts (*yāgādi*) were not related to the desired end, viz., happiness in heaven, as *guṇa* to *pradhāna*, i.e., auxiliary to principal or means to end, from which follows *sādhyasāadhanabhāva* or the relation of means to end between the enjoined acts and the desired consequence. Hence according to (ii) and (iii) the end (*phala*) is implied in *kāmyakarma* though not directly present in the consciousness of the Imperative as authoritative or morally impelling, while according to (i) the presence of the end in the agent's consciousness as a motive makes the Imperative morally inoperative. (cf. "Vivaraṇaprameyasangraha.")

N.B.—Some of the Prābhākaras conceive *phalasādhana* or conduciveness to an end even in *nitya* or unconditional duties, though not admitting a direct knowledge of it in the person commanded. The end is only implied in the command, but not consciously present to the agent as a motive.

Hence according to the Cārvāka, the obligatoriness of duty is only the mechanical attraction of pleasure while

according to the Naiyāyikas it is only its *iṣṭasāadhanatā* or conduciveness to an end appealing through the agent's desire. For the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras on the contrary it is independent of extraneous ends, an end being only necessary to constitute the psychological motive and not the moral authority of the duty according to the Bhāṭṭas, and being only implied and never consciously present to the agent, if present at all, according to the Prābhākaras. These different views of the nature of moral authority or obligatoriness imply also correspondingly different views of the nature of the operation of the Imperative on the agent's consciousness. The next question therefore to be considered is

(b) *What constitutes the prerakatva, the impelling force of the Imperative or Vidhi.*

The question here is : how does the moral Imperative act on the agent's will ? How does it influence consciousness so as to lead to the accomplishment of the duty ? Does it act mechanically just as one physical object acts on another ? Or does it act in some other manner which differs altogether from mechanical action and constitutes a category by itself ?

(1) We have already seen that for the Cārvākas the obligatoriness of the *Vidhi* is only the attraction of pleasure. Hence in this view the operation of the Imperative on the agent's will will be only the mechanical attraction of the anticipated happiness. This is extreme hedonistic determinism.

(2) As against this we have the Refined consequentialism and Self-determinism of Nyāya which recognises a pure desire for the Good besides the pathological motives of pleasure-seeking and pain-avoiding. According to this view the Imperative being obligatory through *iṣṭasāadhanatā* or conduciveness to an end, the operation of the Imperative in consciousness is the operation

of the desired end or good to which it conduces. But since the end itself is constituted or determined by the subjective desire or *kāmanā*, the action of the Imperative implies also the action of the desire in the agent's consciousness. The operation of the Imperative thus consists in awakening the dormant desire by presenting adequate means for satisfying it. The Imperative presents the duty as conducive to the end. If the agent's desire is awakened thereby, the duty acts on the agent's will as being conducive to the desired end. Provided there is the desire or *kāmanā*, the *Vidhi* becomes operative, but the particular *kāmanā* or desire depends on the agent's subjective preference.

(3) According to Kumārila, the operation of the Imperative is independent of any extraneous end just as is its authority or obligatoriness. A scriptural Injunctive (*Vidhiwākya*) is charged with a peculiar prompting force (*śabdabhāvanā*) which is of the nature of causation. This calls forth *puruṣapravṛtti*, the agent's will which leads to the accomplishment of the act (*arthabhāvanā*).

(4) According to the Prābhākaras, we have here something different from causation or *bhāvanā*. *Bhāvanā* is that in the agent which causes what was not: it is the causality of the will and actual willing or *kṛti*. *Niyoga* is not *bhāvanā* in this sense: it does not cause or determine or bring into being. It is only a *preraṇā* or authoritative suggestion to the will. This suggestion is only the revelation of the Law as imperative and is distinct from physical or psychological compulsion or determination. *Preraṇā*, moral prompting, implies *praiṣya-praiṣasambandha*, the relation of the command to the agent commanded. It thus differs from *bhāvanā* or causation which is *kriyākartṛsambandha* or relation of the act of willing to the agent who wills it. Through this relation of command to the commanded, *preraṇā* or

moral obligation is realised or revealed to the agent. Hence it comes first, is primary (*prathama*) in the consciousness of duty or moral impulsion. There is also *kriyākartṛsambandha*, the relation of the act to the agent willing, but that is only secondary or derivative (*pāścātyah*). *Ayam ādyaḥ sambandhaḥ, pāścātyastu kriyā-kartṛsambandhaḥ.*

Atra hi praiṣyapraiṣayoḥ sambandho' vagamyate. Kimanyaścātra kriyākartṛsambandho nāvagamyate? Na brūmaḥ nāvagamyate iti, kim tu praiṣyapraiṣalakṣaṇaḥ api sambandhaḥ prathamam avagamyate, preṣito hi kriyām kartumudyacchati ("Nyāyamanjari").

Moral Impulsion thus involves the agent's relation to the command as well as his relation to the act commanded, but the latter is derivative being mediated through the former relation which is the revelation of the Law. The latter thus implies the former as its reason or ground, the agent's relation to the act or actual willing of the duty implying, besides the psychological process of the moral choice, the consciousness of the Imperative as its ground or prius. We have thus two moments or factors in the complex constituting moral willing—(1) the *bhautikavyāpāra* or empirical process in the agent which is derivative and secondary and is of the nature of *bhāvanā*, causation or becoming and (2) the ground or reason of it which is *preraṇā* or moral impulsion and is mere revelation of the Law as distinguished from compulsion, mechanical determination or causation.

It may be objected that *preraṇā* or moral impulsion is itself a form of action or *kriyā* and thus the two *sāmbandhas* or relations are same in essence. But this misses the fundamental character of moral obligation which is only knowledge-inducing (*jñāpaka*) and not action-making (*kāraka*). Enlightenment (*jñāna*) is not causation (*kriyā*). The rational motive is no subtle force,

jñāpaka, what reveals, and *kāraka*, what compels, being fundamentally distinct. The *Vidhi*, the Imperative is a motive (*pravarttaka*) simply by its function of revelation of the Law. i.e., of the act as something commanded. Its suggestive force is through an appeal to the reason, but does not amount to a compulsion of the will. *Nanu nedamubhayam bhavati praiṣo'pi kriyaiva pravartanam hi kurvan pravartayatityucyate so'yam kriyāsambandha eva bhavati na tato' nyah praiṣyapraiṣasambandha iti . . . prerito'-hamatrete jñānajanakatvam vidheḥ pravartakatvam sa eṣa pravartanam jñāpayati na karotityanya evāyam kriyākartṭṣambandhāt praiṣyapraiṣasambandhaḥ* ('*Nyāyamanjarī*').

There are different forms of *preraṇā*, impulsion or suggestion as in request (*anurodha*), invitation (*nimantraṇa*), favour-seeking (*adhyeṣaṇa*), etc. These are expressed by the different moods, viz., *lot*, *liṅ*, etc. They are only different *modes* or *modalities* of *preraṇā* or suggestion, being due to the differences of *upādhis* or modalising circumstances (*aupādhikāḥ avāntarabhedāḥ*). The modalising factors are the circumstances of its *prayoga* or application, i.e., the particular position of the impelled relatively to the *preraka* or person impelling. Thus the suggestion (*preraṇā*) may be of an equal to an equal (*samaviṣayaprayoga*), or of a superior to an inferior (*hināviṣayaprayoga*), or again of an inferior to a superior (*jyāyaviṣayaprayoga*). In each case we have impulsion or suggestion in a particular form or mode and the particular form or mode is determined by the special circumstances of the suggestion as arising from the position of the person suggesting relatively to that of the person to whom he addresses his suggestion. In every case we have therefore the same thing, viz., impulsion though particularised or modalised by the peculiar circumstances of its application. In no case however is this impulsion of the nature of causation or compulsion. It

is always suggestion by enlightenment and is to be distinguished from *ñijartha* which is compulsion. Herein the relation of *praiṣa* or command differs from the relation of doer and his deed (*kriyākartṛsambandha*). The latter admits of different degrees of freedom : the agent may be partially compelled (*kārita*). Not so the former, there being no compulsion in inducement by knowledge which only reveals the Law and leaves the agent free to choose. The function of enlightenment ends with producing the consciousness of the Imperative, the actual willing of it being left to the agent's freedom, while the function of causation extends to actual willing, *i.e.*, to a determination of the agent's choice. It is for this reason that *preraṇā*, moral impulsion or persuasion is possible only in the case of the *pravartamāna*, the person capable of free will and choice : *e.g.*, a tree which lacks this freedom of the will is also incapable of *preraṇā* or moral persuasion by knowledge. *Anyā hi karotu kuryāditi pratitiranyā ca kārayatīti pratītiḥ. Prayojakavyāpāraḥ hi ñijarthah jñāpakavyāpāraḥ hi līnarthah. Pravṛttakriyāviśayaśca prayojakavyāpāraḥ hi ñijarthah iha tu tadviparītaḥ. Tatra hi kāryam paśyataḥ pravartanamiha tu pravartitasya kāryadarśanamiti mahān bhedaḥ. Tatra yathā kurvantaḥ kārayati tathāivehāpi praiṣaḥ pravartamānām prerayati na āpravartamānam sthāvaram* ("Nyāya-manjarī").

This impulsion or *preraṇā* is an *Ātmadharma* or subjective determination of the Self. Like the *Ātman* or Self it is *svasamvedya*, known only through itself. It is not *pramāṇāntaravedya*, known through any other cognitive process or means of knowledge. It is an ultimate irreducible fact of consciousness just as the Self is or just as volition is. It is essentially a kind of *Ātmākūta*, wave, excitement, or impulse in the *Ātman* which is not *bhāvanā* or becoming strictly speaking, but which is itself the *hetu*, ground or reason, of the *bhautikavyāpāra*, the empirical, psychological process which constitutes the willing of the act commanded. It can

only be felt where there is an imperative or command (*śabda*, *vidhivākya*) present to consciousness. It follows therefore that *dharma*, the code of duties that are morally obligatory, can be known only through *śabdapramāṇa* or scriptural commands: the duties imply *preraṇā*, moral impulsion, and are revealed through *preraṇā* and therefore can be known only through authoritative commands (*śabda*) and not through any other *pramāṇa* or means of knowledge.

According to the Prābhākaras therefore impulsion through suggestion or command is essentially of the nature of enlightenment or inducement by knowledge which does not interfere with the agent's freedom or compulsion. It is thus no conative impulse in the agent, though it may lead to it through the agent's subjective choice. It is however not the simple cognition of a fact, but the cognition of an act or duty to be accomplished, implying a unique feeling of excitement or impulse in the *Ātman* which is not however conative impulse of force. We have thus in *preraṇā* something which is new and unanalysable, a new category of determination which is not physical or psychological determination. It is determination or impulsion without compulsion or mechanical constraint on the freedom of the will. According to the Bhāṭṭas however the two determinations are of the same order. The *śābdī bhāvanā*, the action of the Imperative is however trans-subjective, being the operation of the Impersonal Law on the agent's will, while the *ārthī bhāvanā*, the realisation of the Imperative is intro-subjective being the agent's accomplishment of the duty through the psychological operation of the motive. For the Naiyāyikas on the contrary, there is no ex-subjective or trans-subjective operation, the action of the Imperative being only operation of an end or good influencing will through the agent's desire or *kāmanā*.

(c) The question however remains to be considered as to what constitutes the *object* of the Imperative as distin-

guished from its mode of operation on the agent's consciousness. Though distinct from the question of operation or action, it is also closely connected with it. The action, the mode of operation of the Imperative, may be conceived only psychologically as the operation of an end or object of the Imperative as distinct from the Imperative itself, an end which operates through the agent's choice. It may also be conceived unpsychologically as independently operative, an end of the Imperative to be accomplished being admitted at the same time as a psychological motive. Lastly, the imperative may be conceived as being itself its own end and therefore as the object to be accomplished, no extraneous end or object of the Imperative being conceived. We have therefore to consider this question of the end or object of the Imperative and its relation to the impelling function of the Imperative.

What, then, is the object of the Imperative? What is the *anuṣṭheya*, the thing to be accomplished in the Imperative? Is the *ājñā*, the command, itself the *anuṣṭheya*, the object to be accomplished? Or, does the command point beyond itself to something to be accomplished? What is the *kārya*, the objective content of the duty in the Imperative? Is the Imperative or command itself the duty that impels? Or, is the *prerakatva*, the impelling function of the Imperative, distinct from its *anuṣṭheyatva* or function of an objective prescription of something to be accomplished? Is the command distinct from what is commanded as duty? Or is it itself the duty which is commanded to be accomplished?

(1) The Bhāṭṭas hold that the *anuṣṭheya*, the object of the Imperative, is an *iṣṭa*, end or good. The command necessarily refers to this end to be accomplished, an end being *logically* implied in the command as well as required for *psychological* motivation in the execution of it. The *moral* authority of the command is however independent of

this end which is only a psychological and logical implicate of it. The moral impulsion (*śabdabhāvanā*) is expsychological, the operation of the end being confined to *arthabhāvanā* or the psychological process of the accomplishment of the duty. It is only through a specific content as end or object that the operation of the Imperative embodies itself in concrete empirical willing.

(2) According to the Naiyāyikas, however, there is no *preraka* or impelling function of the Imperative independent of its function of the prescription of an end to be accomplished. The end as subjectively determined by the agent's desire or choice is not only the object of the command or Imperative but also the sanction of its authority or impelling function. We no doubt speak of the Imperative or *vidhi* as being itself impelling (*preraka*), but this is mere usage or convention (*vyavahāramātra*). The *ājñā*, the command, is not itself the *sampādyā*, the object to be accomplished. The agent (*anuṣṭhātā*) certainly does not consider that the command (*ājñā*) is itself to be accomplished (*sampādyā*). In accomplishing his duty he is conscious of accomplishing some *iṣṭa*, end or good of his own. It is this *iṣṭa* or end therefore that constitutes the object of the Imperative or Command, the *ājñā*, the command itself serving only as an incitement to the same or as a sanction (in the juristic sense). Hence what impels is not the Command itself but the end or good which it holds out. As a matter of fact, there may be impulsion even without a command, *e.g.*, men may be prompted to action from the mere knowledge of a possible good even when such knowledge is not acquired or conveyed through any Imperative or Command.

Ājñā hi nāma naivānyasampādyatvena gamyate
Nānuṣṭhāturiyam budhirājñā sampādyatāmili,
Evam hi yasya kasyāpi pravarteta sa ājñayā,
Na ceha bālonmattādivacanādyatnavarjitāt,

*Satyapi preranājñāne pravartante sacetasah,
 Bhayam nāśaṅkyate yasmātphalam vā' pi samīhitam,
 Tathāvidhasya rājño' pi nājñā nuṣṭhiyate janaiḥ.
 Vartamānāpadeśe' pi phalam ya'rāvagamyate,
 Tatra pravartate loko līnādiṣvaśrutesvapi.
 Bhavatyārogyasampattirbhujānasya haritakim,
 Tatkāmo bhakṣayecceci ko viśeṣah pravartane.
 Anvayaavyatirekābhyām tadevamanumanyate,
 Prerakatvam phalasyaiva na niyogātmanah punah.*

(“Nyāyamanjarī”.)

The *prerakatva*, the impelling function, thus belongs to the *phala*, consequence or end, and not to the command itself. The command only incites by indicating the end to be accomplished and is not itself the thing to be accomplished. If the command were itself the object to be accomplished, men would be prompted to act even from the suggestions of little children and insane people. Men do not execute even the commands of the sovereign from the simple consciousness of a command without any hope of gain or fear of loss. And even where there is no impulsion through a command or imperative, men are actuated to specific acts through the simple expectation of a good. Consider the case, for example, of the person actuated to take myrabolan from a knowledge of its healing virtues. His knowledge may be only an inference based on agreement and difference and such inferential knowledge is sufficient to impel provided he desires the healing in question. There is therefore no imperative necessary in impulsion, the consequence or end being the only necessary condition of impulsion. It is this end which is accomplished in the accomplishment of the duty and it constitutes not only the object of accomplishment in the duty but also its impelling force on the agent. It is wrong to make a distinction here between the object of the Imperative and its impelling force. The Bhāṭṭa

conception of a *śabdabhāvanā* or operation of the Imperative which is underived and independent of the object or end to be accomplished, is arbitrary and inconsistent with actual facts. Experience testifies not only to impulsion without an imperative but also to suggestions which are unavailing or fail to impel because of the absence of an end.

For the Naiyāyikas therefore the object to be accomplished is an end which is other than the Imperative or Command, an extraneous end which validates the Imperative and imparts to it its impelling character. Hence impulsion is derived or mediated through the end which alone has intrinsic value and validity.

(3) For the Prābhākaras however the Imperative itself is its own end having absolute value and validity. There is therefore no extraneous end, not even as a psychological or logical implicate. The *anuṣṭheya*, the thing to be accomplished, is the Imperative itself, the command (*ājñā*) and the object of the command (*anuṣṭheya*) being one and the same thing. That this sameness or identity is not apparent to us is due only to our intellectual indolence. When Law or *Vidhi* is the motive, the sense of an unsatisfied demand accompanies the action from beginning to end. It is this demand of the Law or Command which acts as the spur to action, and the fulfilment of the Command or *Niyoga* requires nothing but the agent and his actual willing it. There is thus no extraneous end involved, neither in the moral authority of the Command nor as a logical implicate of it nor also as a psychological condition of motivation, the Imperative or Command being itself the motive, the end and the sanction. Hence what is *anuṣṭhita*, accomplished in the execution, is the *ājñā* or command, the *preraṇā*, the subjective prompting or impulsion, being itself the *sampādyā*, the object of accomplishment. According to some however there is a distinc-

tion between the *subjective* prompting or *preraṇā* of the *Vidhi* and the *objective* duty or *kārya*, a distinction however which does not imply absolute separateness or independence of meaning. Thus (1) some hold that the *prerakatva*, the impelling function is *śabda*, i.e., the primary and direct meaning of the Imperative or Injunctive, while *kāryatva*, the function of objective prescription of a duty is *ārtha*, i.e., follows by implication. (2) Others however consider the *kāryatva* or objective function to be the primary meaning and *prerakatva*, or impelling function to be merely implied. In any case however there is only one meaning of the Imperative and not two, viz., one with the other as necessarily implied—either *prerakatva*, subjective prompting with *aparityaktakāryabhāva* or necessary implication of an objective right or duty, or *kāryatva*, objective duty with *aparityaktapreraṇabhāva* or necessary implication of subjective impulsion.

N.B.—Vidyānanda in the *Aṣṭasaḥasrī* enters into an extremely acute analysis of the meaning of *Niyoga* or Command with special reference to these two functions of objective prescription and subjective impulsion. The various possible interpretations of *Niyoga* which he considers in this connection constitute an invaluable contribution to the Doctrine of Conscience remarkable alike for the depth, the profundity and the subtlety of the analysis. There are according to him altogether eleven different interpretations of *Niyoga* or the Moral Imperative. Thus :—

(1) According to some, *Niyoga* is *kāryarūpa*, i.e., of the nature of something to be done or something that ought to be done. Hence it refers to *objective right*, right as right considered objectively. Right or Duty thus conceived as having objective value and validity, i.e., as an objective verity belonging to the Moral Order, is the essence of the Moral imperative or Command which constitutes *Niyoga*.

Niyoga is thus objective duty (*Kāryarūpa*) as distinguished from subjective prompting (*preraṇārūpa*), but it is *śuddha-kāryarūpa*, pure, unconditional duty, duty as duty without the *viśeṣaṇas* or modalities. It is not this or that duty, but duty as such without the particular mode. "Give unto such and such persons," "sacrifice in such and such ways, etc.,—these are duties, obligations to be discharged, but not pure duty, but only modalities, *viśeṣaṇas* or particular modes of duty. *Niyoga* is what is common to these all without the modalities of *viśeṣaṇas*—it is pure (*śuddha*) and absolute (*anyanirapekṣa*). This particular act or that particular act—these are only modes that do not enter into the pure consciousness of duty—neither the particular mode of the act, nor desires (e.g., *Svargakāmanā*) and other psychological accompaniments. As to *prerakalva*, the subjective prompting or motive—that also does not enter into *Niyoga* as such. The accompanying modalities and the psychological accompaniments have alike to be stripped off from *Niyoga* which is pure, unconditioned objective Right. The purity of Duty as Duty must not be spoiled by importing anything extraneous into it.

(2) According to others, *Niyoga* is *preraṇā*, the subjective prompting and not anything objective such as the act. This prompting or moving force cannot be ignored in the *Niyoga*. The objective factor, that which is to be done, is only an objective accompaniment and is inessential. It is the subjective prompting that is essential—the *preraṇā* in the sense of psychological motivation. The duty as such is only a means to the subjective impulsion. Take away the latter and *Niyoga* loses all significance. It is the subjective impulsion or prompting that constitutes the value and the validity of the *Niyoga*. *Niyoga* is thus essentially this subjective prompting or *preraṇā*, the objective duty being only an accompaniment or means to it. But it is *śuddhapreraṇā*, pure, unadulterated *preraṇā*, or moral

prompting from the pure sense of duty without pathological or material motives. It is this pure impulsion from the sense of duty for duty's sake that constitutes the essence of the *Niyoga* or Command, not the objective duty or act commanded. The agent does not consider himself appointed (*niyukta*) under the Law unless he also feels that he is *prerita*, subjectively impelled or prompted by the sense of duty. It is *preraṇā* or subjective prompting therefore that is the essential factor in the command, the objective duty being inessential or adventitious.

(3) According to others, *Niyoga* is neither pure objective duty nor the mere subjective prompting, neither mere *kāryarūpa* nor mere *preraṇārūpa*, but *preraṇāsahitakāryarūpa*, i.e., *kārya* or objective duty as supported by the sense of *preraṇā* or impulsion. The emphasis is on the objective aspect, but the subjective impulsion must also be there. The pure act, the thing to be done, considered in itself, is not sufficient to constitute duty which must also present itself as *my duty* (*mama idam kāryam*). Hence it must also be subjectively impelling, must operate as a motive on the agent in order to be presented as *his kārya* or duty. It completes itself in *kārya* or duty and therefore the objective factor is principal, but it must also present itself as *mama kārya* or *my duty* and therefore *preraṇā* or subjective prompting is also necessary.

(4) According to others, *Niyoga* is *preraṇā*, subjective prompting, in the first instance, and *kārya* or duty only for the sake of the realisation of this *preraṇā*. Hence it is *kāryasahitapreraṇā*, subjective impulsion modalised into objective duty. It is the subjective factor that is primary, but the objective duty as giving form to the subjective *preraṇā* is also necessary.

(5) According to others. *Niyoga* is morally valid, authoritative. It is this which constitutes its *prerakatva* or *pravartakatva*. But whence does it derive this binding

force, this authority on the agent or subject ? The external act, the objective duty or *kārya* cannot have binding force on the subject. There is no *natural* link between the *kārya* or duty and its *preranā* or validation in consciousness. The *kārya*, the external act, cannot exercise authority on the free subject. It derives its authoritativeness by *upacāra* or projection, not from its own nature. The duty validates itself in consciousness. There is *pramāṇavyāpāra*, a process of validation, through which it establishes itself. What then is the process ? How does the duty establish its authority on the agent ? The act as objective external fact cannot be obligatory on the subject. Its authority is only by *upacāra*, projection, of the Self on the external duty. It is the Self as *Caitanya* or Illumination which is the real *Pramāṇa*, or validating authority. The *Prameya*, the object, is object because of the subject which is *cidātmaka* or Illumination. The object shines, is established as object, through the light of the validating subject which is the true validating authority. Its authority is thus derived from the subject or Self which is the Light of Intelligence or Consciousness. It is this Light of Consciousness which is transferred by *upacāra* to the external fact thereby investing it with objective authority or validity. The free person does not submit to the dead matter of fact : it is the fact that derives its binding force from the Self which is the Light of Intelligence.

(6) According to others, *Niyoga* is *kāryapreraṇayoh sambandhaḥ*—the *sambandha* or link between the *kārya* or duty and the *preraṇā* or subjective prompting. It is neither *kārya* or the act as duty, nor the agent's subjective prompting, but the relation between the subjective and the objective factors—a certain indissoluble nexus between the agent and his present duty.

(7) According to others, *Niyoga* is not bare *sambandha* or relation, nor mere *kārya* or duty, nor simply the agent's

prompting, but is the *samudaya*, the entire complex of the duty, the prompting and the nexus. It is an organic whole of consciousness consisting of the subjective factor, the objective factor and the nexus—the concrete experience which is neither the one simply nor the other simply. By themselves these are all abstractions, *Niyoga* being the concrete whole of experience consisting of all these together.

(8) According to others, *Niyoga* is *Tadubhaya-vinirmukta*, is free alike from the subjective and the objective factors, being neither *preraṇāsvabhāva*, subjective impulsion, nor *kāryasvabhāva*, objective duty. These are only modalities which are conditional, but *Niyoga* is absolute, unconditional Imperative and therefore represents something Transcendental. Brahma is this *Niyoga*—the noumenal reality, the Absolute. It is the accomplished (*siddha*) Absolute that manifests itself to you under the phenomenal form of *kārya* or *sādhya*, the form of something to be accomplished. Because Brahma is accomplished (*siddha*), *prerakatva*, subjective prompting, *kārya*, objective duty, etc., must all be only phenomenal forms. They are modalisations of the timeless under the form of time.

(9) According to others, *Niyoga* is the *yantrārūḍha* agent, the agent as the master of a machine or as using a certain instrument. The agent uses an instrument to accomplish something, to work out some end, and *Niyoga* is the agent as working out his end, the agent representing himself as driven along the path of fruition (*viśayārūḍham ātmānam gamyamānam pravartate*). The agent desires something which sets him to work along a particular line and *Niyoga* is the agent considering himself as *viśayārūḍha*, i.e., as the master of or realising the object of his desire. Hence *Niyoga* is the agent conscious of himself as rising to fruition through a particular line of action. It is the agent's subjective impulsion along a particular line as

determined by the sense of progressive fruition. Hence it is *preraṇārūpa* or subjective impulsion but not pure impulsion without pathological motives, but impulsion as determined by empirical ends and sustained and fed by the sense of progressive realisation.

(10) According to others, *Niyoga* is *bhogyarūpa*, i.e., something which fulfils, something which conduces to fruition. It is therefore essentially an object, an object which conduces to the Self's fruition or fulfilment. But such an object cannot be considered as detached from the subject; the *bhogya*, the object of experience or fruition, points necessarily to a *bhoktā*, experiencer or subject that is fulfilled. Hence there is self-reference (*mamatvena vijñāna*), *niyoga* as *bhogya* or object conducing to fruition becomes merged as it were in the subject that is fulfilled (*bhoktari vyavasthitam*). But this is not all: *bhogya* implies also feeling of ownership (*svāmitvena abhimāna*), the feeling of self-appropriation. There is a *bhogya* or object of fruition only through the sense of ownership or self-appropriation, *bhoga* or fruition necessarily implying the self as being fulfilled and therefore as being enriched by or as appropriating the object to itself. *Niyoga* therefore as *bhogya* or conducing to self-fulfilment implies this self-appropriation or *svāmitvena abhimāna*. But even this is not all. It must also determine the self as agent or doer (*svam nirūpyate*), i.e., must be self-determining besides being self-determined or self-appropriated as *bhogya* or object of fruition. It is only as it determines the self as *bhogya* that the latter is a moral agent; till then he is not a moral agent and the *Niyoga* has no application. *Niyoga* is thus the self-determining and self-determined *bhogya*, the *bhogya* which constitutes its experiencer and is itself constituted by its experiencer. Further as *bhogya* or object of fruition, it is not *siddha*, accomplished, but *sādhya*, to be accomplished. In other words, it represents a satisfaction

which is *to be*, thus implying an element of becoming—the realisation of what is possible. Hence *Niyoga* is the self-appropriated and self-determining *bhogyā* in the form of a duty to be accomplished. But it is not pure unconditioned duty (*śuddhakāryarūpa*) without subjective or psychological accompaniments but duty constituted by as well as constitutive of its subjective conditions.

(11) According to others, *Niyoga* is the agent himself (*Puruṣa eva niyogaḥ*), the agent determining himself by the act (*karyaviśiṣṭaḥ puruṣaḥ*). The agent is both the *sādhaka*, accomplisher, and *sādhya*, accomplished. In accomplishing *Niyoga*, the agent accomplishes himself. It is not the act which is really accomplished or *sādhita*, but the agent who acts. The agent no doubt says to himself “this is my *kārya* or duty”, but this is only because he conceives himself as fulfilled in this particular mode. It is the agent therefore that realises himself and the agent is therefore the *Niyoga*.

Hence *Niyoga* may be conceived either (1) as unconditioned objective duty, or (2) as pure subjective impulsion, or (3) as duty with *preraṇā* as auxiliary, or (4) as *preraṇā* with duty as an accompaniment, or (5) as the free person prescribing freely to himself, or (6) as the bare link between the *preraṇā* and the duty, (7) as the entire complex of the duty, the *preraṇā* and the link, or (8) as the Transcendental Absolute as the negation of both *preraṇā* and duty as phenomenal forms, or (9) as empirical *preraṇā* or impulsion implying pathological motives and also the objective act as conditions, or (10) as empirical duty implying subjective determination and realisation in time, or (11) as the Self itself. It will be seen that (9) is the hedonistic and empirical form of pure, unconditioned *preraṇārūpa* just as (10) represents the empirical form of unconditioned *kāryarūpa*. Again both (5) and (11) consider *Niyoga* from the standpoint of the Self but while (5) considers the Self as *Self-validating*, *Self-establishing* experience, (11) considers it

as *Self-fulfilment* or *Self-realisation*. Lastly, both (5) and (8) emphasise the factor of validation through the Light of Consciousness or *caitanya*, but while in (5) this is considered from the standpoint of the individual subject or Self, in (8) it is regarded as the essence of the Transcendental Brahma or Absolute.

(d) We shall now consider the last question, *viz.*, the implications, subjective and objective, of *Niyoga* as the Moral Imperative. Two questions will have to be discussed in this connection :

(1) Does *Niyoga* imply *subjective* freedom or the agent's free will ? And

(2) Does *Niyoga* imply an *objective*, personal source—a superior or Perfect Person as the Law giver to the moral agent ?

(1) As regards the question of subjective freedom, it is contended that it is a necessary implication of the moral Imperative. The Imperative, it is argued, being *pravartanārūpa*, or actuating in character, necessarily implies a corresponding capacity or competency in the agent to accomplish it. It would be a moral as well as a logical absurdity for the Imperative to actuate the agent to anything which it is not in his power to accomplish. The "Ought", the Imperative of the *Vidhi*, thus necessarily implies "can", *i.e.*, the agent's capacity to accomplish it. (*Pravartanārūpo hi Vidhih arthāt samīhitasādhanaśaktim bodhayati. Pravartanā ca āśakyaviṣaye na sambhavati—*"Śāstradīpikā"). Hence there cannot be any moral injunction in respect of the impracticable or impossible—a command which enjoins the unattainable or impracticable loses all moral significance and authority by the very fact.

It follows therefore that the agent's subjective competency or freedom is a psychological as well as a logico-ethical implicate of the moral Imperative. The Imperative can impel or actuate only through the agent's subjective

consciousness of competency or freedom as a psychological condition, and it would be a logical absurdity which would deprive it of its validity or moral authority if the imperative were to enjoin anything which is by nature beyond the power of the agent to realise. *Niyoga* thus implies the agent's subjective freedom psychologically, logically as well as morally.

(2) As regards the question of an objective implication of a personal source, there are two schools of Hindu thought, viz., (i) the school of *Pauruṣeya-vādinas* which conceives a personal (*Pauruṣeya*) source of the *Niyoga* and (ii) the school of *Apauruṣeya-vādinas* which conceives it as Impersonal Law without any personal source. Thus according to the Cārvākas, the Bauddhas, the Jainas, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Rāmānujists, *Niyoga* is a Personal prescription of a superior to an inferior being, while according to the Purvamīmāṃsakas (i.e., the Bhāṭṭas, the Prābhākaras, etc.) it is Impersonal Law without a Lawgiver.

For the Cārvākas however *Niyoga* is only the command of the earthly king (*rājājñā*) and not of any perfect person as ordinarily assumed. As a matter of fact there is no such perfect person nor any supersensuous satisfaction which he can vouchsafe as the sanction of the command. Worldly pleasures are the only possible pleasures and the law of the king as the dispenser of earthly happiness is therefore the true Moral Law.

For the Jainas and the Bauddhas however, the Law is the declaration of the Āptas or Seers of the transcendental plane—person who by acquiring personal experience of matters of spiritual significance are competent judges of what is truly right or wrong. Hence *Niyoga* represents the verdict of spiritual experts, persons who have acquired spiritual insight and vision. The "Vātsyāyanabhāṣya" notes the following characteristics of these spiritual experts

or Āptas : *kim punarāptānām prāmāṇyam ? Sākṣātkrta-dharmatā, bhūta-dayā, yathābhūtārthacikhyāpayiṣā iti. Āptaḥ khalu sākṣātkrta-dharmāṇaḥ idam hātavyam ayamasya hāni-hetuḥ idamasya adhigantavyam ayamasya adhigamaheturiti bhūtāni anukampante. Teṣām khalu vai prāṇabhṛtām svayam anavabuddhamānānām na anyat upadeśāt avabodha-kāraṇamasti, na ca anavabodhe samihāvarjanam vā, na vā akṛtvā svastibhāvaḥ, nāpiasya anyāḥ upakārakaḥ api asti, hanta vayamebhyo yathādarśanam yathābhūtam upadiśamaḥ.*

An Āpta, therefore, is one who is possessed of—

Sākṣātkrta-dharmatā, i.e., right judgment as to what is dharma or duty by virtue of direct, personal experience.

Bhūta-dayā, compassion towards all sentient creatures sincerely wishing that they should know the right from the wrong, the beneficial from the injurious, in order to attain the one and avoid the other.

Yathābhūtārthacikhyāpayiṣā, the desire to teach sentient beings the nature of things as they really are, i.e., to teach them as to what is really injurious and should be avoided and what is really beneficial and should be sought—a desire which proceeds from the knowledge that they cannot themselves know either the one or the other and the means of avoiding the one or attaining the other, and also that they have not anybody else to help them to a knowledge of these things.

It follows from the above that the Āpta is free from the faults and shortcomings which vitiate the knowledge of ordinary mortals—the faults, e.g., of carelessness (*pramāda*), error (*viparyaya*), greed (*vipralipsā*), defects of sense-organs (*indriyadoṣa*), etc.

It is the declarations of these Āptas, perfect or perfected persons, that constitute *Niyoga* according to the Bauddhas and Jainas. But this does not imply however that there is an eternally perfect being whose commands constitute the Moral Imperative or *Niyoga*. The Bauddhas and Jainas,

being atheists, do not admit any such eternally perfect being. In place of such a being they assume an endless series of perfected persons who acquire perfection in course of time—an endless series in which the preceding Āptas stand as preceptors to those who succeed.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Rāmānujists on the contrary conceive an Īśvara or Lord as the prescriber of the Moral Law, an Eternally Perfect being who lays down the duty for man in a code of injunctions and prohibitions. But while according to Rāmānujists the commands represent the Intelligence of the Lord, *i.e.*, his knowledge of what is truly right and what is wrong, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas they represent only the will of the Lord, *i.e.*, his mere pleasure or fiat.

The Pūrvamīmāṃsakas however do away altogether with the conception of a personal source. *Niyoga* in their view is an impersonal verity of the Moral Order—a Law which has intrinsic validity without being a personal command. For what is *Niyoga*? It is *Vidhivākya*, *i.e.*, the declaration of scripture. Now a declaration (*vākya*) is its own evidence or *pramāṇa*. It is self-validating, self-evident by nature and can be overthrown only by *vaktṛdoṣa* or fault of the speaker. But the Vedas have no speaker or Vaktā, there is no personal source of the *Āpauṣeṣaya* Vedas. Hence there is also no *vaktṛdoṣa*, no fault of the speaker to vitiate the purity of the Vedic declarations. Such declarations have thus intrinsic validity without implying a personal source. These self-evident, self-authoritative Vedic Declarations constitute the Moral Law which is *Niyoga*. The Moral Law is thus the Impersonal Law of the Vedas without a lawgiver.

The Naiyāyikas however point out that the mere absence of vitiation by the speaker's faults does not constitute the *prāmāṇya*, the evidential value or validity, of the Vedic Declarations. This is only a negative condition

of their validity which supposes also other positive conditions such as direct experience, etc. Without these the Scriptural Declarations will lose all authority. The Mimāmsaka conception of the self-evident character of all declarations is an arbitrary assumption which does not bear examination. The Mimāmsakas ignore the element of personal experience and other positive factors involved in the validation of the Moral Imperative.

We have so far considered the nature and implications of the Moral Imperative without reference to the nature of the specific duties enjoined. We have seen however that there are not only *nityanaimittika* or unconditional duties for the individual but also *kāmyakarmas* or duties which are conditional on the agent's subjective desire for an end. The question therefore remains to be considered how the Imperative is to be conceived in regard to these conditional duties. These duties imply the agent's desire for empirical ends and yet according to the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras the Imperative is independent, in its authority as well as its operation, of any subjective desire of the agent. We shall therefore have to consider now :

The Nature of the Imperative or Vidhi in the conditional duties (kāmyakarmas), particularly those that involve evil in the form of himsā or injury to sentient beings.

Such *himsā* or destruction of life is part of many *kāmya* duties such as *śyena*, *agniśoma*, etc. Thus *śyena* is the specific ceremonial duty which is obligatory on the individual who wants to destroy his enemy. In so far as it enables him to attain this end it involves *anartha* or evil in the form of destruction of life. The question therefore has to be considered how from the Prābhākara and the Bhāṭṭa stand-points these can be conceived as obligations or duties conducive to the agent's merit, particularly the acts involving *anartha* or evil.

(a) *The prābhākara view* : The Prābhākaras contend that the Imperative as *pravartaka*, morally obligatory or impelling, requires only two things, *viz.*, a *niyojya* or person commanded and a *viṣaya* or act commanded. These are the *anubandhadvayas*, the two necessary accompaniments, of *Vidhi* or Moral Imperative. Now in *kāmyakarmacodanā* or injunction as to a conditional duty we have these two *anubandhas* or necessary accompaniments respectively in the person desiring something and the act which is laid down for the satisfaction of the desire. For example, in the injunction *svargakāmo yajeta*, he that desires happiness in heaven must perform this particular sacrifice, we have the *adhyakāranubandha*, the subject of the command, in the term *svargakāma* or 'the agent who desires happiness in heaven' and the *viṣayānubandha*, *i.e.*, object or act commanded, in the term *yajeta*, 'the injunction of the particular sacrifice.' It follows therefore by logical implication that the act, *viz.*, *yajikriyā* or particular sacrificial ceremony which is the *bhāvārtha* or object of the injunction, must be *svargasādhana*, *i.e.*, a means to the desired happiness in heaven. If it were not so, the term *svargakāma* would be meaningless. Why should there be reference not merely to an agent but also to an agent desiring a particular end, *viz.*, a specific satisfaction or happiness, if the enjoined duty had nothing to do with the particular end in question? It therefore necessarily follows that the act of sacrifice is a means (*sādhana*) and the happiness in heaven the end (*sādhya*) and there is *sādhyasādhanabhāva* or relation of means and end between them. Hence this *sādhyasādhanaprātiti* or sense of a means-and-end relation is *logically* implied in the prompting of the Imperative or *Vidhi*. But in this case the *pravartakatva*, the impelling character, of the *Vidhi* as the Moral Imperative, does not extend to *svargādiphala* or ends of happiness in heaven, etc. The agent is prompted by his own subjective desire or *lipsā* towards this end, and as this

empirical, pathological motive intervenes in a *kāmya* duty prompted by the agent's desire, the *Vidhi* as the non-empirical moral motive becomes *udāsīna* or indifferent. In other words, the Imperative is deprived of its character of moral impulsion or motivation through the presence of the empirical or material motive. The only operation of the Imperative in this case is to produce the *sādhyasāadhanapratīti* or consciousness of the act as a means to the desired end, and to indicate the *itikartavyatā*, the manner of accomplishing the act and thereby the end to which it is a means. These are the only functions of the Imperative in the conditional duties which imply desire in the agent and refer to specific empirical ends. In the *nitya* or unconditional duties however there being no extraneous end or consequence, there is also no subjective desire or *lipsā* as a motive. Hence the Imperative here is a motive to the act itself, its function extending to motivation as well to the indication of the manner of accomplishing the duty in question. The two *anubandhas* or accompaniments here are :—

- (1) the *niyojya* or *adhikāri*, i.e., the agent commanded, in this case irrespectively of his personal craving or wish, and
- (2) the *viśaya* or *bhāvārtha*, i.e., the act enjoined. Since there is no subjective motive, the *viśaya*, the objective act, is itself the moving or prompting force.

Now let us consider the cases of *agniśomīya himsā* and *śyena*. The one involves evil in the form of *paśughāta* or slaughter of animals, this being part of the sacrificial ceremony. The other also involves evil, viz., in the form of the destruction of the enemy, this being the object of the *śyenayāga* or ceremony of *śyena*. Now we have seen that in the case of *kāmya*, empirical or conditional duties (including *jyotiṣṭoma*, *śyena*, etc.), the *pravartakatva*, the prescriptive or prompting function of the Injunctive as constituting *sāstriyapratīti* or moral impulsion consists only in indicating the *itikartavyatā*, manner of accomplishing

the act (including the *sādhyasāadhanapratīti*, the inducement of the means-and-end consciousness), but does not cover the *phalāṃśa*, the consequence or end desired to be accomplished. Now in *Agniṣomīya himsā* or injury to life involved in the ceremony of *Agniṣoma*, the *himsā* or element of injury, viz., animal slaughter (*paśughāta*) is included in the *itikartavyatāmśa* or manner of accomplishing the ceremony and is therefore covered by the *śāstrīyapraṇṛtti*, the moral function of the Imperative. Hence such *himsā* or injury to life is morally legitimate (*vaidha*), and the *sāmānyavidhi*, the general prescription which prohibits *himsā* or injury to life (e.g., *ma himsyāt*, thou shalt not take life), has therefore to be limited, restricted in its scope, by the *viśeṣavidhi*, the special injunction which prescribes the *agniṣomīya himsā* in the sacrificial ceremony of *jyotiṣṭoma*. But in the case of the *śyena* ceremony however, the *himsā*, viz., *śatrumārana* or destruction of the enemy is *phalāṃśa*, part of the end or object which is aimed at. It does not fall within the *itikartavyatāmśa*, i.e., the part of the injunction which relates to the manner of accomplishing the *śyena* ceremony. For this reason it cannot be covered by the moral function of the Imperative or *Vidhi*, i.e., the function of the injunction which prescribes the *śyena* ceremony for the person who wants to destroy his enemy. Hence the *sāmānyavidhi* or general injunction which condemns injury to life (*himsā*) is not restricted in its application here, i.e., it condemns *śyena* as *adharma* or morally evil.

It follows from the above that for the Prābhākaras *śāstrīya himsā*, destruction of life having scriptural sanction, is right or wrong according to the nature of the particular injunction which leads to or involves it. Thus scriptural injunctions include *nitya* or unconditional duties and *kāmya* or conditional duties (including *jyotiṣṭoma*, *śyena*, etc.). Now of these only *arthas*, i.e., those that are *sukhādhikaraduhkhājanaka* in the sense of not being fraught with un-

happiness in excess of the happiness, are *dharma*, i.e., morally right or morally good. *Śyena*, e.g., is *adharma*, morally evil because it is *anartha* or evil, i.e., evil as leading to unhappiness in excess of happiness. But it is not simply because it is an *anartha* or evil that it constitutes moral wrong or *adharma*, but because it is an *anartha* or evil which is scripturally condemned or prohibited. In other words, only such *anarthas* as are prohibited by *śāstrika* command are moral evils, and *śyena* as involving *himsā* or injury to life in its *phalāṃśa* or end aimed at falls within the scope of the general prohibition of *himsā* or injury to life—a general prohibition which is restricted only in respect of such injury as is involved in the manner of accomplishing an act and not as an end or consequence desired to be accomplished. Contrarywise only *arthas*, i.e., acts or objects which do not produce unhappiness in excess of happiness are *dharma*, morally good or morally right. But all *arthas* are not morally good, only *codanālakṣana arthas*, i.e., *arthas* having the mark of scriptural sanction, constitute moral duty. Thus there may be some *arthas* which are desirable from the non-*śāstriya* or secular standpoint. These are not *dharma*. Similarly there may be some *anarthas* which are undesirable from the empirical standpoint—*anarthas* as producing unhappiness in excess of happiness. But these will not constitute moral wrong unless prohibited by *śāstrika* prescription. It follows therefore that there may be some *arthas* and some *anarthas* which are devoid of moral significance. Thus nonprohibited *anarthas* are neither right nor wrong; similarly non-prescribed *arthas* are also neither the one nor the other, and it is possible that there may be specific objects or acts which are neither *arthas* nor *anarthas*, and these also are morally neutral.

It follows from Prabhākara's view that the *prāmānya*, the authority or authoritative character of Vedic injunctions, is independent of any extraneous consequence or end,

any fruition or satisfaction to which it may conduce. This is true of the *nitya* or unconditional as well as the *kāmya* or conditional duties enjoined by the Vedas. In both cases the authority is independent of any ulterior end, and since in the conditional duties the agent is moved by his subjective desire, the authoritative or imperative function of the injunction relates only to the *itikartavyatā*, the manner of accomplishing the act and to the *sādhyasāadhanapratiti* or inducement of the knowledge of means-and-end relation, between the act and the end aimed at. The authority in this case is logical rather than strictly moral—the Imperative ensuring validation of the consciousness of means-and-end relation and of the manner of accomplishing the act rather than impelling the will or *pravṛtti* through its authority. In *nitya* or unconditional duties however there being no intervening subjective desire, the authority extends to the will and determines it through its moral validity or *prāmānya*. In either case therefore the *prāmānya* or authority is established through the duty which is enjoined and not through any ulterior fruition or satisfaction which it may ensure. And this is true of all Vedic prescriptions, their validity or authority being constituted by the prescribed acts or duties independently of extraneous ends (*sarvasya vedasya kārye eva prāmānyam*). Where such ends exist as in *kāmya* of conditional duties, the Injunction loses its character of moral impulsion or authority, its only function being to indicate the act as a means to the end and the manner of accomplishing it. It follows from this that all Vedic prescriptions are validated through the duties enjoined and that prescriptions which lay down ends-in-themselves independently of specific acts or duties are *apramāṇa* or unauthoritative. Hence the *Ātmasvarūpaparavākyas* of the Upanisad^s, i.e., the Texts which declare realisation of the Self's true nature as the highest end, are unauthoritative. Such declarations enjoin a static fruition

for the moral agent—the fruition of rest in the Self's true nature as distinguished from an act of duty to be done, an end therefore which is other than any specific act to be accomplished. Hence they cannot be valid or authoritative.

According to the Prābhākaras therefore the Vedic Law as *Vidhi* or Moral Imperative is not the eternally self-accomplished fruition of the Absolute as realised consciousness or experience presenting itself as an end to be realised. It is the act of duty itself in its pure essence, the act as having self-evidencing, self-validating authority, the act as an impersonal verity of the moral order as distinguished from a fact given in experience. *Vidhi*, in other words, is the self-positing and self-posed duty which is as different from the being of a given fact as it is from becoming. It is accomplished, realised being as distinguished from the static being of a given matter of fact, the being or reality which constitutes the validity of a self-authoritative duty or imperative as distinguished from the being of a self-accomplished experience or fruition. It is this accomplished being as duty that comes up to us in the form of a categorical imperative. The authority of the Imperative is only the self-validation of the Duty in consciousness as an accomplished verity of the moral order: it is the Law revealing itself to consciousness in its essence as having dynamic reality or the validity of a duty to be accomplished.

Such injunctions as are *artha* constitute *dharma* or morality according to the Prābhākaras, *i.e.*, injunctions which do not produce unhappiness in excess of happiness constitute moral right, while injunctions which are *anarthas* as producing more unhappiness than happiness are not morally right though having scriptural sanction. It is these injunctions which are really accomplished in the agent's accomplishment of his duties and not any ulterior end or

consequence. Since in *kāmya* or conditional duties the agent is moved not by the injunction but by his subjective desire for an end, these are not strictly duties in the moral sense : they are pseudo-duties whose only function is to indicate the manner of accomplishing an end without prompting or impelling the will which is the true function of a duty as having moral authority. Hence it is the unconditional duties without any extraneous end or consequence that are duties in the strict sense. The prompting here is the prompting of the Imperative and not of any extraneous consequence or end, and is therefore strictly moral prompting or impulsion as distinguished from the empirical prompting of desire. It is therefore the accomplishment of such duties with *pravṛtti* or will determined by moral as distinguished from pathological prompting that constitutes man's proper course. Such duties performed for duty's sake constitute morality (*dharma*), i.e., the accomplishment of the Imperative for the sake of the imperative without reference to any ulterior fruition or satisfaction. This is also man's highest good, his *nihśreyasa* or *paramapuruṣārtha*—this *niyogasiddhi* or accomplishment of pure duty as distinguished from the realisation of an ulterior end or happiness. It does not lead to happiness in heaven (*svarga*) or any other ulterior satisfaction which is implicated only in the *kāmya* or conditional duties. These latter refer to a *phala* or extraneous result, such *phala* being *ākṣiptā*, drawn on or implicated by, the fact of the subjective desire which prompts, though not implied in the imperative or impelling function of duty as duty. This impelling function becomes inoperative by the very fact of the subjective prompting in a conditional duty which thus lacks true moral significance or value.

N.B.—Some points however remain obscure in the Prābhākara doctrine. (1) Does *Niyoga* imply *vyāpāra* or a process of becoming ? Is it something that realises, posits itself ? In that case, it is *bhāvanā*, becoming, and not

being which contradicts the doctrine of a Moral Order as a system of established or accomplished moral verities. Is it then not *vyāpāra* at all, no process of becoming, but mere *svabhāva* or essence? In that case, what is it the essence of? Is it *viśayasvabhāva*, the essence of the enjoined duty? In that case, *Niyoga* is the act itself, the act in its pure essence, not a fact in its pure essence. But the question in this case is: is the *viśaya*, the act which is the object of the *Niyoga siddha*, accomplished, or *asiddha*, unaccomplished, *i.e.*, *vidyamāna* existent, or *avidyamāna*, non-existent, at the time of the *niyoga*? If it is non-existent, then how does it become *vākyārtha*, the import of the categorical proposition? An hypothetical proposition may refer even to the non-existent, but a categorical proposition refers only to what exists. To say that the non-existent may be clothed with an imagined (*kālpanika*) reality and thus be the import of a categorical proposition is to deprive *Niyoga* of its character of an objective, ontological verity, *i.e.*, of its character of an accomplished fact in an established Moral Order. It is to give it only *kālpanika*, imagined existence, subject to all the forms and categories of the understanding. Again, if the *viśaya*, the act in its essence, is existent (*vidyamāna*), then it is *siddha*, accomplished and cannot be accomplished again. Lastly, if it be partly existent and partly non-existent (*i.e.*, ideally existent and actually non-existent), then by as much as it is non-existent by so much it cannot be the meaning of the categorical proposition, and by as much as it is existent by so much it cannot be accomplished. Is it then *phalāsvabhāva*, of the essence of an end, as distinguished from *viśayasvabhāva*, the essence of a duty? This will be consequentialism as distinguished from the ethical realism of *Niyoga* as act-essence or *viśayasvabhāva*. The difficulty here however is: the *Niyoga* as looking forward to an end will imply also an end of this end and also another end for the latter and so on *ad infinitum*. Again

the end as end being *avidyamāna* or unrealised cannot be the import of a categorical proposition. (2) Again *Niyoga* is *pramāṇa*, validates or establishes itself as authoritative. But what is *Pramāṇa*? *Pramāṇa* is *cidātmaka*, self-validating experience or position in consciousness. *Niyoga* as *pramāṇa* is therefore bare *pratibhāṣa* or position in consciousness and thus we get neither its *kāryarūpa*, the form of duty nor its *preraṇārūpa*, the form of impulsion. These must be therefore only illusory superimpositions on *Niyoga* as mere self-evidencing experience. This is the objection of *Brahmavāda* or Absolutism against the doctrine of *Niyoga* as mere Impersonal Law. *Niyoga* in this view is *samvidātmaka*, the self-revealing Spirit itself and is not Pure Act or Duty as an impersonal axiological verity. (3) Thirdly, *Niyoga* is either of the form of duty (*kāryarūpa*) or of the form of moral impulsion (*preraṇārūpa*). This *Niyoga* again is *Apūrva* which constitutes *dharma* or merit, i.e., *Niyoga* as accomplished constitutes merit. But the *Prābhākaras* reject alike the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* conception of *Apūrva* as *Ātmasamskāra* or subjective disposition of the self and the *Bhāṭṭa* conception of it as *kriyāśakti*, i.e., an objective potency of the act itself. Hence the question is: where does *Niyoga* reside as *Apūrva* and as constituting the agent's *dharma* or merit during the interval of its accomplishment? Further how can it be *Apūrva* or *Dharma* as pure *kāryarūpa* or duty or as pure *preraṇārūpa* or moral obligation and impulsion? In either case we shall have the accomplishment of that which in its true essence is always to be. And further there is no difference in this case between the *Niyoga* as accomplished and the *Niyoga* as unaccomplished, at least it is not clear what this difference, if any, positively is. *Niyoga* as *Apūrva* is not *karmika* potency nor a *samskāra* or disposition of the *Ātman*. What then, is it positively as distinguished from unaccomplished Law? (4) Lastly, what is the *niḥsreyasa* or highest good

in the sense of *paramapurusaārtha* or ultimate and highest end of the individual? The Prābhākaras describe it as *niyogasiddhi*, the realisation of the Imperative, i.e., its realisation in the case of the *nitya*, or unconditional duties (*Tasmāt nityeṣu niyogasiddhireva puruṣārtham, niyoga-siddheḥ paramapurusaārthatvāt*—"Citsukhi" reporting Prabhākara's view). What, then, is the essence of this realisation of the Imperative? We have already seen how the Prābhākaras avoid a positive definition of it. They merely reject the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Bhāṭṭa conceptions. Hence it is not clear what constitutes the positive content of Prabhākara's *mokṣa*. This *mokṣa* as Transcendental Freedom is described as *niyogasiddhi* or realisation of the Imperative, but *niyoga* is always either *preraṇā*, impulsion, or *kārya*, duty : it is not clear how it can be accomplished or realised verity without being deprived of its very nature. There is also no possible locus of it in the interval of realisation or accomplishment, and thus Prabhākara's *mokṣa* as consisting in the realisation of *Niyoga* remains merely a negative concept. Śālikanātha (a disciple of Prabhākara) however, in the "*Prakaranapañcikā*," in the chapter on *Tattvāloka*, mentions *duḥkḥābhāva* or freedom from suffering as Prabhākara's *mokṣa*. According to him there are two courses—the course which leads to *svarga* or happiness in heaven and the course which leads to *mokṣa* or freedom from suffering. The former comes on the wake of *kāmyakarmas* or conditional duties depending on the agent's desire, while the latter is brought on by self-knowledge (*Atmajñāna*), the discharge of the unconditional duties (*nityanaimittika-karmānuṣṭhāna*) and the *varjana*, eschewing, of the conditional duties (*kāmya*) and of the *niṣiddha* or forbidden actions, by an agent who is *virakta*, dispassionate or indifferent to allurements of pleasure or happiness. Hence Prabhākara's *mokṣa*, according to Śālikanātha, is more than mere *niyogasiddhi* in the sense of the disinterested discharge

of the unconditional duties : it is not merely the accomplishment of the duty but is also self-knowledge besides conducing to an end, viz., *duḥkhābhāva* or freedom from suffering. But this is practically giving up Prabhākara's speciality and conceding everything to Kumārila. An extraneous end is assumed as completing the accomplishment of the *Niyoga* and even the Upaniṣad texts declaring self-knowledge as the highest end are rendered authoritative by being brought under a *codanā* or injunction, viz., *ātmajñānacodanā* or command enjoining self-knowledge. Says Śālikanātha : *ato viśayaviśeṣasambhogāḥ eva ānandaḥ iti sundaram*, i.e., the satisfaction which consists in the enjoyment of specific objects is one way to *svarga* or happiness in heaven. It is not *mokṣa* however which is the end or good which results from the cessation of all empirical suffering : *mokṣastu sāmsārikaduḥkhopaśamāt puruṣārtha iti puṣkalam*. What, then, is this *mokṣa* or liberation ? He is said to be liberated who by subduing his desire for empirical life full of woes, religiously refrains from the pursuit of empirical ends as well as from the acts which are forbidden as sinful, whose merit as well as demerit have worn out, and who by the cultivation of self-knowledge as a religious duty with the aid of moral tranquillity, application, sexual continence, etc., has completely destroyed the entire mass of responsibility for his doings. *Kaḥ punarmokṣaḥ ? Yaḥ khalu sāmsārikebhyaḥ duḥkhebhyaḥ gatasprhaḥ saḥ niṣiddhebhyaḥ abhyudayasādhanebhyaḥ ca nivartamānaḥ dharmādharmau kṣayam nayan śamadamabrahmacaryādikāṅgapabṛmhitena ātmajñānena "na ca punarāvartate" iti coditena niḥśeṣakarmāśayam nāśayan mucyate* (Śālikanātha's "Prakaraṇapañcikā").

(b) *Kumārila's view* : We have seen that Prabhākara interprets *dharma* as *codanālakṣaṇaḥ arthaḥ* in the sense that it includes *anarthas* which have the mark of scriptural sanction as well as *arthas* which are without scriptural sanction. In other words, according to Prabhākara there may be

arthas, i.e., objects not producing unhappiness in excess of happiness, which may not be scripturally enjoined. These are not *dharma*, duty or moral right. Similarly, there may be *anarthas* or evils as producing more unhappiness than happiness and these may be scripturally enjoined. These also are not moral duties or *dharma*. Only *arthas* are *dharma* and of these only such as are scripturally enjoined. For Kumārila however whatever is scripturally enjoined is an *artha* and also a moral duty or *dharma*. Hence scripture cannot enjoin *anartha* or evil : it only forbids or prohibits the pursuit of such *anartha*. A scriptural law (*codanā*) may be either a positive injunction (*Vidhi*) or a negative prohibition (*Niṣedha*). It relates to an *artha* or positive end in the first case and prescribes its accomplishment as duty. In the latter case it relates to some *anartha* or evil and prescribes cessation or abstention (*nivṛtti*) from it. It is these negative prescriptions as prohibiting *anartha* or evil and wrong actions that are implied by *codanālakṣaṇaḥ anarthaḥ* or *anartha* having a scriptural mark. They are not *anarthas* having scriptural sanction as Prābhākaras interpret them, but *anarthas* scripturally indicated for abstention or cessation. Such *anarthas* are *adharma*, morally evil or wrong, as prohibited by scripture and not morally neutral or indifferent having scriptural sanction as Prābhākaras contend. There are no *anarthas* positively enjoined, *anarthas* being always the object of prohibition, and never that of a positive injunction. Contrarywise only *anarthas* are the objects of scriptural prohibition and there are no objects of prohibition which are *arthas* or positive ends as Prābhākaras hold. There may indeed be *anarthas* which are not prohibited by Śāstra and thus are morally neutral, but whatsoever is thus prohibited is an *anartha* and therefore *adharma* or morally evil, and never an *artha* which is morally neutral as Prābhākaras contend. Similarly, there may indeed be *arthas* which are not scripturally

enjoined and thus are morally neutral, but whatsoever is so enjoined is an *artha* and therefore *dharma*, morally right, and never an *anartha* which is morally neutral as Prābhākaras conceive it. For Kumārila an end is a logical and psychological implicate of a scriptural Imperative, though of course it does not constitute its moral authority. Hence an end, either as positive realisation of a good or negative cessation from an evil, being necessarily implied, an Imperative as injunctive or prohibitive must necessarily refer to an *artha* or *anartha*. Hence there cannot be positive injunction of an *anartha* nor negative prohibition of an *artha*. Kumārila further holds that there is no rule that the validity of the Vedas consists exclusively in the obligatoriness or authority of specific acts as duties. With regard to the Upaniṣad texts at least it must not be denied that the validity accrues from something other than an act or duty, *i.e.*, from the intrinsic value or excellence of the Self in its true nature as an accomplished reality as distinguished from an act to be accomplished. It cannot be supposed that the Self is a duty to be accomplished by the will. It follows therefore that Śabda, verbal testimony, is not necessarily and invariably in reference to some *kārya* or duty to be accomplished, *i.e.*, it is not invariably a command but may also be a simple declaration of truth, (*Sarvasya Vedasya kārye eva prāmānyam iti na niyamah upaniṣadvākyānām Ātmasvarūpaparātvaṃ na nirākartavyam Na avāśyam pravṛttyādhinā vyutpattiḥ. Tasmāt naikāntataḥ kāryārthatā śabdānām.*—“*Śāstradīpikā.*”)

According to Kumārila therefore an end is implicated logically and psychologically in every scriptural Imperative prescribing a duty, but does not constitute its moral authority or validity as duty which depends purely on its own nature as duty. But this holds in case of texts that prescribe duties, *i.e.*, are of the nature of imperatives or commands. There are however other texts which are not

imperatives but simple declarations of truths or accomplished realities. Such for example are the Upaniṣad texts which declare the intrinsic worth or excellence of the Self in its true nature. In this case the nature of an accomplished reality is declared as an end-in-itself, and the validity or authority of the text is consequent on this self-accomplished end or value which is thus not merely a logical or psychological implicate of the declaration but also constitutes its content and determines its validity. We have thus two kinds of scriptural declarations :—(1) those that are moral imperatives in which ends are non-morally implicated or involved, but which are not themselves validated or established as morally authoritative through such ends, and (2) those that are declarations of accomplished facts having intrinsic value or excellence and are thus established through these as being themselves their own ends.

What, then, are these ends which are non-morally implicated in Moral Imperatives ? According to Kumārila, we have two kinds of these ends, (1) *dukkhāsambhinnam sukham*, i.e., unmixed happiness or happiness unadulterated by unhappiness, and (2) *nityasukham*, i.e., eternal happiness, unending satisfaction or bliss. The former constitutes *nihśreyasah* or *summum bonum* in the lower sense, an inferior sort of *summum bonum*, which is only unmixed happiness but not eternal happiness as it may be exhausted through fruition or *bhoga* and thus end in a rebirth. The course which leads to it is the course of the accomplishment of *kāmya* or conditional duties—the course of *vihitakāmya-karmānuṣṭhāna*. As it does not lead to an enduring and imperishable fruition, it is only a relative best. A better course is that of the discharge of the *nitya* or unconditional duties and the realisation of *Ātmajñāna* or self-knowledge. These are *dharmādharma-virodhi*, i.e., opposed to *dharma*, merit, as well as *adharma*, demerit. Hence they may bring

on the destruction of both in the end, thereby conducing to an eternal happiness or *nityasukha* (according to some followers of Kumārila) or the Self's freedom by the destruction of all its specific qualities (*samastavaiśeṣikātmagunochedaḥ*) according to others. Hence while the lower course of the conditional duties leads only to some kind of unadulterated happiness, the higher course of the unconditional duties and self-knowledge leads to a lasting fruition either as *samastavaiśeṣikātmagunochedaḥ*, i.e., enduring freedom through the destruction of all the specific qualities of the Self, or as *nityasukha*, i.e., eternal happiness.

Let us now consider the nature and implications of a specific duty involving evil in some form such as *himsā* or destruction of life. Take the case of the ceremony of *śyena* whose end is the destruction of the enemy. We have seen that according to Kumārila whatever is positively enjoined by scripture is an *artha* as well as *dharma* or duty. Now *śyena* is the object of a *Vidhicodanā* or positive injunction. Hence it is *svarūpataḥ dharmah*, i.e., moral duty considered in its own nature as scripturally enjoined. But *śyena* also leads to an *anarthaphala*, i.e., evil consequence or result, viz., the destruction of the enemy. How is such an evil consequence or *anartha* to be reconciled with the nature of *śyena* as duty which is always *artha* or good? Kumārila's view is that the consequence or end, being only a *non-moral* implicate of the duty, does not affect its nature as *morally* authoritative. The duty as a moral imperative is an *artha* even though there may be an *anartha* or evil in its implication of an end or *phala* which is non-moral. The evil or *anartha* in this case is *himsā* or destruction of life which is the object of the scriptural prohibition "thou shalt not take the life of a sentient being." Hence it is not merely *anartha* or evil but also *adharma* or moral evil. Now this *adharma* or moral evil appertains to the consequence or *phala* which is implicated in the moral

imperative but is not essential to its nature as moral duty. Hence the nature of the latter as moral duty and therefore as *artha* or good is not affected by association with such moral evil as its consequence. It may be called moral evil only by *upacāra* or transference of the nature of the end to itself, but in itself it is not *adharma* or moral evil. This holds good inspite of the fact that the moral evil of the consequence or *phala* will bring on its own retribution in the form of *naraka* or suffering in hell, for it is not *śyena* itself which brings on this retribution, but it is the evil involved in the consequence. This evil being destruction of life which is scripturally prohibited must mature into its own punishment in due course but not because of the ceremony of *śyena* as an enjoined duty but because of the forbidden consequence of injury to life which is not necessary to its moral authority as scripturally enjoined. There are indeed certain exceptional or special cases in which destruction of life is allowed by the Vedas. These are the six exemptions, *i.e.*, the exceptions to the general rule prohibiting such destruction. Destruction of life is legitimate, *e.g.* (1) in protecting the life of a cow from the attack of an *ātatāyī* or enemy, (2) in saving the life of a Brahmin, etc. In such circumstances there is no evil in *śyena* if there is no natural or *laukika* means available. In all other cases *śyena* involves evil, but only indirectly or mediately through the consequence or end and not in its own nature as duty. Such evil brings on *naraka* or suffering in hell, but *śyena* itself does not bring about this suffering. [This is also the view of most Neo-Naiyāyika writers and also of Viśvanātha, but is opposed to that of Old Nyāya writers (*e.g.*, Jayanta) and of Sāṅkhya, both the latter condemning *śyena* as *anartha* or evil.)

Let us consider the above with reference to the three parts or constitutive factors of a *Vidhi* or Scriptural Injunction. We have seen that an injunction usually

consists of (1) a *sādhyaṃśa* or part prescribing an end, (2) a *sādhanāṃśa* or part indicating the means, and (3) an *itikāryavatāṃśa* or part showing the manner of accomplishing the act indicated as means. Now according to the Prābhākaras, the end or consequence being not implied or imported by the moral function of the Imperative, *śyena* which involves prohibited *himsā* or destruction of life in its *phalāṃśa* or end cannot be morally justified. According to Kumārila however the moral function of the Injunction covers all the three parts of end, means and manner of accomplishment, but unequally. viz., primarily the means or act (e.g., the *Yāga* or sacrifice) and the manner or mode of accomplishment, and only by implication the end, *sādhya* or *phala* such as happiness in heaven, etc. Further *Vidhi* or moral Imperative has authority even in the *kāmya* or conditional duties as revealing (*jñāpaka*) the *sādhya*sādhanatā or conduciveness of the act to the end desired. But the *phalakāmanā* or desire for an end depends on the *puruṣa*, the agent, and therefore it is the *puruṣa* himself who causes the *pravṛtti* or will to the accomplishment of the end. (*Swayameva hi jñānti pūruṣaḥ kartavyam iti swayameva puruṣappravṛtti—Rāmakṛṣṇa's "Siddhāntacandrikā" on "Śāstradīpikā"*). But since the Imperative is also *pravartaka*, obligatory or morally impelling, the *sādhya*phala, i.e., the end to be accomplished, is also in a secondary sense *vidheya*, duty or object of the Imperative. Hence in *kāmya* or conditional duties like *śyena*, the scope of the Imperative extends also to the end or consequence though only indirectly by implication or in a secondary sense, but since this consequence is a prohibited *anartha* or evil in certain cases, e.g., *himsā* or destruction of life, there is *adharma* or moral evil on account of such consequence. But such *adharma* appertains to the end and does not taint the nature of the *śyena* itself in its own nature which is *dharma* or duty. The *śyena* is thus *svarūpataḥ dharmah*,

i.e., is morally legitimate in its own nature as a duty primarily imported by a positive injunction, but since it brings on *śyenajanyahimsā*, *i.e.*, prohibited destruction of life, mediately through its consequence or end, it is regarded as morally wrong (*adharmā*) by superimposition (*upacāra*), *i.e.*, the superimposition of the consequence on the act itself which leads to the consequence.

It follows therefore that according to the Prābhākaras evil or wrong can be justified only as implicated in or as a necessary part of the duty itself. It cannot be justified as an end aimed at. According to Kumārila however such evil or wrong may be indirectly implicated in a relative or conditional duty depending on the agent's desire though it cannot be primarily imported by the Imperative. Thus there is a duty even with reference to the accomplishment of an end which is morally evil or wrong : one may seek it in the proper manner or one may be remiss even in this. The duty therefore is with reference to the mode of accomplishing the end and one may acquire merit or demerit by conforming to the rules or not conforming thereto. The end is thus only indirectly implicated in such a duty, and though the evil of the end may result in the agent's demerit, yet this is other than the demerit which may accrue to him on account of his not properly accomplishing his duty with reference to the end. (In this sense even the sharper and the robber have their specific duties : they must conform to the rules, to their special codes failing wherein they will be failing in their duty.)

In the foregoing analysis we have considered evil and particularly moral evil with reference to positive scriptural prescriptions or injunctions, *i.e.*, we have considered how far and in what sense such injunctions can be said to imply anything which is wrong or evil in its nature. It now remains to be considered in what sense such evil is to be

regarded as constituting the object of the negative prescriptions or prohibitions. This leads us to :

The Doctrine of Niṣedha or Scriptural Prohibition according to Prabhākara and Kumārila respectively.

(1) *Prabhākara's view* : We have already seen that, according to the Prābhākaras, an *anartha* may be *anartha* or evil merely from the *laukika*, secular standpoint, or simply from the *Śāstriya*, scriptural standpoint, or from both. Now scriptural *anarthas*, whether simply scriptural, or scriptural as well as secular, may be the object of a scriptural prohibition as well as a scriptural injunction. It is only *anarthas* which are scripturally prohibited that constitute *adharma* or moral wrong. An *anartha* is scripturally enjoined in a *kāmya* duty, and as the injunction in such a case is without moral force because of the agent's *kāmanā* or subjective desire, such *anartha* is devoid of strict moral significance, *i.e.*, is neither moral nor immoral. Provided therefore that an *anartha* is not specifically prohibited in some other prescription, it may be the object of a positive injunction without being either right or wrong. But if it is prohibited elsewhere it is wrong because of such scriptural prohibition. Further all scriptural prohibitions have only *anartha* in view, *i.e.*, *anartha* in the sense of producing more unhappiness than happiness. Such *anartha* may not be *anartha* or evil from the secular standpoint, but it is always *anartha* in the *Śāstriya* or non-empirical sense.

It is these *anarthas* which constitute the object only of scriptural prohibitions that constitute moral evil or moral wrong. But the prohibitions do not refer to any ulterior end or consequence such as sin of the agent (*pratyavāya*) and his consequent punishment in hell : it is not reference to any such extraneous end that constitutes the moral wrongness of an act which is prohibited. On the contrary, the prohibition itself constitutes the wrongness in question.

As a matter of fact the prohibition involves nothing beyond the two essentials of a *niyoga* or command. *viz.*, (1) a *niyojya*, *adhikṛtapuruṣa* or person on whom the command is binding, in this case every man who feels the desire for the forbidden indulgence, and (2) a *sādhana*, means or instrument for the accomplishment of the command which in this case is *nivṛtti* or cessation from the forbidden act. These are the only necessary accompaniments of the prohibition as imperative or obligatory so that no *phalakāmanā*, no desire for any ulterior end or consequence such as *pratyavāyābhāva* or freedom from the taint of sin, is necessary. The mere presentation of the enjoined duty is sufficient for the agent's cessation : the imperative is self-appropriated as *puruṣa-viśeṣaṇa* or specification of the Self, and thus acts as the deterrent. There is no pathological desire which acts as the counteractive to the forbidden impulse, no extraneous end or consequence, the carrying out of the command, *i.e.*, the required cessation or abstention, being itself its own end. Hence the only *puruṣārtha* or end which is accomplished by the cessation is *niyogasiddhi* or accomplishment of the command, the *siddhi* or accomplishment in this case being negative abstention or overcoming of a positive craving.

(2) *Kumārila's view* : According to Kumārila however the desire for an end is a psychological condition of volition in every case, *i.e.* in the negative as well as the positive form of it. Thus there is *hitapṛāpti* or attainment of the good as a motive in positive willing (*pravṛtti*) while there is *ahitaparihāra* or avoidance of evil as a motive in negative willing or *nivṛtti*. The law of selection and rejection as a psychological condition thus holds good in all cases, even in moral willing from the consciousness of duty. Hence in *nivṛtti* or cessation in view of scriptural prohibition or *niṣedha*, there is desire for an end, *viz.*, the desire to avoid subjective sin (*pratyavāya*) and its consequence of suffering

in hell (*naraka*). This is the *ahita* or evil which is sought to be avoided by such cessation just as in *vidhi* or positive injunction there is the realisation of a positive end or good (*hita*), viz., happiness in heaven and the like.

It follows therefore that according to Prabhākara the prohibition, though binding independently of the agent's desire for an ulterior end such as freedom from sin, is yet conditional on his feeling the forbidden impulse. It is thus conditional in one sense and unconditional in another: provided you feel the impulse, the prohibition binds you, but you cannot avoid coming under its authority if you are under the sway of the impulse. Further, such impulse is a prius only of the application of the imperative to your case; it is not a condition of the accomplishment of the imperative. The imperative is accomplished purely through the moral prompting without requiring a nonmoral psychological motive for its accomplishment. It is otherwise with the positive injunctions. These are unconditionally authoritative, independently even of a psychological prius of subjective impulse. They are accomplished likewise through themselves without implying any extraneous desire. The so-called conditional injunctions are not true moral injunctions. They imply a subjective prius of empirical impulse and for that very reason are not duties but mere facts resulting from psychological causes. According to Kumārila however there is desire for an end in all scriptural imperatives, negative and positive. Such desire is a psychological condition of the accomplishment of the duty though not necessary for the moral impulsion or obligatoriness of the imperative. This is true not only of the unconditional but also of the conditional injunctions as well as the prohibitions. The prohibitions however imply something more: they imply a forbidden impulse in the agent as the prius of their application. Hence they are conditional on the agent in two ways, conditional on a

forbidden impulse in him and conditional on his desire to avoid the consequence thereof. The former is the prius of the application and the latter of the accomplishment of the prohibition. The conditional injunctions are also similarly conditional in two ways, conditional on an empirical impulse which in this case is a condition of application as well as of accomplishment of the enjoined duty. Thus the prohibitions and conditional injunctions are doubly conditional according to Kumārila : in either case there is not only desire for an end as a condition of psychological motivation but also an impulse (to be checked or realised) as the condition of the moral application of the command. The unconditional injunctions however apply without reference to any subjective impulse and thus are conditional on desire only in respect of psychological prompting.

Hence according to the Prābhākaras the moral imperative, positive or negative, is independent of pathological motivation, though in the case of the latter there is a psychological prius of forbidden impulse to be counteracted. Moreover the conditional injunctions resulting from subjective prompting are without moral force. According to Kumārila however, even the unconditional injunctions imply psychological motivation through the desire for an end. In the prohibitions and the conditional injunctions there is moreover an additional psychological prius of impulse as the condition of application. Both Kumārila and Prabhākara however admit that the moral motive or prompting of the Law is the essential factor which may require a pathological psychological prompting as a secondary accompaniment or may not require it. In either case therefore the moral intention is primary and an extraneous desire is either unnecessary or merely subsidiary. Another question however arises here : the moral intention may not only refer to an

extraneous end through the implication of a subjective desire, but may also lead to unintended or undesired consequences fraught with good or evil. How far are these consequences of moral significance? Do they lead to the agent's merit or demerit? Do they affect in any way the moral nature of the acts whose collateral accompaniments or consequences they are? This leads us to the question of *the subjective and objective rightness or wrongness of an act considered as such*.

The question is: whether rightness or the opposite appertains to the act in its own nature apart from the subjective intention of the agent or whether it attaches to it only through the agent's conscious choice. In the former case, there will be responsibility even for unintended and accidental acts, *i.e.*, merit or demerit will accrue therefrom. In the latter case there will be responsibility only for acts from conscious foresight and choice. Is the act, then, in itself right or wrong? Is it a source of merit and demerit on its own account, or only through the subjective intention? Is moral responsibility determined purely by the nature of the act, or by the subjective intention, or by both conjointly?

Consider the following cases:—

- (1) When the forbidden *anartha* or evil, *e.g.*, destruction of life condemned by scripture, is intended as a consequence, but is remote and mediated (*vyavahita*), though certain. (a) Thus there may be death in consequence of festering boils, ulcers, etc., which may again be hastened by means of poisoning (*viṣaṇḍa*), sword stroke (*khadgāghāta*), etc. Here death is caused by the latter through the intervening boils, ulcers, etc., and the question is how far this tantamounts to murder and the consequent guilt thereof. (b) Similarly death may be caused by means of the *śyena* ceremony, the *śyena* generating *marañā-pūrvā*, *i.e.*, a non-natural potency which causes the death in

question. Here also death is caused mediately, the intervening factor here being a non-natural agency as distinguished from the natural factors in the previous instance. Is this then also equivalent to murder? (c) Again, one may worship the *Śiva* Deity with a view to laying down one's life at the holy pilgrimage of Kāśī. Here also a non-natural means is employed and the question is whether the agent is chargeable with the guilt of suicide.

(2) When the *anartha* or evil is unintended and accidental, being the unforeseen consequence of an act done originally with a good intention, *e.g.*, when there is death of a cow caused by its falling into a well that has dried up and thus has failed of its original beneficial purpose of supplying drinking water to the locality.

(3) When the *anartha* or mischief is an accidental consequence of an act which is morally indifferent (neither good nor evil). *e.g.*, the throwing of a javelin which by missing its aim kills a Brāhmin.

The question is : how far is the agent morally responsible in each of these cases? Has he incurred demerit because of the consequence of his action? Or has there been no demerit in so far as there has been no subjective intention and choice?

Here there are different views :—

(1) Some hold that right and wrong relate always to the agent's motive. There is indeed an objective factor, *viz.*, the nature of the act or its consequence. But not until these are subjectively foreseen and intended, is there any moral responsibility. *Himsā e.g.*, destruction of life, may be considered merely objectively as *maranaphalavyāpāra*, *i.e.*, as a series of events ending in a death. Thus regarded it is not *adharma* or morally wrong : it is only an objective happening in nature, a chain of objective conditions and circumstances culminating in the death of a particular

being. *Himsā* may also be defined as *prāṇaviyogāvacchinna prayojakavyāpārah*, i.e., as a voluntary act which ends in a consequence of death. Even in this case it would not be necessarily wrong as the consequence in question may be no part of the intention of the voluntary action. Lastly, *himsā* may be defined as *maraṇaphaladoṣeṇa anuṣṭhīyamāna maraṇaphalaprayojakavyāpārah*, i.e., as a voluntary act culminating in death in consequence of the act being willed deliberately with the object of bringing about the death in question. In this case the *himsā* is morally wrong (*adharma*), but not if it is scripturally sanctioned (as e. g., in destruction of an enemy by means of *śyena*), nor also if it comes under the six exceptions allowed as in protecting the life of a cow or a Brāhmin.

Hence in the absence of subjective intention (*uddeśa*) the *kūpakartā*, the owner of the well, is not responsible, i.e., incurs no sin, for the death of the cow ; the *pariveśakah*, the person who serves the meal, is not responsible for the death of the *bhoktā*, the person who eats it ; the *galalagnā-nnamṛta*, the person who dies of choking while taking his food, is not *ātmahantā*, guilty of suicide. Because there is no *uddeśa* or subjective intention of *himsā* or injury to life, therefore there is no sin in these cases. The upholders of subjective rightness exempt even unintentional causing of a Brāhmin's death from the category of acts to be regarded as sinful : when the *nārācaprakṣepa*, the throwing of the javelin which causes *Brāhmaṇamaraṇa* or death of a Brāhmin, is *anyoddeśakṛta*, is thrown with a purpose other than that of causing the Brāhmin's death, it is not *Brahmahantṛtva*, i.e., not culpable destruction of a Brāhmin's life. It is regarded as culpable destruction by *gaunavyapadesa* and *lakṣaṇā*, i.e., in a secondary sense to indicate the social loss. The penalty for such unintentional destruction of a Brāhmin is only half, and is merely *vācanika* or customary being imposed for social reasons and not for any

sin (*pratyavāya*) incurred. But where there is *uddeśa* or subjective intention, there is sin even if the consequence is remote and mediated as in *khadgāghātena braṇaparamparayā maraṇam*, death caused by a deliberate injury on a festering boil. In this sense there is sin in destruction of life by *śyena* and other non-natural means, provided of course that such destruction does not come under the six exemptions or is otherwise positively enjoined by scripture.

(2) Others however hold that rightness and wrongness are objective categories independent of subjective intention or *uddeśa* : they belong to acts considered objectively as conducing to good or evil without reference to the agent's foresight and choice. The upholders of this view hold that every forbidden act is charged with a *narakasāadhanāpūrva* i.e., a supersensuous potency for evil which necessarily leads to suffering in hell and this is independent of *uddeśa* or the agent's subjective intention. In other words, there are objective supernatural potencies associated with certain acts and these bring on a specific suffering or a specific happiness, as the case may be, even when the agent has been led into these acts purely by accident without conscious intention and foresight. Hence every such act is a sin and thus *prāyaścitta* or proper expiation is also obligatory on the agent in every instance. Hence the man who kills a Brāhmin is guilty of culpable destruction of a Brāhmin and must undergo the full twelve years' religious penalty even if he has killed him by pure accident. Ordinarily no doubt *akāmakṛta*, i.e., accidental and unintentional acts, are visited only with half the penalty, but this does not apply to acts which are scripturally forbidden. These latter produce *pratyavāyāpūrva* or religious demerit and must be expiated by the full penalty imposed.

According to Viśvanātha however there is no sin only where *adṛṣṭa* or supernatural means are used, in every other

case the sin depending on *uddeśa* or subjective intention of the agent. Hence there is no sin in *śyena*. Śrīdhara however holds that there is sin in all *akāmakṛta* or unintentional acts, this being due not to any objective potency in the acts to lead to a specific punishment such as *naraka* or suffering in hell, but being due to the *pramāda*, carelessness or inadvertence which such acts imply. The agent is responsible for this carelessness and is thereby responsible also for the acts.

N.B.—With these conceptions of objective rightness we may compare the Buddhist conception of institutional morality and institutional responsibility. The Buddhists hold that there is responsibility not merely for the objective consequence of any particular action, but also for all the consequences of all the actions which the founding of a particular institution may entail. Thus the founder of an institution is morally responsible for *all* the good and evil effects of the institution, present and future, even effects which come about long after his death. For example, if a religious ceremony involves *prāṇihimsā* or animal sacrifice, then the person who first initiates the ceremony is responsible for every life that is sacrificed for the sake of the ceremony in question. (*Devakulādipratisthāpanam, tatra sattvāḥ hanyante. Tadeva kulādyapabhāgāt talkartṛṇām santānaparibhāgānvayam apuṇyamapi jāyate*—“*Mādhyamikāvṛtti*” by Candrakīrti.)

CHAPTER III.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SPRINGS OF ACTION.

The "Analysis of conscience" has shown that the consciousness of duty presupposes specific impulses in the agent to be regulated, subdued or moralised. Thus there are pathological feelings determining the so-called conditional duties which are obstacles to ethical disinterestedness and must be restrained with a view to the proper discharge of the unconditional duties. There are also immoral impulses and passions which are prohibited altogether and these have also to be subdued. A classification of these impulses and passions from the psychological as well as the ethical point of view is thus a necessary sequel to the analysis of conscience in the Psychological Ethics of Self-Purification. In this chapter we shall consider the Hindu Analysis and classification of the Springs of Action, and we shall find that the Hindus tackle the problem not merely from the theoretical standpoint of psychological mechanism but also from the ethical standpoint of moral worth or value.

The subject is treated in Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya as well as Vedānta systems. The Vaiśeṣika treatment of the question is to be found in Praśastapāda's Bhāṣya on the Vaiśeṣika sūtras which I have supplemented by occasional references to the "Nyāyakandalitika". As regards the Nyāya view however I have considered it necessary not only to refer to Vātsyayana's presentation of the subject but also the classification in the "Nyāyamanjari" of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa which is slightly different and in some respects fuller. My presentation of the Sāṅkhya treatment is based mainly on the Vyāsa-Bhāṣya on the Pātañjala

sūtras while the Vedānta view I have tried to expound from one of the later writings which, as we shall see, presents many special points of interest in several ways.

I. VAIŚEṢIKA CLASSIFICATION OF THE SPRINGS OF ACTION.

Prasastapāda considers the subject of the Springs of Action in the Guṇagrantha of his Bhāṣya on the Vaiśeṣika sūtras. According to him there are two roots or Springs of the process of willing, namely, Desire (*Ichhā*) which is always the desire for pleasure or happiness (*Sukha*), and Aversion (*Dveṣa*) which is the aversion towards pain (*Duḥkha*).

(A) *Analysis of Pleasure or Sukha*

The nature of pleasure is that it is characterised by a peculiar consciousness of gratification, a sense of favourableness or *anugraha*, and its specific effects are (1) this sense of favourableness, (2) a feeling of attraction towards the pleasurable object (*abhiṣvanga*) and (3) certain bodily expressions such as the brightness of the eyes, the face, etc. (*nayanādi-prasāda, vaimalya*).

It is to be observed that the effect of favourableness gives us the subjective side of pleasure while attraction represents its objective or conative aspect. Lastly, the physiological effects, namely, the brightness of the eyes, etc., are also taken into consideration.

In the Nyāyakandalitikā the effect of favourableness is very fully explained. It is pointed out that pleasure being by nature favourable is the experience of the object which reacts favourably on the self producing the consciousness of fruition. This constitutes the subjective appropriation of the pleasure. Pleasure being once produced produces also the consciousness of itself as favourable

to the self and this constitutes the self's approval of the pleasure. Hence, according to this interpretation there are no unfelt or unrecognised pleasures, a conclusion against which the Vedāntist will cite such familiar states as the unconscious happiness of a dreamless sleep and analogous experiences.

Praśastapāda next enumerates the conditions which induce pleasure, which are :—(1) proximity to the desired object, (2) consciousness of some good to be attained, (3) stimulation of the sensibilities by the object, (4) organic equilibrium (*svasthātā*) and (5) merit (*dharma*).

It is pointed that *iṣṭopalabdhī* or prospect of some good to be realised by the object is a necessary condition of pleasure, for the person who is drawn towards some other object feels no pleasure from the experience (*viṣayāntara-vyāsaktasya sukhānutpādāt*). Hence, pleasure presupposes not only subjective predisposition towards the object but also active interest and attention for the time being, this being the pragmatic aspect of all feeling.

It is also assumed that besides the natural causes, pleasure also supposes certain other conditions of a non-phenomenal character. These are the moral causes or conditions of pleasure such as *dharma*, merit or righteousness of the subject. The assumption is that the life of a spiritual being cannot be explained merely by natural causes without reference to his freedom. It is freedom that distinguishes the spiritual from the merely natural agent. A spiritual being is the creator of his own values, and his pleasures and pains should be regarded in the last analysis as the fruition of his own self-determined activity, of his own *karma*.

In the Nyāyakandalitikā three other kinds of pleasure are also recognised, *i.e.*, pleasures which are induced by conditions different from those noticed above. Thus we have pleasures of reminiscence (*smṛtījam*) and pleasures of

choice and resolution (*saṅkalpajam*). These are not sensory feelings and do not depend on the condition of the stimulation of the sense-organs. Thirdly, there is in the case of those who have attained a true knowledge of the self a kind of satisfaction even when we have neither object (*viṣaya*), nor desire (*icchā*), nor reminiscence, nor anticipation—a kind of felicity which results from (1) self-knowledge (*ātma-jñāna*), (2) self-collectedness (*śama*), (3) contentment (*santoṣa*), (4) the consummation of righteousness (*prakṛṣṭa-dharma*).

Hence, two kinds of pleasure are to be distinguished :

(1) Lively and fleeting pleasures—the pleasures arising from the titillation of the flesh. These include the sense-feelings as well as the pleasures of reminiscence and choice. All these arise from attraction towards the object and consist in a feeling of restlessness.

(2) A quieter and more permanent form of satisfaction, pleasure in self-centered repose and calm and therefore free from mental unrest.

It is to be seen that the latter is not the same as the refined pleasure of the Epicurean. The Epicurean's refined pleasure presupposes a minimum of objective conditions and is therefore heteronomous. Here, however, no objective condition is recognised, the pleasure arising wholly from within, being the manifestation of the felicity that belongs by nature to the self.

(B) Analysis of Pain (*Duḥkha*)

Just as pleasure is characterised by the sense of favourableness so pain has the opposite characteristic of unfavourableness (*upaghāta*). The effects of pain are : (1) unfavourableness, (2) aversion towards the object causing pain (*dveṣa*) and (3) paleness (*dainya*, *vicchāyatā*). Similarly, the conditions which induce pain are : (1)

proximity towards an object of aversion (*anabhipretaviṣayasānnidhya*), (2) apprehension of evil (*aniṣṭopalabdhi*), (3) stimulation of the sense-organs by the object, (4) absence of organic equilibrium and (5) demerit. There are also pains of reminiscence and of anticipation in which there is no sensory stimulation. But there is no transcendental suffering corresponding to the transcendental bliss which belongs by nature to the self.

From the feelings of pleasure and pain arise two kinds of reaction of the will, viz., desire (*icchā*) and aversion (*dveṣa*).

Desire is defined as *aprāptaprārthanā*, the yearning for the unattained. It is either egoistic (*svārtha*) or altruistic (*parārtha*). An egoistic desire is the desire to attain something for the self of which it is not yet in possession as when we say 'May this happen to me' (*aprāptasya vastunaḥ svārtham prati yā icchā idam me bhūyāt*). An altruistic desire is the desire to attain something for another of which the latter is not yet in possession as when we say 'May this happen to him' (*asya idam bhavatu*). The Nyāyakandalitika does not recognise the ego-altruistic form of desire as an independent class.

The conditions of desire are :—(1) Connection of soul with the mind (*ātmanamanah-samyoga*), (2) Experience of pleasure, (3) Recollection of pleasure leading to the expectation of similar pleasure in future.

In the case of the absent object the desire is supposed to arise from the recollection of it as a means to pleasure. In this case the absent pleasure moves the will through the representation of it by the mind. This brings out the pragmatic aspect of cognition. Even a representation is a motive because of the consequence to the subject (*phalasya prayojakatvāt*). An idea of the good is therefore not a mere idea, but also an incipient activity to realise the good.

The Nyāyakandalīṭikā here points out that desire is a stretching forward as well as a stretching backward, a double-faced psychosis which points alike towards the future and the past. Thus we may desire to attain the unattained, to realise the unrealised. This is one form of desire. But there is also another form of it, which is the desire to live over again through the past. Thus the desire for the object of pleasure generates the effort to realise it which has therefore a forward reference. Similarly the desire to recollect the past restores the past in the form of memory. (*Upādānecchāstadanugūṇaḥ prayatno bhavati, smaraṇecchātaḥ smaraṇam.*)

In the Nyāyakandalīṭikā these two aspects of desire are considered to be independent phenomena. In the Vyāsa-bhāṣya on the Pātañjala sūtras however they are shown to be closely related and to constitute the two different marks of all transformation (*pariṇāma*). It is there pointed out that change of form involves the twofold process of the transformation of the potential into the kinetic and of the kinetic into the sublatent. Hence even the present state (the kinetic, *vartamāna*) contains within itself the marks of the past (the sub-latent, *alīta*) and the future (potential, *anāgata*). The present that stretches beyond itself into the future is thus the present which has drawn the past into itself. Desire therefore as a present state of unrest is both a continuation of the past and an anticipation of the future.

(D) *The Springs of Action under Desire.*

After analysing desire Praśastapāda next considers the Springs of Action coming under desire.

These are :—

(1) *Kāma*. According to Praśastapāda it signifies the sexual craving in ordinary usage, but when particularised

may also designate longing for happiness in heaven (*svargakāmanā*), for wealth (*arthakāmanā*), etc.

(2) *Abhilāṣa*, Appetite for food and drink (*bhojanam tatra icchā abhilāṣaḥ*).

(3) *Rāga*, Passion which is the desire for a recurring enjoyment of objects (*punaḥ punaḥ viṣayarañjanecchā*).

(4) *Saṅkalpa*, Resolve which is the desire to realise what is not yet (*anāgatasya arthasya-karaṇecchā*).

(5) *Kāruṇya*, Compassion which is the desire to remove the sufferings of others without any prompting of self-interest (*svārthamanapekṣa para-duḥkha-prahāṇecchā*).

(6) *Vairāgya*, Dispassion which is the desire to renounce the world from the preception of its faults (*doṣadarśanāt viṣayatyāgecchā*).

(7) *Upadhā*, Insincerity which is the inclination to deceive others (*parapratāraṇecchā*).

(8) *Bhāva*, which is a carefully concealed desire—a desire without physical expression but manifested by signs (*antarnigūḍheccchā līngairāvīrbhāvitā yecchā sā bhāvaḥ*).

(9) *Cikīrṣā*, Desire for Action; *Jihīrṣā*, Desire for appropriation, and the various other forms of desire arising from the differences in their corresponding actions (*kriyā-bhedāt icchābhedāḥ*).

It will be seen that *Prasastapāda*'s list notices the individualistic appetites (e.g., the appetite for food and drink) as well as the cravings of the sex which are non-individualistic and serve the preservation of the race.

Secondly, it also recognises the difference between a desire as such and the more enduring and persistent form of it which we call passion (*Rāga*).

Thirdly, a distinction is made between desires for enjoyment and desires for action. This is the basis of the difference between passion and resolve. Passion is a *Bhogeccchā*, a desire for enjoyment or fruition while Resolve is a *Karaṇecchā*, a desire for action, a desire to realise the

unrealised. In passion the subjective aspect of desire is prominent, in Resolve its objective aspect.

Fourthly, Dispassion is regarded as a form of desire and not as a form of aversion. The reason is that aversion or hate in any form is believed to be inconsistent with the mental equanimity and calm of the state of Transcendental Freedom or *mokṣa* to which Dispassion is recognised to be a necessary means.

This is also the underlying purpose in the inclusion of compassion among the forms of desire rather than of aversion. It is to be seen however that while the negative feeling of compassion is recognised by Praśastapāda, the corresponding positive virtue of the Buddhists, *viz.*, rejoicing at the good of creatures, *muditā*, *maitrī*, is not noticed. This omission is significant from the biologist's as well as the sociologist's point of view. For the maintenance of life as well as social stability removal of suffering is perhaps more imperatively necessary than the furtherance of happiness. This is why it is easier for us to sympathise with suffering and misery than rejoice at the good fortune of our fellow-beings. It also explains the elaborate provisions of society for the detection and punishment of crime and its comparative deficiency in regard to positive reward of merit and service. In fact, it is this consciousness of the interminable suffering of life that accounts for the Hindu preference of Dispassion to Compassion as the means to transcendental fruition. Compassion is a virtue of the lower order : it may alleviate suffering to a certain extent but cannot remove it altogether. It thus gives us a relative best rather than the absolute best, and the uncompromising idealist who seeks an absolutely perfect order should turn away from the world, *i.e.*, should refuse to participate in a life which is a mere compromise. Hence he must cultivate Dispassion which is the desire to renounce all desires and this will

lead to his freedom in the end. It must be noticed here however that the great teachers of Buddhism and Jainism insist on vicarious suffering for others among the perfections, though it does not appertain according to them to the Transcendental State. The Vaiṣṇava scriptures, *e.g.*, the Bhāgavat, and the Vaiṣṇava teachers, *e.g.*, Rāmānuja, go further recognising Compassion for suffering as among the perfections of the *Muktas* and indeed of the Lord or *Bhagavān* himself.

(E) *Analysis of Dveṣa, Aversion, and of the Springs of Action which are Forms of Aversion.*

Aversion is described by Praśastapāda as being of the nature of a consuming flame that produces a burning sensation, as it were, in the subject (*Dveṣaḥ prajvalanātmakaḥ*).

Its conditions are :—(1) The contact of the soul with the mind (*ātma-manah-samyoga*), (2) experience of suffering, and (3) recollection of suffering leading to the apprehension of it in future.

The Springs of Action which are compounds of Aversion are :—

(1) *Krodha*, Anger. It is the form of aversion which exhausts itself after a momentary ebullition and is the cause of certain physical expressions such as violent tremor and agitation of the body as a whole as also specific changes in the organs of sense and motor activity (*śarīrendriyādivikārahetuḥ kṣaṇamātrabhāvi dveṣaḥ krodhaḥ*).

(2) *Droha*, Revengefulness. It has no perceptible physical expression (*alākṣita-vikāra*), is long-mediated (*cirānuvaddha*), and terminates only with the infliction of some actual injury (*apakāraवासāna*).

(3) *Manyu*, Concealed ill-will. It is the aversion which an injured person feels towards his malefactor, but on whom he is conscious of being powerless to retaliate

(*āpakṛtasya pratyāpakārāsamarthasya antarnigūḍha dveṣo manyuḥ*). Hence it is a special form of revengefulness—revengefulness conscious of being impotent to retaliate, and it is therefore also without physical expression like revengefulness in general, being seated (*antarnigūḍha*) deeply within the inner life of the soul.

(4) *Akṣamā*, Jealousy. It is the aversion which one feels towards the good qualities in another (*paraguṇeṣu dveṣaḥ*).

(5) *Amarṣa*, Envy. It is the aversion which arises from the sense of relative inferiority. (*Svaḡuṇaparibhava-samutthahdveṣaḥ*.) Hence it is Jealousy become self-conscious.

It is to be seen that the forms enumerated under *Dveṣa* are emotions and sentiments rather than active impulses. They however lead to conation and are therefore included among the Springs of Action.

We should note also that Praśastapāda's analysis is on a scientific basis only as regards the two main classes, *viz.*, Desire and Aversion. The rest are mere enumerations based on observation. At the same time Praśastapāda shows an acuteness of psychological analysis which will do credit to any of the modern psychologists.

Thirdly, we should observe that Praśastapāda gives us a mainly psychological classification, but the division of desires into egoistic and altruistic is also on a socio-ethical basis.

Fourthly, we should note that Praśastapāda does not trace all impulses to one root, *viz.*, the desire for the good. This is the view of Socrates who thus resolves evil into something negative, *i.e.*, as the privation of good. This is wrong according to Praśastapāda. Pain could not be the mere privation of pleasure because it is never experienced as such and also because a mere negation can never be an object of willing.

Lastly, it is to be remarked that the connection of the soul with the mind is recognised among the conditions of Desire as well as Aversion. But as in the Transcendental state this connection ceases, Desire as well as Aversion and their special forms must be regarded as appertaining to the empirical life as distinguished from the Transcendental. They are thus pathological. At the same time we have a special form of Desire, *viz.*, Dispassion which is not pathological but pure and which therefore characterises the intermediate stage of the spirit between the purely empirical and phenomenal and the absolutely Transcendental and non-empirical.

II NYĀYA CLASSIFICATION OF THE SPRINGS OF ACTION.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, there are two roots of the will, namely, Desire and Aversion. The Naiyāyikas, however, resolve these into something more ultimate, *viz.*, Error, Delusion, *Moha*. The subject is treated by Vātsyāyana as well as by later writers on Ancient Nyāya, *e.g.*, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. The later presentation, however, is in some respects fuller and more advanced than the earlier.

(A) Vātsyāyana's Classification of the Springs of Action.

According to Vātsyāyana the passions and emotions are to be traced ultimately to one root, *viz.*, Delusion, *Moha*. From Delusion arise Attraction towards the favourable object (*Anukūlaviṣayeṣu rāgaḥ*) and Repulsion towards the unfavourable object (*Pratikūlaviṣayeṣu dveṣaḥ*). From attraction and aversion arise the various forms of the passions and emotions such as Mendacity (*Asatya*), Deceitfulness (*Māyā, Kapaṭatā*), Greed (*Lobha*), etc. These lead to conation (*Pravṛtti*) which may be either righteous (*Śubhā*) or unrighteous (*Aśubhā*).

Vātsyāyana's classification thus differs from Prāśastapāda's in two respects. In the first place Vātsyāyana traces attraction and aversion to something more ultimate, *viz.*, Error. Secondly, in addition to the purely psychological classification of the springs of action on the basis of the original difference between attraction and aversion, he also suggests an ethical classification on the basis of the rightness and the wrongness of the conduct to which they lead.

It is also to be seen that Vātsyāyana considers the disorder of the reason to be the ultimate source of the passions. This intellectualistic contempt of the passions is also a characteristic of the Stoics. There is, however, one important difference between Vātsyāyana and the Stoics in this respect. For the Stoics the impulses in themselves are not passions—they are transformed into the passions only when under the influence of error they are carried beyond their proper limits. Vātsyāyana, however, makes no distinction between the natural impulses and the passions. According to him all impulses are to be traced to the disordered reason and therefore are to be regarded as subversive of the tranquillity of the soul. This applies to the righteous as well as the unrighteous impulses which are alike bonds that bind the soul to the life of *samsāra*. Hence the nonphenomenal, transcendental life is a life of absolute freedom, of freedom not only from the natural bonds but also from the obligations of the moral life. The released individual is one who has refused to participate in the phenomenal life, has annulled his will-to-live (*Tṛṣṇā*) by withdrawing his assent to *samsāra* or empirical life and all that comes with it.

(B) *Jayanta's Classification of the Springs of Action.*

Jayanta's classification in the "Nyāya-Mañjari" represents the later treatment of the subject from the stand-

point of Ancient Nyāya, and is more profound and complete than the earlier presentation of Vātsyāyana.

According to Jayanta, conation (*Pravṛtti*) is to be traced to three roots, viz *Moha* (Delusion), *Rāga* (Attraction), *Dveṣa* (Aversion).

Delusion (*Moha*) is defined as the erroneous judgment implying an assent of the will (*Avasāya*) which arises from the failure to discriminate the ultimate transcendental nature of things (*Vastuparamārthāparicchedalakṣaṇo mithyāvasāyo mohah.*)

It is regarded as the crowning folly (*Pāpatama*) because attraction and aversion cannot arise except through *Moha*, Error or Delusion.

The emotions and springs of action which are compounds of Delusion are the following :—

(1) *Mithyājñāna*, Erroneous Cognition. It is the erroneous judgment which ascribes to a thing the nature of something else (*Atasmin tat iti jñānam*).

(2) *Vicikitsā*, Perplexity, Scepticism. It is the judgment or attitude of the will which arises from the absence of certain or definite knowledge (*Kimsvititi vimarśah*).

(3) *Māna*, Vanity. It is the consciousness of a false superiority produced by the ascription to oneself of excellences which one does not possess (*Asadguṇādhyāropeṇa svotkarṣabuddhiḥ*).

(4) *Pramāda*, Inadvertence. It is neglect of duty arising from the absence of earnestness (*Avajñayā kartavyā-karaṇam*).

From Delusion arise the impulses of Attraction and Aversion and the compounds coming under them. *Rāga*, Attraction, is characterised by desire for the object that is regarded as favourable (*Anukūleṣu artheṣu abhilāṣalakṣaṇaḥ rāgaḥ*).

The compounds coming under Attraction are the various forms of Desire. These are :—

(1) *Kāma*, sexual craving. *Prasastapāda* extends the meaning also to longing for happiness in heaven, for wealth, etc.

(2) *Matsara*. It is defined as the unwillingness to part even with that which is not diminished by sharing with others : *Yadanyasmai nivedyamānamapi vastu dhanavanna kṣīyate tadaparitṛyāgeccchā matsarah.*

(3) *Spṛhā*, Worldliness. It is the desire for worldly possessions and things that are non-spiritual : *anātmīya-vastvāditsā.*

(4) *Trṣṇā*, Will-to-live. It is the desire to live again as produced by the representation of a possible recurrence of this phenomenal life : *punarbhavapratisandhānahetubhūteccchā.*

(5) *Lobha*, Greed. It is the desire to obtain a forbidden thing : *nīsiddhadravyagrahaṇecchā.*

Next as to *Dveṣa*, Aversion.

It is the opposite of Aversion and is characterised by repulsion towards the object regarded as unfavourable : *pratikūleṣu asahalakṣaṇaḥ dveṣaḥ.*

The compounds under aversion arise from the various forms of repulsion : *asahanabhedaparakārabhedāt.*

These are :—

(1) *Krodha*, Anger. It is an explosive emotion of the painful type, sudden in appearance and painful to the subject like a burning flame (*prajvalanātmaka*). Its physical effects are certain expressions of the eyes, the eye-brows, etc.

(2) *Irṣyā*, Envy. It is the Aversion which arises from the perception of even the most ordinary advantages in others : *sādhāraṇe'pi vastuni parasya darśanādyasahanamīrṣyā.*

(3) *Asūyā*, Jealousy. It is the grudging sense of the superior qualities in another : *Paraguṇeṣu akṣamā.*

(4) *Droha*, Malevolence. It is the disposition to do injury to others.

(5) *Amarṣa*, Malice. It is revengefulness without physical expression, that is, the long-cherished but carefully concealed desire for revenge in one conscious of being powerless of doing an injury in return : *adarśitamukhādivikārah param prati manyuramarṣa iti*.

It is to be observed from the above that Jayanta considers the enumerations under Delusion (*e.g.*, erroneous judgment, perplexity, etc.) to be independent motives to will, and he holds that the forms under attraction and aversion act as motives only under the influence of Delusion. Hence according to him, we have two kinds of the springs of action both arising from *Moha* or the disorder of the reason : (1) those that are derived immediately from *Moha* and as such are motives to the will, (2) those that act through attraction and aversion. The difference between these two classes lies in the fact that the springs of action which arise immediately from *Moha* are characterised by a minimum of feeling while those that act through attraction and aversion are characterised by a marked preponderance of feeling. It is also to be noted that by including erroneous judgment, perplexity, etc., under the springs of action Jayanta brings out an important psychological truth, *viz.*, the pragmatic aspect of cognition. It is a mistake in this view to consider cognition apart from conation. An act of knowledge is at the same time a conative attitude implying a reaction of the will and a preparedness to respond in a specific way. This conative aspect of cognition comes out clearly in the last two enumerations under this head, *viz.*, vanity and inadvertence, the first of which consists in the overestimation of the subjective factor in all action and the second in the underestimation of the objective factor. The folly of the vain person is ultimately an illusion in regard

to the subjective conditions of action, while that of the careless person is an illusion in regard to the objective conditions.

Secondly, we should note that Jayanta's classification is scientific only as regards the three main classes, *viz.*, Attraction, Aversion, and Delusion. The rest are mere enumerations without any scientific basis. At the same time certain forms of passion are noticed that have escaped even so competent an observer as Martineau. For example, while noticing revengefulness in general Martineau has not analysed that particular form of it which is characteristic of the person who is conscious of being too weak to retaliate. This holds good also in respect of *Matsara* under Attraction and its corresponding feeling, namely, *Īṣyā*, under Aversion, and also of Worldliness, Will-to-live and the enumerations under *Moha*.

Comparing now Jayanta's enumeration with Praśastapāda's we notice that the enumerations under aversion (*dveṣa*) are much the same in both, but the enumerations under attraction diverge widely in the two lists. For example, in Jayanta there is no mention either of Dispassion or of Compassion. Similarly in Praśastapāda we miss Jayanta's *Trṣṇā* and *Sprhā*. Jayanta excludes Dispassion from his list of the passions and emotions possibly because while the passions according to him are the effects of the disordered reason which erroneously conceives as a good what is in reality its opposite, dispassion is the means through which the soul is liberated from the bondage of these passions. But according to Praśastapāda the ultimate roots are the feelings of attraction and aversion and these need not be regarded as co-effects of some cause still more ultimate such as *Moha*. Hence there is room in Praśastapāda's scheme for the inclusion even of the Transcendental Impulse of Dispassion.

III. PATANJALI'S CLASSIFICATION OF THE SPRINGS OF ACTION.

Patañjali considers the subject in Sūtra 34 of the Sādhana-pāda of the Yoga Sūtras.

According to him, the passions of cruelty, mendacity, sexual indulgence, etc., are to be traced to three roots :— Greed (*Lobha*), Anger (*Krodha*) and Delusion (*Moha*). For example, cruelty in the form of animal slaughter may originate in greed or the desire for the pleasures of eating. It may also originate in anger produced by any injury received from the animal. Lastly, it may arise from the sophisticated idea that animal slaughter in connection with particular religious ceremonies is a source of merit to the agent (*Vitarkā himsādayaḥ kṛtakāritānumoditā lobhakrodhamohapūrvika mṛdumadhyādhimātrā duḥkhājñānānantaphalā iti* ; Yoga Sūtra, 34 : *Lobhena māmsacarmārthena, krodhena apakṛtamanena, mohena dharmo me bhaviṣyati*).

These passions again may determine the moral agent in various ways. Thus some may indulge their passions by overt acts, some again may persuade others to acts that will gratify themselves, while some may merely approve such acts in others. All these again may be of various degrees of intensity. Some may be mild and comparatively harmless, some again of mean (*Madhya*) intensity and therefore not to be neglected, and some violent (*Adhimātrā*) and urgently requiring control.

Vyāsa in his commentary goes a step further in this quantitative division. According to him each of these degrees is capable of a further sub division on the same quantitative basis. Thus within the class of the feeble impulses we may notice the three grades of the extremely feeble, the moderately feeble and the feeble approaching the mean in intensity.

Patañjali, it may be noted, while preaching the conquest of the passions as being in the way of the true freedom of the spirit shows, by his stress on the comparative strength of the different passions and their different degrees of intensity, a way to subdue them gradually starting from the more violent and reaching down to the less intense and weaker manifestations. Another special feature of Patañjali's analysis is the different ways in which these passions may be indulged, *e.g.*, by the individual himself, or through the instrumentality of another, or as mere approval in other's indulgence in such passions. Patañjali's inclusion of all these under the passions to be conquered shows clearly that he condemns as immoral even an approval of an indulgence by another which one does not consider right in respect of one's own self. This is a point of view which does not receive serious notice in western ethical writings in their accounts of moral evil and responsibility.

IV.

THE VEDĀNTA CLASSIFICATION OF THE SPRINGS
OF ACTION.

The subject is very fully treated in the "Jivanmuktiviveka" of Vidyāranyasvāmī. In this work the author classifies the springs of action on the basis of certain spontaneous and instinctive tendencies.

The causes of anger and other motives are certain latent and residual tendencies (*samskāras*) in the mind produced by habitual past indulgence. These tendencies are the *vāsanās*, and constitute the sources of the emotions and passions which are unreflective and spontaneous.

These subjective predispositions or *vāsanās* are either good (*śubhā*, auspicious) or evil (*aśubhā*, inauspicious).

The evil tendencies are the cause of birth and participation in *samsāra*. These are :—(i) Desire for popularity

(*Lokavāsanā*), (ii) Desire for learning and reputation for piety (*śāstravāsanā*), (iii) Desire for carnal pleasures (*dehavāsanā*) to which some add also (iv) certain mental traits (*mānasa-vāsanā*) such as boastfulness (*dambha*), pride (*darpa*), etc.

ACCORDING TO A SECOND INTERPRETATION,

Mānasa-Vāsanā signifies those unrealised desires which flit over the surface of the mind without being subjectively appropriated, the passing wishes (*Kāmyamāna*) that seem to have no effect on personal life, as distinguished from

Viśaya-Vāsanā or desires realised and appropriated by the self (*bhujyamāna*).

The purer inclinations (*Śuddhavāsanā*) are supposed to lead to cessation of life (*Janmavināśinī*). They are distinguished from the baser passions by the fact that they are not unreflective or spontaneous but involve judgment. These are :—

Sympathy with the happiness of others (*Maitrī*).

Compassion towards the suffering (*Kārunya*).

Rejoicing at the good of sentient creatures (*Muditā*).

Indifference or neutrality towards the unrighteous

(*Upekṣā*).

Self-collectedness and tranquillity of the mind (*Śama*).

Repression of the external senses (*Dama*).

Endurance of pain (*Titikṣā*).

Renunciation (*Sannyāsa*).

It is to be noted that the distinction between unappropriated desires and desires consciously approved and chosen is of profound significance from the ethical standpoint. Our modern ethical treatises notice only the more obvious and potent forms of the passions and impulses, that is, those which either pass into overt action or are consciously approved by the moral agent. The passing wishes and unappropriated desires are ignored on the

assumption that since they have no effect on the personal life they are without ethical significance. Research into the life of the subconscious is however bringing out the significant fact that these fleeting desires are neither arbitrary nor unimportant but are the occasional expressions of an undercurrent of a deeper subliminal personality which may under certain circumstances be strong enough to upset the conscious life of the moral agent.

Secondly, we should note that in addition to the usual Vedānta virtues of equanimity, repression of the senses, etc., this author notices also the altruistic impulses of compassion, sympathy, etc. It may not be hazardous to conclude from this that these are only later additions under Buddhist influence.

We should note also that *Maitrī* corresponds to the Christian virtue of good-will and *Muditā* to that of peace with all sentient creatures. Hence *Muditā* as the harmony of the individual with the rest of creation represents on the objective side the state which is represented on the subjective side by the virtue of equanimity (*Śama*). *Śama* is a state of internal equilibrium and self-harmony while *Muditā* is harmony with creation in general.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We have so far considered, in detail, the subject of the Springs of Action as presented in the various systems of Hindu Philosophy. If now we consider all these presentations together, we find that one of the special characteristics of the various psychological analyses of the passions is the description of their physiological expressions and effects which are always fairly accurate and exact. Another characteristic of the psychological analyses is the idea of psychological composition in the genesis of the complex emotions and passions, the idea of the

compounding of elementary mental states into complex compounds. A third feature of these analyses is the recognition of the residual, the instinctive, and the subliminal even in our ethical life and their psychological bases. Another characteristic of the various Hindu classifications of the Springs is the attempt at a non-empirical explanation of the passions and a criticism of the values based thereon. Thus the passions are judged and appreciated not so much by reference to the standard of the empirical order and its maintenance and progress as by reference to their conduciveness to the life transcendental and absolute. It is in fact this transcendental standpoint that underlies the doctrine of Error as the ultimate cause of the passions which bind the individual to the phenomenal life of *samsāra*. But this transcendentalism and intellectualism, however, is counterbalanced by a corresponding pragmatism in their empirical investigations where cognition is always viewed in its pragmatic aspect as intellection in the service of life and therefore closely connected with the life of will or volition. It is also to be seen that there is an attempt throughout to overcome the dualism of the transcendental and the empirical worlds by the assumption of some kind of transcendental impulse even in the empirical life, a pure aspiration as distinguished from the pathological yearnings of the natural life. This is the significance of the *sattvika* emotions, the *śubhā vāsanās* which have transcendental *Sukha* or bliss for their object as distinguished from empirical pleasure. These are the pure impulses which drive out the impure ones and thus bridge the gulf between the transcendental and empirical worlds.

The psychological ethics of the Hindus is therefore not only theoretical but also disciplinary and practical always keeping in view the practical end of leading spirit beyond the empirical life to that which is non-empirical

and transcendental. But the transcendental life which it aims at is not a life of co-operation and freedom in co-operation, but one of absolute freedom and perfect autonomy of the self. It is here that it furnishes the strongest contrast to Buddhist, Vaiṣṇavika and Christian ethics all of which recognise self-realisation through the life corporate as the highest ideal of the spirit.

CHAPTER IV

CLASSIFICATION OF THE VIRTUES

In chapter III we have considered the Hindu classification and analysis of the Springs of Action, the *pravṛtti-mūlas* or roots of the will regarded both in their psychological and ethical aspects, and in Part I we have considered the Hindu enumeration and classification of the duties, *i.e.*, *dharma* or morality considered objectively as embodied in a code of injunctions and prohibitions. In this chapter we shall consider the Hindu classification of the virtues and their opposite, *i.e.*, the duties considered as subjectively appropriated by the moral agent and thus realised as *moral* attributes or determinations of the personal life.

The virtues are considered in detail by Ancient Nyāya writers as well as by Patañjali and his commentators. There is also an interesting Buddhist treatment of the subject which I have appended as a supplement. Incidentally I have also referred to the Jaina treatment.

The Nyāya-treatment of the subject appears both in Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya on the Nyāya-Sūtras as well as in later writings such as the "Nyāya-manjari" of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. For the Pātañjala treatment of the question we have not only the sūtras of Patañjali but also the Vyāsa-bhāṣya thereon. The Bauddha and Jaina treatment are obtained from Buddhist and Jaina writings.

A. Vātsyāyanas Classification of the Virtues

Vātsyāyana classifies will (*pravṛtti*) into *pāpātmikā*, wicked, impious, and *śubhā*, pious, auspicious. The latter leads to *Dharma*, righteousness, while the former produces *Adharma*, unrighteousness.

1. *Adharma*, unrighteousness, takes three forms with reference to the originating condition or source, viz.

- (1) Unrighteousness which depends on the *śarīra*, the body, as its instrumental condition ;
- (2) Unrighteousness which arises from the improper use of speech, *vāk* or verbal utterance ; and
- (3) Unrighteousness which originates in the mind (*manas*) as the instrumental condition.

The forms of unrighteousness that are connected with the activities of the body or *Śarīra* are :—

- (1) Cruelty (*himsā*)
- (2) Theft (*steṇa*, *caurya*)
- (3) Forbidden Sexual Indulgence (*Pratiṣiddha maithuna*).

The vices originating in *speech* as the instrumental condition are :—

- (1) Mendacity (*mithyā*)
- (2) Causticity, Asperity, Tartness of expression (*paruṣa*, *katūkti*)
- (3) Calumny, Insinuation (*sūcanā*)
- (4) Gossip (*asambaddha*)

The vices originating in the mind as the instrumental condition are :—

- (1) Hostility, Ill-will towards others, malevolence (*paradroha*)
- (2) Covetousness in respect of what belongs to another (*paradravyābhīpsā*)
- (3) Irreverence, Impiety, Scepticism, Want of faith in the scriptures (*nāstikya*).

It is to be seen that the enumerations under the last head, i.e., the class of vices depending on mind as the instrumental condition, differ from the lists under the first two heads in being more properly subjective dispositions or modifications of the personal life than active tendencies manifesting themselves in overt acts. In this respect they

may be regarded as internal determinations of the moral personality which are either of the nature of impeded or inactive emotions or general temperamental characters which do not reveal themselves in any one particular act or set or class of acts, but give a specific direction or trend to the volitional life as a whole.

It is also to be observed that the enumerations under the vices connected with speech are a special characteristic of the Hindu treatment of the question, the comparative neglect of which in Greek and Christian Ethics unmistakably establishes the refinement of the Hindus in this respect who would not excuse even a harsh word which does no visible wrong to anybody like cruelty, ill-will and the other vices.

It is however to be noted that the inclusion of theft with cruelty and sexuality under one class, *viz.*, class of vices depending on the body as the instrumental cause, is artificial and forced to a degree. It may be possible however to justify this by pointing out that just as cruelty implies injury to the person and sexuality involves injury to the race so does theft involve injury to the individual not by any harm done to his body or person but by the misappropriation of his property. It is however doubtful whether the commentator Vātsyāyana had all this in his mind while making his classification.

II. Next as to *Dharma*, Virtue, Righteousness :

It is threefold like *adharma* or unrighteousness, comprising :

- (a) The virtues of the body or *śarīra*,
- (b) The virtues of speech, and
- (c) The virtues of the mind

The virtues of the *body* are :—

- (1) Charity, Bounteousness, Munificence (*dāna*).
- (2) Succouring the Distressed (*paritrāṇa*).
- (3) Social Service (*paricarāṇa*).

The virtues of Speech are :—

- (1) Veracity (*satya*).
- (2) The uttering of beneficial speech, *i.e.*, speaking always with a view to the good of mankind (*hitavacana*).
- (3) Gentleness and Agreeableness of Speech (*priyavacana*).
- (4) The reciting of the scriptures (*Svādhyāya*, *Vedapāthādi*).

Lastly, the virtues of the mind are :—

Kindness, Tenderness or Benevolence (*dayā*).

- (2) Unworldliness, Indifference to material advantages (*asprhā*).
- (3) Reverence, Piety (*śraddhā*).

It is to be seen that of the three bodily virtues, *dāna*, Munificence is the opposite of the vice of theft which consists in appropriating what belongs to another. Similarly *paritrāṇa*, succour, is the virtue corresponding to the vice of cruelty or *himsā*. This correspondence however is not obvious in the case of *paricarāṇa* or social service and *pratisiddha-maithuna* or sexuality. It may be said however that just as *paricarāṇa* consists in doing good to society so *pratisiddha-maithuna* rends the social fabric by loosening the social bonds and weakening the stock.

As regards the *vācika* virtues or virtues of speech it is to be observed that veracity corresponds to mendacity in the corresponding class of vices, *priyavacana* to causticity or asperity, *hitavacana* to scandal and insinuation, and *svādhyāya* to gossip or idle talk.

Lastly there is also similar correspondence as regards the third class between benevolence and malevolence, unworldliness and covetousness, piety and impiety.

Again, it is to be observed that, as in the lists under the vices, the virtues of the mind are of the nature of emotions, subjective moods or temperamental traits

which need not manifest themselves in specific overt acts rather than active tendencies involving specific activities and modes of conduct. Thus kindness or tenderness is a virtue which may not lead to a specific act, but this can hardly be said of veracity or social service or succour which are nothing at all without the overt acts on which they depend.

It is also to be noted that the virtues relating to speech constitute one of the specific Hindu contributions to the ethical concepts of the world, the only virtue under this class which has received any special notice by ethical writers being veracity. That veracity is only one of the virtues of speech which may under special circumstances be required to be subordinated to other and higher considerations, was early recognised by the Hindus. (Thus in the Mahābhārata in the Rājadharmānuśāsanaparva in chapter 109, it is frankly recognised that there are circumstances where truth is falsehood and falsehood is truth and the righteous man in such circumstances prefers the latter. Thus the ruffian who is out for pillage and murder should not be told the truth, and if silence will excite suspicion it is proper even to put him on the wrong scent by telling a lie). It was assumed that the ultimate purpose of speech was the good (*hita*) of mankind and therefore if a rigid adherence to truth was likely to do more harm than good the evil should be averted by a lie, if necessary. Similarly one should seek to be agreeable as well as truthful, and if the plain blunt truth is likely to wound mortally it is a duty to avoid it or at least take off its edge as far as possible.

Another thing to be noticed here is the virtue of unworldliness or *asprhā* in the third class. It may be said to be the characteristic Hindu virtue indicating as it does the Hindu conception of the highest Spiritual Ideal which is a life of detachment, *i.e.*, of absolute freedom and

autonomy of the Self. This negative attitude to the world is however relieved to a great extent by the virtues of charity (*dāna*), succour (*paritrāṇa*), and service (*paricaraṇa*), which open the way to a more positive and useful view of life and a more humanitarian morality than that of the stern ascetic.

3. Patañjali's Classification of the Virtues

Patañjali considers the virtues in the Sādhana-pāda of the Yoga sūtras in connection with the question of the conditions to be fulfilled by those preparing for the life of Yoga.

The virtues, according to Patañjali, are the *yamas*, the restraints that purify the mind of the evil passions and thus clear the ground for Yoga. They thus form a subordinate class within the wider Nyāya classification of virtues, a class of virtues suitable only for Yoga.

These virtues are :—

Ahimsā—Tenderness, Benevolence, Good-will.

Though negatively stated as abstention from *himsā* or injury to living beings, it also implies positive goodwill and amity with all creatures. Further it is a virtue which is to be cultivated without any exception as to particular creatures and also without any restrictions as to specific occasions or particular methods : *sarvathā sarvadā sarvabhūtānām anabhidroha*. Hence it is not allowable to make any exception in regard to *himsā* or cruelty involved in the sacrifices enjoined by scriptures. These must be abjured just as the other forms of *himsā*.

Thus *ahimsā*, kindness and good-will, implies some other virtues. It implies self-restraint and sacrifice in so far as some of the acts of cruelty are prompted by greediness or inordinate hankering. It also implies the subjugation of the feelings of aversion or hate which are also the

determining conditions of cruelty in a great many cases. Again it implies the overcoming of intellectual indolence which is itself the cause of greediness and aversion and is also an independent cause of specific forms of cruelty such as scriptural sacrifices. Similarly *ahimsā*, kindness, implies abstention from harsh words (*parūṣavacana*) as well as from acts of intimidation. In short, it is the highest virtue, the mother of all other virtues, and veracity (*satya*) and the other virtues are to be practised only to the extent that they do not clash with this highest virtue of Universal Good-Will and Tenderness.

Satya.—Veracity. It is the opposite of mendacity and consists in correspondence in thought and speech with the objective fact or event as ascertained by valid evidence. Thus when a thing or event whose nature has been ascertained by perception or inference or reliable testimony is correctly apprehended by the speaker and described faithfully in suitable terms so that there is no misapprehension of his meaning in the hearers, we have veracity or truthfulness. Veracity therefore implies two things: (1) that the object as ascertained by valid evidence is to be correctly apprehended by the speaker's mind, *i.e.*, there should be no illusion or error (*bhrānti*); and (2) that the speaker should faithfully describe his own idea in his speech, *i.e.*, there should be neither intentional deceit (*vancanā*) nor indulgence in meaningless words (*pratipatti-bandhyā*) from inability to express oneself. (Hence half-truths, evasions, subterfuges are to be treated as lies, for though they may agree with some real objective state, condition or circumstance, they do not convey what the speaker has in his mind or means to convey). But even such agreement is not the only condition: even the most faithful, unambiguous and precise utterance would fall short of veracity in the true sense if it were not directed towards the good of creatures. Thus even the most truthful speech which

hurts or injuries creatures is to be reckoned amongst the forms of unrighteousness, not as the virtue of truthfulness. In this sense it is a sin to recount even another's real faults when such recounting will serve no good purpose. (*Satyam yathārthe vānmanase, yathādr̥ṣṭam yathānumitam yathāśrutam tathā vānmanaśceti, paratra svabodhasamkrāntaye vāguktā, sā yadi na vañcitā bhrāntā vā pratipatti-bandhyā va bhavediti, eṣa sarvabhūtopakārārtham pravṛttā na bhūtopaghātāya, yadi caivamaṇyabhidhiyamānā bhūtopaghātaparaiva syāt na satyam bhavet, pāpameva bhavet.*)

Asteya.—Abstention from theft. It is the opposite of *steya* or unlawful appropriation of another's property and consists not merely in the abstention from the outward act of theft but also in inward uprightness or freedom from unlawful greed (*aspr̥hārūpa*). *Steyam aśāstra pūrvakakam dravyāṇām parataḥ svikaraṇam, tatpratīṣedhaḥ punaraspr̥hārūpamasteyam* (*Vyāsa-bhāṣya*). Thus there are *pratigrahas*, specific acceptances authorised by *śāstra*. With the exception of these, every other form of appropriation is unlawful and therefore classed under *steya*. According to *Vijñānabhikṣu* however this is only one interpretation of misappropriation or wrongful possession. According to another interpretation however every idea of ownership is rooted in error. Hence all appropriation is misappropriation and *asteya* is freedom from *steya*, i.e., from the sense of ownership or appropriation altogether. In this sense it is *aspr̥hārūpa*, i.e., of the nature of *aspr̥hā*, unworldliness, or absolute indifference to the material advantages of life. (*Pratigrahavyāvartanāyā-śāstrapūrvakamiti. Atha vā svikaraṇam mameti buddhimātram bhramasādhāraṇamiti tatpratīṣedhaḥ tannivṛttiḥ tayāpi aspr̥hāmu-palakṣayitvāha, aspr̥hārūpa iti ; "Yogavārttika."*)

Brahmacaryya.—Continence which consists in the restraint which one imposes on one's desire for sexual enjoyment. It implies not merely the control of the genitals but also abstention from lewdness in thought,

speech and the other organs of sensation and expression, *i.e.*, restraint here means restraint of every organ including the genital in regard to the matter of sexual enjoyment. (*Brahmacaryyam guptendriyasya upasthasya saṁyamah—“Vyāsabhāṣya”*. *saṁyama iti atropasargeṇa anyendriyasāhitya-mupasthasya grāhyam tenopasthasya viṣaye sarvendriyavyāpāroḥ-rama iti lakṣaṇam—“Yogavārttikam.”*)

Aparigraha.—Unworldliness, Renunciation, *i.e.*, the attitude of indifference to material prosperity through the perception of its being tainted by cruelty (*himsā*) and the other faults. Thus the earning, hoarding and spending of riches all involve deceit (*asatya*), cruelty (*himsā*) and the other faults. (*Viṣayāṇāmarjanarakṣaṇakṣayasāṅgahimsādoṣadarśanāt asvīkaraṇamaparigraha—“Vyāsabhāṣya”*. According to *Vijñānabhikṣu* this kind of unworldliness is to be distinguished from the indifference (*asprīhā*) arising from the freedom from the illusory consciousness of ownership. This latter is *asteya*, uprightness, according to one interpretation. It differs from the indifference signified by *aparigraha* in being grounded in the sense of ownership as represented in the impulses of *dambha* (pride), *āśakti* (attachment), etc., while *aparigraha* arises from the consciousness of all material prosperity being tainted by the faults of deceit, cruelty, etc. (*Parigrahe himsādyā api doṣāḥ teṣāṁ darśanāditi viśeṣaṇam dambhāśaktyādinimittakāsvikaraneativyāptinirāsāya iti : “Yogavārttika.”*)

These virtues are to be practised without any restrictions as to class, profession, place or occasion. Thus abstention from cruelty is to be practised even by the soldier and the fisherman without reference to his profession or class. Similarly cruelty (such as animal sacrifice) is not allowable even in a pilgrimage or on an auspicious day. Nor is an exception to be made in practising abstention from cruelty in respect of a particular class of living beings as, for example, in respect of fish by

the fisherman : *Ebhīrjātidesakālasamayānavacchinna ahimsādayaḥ sarvathāiva paripālaniyāḥ sarvabhūmiṣu sarvaviṣayeṣu, sarvathā eva aviditavyabhicārāḥ sārvaabhaumā mahābratamityucyāte ; “Vyāsabhāṣya”*). The virtues are to be practised in all *bhūmis* or planes of the mind in regard to all *viṣayas* or objects and in every respect without exception.

It is to be seen that a distinction is here made between the common man's morality and Yogika morality. It is assumed that the former consists of a multitude of moral codes which are unorganised and often mutually contradictory. Thus the common man has one code of morality for dealing with human beings and another code for dealing with lower animals, one code for civilised man and another for the uncivilised, one for his own countrymen and another for others ; and even the legal code varies in relation to the particular zone or plane of life which it is to regulate. Thus while human life is held sacred by law there is no similar punishment for the destruction of animal life. Similarly while flogging of adults and other similar acts are denounced as inhuman and brutal by customary morality, there is scarcely any indignation at similar treatment of the horse or the beast of burden which is only too familiar an occurrence to attract any special notice. The truth is that in these as in many other instances we judge by different moral codes *i.e.*, we recognise different moral planes to which we apply separate moral standards or norms disregarding the mutual contradiction or incompatibility of these standards. It is this multiplicity and conflict of moral codes that the Yogin seeks to overcome and reconcile by insisting on the highest standard of morality in all planes of life including the lowest.

Another characteristic of Patañjali's classification is the conception of *Ahimsā* as tenderness or good-will to sentient creatures as the highest of the virtues. This

relieves his ethical system of the severity of egoistic rigorism which is a common charge against the Hindu conception of the moral life. Patañjali, however recognises also the virtues of *Aparigraha*, unworldliness, and *Aspr̥harūpa-Asteṣya*, i.e., uprightness and freedom from greed as also essential to morality. Patañjali's conception may thus be regarded as an attempt to reconcile the ideal of a rigoristic autonomy of the self and freedom from desire with that of the altruistic seeking of the good of creatures through goodwill and love. In this respect it is free alike from the defects of ascetic egoism and impassioned altruism. It is only too true that an immature and exaggerated altruism without any preliminary training in dispassion and self-restraint often degenerates into cynicism, contempt and world-hatred with the failure of the altruistic instincts, or rather it is only in so far as there is a dispassionate pursuit of the good of creatures that there is altruism in the true sense which without this self-control becomes only a disguised and subtle form of egoism that degenerates into unhealthy passions when circumstances prove unfavourable. In so far therefore as Patañjali insists on *Ahimsā* or goodwill being supplemented by *aspr̥hā*, unworldliness or dispassion he touches on an inherent weakness in altruism which is itself to be practised under reservations if it is to produce truly beneficial results.

As regards *Satya* or veracity, it is to be seen that Patañjali emphasises two kinds of responsibility on the moral agent. Thus it is necessary to ascertain that the object has been properly cognised, i.e., that there is no misapprehension in consequence of defective perception, misinterpretation or error. Secondly the object as thus apprehended must be faithfully described in speech, i.e., confused utterance as well as intentional deceit must be avoided. It is therefore no excuse for the person practising veracity to plead ignorance, it being the duty of the

truthful man to refrain from utterance till he has acquired all the knowledge possible under the circumstances. And it is also no excuse for him to plead accidental slips or unintentional misrepresentation, it being his duty to be careful, economical and precise in the use of words. Hence the truthful man must cultivate the habit of gravity and seriousness and a capacity for silence. But this is not all: truth which is not beneficial and wholesome is a pseudo-truth or falsehood, and when circumstances are such that a rigid adherence to truth will vitally injure a sentient creature, the bare truth should be avoided even by a lie, if necessary. The idea is that such lies are of the nature of truth, because the True is the Good and the Good is Truth, and the apparent falsehood that contributes to the world's real good is truth, while the truth that mars or frustrates the world's good is a pseudo-truth and an evil to be avoided like falsehood.

C. *Jaina Classification*

Though Jainism does not come strictly under orthodox Hinduism, yet we may consider here some of the Jaina classifications not only for the philosophical interest they possess but also for purpose of comparison and contrast with the strictly Hindu standpoint.

1. Vidyānanda's Classification of the Virtues in the "Aṣṭasāhasrī" :—

The most interesting Jaina classification is that of Vidyānanda in the "Aṣṭasāhasrī" which is a commentary on Samantabhadra's Kārikā.

Righteousness (*Punya*) and unrighteousness (*Pāpa*) are characterised by Vidyānanda as depending on subjective intention or *abhisandhi* and not merely on consequences of happiness or suffering (*sukha-dukkhaphala*). Thus even non-sentient objects which are incapable of morality can

produce consequences of happiness or suffering. Similarly the dispassionate saint who has attained to the supermoral plane of being is also the cause of happy or unhappy consequences to others. Hence morality and immorality do not arise merely from results of happiness or unhappiness but depend on subjective intention or *abhisandhi* which is absent both in the non-sentient objects and the saint.

What is the nature of this *abhisandhi*, subjective intention or attitude which determines right and wrong as distinguished from consequences of happiness or suffering? It is pure (*Viśuddhyāṅga*) in the case of righteousness (*Punya*) and impure (*Saṁkleṣāṅga*) in the case of unrighteousness (*Pāpa*).

1. *Saṁkleṣa*, impurity (of intention), is either

(a) *ārta*, of a distressing or afflicting nature, which may manifest itself in

(i) the effort to escape from contact with the unpleasant (*amanojñā*),

(ii) the effort to attain the pleasant when separated from it,

(iii) absorption in the experience of pain and suffering (*vedanā*),

(iv) desire for the acquisition of power not yet acquired (*nidāna*, *aprāptaiśvaryaprāptisaṁkalpa*), or

(b) *raudra*, aggressive, violent, which also may take four forms, viz., the forms of

(i) *himsā*—Cruelty,

(ii) *anṛta*—Untruth, Mendacity,

(iii) *steḥa*—Theft, Wrongful Possession,

(iv) *viṣayasamrakṣaṇa*—Aggressiveness in the preservation of one's property.

2. *Viśuddhi*, Purity, is likewise either

(a) *dharmadhyānasvabhāva*, i.e., of the nature of contemplation of the ideal of *Dharma* or Duty ;

or

- (b) *Śukladhyānāsvabhāva*, i.e., of the nature of contemplation of the ideal of purity or perfection (*Śukla*).

This, it will be seen, is a new classification of the virtues, based not on the consequences of happiness or unhappiness but on the purity or impurity of the subjective intention or attitude of the moral agent. Hence the principle of classification is not any external consequence or result, but a state of internal determination of the Self or *Ātman*, viz., that which the *Ātman* becomes. This subjective determination takes the form of contemplation of Duty or Perfection in the case of Righteousness (*Punya*), and that of aggressiveness and absorption in pain in the case of unrighteousness (*Pāpa*). Thus this subjective self-determination is not the pure willing of the Moral Law, but is the concrete determination of the self in reference to positive content which consists in the ideal of duty or perfection in the case of righteousness or virtue and the states of affliction and aggressiveness in the case of unrighteousness. Hence we have here a synthesis of externalistic, consequential morality with the internalism of the theory of self-determination. While the consequence by itself does not determine virtue or the opposite, it furnishes the content as it were in relation to which the subject has to determine itself in the direction of righteousness or unrighteousness. Thus *himsā*, cruelty, regarded merely as a consequence of unhappiness to creatures, is neither righteous nor unrighteous, but when it results from the aggressive nature of the moral agent it is no longer morally neutral but becomes a form of unrighteousness reflecting as it does a specific act of self-determination on the part of the self as a consequence of the specific impurity of aggressiveness in the will. This aggressiveness or affliction again as a specific psychic state cannot be pure, abstract willing but necessarily signifies

concrete self-determination in reference to positive content. Thus the state of affliction implies concrete self-determination in relation to the experiences of want, misery and suffering, thus implying consciousness or determination of the self in reference to its condition of passivity, helplessness and weakness, just as the state of aggressiveness implies the determination of the self in respect of its consciousness of strength, power and vigour.

II

ANOTHER JAINA CLASSIFICATION

Āsrava is that by which *karma* enters the soul.

Samvara is the *nirodha*, i.e., the arrest of *āsrava*, the arrest of the flux of Karmic matter into the soul.

Dharma (Righteousness) is one of the means (*upāya*) of *samvara* or arrest of *karma*.

Dharma is *uttamaḥ*, *uttamaguṇaprakāśayuktah*, is connected with, or manifests, excellences of the highest quality.

The *Dharmas*, Virtues or Excellences, are :—

- (1) *Kṣamā*, Forgiveness.
- (2) *Mārdava*, *Mṛduta*, Humility,
- (3) *Ārjava*, *Rjuta*, Sincerity, Straightforwardness,
- (4) *Śauca*, Cleanliness,
- (5) *Satya*, Veracity,
- (6) *Tapas*, Practice of physical hardship and privation in view of the acquisition of strength of will for devotion,
- (7) *Tyāga*, Renunciation,
- (8) *Ākiñcanya*. Strenuousness,
- (9) *Brahmacaryya*, Continence.

This, it will be seen, is a mere enumeration of the virtues without any scientific basis of classification. But the Jaina list does not include the other-regarding virtues of Benevolence, Succour and Social Service. This shows that

the Jaina virtues aim more at self-culture than at social service. This is particularly evident in respect of the virtue of Forgiveness or *Kṣamā* in the Jaina list, a virtue which we miss in the Hindu enumerations proper and which consists primarily in effecting the moral uplift of the forgiving person at the expense of the forgiven.

D. BUDDHIST CLASSIFICATION

We shall now conclude by a study of the Buddhist treatment of the virtues. Buddhism, like Jainism, does not come properly under Hinduism, and, as we shall, see Buddhism furnishes in certain respects a very essential contrast to the Hindu ideal of life. But it is also this contrast with Hindu Ethics that necessitates some consideration of Buddhist Ethics here without which the Hindu standpoint cannot be fully understood in its true significance.

The subject of the virtues is considered in the “*Mādhyamikāvṛtti*” by Candrakīrti where the virtues are classified into

I. *Vijñapti-samutthāpikā*, i.e., morality which is overt and expressed.

II. *Avijñaptayaḥ*, or non-manifested moral traits, subjective dispositions without physical expression.

III. *Paribhāgānvayam Karma*—righteousness and unrighteousness arising from institutional or communal responsibility through the righteous and unrighteous acts of the community or the institution.

IV. *Cittābhisamskāramanaskarma*, i.e., righteousness and unrighteousness arising from subjective determinations as revealed in the conscious effort of the mind (*manaskarma*).

1. As to the *Vijñaptisamutthāpikā*, i.e., Moral traits that express themselves in overt action. These are *Kuśala*,

Viratilakṣaṇa, i.e., beneficial, in the case of righteousness, and *Akuśala*, *Aviratilakṣaṇa*, i.e., noxious or injurious, in the case of unrighteousness. They comprise

(1) *Vāk*, i.e., the virtues of speech and the corresponding vices.

(2) *Viṣpanda*, *Śariraceṣṭā*, i.e., the virtues connected with physical activities and the corresponding vices.

II. As to *Avijñaptayaḥ*, i.e., traits or dispositions that are non-manifest or without physical expression (*parāṇna vijñāpayati iti avijñaptayaḥ*—i.e., do not manifest themselves to others). These are internal subjective traits or dispositions without external manifestation, and comprise

(1) *Avijñaptayaḥ*, subjective dispositions which are *Aviratilakṣaṇa* or *Akuśalasvabhāva*, i.e., of a hurtful or injurious nature. and

(2) *Avijñaptayaḥ*, dispositions, which are *Kuśalasvabhāvaḥ* or *Viratilakṣaṇaḥ*, i.e., of a beneficial nature.

As examples of *avijñaptayaḥ* under class (i) we have (a) the evil or unrighteousness that goes on accumulating, determining and modifying the character from the moment it is subjectively resolved that “from this day forward I shall earn my living by plundering and by killing sentient beings” even though this resolution may not be immediately put into execution, and again, (b) the *akuśalalakṣaṇaśaṃskāras* or unrighteous tendencies and dispositions that go on accumulating to the fisherman from after the moment the fisherman completes the weaving of the net which will be an instrument or means of killing fish.

(*Adyaḥprabhṛti mayā prāṇinām hatvā cauryyam kṛtvā jīvikā parikalpayitavyā iti upagamalakṣaṇāt prabhṛti tadakāriṇo’pi akuśalakarma iti upagamalakṣaṇāt satatam avijñaptayaḥ upajāyante kaivartādinām ca jālādiparikarmakālāt prabhṛti tadakārināmapi yā avijñaptayaḥ upajāyante tā etā aviratilakṣaṇāḥ avijñaptayaḥ*).

The difference between the two examples above lies in the fact that in the first instance there is nothing but the

outstanding resolution or subjective choice, there being no overt action, while in the second there is *avijñapti*, i.e., a subliminal tendency with cumulative effect after an overt act, viz., the weaving of the net. Hence *Avijñaptayaḥ* represent the subconscious determinations of the self in continuation of a specific modification of the moral personality, a modification which has been initiated by the first step in a specific line of conduct, a step which may consist either in an outstanding subjective resolution or choice or in the first of a series of overt acts.

Similarly we have also subconscious determinations of a beneficial nature (*Kuśalasvabhāvaḥ*, *Viratīlakṣaṇaḥ*), determinations which may result either from a subjective act in the form of a pious resolution or from the outward objective performance of the first of a series of meritorious acts. Thus I may decide to abstain from the path of evil and cruelty (*adya prabhṛti prānātipātādibhyaḥ prativīramām iti*) and from the moment I resolve to do so there is subconscious modification of my personality in the direction of righteousness which goes on accumulating even when there is no conscious endeavour to better and improve myself in the intervening time. Similarly I may perform an overt act of merit and from the moment I do it there is subconscious determination of myself in the direction of virtue which goes on accumulating even in states of unconsciousness or sleep (*pramattādi avasthā*). *Kāyavākviññaptipariśamāptikālakṣaṇā prabhṛti taduttarakālam pramattādyavasthasyāpi yāḥ kuśalopāyasvabhāvā vijñaptayaḥ upajāyante.*)

III. As to *Paribhāgānvayam karma* or morality arising from communal responsibility. This again takes the two forms of—

(1) *Apuṇya*, demerit or unrighteousness, and

(2) *Puṇya*, merit or righteousness.

(1) Thus we have *Paribhāgānvayam Apuṇyam*, unrighteousness accruing to us from the unrighteous acts of

the institutions we have established. Take for example the establishment of a religious institution such as the worship of a particular god or goddess. Now such worship may lead to animal sacrifice and this is an evil. The responsibility for this evil lies with the author of the institution, *i.e.*, *Apunya* or demerit must accrue to him for every such unrighteous act of the institution. (*Paribhāgānvayam apunyam, yathā, devakūlādipratisthāpanam. Tatra sattvāḥ hanyante. Taddevakūlādi upabhāgāt tatkarṣṇām santānaparibhāgānvayam apunyam api jāyate.*)

(2) Similarly we have also *Paribhāgānvayam Puṇyam* or righteousness accumulating to the author of an institution for the good effects of the institution.

IV. Lastly as to *Cittābhisamskāra-Manaskarma*. This is the merit (or demerit) arising from *Manaskarma*, conscious resolve or self-determination of the mind in the direction of righteousness (or unrighteousness). Hence it is to be distinguished from subconscious modification of personality (*avijñaptayaḥ*) as well as from overt acts of merit or demerit (*viñaptayaḥ*). Thus it implies conscious determination of the self as distinguished from the subconscious modifications after a conscious act, but this conscious determination is a mental act (*manaskarma*) without objective or physical manifestation. There are three forms of this self-conscious determination of the Self.

(1) *Ātmasamyamakam cetah or viparyyayaḥ*—the conscious resolve of self-restraint or the opposite,

(2) *Parānugrahakam cetah or viparyyayaḥ i.e.*, the conscious resolve of benevolence or the opposite,

(3) *Maitram cetah or viparyyayaḥ*—the conscious resolve of amity and peace with all creatures or the opposite.

It is to be seen that the Buddhist analysis of the virtues is suggestive of unique and original norms in ethics. Thus the Buddhists recognise subconscious

and unconscious morality and not merely the self-conscious morality of orthodox ethics. Thus ordinarily it is said, if we have *pravṛtti*, a voluntary act, we have merit or demerit. But the Buddhists with their fine ethical sensibility suggest an entirely new norm in ethics. Even outstanding resolutions, outstanding arrangements, have moral effect because they influence the subconscious or subpersonal strata.

Similarly the Buddhists also speak of institutional morality, and this is a new category which has to be added to modern ethics. By institutional morality the Buddhists mean that given any institution, the founder of the institution is responsible for the good and evil effects of the institution. This is the conception of communal and posthumous ethical responsibility—a conception which furnishes the strongest contrast to the Hindu ideal of ethical self-autonomy and self-determination as implied in their doctrine of *karma*.

If now we compare the cardinal Greek virtues with the Hindu lists we find that the virtues of the mind, *viz.*, Detachment (*Aspr̥hā*), Compassion (*Dayā*), and Reverence (*Śraddhā*) are specially Hindu. We may contrast them with the characteristic Greek virtues which are Justice and Friendship, *i.e.*, Justice based on a proper regard for the rights of others and friendship which is a social feeling. It is otherwise with the Hindus. Instead of friendliness which is based on strongly defined individuality and worldliness, they recommend compassion (*anukampā*) and faith (*paraloka-śraddhā*). These two are also the characteristic Christian virtues, but according to the Hindu these are to be cultivated with a view to *Aspr̥hā*, unworldliness, or detachment, which is the highest virtue, *i.e.*, from a standpoint which is diametrically opposed to the Christian ideal of life.

It is also to be seen that the Hindu virtues are not merely negative consisting in merely abstaining from vice. Thus the lists include not merely *Asteya* abstention from theft, *Asprhā*, unworldliness, etc., but also the positive virtues of charity (*Dāna*), succour (*Paritrāṇa*) and service (*Paricarāṇa*), and in Patañjali we have also *Ahimsā* in a positive sense as universal good-will and tenderness as the highest of the virtues, the root of all other virtues. These virtues also provide for social service besides self-culture but for the Hindu it is self-culture that is highest in rank and social service is only a means to self-culture and self-autonomy to be attained by cultivating *Asprhā* or unworldliness.

CHAPTER V

SPECIAL FEATURES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL HINDU ETHICS

We shall now consider the Psychological Ethics of the Hindus as a whole with a view to finding out what is really significant as well as what is distinctive or characteristic in the Hindu treatment. As regards the Analysis of Volition we may observe that the Hindu treatment has almost a modern note about it. The distinction between volition proper and the organic activities and the analysis of the motive with special reference to the consciousness of good or the absence thereof are in line with the modern treatment of these questions. The distinction however between the cognition of an act as distinguished from the passive cognition of a fact, between prudential (*kāmya*) actions and moral actions proper in their *psychological* aspects, and between the positive and the negative forms of volition, are all specifically Hindu. The analysis of the process of choice with special reference to the consciousness of freedom and with reference to the *order* as distinguished from mere number of the conditions of choice, is also a contribution to the Psychology of volition. The forms of determinism and indeterminism which are discussed in this connection in a purely psychological reference are without parallel in modern ethics and modern psychology both in respect of subtlety and profundity. The analysis of the deterrent and of the suspension of the deterrent with reference to the psychology of temptation and suicide, and particularly of the operation of the deterrent in the negative as well as the positive forms of willing, is also another special feature of the Hindu treatment. The Nyāya conception of a specific

order in pains and pleasures as an operative factor in choice is an addition to the Benthamite calculus which will do credit even to a modern psychologist. Of modern significance is also the relativistic conception of willing as dependent on the agent's condition and capacity relatively to the time and the circumstances of the willing.

As regards the Analysis of Conscience, it may be observed in the first place that the category of Dharma or morality is considered from the subjective as well as the objective points of view. And from the subjective standpoint it is considered not merely as a function of the mind (Sāṅkhya) but also as a determination of the substantive Self (Nyāya) resulting from the purity of the intention. Similarly from the objective standpoint it is considered not merely as external *śāstrika* prescription (*Bhāṭṭa*) but also as *Āpūrva* which is the essence of duty as an accomplished verity of the Moral Order (*Prābhākara*). It may be observed also that morality is regarded as having only relative and empirical validity in all Hindu systems except the Mimāṃsaka, the idea being that the righteousness which accrues to the agent through the accomplishment of the duties being an event in time cannot be a natural or essestial accompaniment of the Self in its *true* nature. This holds good even of the Rāmānujists who recognise an essential difference between the natural unmediated morality of the empirical life and the morality of the transcendental life which is transfigured by mediation through the act of self-surrender to the Absolute. In this latter stage morality is divested of its subjective character as seeking of the subjective end and becomes the realisation of the Absolute in self so that self-love becomes transformed into the love of God. The Pūrvamīmāṃsakas however, and particularly the Prābhākara school of the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas, ascribe a transcendental significance to morality, conceiving the highest end of the spirit as

consisting in *Niyogasiddhi* or realisation of the Moral Imperative. The Sāṅkhya, the Vedānta as well as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems on the contrary ascribe only a relative significance to morality on the ground that it conduces to no lasting fruition and also entails suffering. But while the Sāṅkhya condemns such morality altogether, particularly the morality of scripture as entailing suffering through the impurities of destruction of life, etc., recognising only a higher noetic morality of *sāttvika* duties as leading to the discriminative knowledge of Spirit, the Śāṅkara-Vedāntists and some of the Rāmānujists justify even the lower morality as subservient to the higher ethics of the transcendental life. The frank recognition of the evil element in the *himsā* of animal slaughter even from the standpoint of ceremonial ethics is another merit of the Hindus, and the attempts to reconcile the authority of the natural reason with that of *śāstrika* revelation in this connection are only an indication of their synthetic mind, however scholastic the solutions may appear to be. Of particular significance in this connection is the Prābhākara justification of *śāstrika himsā* as mere means and the condemnation of it when desired as an end-in-itself. It represents the most remarkable attempt at a purely ethical explanation of duty from the standpoint of moral disinterestedness on the basis of a purely external code. The conception of *Apūrva* as an ontological verity of the Moral Order which is self-established and therefore an end-in-itself constitutes the foundation of the Prābhākara rigorism which is elaborated out of the scriptural code. It is a contribution to the analysis of duty which implies not merely an external code but also moral verity as a new category which comes into operation through the modalities. The Sāṅkhya rejection of the external

śāstrika code, the Nyāya and the Rāmānujist attempts at a rational ethical interpretation thereof, and the Śankara-Vedānta differentiation of the two paths in which externalism is merged at last into the higher ethics of the noetic duties, are the various Hindu devices to transcend the purely ceremonial standpoint. They are indicative not only of a frank recognition of the inadequacy of ethical externalism but also of the need of a rational justification thereof from the internalistic standpoint of self-purification. The recognition of a prudential morality of the conditional scriptural duties besides the disinterested morality of the unconditional duties is also an indication of the synthetic mind of the Hindus. Even the Naiyāyika recognises disinterested morality from his utilitarian, consequential standpoint by admitting a non-pathological motive which is neither attraction nor aversion. It works for the highest end through the unconditional duties—the end, *viz.*, of absolute freedom from suffering. This end being negative does not imply pathological feelings such as attraction or aversion. There is thus a non-pathological feeling, *viz.*, the desire for the highest end—a non-utilitarian motive for the end of freedom from suffering which operates through the unconditional duties. Hence there is disinterested morality even for the Naiyāyika who accepts ethical as well as psychological consequentialism. Contrarywise even the Prābhākaras recognise an interested morality which they reconcile with their ethical purism by divesting it of its strictly moral character. Thus the conditional duties according to the Prābhākara, are not devoid of authority, but as this authority is of the logical order as distinguished from the moral authority of duty it does not impair the disinterestedness of morality proper. The conditional duties are therefore to be accepted along with the unconditional duties, but while the latter are to

be accomplished as moral duties, the former have to be recognised as expressing the nature of things as the basis of action. This is how the Prābhākara provides interested morality in his scheme of ethical rigorism. The Prābhākara synthesis in this respect is the counterpart of the Nyāya synthesis of moral disinterestedness with psychological and ethical consequentialism. The same synthetic spirit is also to be remarked in the analysis of conscience which is considered not only in its ethical aspects and implications but also always with reference to the positive psychological bases, *viz.*, the conditions of the psychological motive. Noteworthy also in this connection are the comprehensiveness, the subtlety and depth of the analysis which considers moral obligation not only with reference to the moments of subjective impulsion and objective duty, but also with reference to the nature of the operative process which it involves as well as the implication of subjective freedom and an objective personal source. The Nyāya conception of a purely psychological operation of the moral Imperative through the desire for consequence is significant in this connection, particularly in view of the Nyāya conception of this Imperative as a Personal command which is law-making. The Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara conception of a moral motivation distinct from psychological motivation through the desire for the consequence is also a contribution to the Doctrine of Conscience. Particularly important in this connection is the issue which is raised by the Prābhākaras against the Bhāṭṭas as to whether moral causation is to be conceived on the analogy of physical or psychological causation. The Prābhākara contention, that this being mere revelation as distinct from compulsion we have here a category distinct from causation as ordinarily understood, is full of suggestion alike for the ethics of moral determination and the metaphysics of

causation. The Prābhākaras rightly point out that causality as an ethical category is to be distinguished from causality as a psychological or physical category. The Bhāṭṭas however do not recognise any essential difference between the two, the moral operation of the imperative according to them being of the same order as psychological or physical causation, the only difference being that it is an impersonal action of the law as distinguished from the action of the desire in the agent. The Bhāṭṭas thus secure the autonomy of moral authority as independent of an end or consequence which however operates causally on the will analogously to natural causation. In so far however as they assume also a logical end of this moral authority which operates as a psychological motive in the agent, they also provide the natural heteronomy of the will in their ethics of moral autonomy and impersonal operation of the Imperative. The Bhāṭṭa view thus represents an extremely original reconciliation of the naturalism of psychological willing with the independent authority of moral duty. The Nyāya conception of a subjective and objective moral authority is also a unique synthesis of ethical necessity with ethical freedom based on a purely psychological interpretation of moral motivation. The Naiyāyika contends that the moral end operates psychologically through the agent's desire without impugning either moral freedom or the autonomy and independence of moral authority. The Prābhākaras however analyse moral obligation into a unique feeling of impulsion in the self which is induced by the knowledge-inducing function of the Imperative—a function which is distinct alike from impersonal causal operation or compulsion and psychological motivation through the desire for the consequence. It is through this feeling which is self-evidencing that duty as an ontological moral verity establishes itself in consciousness and this is moral obligation, The Prābhākaras

thus secure the autonomy of the Imperative not merely by recognising in it a new category distinct from the psychological end, but also by distinguishing its function of revelation of the Law from causal or mechanical operation on the will. The analysis of *Niyoga* in this connection with reference to the two moments of subjective prompting and objective duty, particularly the eleven different interpretations of *Niyoga*, constitute one of the most valuable contributions to the Doctrine of Conscience. The moral proof of freedom as implicated in the consciousness of duty is not specifically Hindu, but considered as a supplement to the psychological proof of it as implicated in the consciousness of willing it is characterised by a comprehensiveness of point of view which is lacking in the western treatment. The Hindu treatment of an objective implication of a Personal Source of the Moral Law is also very full and comprehensive, the question being threshed out from nearly every point of view. Lastly, the Hindu conception of subjective right as implying not only the agent's intention but also the purity of this intention such as freedom from pride, vanity, etc., is quite in agreement with modern ethics. Similarly, the Hindu conception of objective wrong even in the absence of the agent's intention, *i. e.*, of wrong and consequent responsibility on account of the agent's inadvertence which it implies, is perfectly rational and legitimate. The conception of a penalty in the latter case as required for merely social reasons (*i.e.*, for impressing on men's minds the need of carefulness in view of the harm which may otherwise be done) is also a very sane view of moral responsibility.

Characteristic then in the Hindu analysis of conscience are not only the conceptions of morality as a subjective and an objective category, of objective as well as subjective rightness, of duty as an ontological verity of the moral order, and of conditional and unconditional duties, but

also the distinction between the moral prompting and the Imperative or duty which prompts, the conception of a moral operation of the Imperative as distinguished from the operation of desire in the agent, of a moral causation as mere revelation as distinguished from natural causation or compulsion of the will, and lastly of the importance of purification of the motive from all empirical inclination with a view to the disinterested accomplishment of the unconditional duties which is the highest morality. The importance which is thus ascribed to the unconditional duties is a necessary corollary of their conception of the highest end as the non-empirical Transcendental Freedom of the Spirit. The way of experience is not the way to this non-empirical end or goal and this necessitates purification in the sense of freedom from all empirical desire as a negative condition of the realisation of the highest end. At the same time the empirical duties are not discarded altogether but are recognised as having a certain value especially as a preliminary moral discipline conducive to the higher morality of the unconditional and noetic duties. It is the unconditional and noetic duties therefore that are highest in rank as leading direct to the Freedom and Autonomy of the Self which is the highest end, and the ethical and empirical duties have value only as preparatory to the higher duties. The highest ethics, according to the Hindu, is therefore the ethics of knowledge and purification of desire, *i.e.*, the ethics of the negation of empirical life, but the lower ethics of the practical life is also recognised as a preparatory training to the higher discipline of the spirit. We have already seen that this is also a characteristic feature of the Hindu treatment of the Springs of Action and the classification of the Virtues. The passions and impulses are considered in view of this non-empirical end of the spirit and even the social virtues are recognised only as conducive to self-autonomy and

spiritual freedom. The highest virtue is thus unworldliness just as the purest impulse is dispassion, and these are the steps or stepping-stones as it were on which the individual ascends to his non-empirical ideal from the plane of the pathological impulses of his phenomenal life.

The Psychological Ethics of the Hindus is therefore essentially a scheme of practical ethics which has in view the realisation of the Transcendental Ideal of the Spirit. In so far as this ideal is conceived in the main as the negation of the empirical, phenomenal life it is also a scheme of practical ethics which has the annulment of the practical life for its object. It is, however, a scheme which is not metaphysically deduced or merely assumed as a first principle, but is also expounded on a positive basis of psychological observation and analysis of the conditions of volition and the springs of action. This is a special feature of Hindu Psychological Ethics in which the scheme of the unconditional and noetic duties is conceived not merely in view of the non-empirical transcendental ideal of freedom but also with reference to the positive conditions of their accomplishment through the non-pathological or *sāttvika* impulses and emotions. It is these which constitute the link as it were between the empirical life of the individual and the nonempirical goal which he is to reach. Through these pure impulses free from empirical taint the individual is prompted to the accomplishment of the unconditional and noetic duties which by inducing disinterestedness and knowledge effects at last his freedom from the bonds of experience. The highest ethics of the Hindus is therefore this ethics of disinterestedness and contemplation and their psychological ethics is only the explication of this higher ethics with reference to their positive and practical condition. The Psychological Ethics of the Hindus is therefore a synthetic scheme of the practical and positive conditions of the realisation of

disinterestedness and the contemplative virtues as preparatory to the non-empirical, intellectual ideal of freedom-in-knowledge—a scheme of ascending stages of realisation through the secular, the scriptural-conditional, and the scriptural-unconditional duties merging at last into the noetic duties proper which are essential to absolute knowledge. It is thus regulative as well as empirical, noetic as well as practical, a synthetic plan of progressive approximation to the non-empirical spiritual end through a graded scheme of duties defined with reference to their positive psychological bases and conditions.

PART III

THE ETHICO-SPIRITUAL IDEAL OF THE HINDUS (*Mokṣa*)

AND

ITS REALISATION (*Mokṣasādhana*)

We have seen how the Psychological Ethics of the Hindus aims at the inwardisation of merely objective morality by laying down the principles and conditions of self-purification. Self-purification, however, is not the highest spiritual end, but is only a means to the highest end which is *Mokṣa* or Freedom of the life absolute and transcendental. We shall therefore consider now the Hindu Doctrine of *Mokṣa* or the Freedom of the Spirit and of *Mokṣasādhana* or the means of its realisation. In so far as this freedom has to be regarded in relation to a prior state of bondage, the Doctrine of *Bandha* or bondage of the phenomenal life has also to be considered in connection with the Doctrine of Transcendental Freedom. We propose to consider these from the standpoint of the different systems of Hindu Philosophy, and for the sake of convenience we propose to treat the ideal and the means of its realisation separately in two sections.

1. THE SPIRITUAL IDEAL OF THE HINDUS :

The Doctrine of Mokṣa or Spiritual Freedom

We have already seen that the highest ideal is conceived in Hindu Philosophy as a state of freedom from the bonds of the empirical life and therefore as a negation of experience which, however, may or may not be conceived as also a reaffirmation or restoration of it from a higher standpoint. Thus the Nyāya, the Sāṅkhya and the Śāṅkara-Vedānta all conceive the highest ideal as the nega-

tion of the phenomenal life, while the Rāmānujists contend that this negation is only a step in the reaffirmation and restoration of experience from the absolute standpoint. But while in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems this negation is conceived as itself constituting the essence of the transcendental life, according to Vedānta the highest state is conceived also as the realisation of a positive transcendental content such as Blessedness or Knowledge besides being the negation of all that is empirical.

Mokṣa According To The Vaiśeṣikas

Thus the highest freedom is described in the Vaiśeṣika system as the negation of all empirical content in the self. Śrīdhara in the "Nyāyakandalitikā" describes Vaiśeṣika *Mokṣa* as the absolute destruction of the nine specific qualities of the Self. (*Navānāmātmaviśeṣaguṇānām atyantacchedaḥ mokṣaḥ*.) The nine specific qualities of the Self are:—Intelligence (*Buddhi*), Pleasure (*Sukha*), Pain (*Duḥkha*), Desire (*Ichā*), Aversion (*Dveṣa*), Conation (*Prayatna*), Righteousness (*Dharma*), Unrighteousness (*Adharma*), and predisposition due to past experience (*Samskāra*). All these become extinct, according to the Vaiśeṣika, in the state of Transcendental Freedom. Hence it is a state of freedom not only from pleasures and pains but also from intelligence or consciousness, a state therefore of unconsciousness or absolute cessation of all experience in the self. It is therefore not even a state of self-knowledge, though according to the Vaiśeṣikas it is produced by self-knowledge and the accomplishment of the unconditional duties. The Vaiśeṣikas contend that though it is a state of negation of all experience yet it is a state of felicity i.e., of the felicity or satisfaction that belongs by nature to the self. This is how the Vaiśeṣikas meet the objection of the critics who say that Vaiśeṣika *Mokṣa* is indistinguishable from the unconsciousness of material bodies such as that of a pebble

or a piece of wood. But the difficulty still remains as to how a state of felicity is to be conceived which is not an experienced felicity, *i.e.*, of which there can be no consciousness whatsoever. The Vaiśeṣikas argue that there is felicity in the self-centered repose and calm of the self, a felicity which may be realised by means of self-knowledge, self-collectedness, contentment and the highest righteousness. But since they maintain that this state of pure being of the self is also free from intelligence or consciousness, this felicity can only be a felicity of quiescence and sleep, the rest and calm of materiality as their critics point out. Further since happiness is always a felt happiness according to the Vaiśeṣikas it is a contradiction to suppose that there is natural felicity in the self even in the absence of consciousness.

Mokṣa According to Nyāya

The Naiyāyikas agree with the Vaiśeṣikas in all essentials in this negative conception of *Mokṣa* as the freedom of the spirit from the bonds of experience. But they point out that freedom from suffering which is the essence of true spiritual freedom entails also the abjuration of happiness which is inseparable from suffering. The highest state, according to the Naiyāyika, therefore is not freedom from experience for its own sake, but total and absolute freedom from suffering (*duḥkḥena ātyantikāḥ viyogaḥ*), and this implies not only renunciation of happiness which is always connected with pain, but also the negation of the empirical life. For the Naiyāyika therefore the cessation of the empirical life is only a moment in the realisation of that freedom from pain which is the highest end. The Naiyāyika is also more consistent than the Vaiśeṣika in the rejection of a transcendental felicity in the self as distinguished from empirical pleasure. The Nyāya contention is that happiness has to be renounced as being inseparable

from suffering, and as there is no experience of suffering in the highest state of freedom from pain there is also no experience of any transcendental felicity or satisfaction in the positive sense. It may be called a felicitous state only in the negative sense, *i.e.*, as a state of freedom from the unrest of life and experience. The Naiyāyika points out that though the psychological reality of pleasure as a positive experience cannot be denied, yet pleasure being inseparably connected with pain through the cause (*nimitta*), the substrata (*ādhāra*) as well as the experience (*upalabdhi*) of pleasure, there is no freedom from pain without the renunciation of pleasure along with it. In this connection the Naiyāyika refutes the views of the opponents and critics of Nyāya, particularly the views of those who conceive *Mokṣa* as a state of pleasurable experience. Against these the Naiyāyika points out that if a man were to be actuated by calculations of imperishable happiness and the like, he would not be free (*mukta*) in the true sense. He will be the slave of his desire for the happiness of *Mokṣa*, and this desire as a motive-force will be a source of bondage. It is true that aversion to pain as a motive to *Mokṣa* will equally bind (*dveṣasya bandhanasamājnānāt*), but this is why the freedom of *Mokṣa* which is total and absolute freedom from pain is to be sought only in dispassion and not in the pathological feelings of desire or aversion. Thus there is no pathological desire or attraction for *Mokṣa* as absolute freedom from pain. Attraction (*rāga*) supposes a positive content which is *anukūla* or favourable to the self, but freedom from pain is a negative ideal which is only not unfavourable (*apratikūla*) and not positively favourable. Similarly aversion also cannot be a motive for absolute freedom from pain. Aversion is itself a form of pain and thus cannot act as a motive for that which consists in the absolute cessation of pain. In short, the highest ideal

conceived as the total and absolute cessation of pain is independent of all pathological motives, while the highest ideal conceived as a positive happiness necessarily implies impure motives and thus cannot lead to true freedom. The seeker of true freedom therefore seeks only cessation of pain from a pure feeling of dispassion without any pathological aversion as the motive (*advīṣan pravartamānaḥ apratikūlam duḥkhaḥānam adhiḡacchati—* “Nyāyavārtika” of Uddyotakara). Believers in the doctrine of imperishable happiness as the highest ideal contend that there is imperishable happiness in the self (*Ātmani nityam sukhāsti*) and that man’s highest end is the realisation of this happiness. According to their view a variety of conditions would not all produce happiness in the absence of eternal, imperishable happiness in the self. In the phenomenal life there is no lasting manifestation of this happiness and the essence of the transcendental life consists in the full manifestation of this happiness. The Naiyāyika however points out that this psychologico-epistemological argument for the existence of imperishable happiness in the self will also equally prove the existence of imperishable suffering as well as imperishable desire and other states of consciousness (*duḥkhamāpi nityam kalpayitavyam, iccādayaśca—* “Nyāyavārtika”). Hence the argument consistently carried out will make every conscious state a resurgence of what is below the threshold. It will thus lead to Idealism and will make the assumption of external objects superfluous. But the Mimāṃsakas who preach this will hardly accept this Idealistic metaphysic. Nor will the logical corollary of eternal suffering in the self be consistent with their doctrine of *Mokṣa* as the realisation of eternal happiness. In short, the doctrine of eternal, imperishable happiness being below the threshold in the phenomenal life will also imply that every state of consciousness lives an immortal life below

the threshold and thus we shall have a most wonderful netherland of mental life in which states, contradictory and mutually incompatible, continue simultaneously in being so that desire continues alongside of aversion and pain endures by the experience of pleasure. Such will also be the state of *Mokṣa* in which the manifestation of the latent happiness will also involve the manifestation of the latent unhappiness. Further what does this *abhivyakti* or manifestation of happiness in the self, mean?

(1) If manifestation means cognition or knowledge of the happiness by the self, then the question is whether such manifestation is eternal or non-eternal. If it were eternal then there would be no distinction between the liberated (*mukta*) and the non-liberated (*samsāra*stha). Further there would be no diversity in the emotional life, but only one unbroken continuum of happiness. Lastly there would be no possibility of suffering and therefore also no desire for freedom from suffering (*duḥkha*jihāsā) nor any toiling for liberation (*mokṣa*-*prayāsa*) as a consequence. It is hardly to the point to argue that the body is an obstacle to happiness, and therefore there is need of toiling for the realisation of this happiness. The body is only a means of fruition (*upabhoga*) and therefore cannot be an obstacle. Further with eternal happiness of the liberated we may also imagine an imperishable body as the instrument (*nimitta*, *sādhana*) thereof. But if an imperishable body is felt to be an absurdity so also must be eternal happiness. (2) Secondly, if the manifestation of eternal happiness is non-eternal (*anitya*), then there must be a reason why there is such occasional manifestation. You must postulate a connection of the soul-substance with its organ of experience, viz., the mind. This connection of soul and mind will have to be assumed as a condition of the manifestation besides the existence of eternal happiness in the self. In liberation these will

be the only conditions of the realisation of happiness and no external objects will be required. In the same way then there may be sense-experiences (*rūpādiviṣayajñāna*) without external objects being required. We shall thus have a strange sort of liberation which will not be detachment of the self (*Kaivalya*) in any case as there will be apprehension of all objects (*sarvārthopalabdhī*). Believers in the Doctrine of Eternal Happiness also prove their theory by an ethical argument. They point out that there is *iṣṭādhigamāarthapravṛtti*, i.e., pursuit of the satisfaction derived from the good. Since this cannot reach its proper goal except in eternal happiness, therefore such happiness must exist (*Seyam pravṛttiḥ nityasukhe arthavati nānyathā*). This is a practical, ethical ground in proof of eternal happiness based on a positive basis of conative experience. It is assumed that conation as the pursuit of satisfaction would be senseless if there were no eternal happiness in which it could be fulfilled. The Naiyāyika however points out that it is not necessary to assume this. Conation is both rejection of the evil (*aniṣṭahāna*) and selection of the good (*hitapṛāpti*). Thus conation may have a negative as well as a positive end, and therefore freedom from pain (*duḥkḥābhāva*) may be an object of pursuit quite as well as a positive satisfaction (*pravṛttidvaidātadarśanāt*). There is no happiness without suffering, but there is freedom from both happiness and suffering. Conation is thus fulfilled only in the negative ideal of absolute freedom and not in any positive satisfaction which invariably entails suffering. It is sometimes argued on the basis of scriptural authority that liberation must consist in some kind of imperishable happiness. For example, in the “*Ānandaśruti*” the liberated is described as living the life of blessedness and felicity (*Muktaḥ sukhī bhavati iti śrūyate*—“*Ānandaśruti*”). Such scriptural texts, it is held, contradict the view that there is no happiness in the state of freedom. The Naiyāyika

however points out that what is really meant by happiness in such scriptural texts is mere relief from suffering. As a matter of fact the use of the term happiness to indicate mere negative relief is very common among men (*Duḥkḥ-ābhāve'pi sukhaśabdaprayogaḥ bahudhā loke*). E.g., we describe the state of freedom from illness as a state of being well.

In this connection the Naiyāyika considers also some of the other views of *Mokṣa*, for example, the views of Patañjali and some of the Buddhists. Thus according to some Buddhists (and also Patañjali) *Mokṣa* is the destruction of the mind or mental continuum (*cittam vimucyate*). It is argued that the mind is subject to attraction and other impulses. Since these can have no power over the self, the mind as subject to these must originate in a material medium or vehicle other than the self. Naiyāyikas however point out that if this were true, *Mokṣa* becomes possible after death (*ayane mokṣaḥ siddhaḥ*). The Naiyāyika holds that it is the self which becomes subject to the impulses through the mind which is its organ of experience. What is necessary is therefore the freedom of the self by the purification of its pathological dispositions and cravings. So long as these continue in the self there is no true freedom (which is the extinction of the possibilities of future experiences) even though there may be a temporary separation from the mind through death. It is therefore a mistake to think that one becomes free from experience merely by being separated from one's mind which is the organ of experience. The mistake of these Buddhists arises from the erroneous conception that the *citta* or mind is not only the organ but also the subject of experience. The subject is the *Ātman* or self and the mind is the instrument through which the self becomes the subject of experiences.

Another Buddhist view is that *Mokṣa* consists in the arrest of the stream of consciousness (*santati anutpādi*). But

this is also inadmissible according to the Naiyāyika for the simple reason that the stream as a concatenation of causes and effects (*kārya-kāraṇappravāha*) can never cease. The Nyāya contention is that an ideal which by its very nature can never be accomplished or realised actually is not admissible even as an ideal.

Lastly there is the view that *Mokṣa* consists in the cessation of the possibilities of future experience (*anāgatānutpāda*). The Naiyāyika points out that the unborn future is of itself non-existent and therefore nothing remains to be done according to such a view. The Naiyāyika means that the past as an accumulated mass of present dispositions with potency to mature in future experiences leaves scope for work to be done, but the future as future is simply non-existent and the arrest of the future in this sense signifies nothing.

According to Nyāya, therefore, bondage is a condition of the *Ātman* or self, the condition of its being subject to experiences including feelings of attraction, aversion, etc., which lead to unhappiness. It is a condition of the self which comes about through its connection with the mind which is its organ or instrument of experience. The effect of such connection is not merely specific experiences in the self, but also certain tendencies or dispositions (*samskāras*) in the self as a consequence of its experiences. The self's true freedom therefore consists not merely in the cessation of its experiences but also in the destruction of these latent tendencies which mature into future experiences through the self's connection with the mind when the suitable occasions arise. The destruction of these tendencies means the destruction of the future possibilities of experience, the negation of the will-to-live and not merely of the actual experiences into which it materialises. What is required therefore is something more than the mere severance of the self's connection with the mind. Such severance may be

effected in death, in sleep, etc., but it does not produce real freedom, for the tendencies, the latent dispositions, remain in the self in spite of the severance and because of such dispositions there is fresh connection with the mind after an interval of rest, resulting in fresh experiences. What is required therefore is the destruction of these *samskāras* or dispositions in the self by self-knowledge and by self-purification through the performance of the unconditional duties. When the self thus masters its *Tṛṣṇā* or thirst for life by the destruction of even the subtle tendencies and dispositions, there is not only a cessation of all actual but also of all possible experience. Thereby the self becomes free from the miseries by being free from all experience and lives the life of calm and peaceful rest in itself. This may be a negative, pessimistic ideal, but it is the only one worth seeking since happiness is impossible without suffering. It is however not Buddhist *Nirvāṇa* which is annihilation of self instead of being the realisation of its freedom. Nor is it Śāṅkara's *Mokṣa* which is self-annihilation in the Absolute instead of being true self-realisation. It is indeed the negation of all empirical content in the self, but this is because such content does not belong to the self's true nature.

THE SĀṆKHYA DOCTRINE OF MOKṢA

There are many points of similarity between Sāṅkhya and Nyāya in respect of this negative conception of *Mokṣa* as freedom from experience. In the first place, Sāṅkhya agrees with Nyāya in respect of its pessimistic conception of the highest end as total and absolute freedom from all kinds of suffering. It also agrees with the Nyāya view that the realisation of this end is possible only by freedom from all experience. Lastly it maintains that the self's freedom is not self-annihilation in Brahma, but the realisation of its distinctive reality as independent and autonomous.

But while according to Nyāya this self-autonomy means the realisation of the self's essence as spiritual substance in which not even consciousness remains, according to Sāṅkhya the self is consciousness itself, not a substance, far less an unconscious spiritual substance. It is this self or *Puruṣa* as light of consciousness that shines forth in experience, and true freedom is the realisation of *Puruṣa's* essence as pure light or illumination. It is through *Puruṣa's* illumination that the non-manifest, formless *Prakṛti* becomes manifest as a world of forms, and it is in *Puruṣa's* experience that the world is fulfilled as a world of experience. *Puruṣa* is thus the *bhoktā*, the experiencer for which the world of experience comes into being. But *Puruṣa* is not experiencer in the Nyāya sense of being the material cause of experience as the soul-substance to which experience appertains as a qualitative determination. *Puruṣa* is experiencer only in the sense of being the final cause, the end which is being realised by the world of experience. It is for *Puruṣa's* experience that a world comes into being, and it is also in *Puruṣa's* fruition that the world is fulfilled. *Puruṣa* accomplishes nothing for its own sake. It is inactive, indifferent, self-accomplished Light from eternity. All activity belongs to *Prakṛti* which is the material and efficient cause of experience. *Prakṛti* functions towards *Puruṣa's* fruition, and the activities of *Prakṛti* result in *Puruṣa's* experience. How can the fruition go to *Puruṣa* if *Puruṣa* is not an active agent? This is not impossible the Sāṅkhya replies. The fulfilled subject is not necessarily also the fulfilling agent. Experience abounds in instances to the contrary (*akarturapi phalopabhogah anyādyavat*). Take the case of the preparation of the meal. The meal is prepared by the cook, but it is the king who enjoys it (*annādyupabhogah rājño bhavati*). Take another case. The battle is fought by the soldiers, but the glory

or the defeat goes to the king. So is it with *Puruṣa*. It is the Understanding (*Buddhi*) that actively functions in experience, but it is *Puruṣa* that enjoys the results thereof. The Understanding is a form of *Prakṛti*, and *Puruṣa* enjoys the functions of its Understanding through a beginningless relation of ownership with it. It is a unique relation, this relationship of ownership (*svatvasvāmītyasambandha*) which is to be distinguished from the relation of agent and instrument or of substance and attribute. It is the relation through which each *Puruṣa* is related to its Understanding or *Buddhi* which is an evolute of *Prakṛti*. It accounts for the individual character of experience, the one-to-one ordering which gives uniqueness to my world as distinguished from yours. Through this relation *Puruṣa* attains fruition in the transformations of its Understanding. Pleasures and pains are functions of the Understanding, the transformations of the *Buddhi* which is their material vehicle or basis. *Puruṣa* is fulfilled through the transformations of its *Buddhi* which are reflected into it through the relation of ownership. The Naiyāyika believes in a real determination of the self in experience. But how can there be real determination when the Self in its true essence is said to be free from experience? There can therefore be experience only in the form of reflection or appearance in the Self. There cannot be real modification of the Self as a consequence. All modifications, all transformations belong to the Understanding, and *Puruṣa*'s fruition is only "transcendental shine," mere *Pratibimba*, reflection or appearance. It is in the reflection of the pleasures and pains of *Buddhi* in *Puruṣa*, the reflection of the determinations of the Understanding in the Original Light of all experience, that *Puruṣa* is fulfilled. This is *Puruṣa*'s bondage, this accomplishment of the accomplished Light of consciousness through the reflection into it of the empirical objects, which it itself causes to appear. It is therefore *aupādhika*, phenomenal bondage, not real

enrichment of *Puruṣa*. It is the cause of *Puruṣa*'s suffering however, this experience of *Puruṣa* which is mere appearance. Realisation of true freedom means the cancellation of this appearance by the realisation of *Puruṣa*'s detached essence through discriminative knowledge. It is because bondage is mere appearance that freedom is attainable. If bondage were natural (*svābhāvika*), freedom would not be possible except by self-destruction. If Bondage were caused (*naimittika*), then the only possible causes being space (*deśa*), time (*kāla*) and organisation (*avasthā*) the first two which are ubiquitous (*vibhu*) will not explain *bandha-viśeṣa*, the specific, individual character of the bondage or experience in every case, while the last being a characteristic of the physical body (*dehadharma*) will not account for *Puruṣa*'s bondage. Bondage is therefore of the nature of *bhrama* or illusion whose origin is to be sought in some adventitious factor or *upādhi*. In this case the *upādhi* is the attachment of *Puruṣa* to *Prakṛti*, i.e., *Puruṣa*'s unique relation to *Prakṛti* through its specific Understanding in each case, an Understanding which is an evolute of *Prakṛti*. It is this unique relation of every single *Puruṣa* to a specific understanding in *Prakṛti*, this *svasvabuddhibhāvāpannaprakṛtipuruṣasamyogaḥ* which is without beginning in time, that constitutes empirical life or *janma*. It entails bondage through the experience it reflects in *Puruṣa*. It thus leads to *aviveka*, non-discrimination or attachment of *Puruṣa* to *Prakṛti*. This *aviveka*, non-discrimination, can be removed only by removing its cause which is *Puruṣa*'s relation to *Prakṛti* through the understanding. This relation is beginningless, but not endless and can be terminated by *vivekakhyaṭi* or discriminative knowledge of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. With the realisation of *Puruṣa*'s essential detachment from *Prakṛti* the latter falls off from *Puruṣa*. The Understanding dissolves into the formless *Prakṛti* in this state and there is no experience as a consequence.

Freedom therefore is attained, according to Sāṅkhya, by the realisation of difference, *i.e.*, of the essential detachment of *Puruṣa* from *Prakṛti*. It is therefore an intuition of difference as distinguished from the intuition of identity. It is intuition of identity that leads to *Mokṣa* according to Śāṅkara, an intuition which involves the cancellation of difference as a moment. According to Sāṅkhya however what is required for *Mokṣa* is the accentuation of difference and not its cancellation, the accentuation, in other words, of the essential detachment of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. Through this differentiation *Puruṣa* recovers its singleness, *kaivalya* or detached essence. Hence *Mokṣa* is not the merging of the individual Self in *Brahman* but the realisation of true individuality in its detached essence. It is true freedom of the Self as brought about by the intuition of Self as distinct from not-Self, and not the freedom of self-annulment in *Brahman* through the intuition of the Absolute as the negation of all difference.

THE PŪRVAMIMĀMSĀ DOCTRINE OF MOKṢA

The Pūrvamīmāṃsā doctrine of *Mokṣa* furnishes a contrast to this negative conception of *Mokṣa* of Sāṅkhya and Nyāya. According to the Pūrvamīmāṃsā view the Self which is different in each body and ubiquitous, is both spiritual and non-spiritual (*cidacidrupo'pi pratisarīram bhinnah vibhūṣca*—"Advaitabrahmasiddhi"). In respect of its spiritual part it is the seer, the witnessing subject of experience and is the object of the recognition "I am he". In respect of its non-spiritual part, it is subject to transformation in the forms of cognitions, pleasures, pains, etc. This Self is revealed only in self-consciousness. (*Tatrāpi cidamśena draṣṭṛtvam so'ham iti pratyabhijñāviśayatvam ca. Acidamśena jñānasukhādirūpeṇa pariṇāmitvam. Saḥ (ātma) ahampratyayenaiva vedyah.*)

In the Pūrvamīmāṃsā view therefore, pleasures, pains, etc., are not transformations of the mind (*manas*) or internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) as in the Sāṅkhya and Vedānta view, but are transformations of the non-spiritual part of the Self. The Pūrvamīmāṃsā also differs from the Nyāya. According to the latter the Self is a spiritual substance without any non-spiritual part and pleasures and pains are specific qualities (*viśeṣaḡuṇas*) of the Self as a spiritual substance. According to Pūrvamīmāṃsā however the Self has both a spiritual and a non-spiritual part, and pleasures and other states are transformations (not qualities) of the non-spiritual part of the Self. The Self as experiencer (*bhoktā*) is thus subject to transformation, and this transformation of the Self through its non-spiritual part is beginningless (*anādi*) and eternal (*nitya*) in this sense. But the place of the fruition (*bhogasthāna*) such as heaven, etc., as well as the duration of the fruition (*bhogakāla*), are non-eternal (*anitya*). Neither creation nor reabsorption are accepted in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā system, experience being explained as the beginningless transformation of the nonspiritual part of the self leading to fruition. (Creation and reabsorption are accepted in the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta systems, but not accepted in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, the Jaina and the Bauddha systems according to which there is no *Iśvara* or Lord of the world as creator and destroyer.)

Hence as the world (*jagat*) is eternal, the bonds of experience are also without beginning in time (*anādi*). The Self's freedom (*Mokṣa*) is thus not a *nivṛtti* or cessation from activity, but the realisation of eternal happiness (*nityasukhābhivyakti*) with *pravṛtti* or active participation in the duties. Since in the freedom of absolute cessation from activity there is no activity of the *indriyas* or sensibilities, there is also no possibility of knowledge which presupposes sense-activity. Hence the self-realisation (*ātma-*

prāpti) which is ascribed to this state is only lapse into the unconsciousness of pure materiality. It thus cannot be an end worthy of being aimed at—this negation of the Self's spirituality into blind, unconscious materiality, and therefore the better course is the course of active participation in life which leads to eternal happiness and not mere cessation which leads to self-negation. (*Ātyantika karmocche-darūpamuktau indriyādirahitasya jñānāsambhavāt jadatvena tādṛśātmaprāptiḥ apuruṣārthātvāt pravṛttireva śreyasī na nivṛttiḥ.*)

The above is a statement of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā position in general with regard to the question of *Mokṣa*. It may be noted however that this general view is more in agreement with that of the Bhāṭṭa school of the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas than with the Prābhākara rigorism and ethical purism. The view of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is explained in the Śāstradīpikā by Pārthasārathimīśra. Pārthasārathimīśra explains Kumārila's *mokṣa* as *Prapañcasambandhaviḷaya*, i.e., as dissolution of the individual's connection with an empirical world. It thus differs from Śankara's *Mokṣa* which in its negative aspect involves not the mere cancellation of our connection with the world but the cancellation of the world itself, not *prapañcasambandhaviḷaya* merely, but *prapañcaviḷaya*. *Prapañca*, the world of experience, is illusory stuff according to Śankara, such stuff as our dreams are made of. With the intuition of the Absolute the principle of illusion being cancelled, the world which is its construction becomes cancelled of itself (*avidyānirmīto hi prapañcaḥ ; svapnaprapañcavat ; prabodhena brahmavidyayā avidyāyām vīlināyām svayameva vīḷyate.*) There is thus a pseudo-reality attaching to the world according to Śankara which thus necessarily dissolves in the light of the intuition of Absolute Reality. According to Kumārila however this world does not dissolve, but only the bonds that attach the individual to a world and thereby

cause experiences of pleasure, pain, etc. There are Idealists like Śankara who ascribe only a pseudo-reality to the world. There are other Idealists who go further maintaining consciousness to be the only reality. Both these are wrong according to Kumārila. The world is not unreal, nor a mere dream-reality which can be cancelled by knowledge. It is a real world that binds us and the *Mokṣa* which man can aspire to attain is only the freedom of detachment from the world. Some of the Vedāntists and Buddhists describe *Mokṣa* as the being of pure consciousness which is realised through the negation of difference—a negation effected by means of the destruction of the residual tendencies of the continuum of conscious states (*jñānasantānasya vāsanoechedāt vaicitryam hitvā kevalam samvīnmatreṇa avasthānam iti keict*). Some of the Mādhyamikas and Yogācāras go farther and describe *Mokṣa* as the cessation of the stream of consciousness like the extinguishing of the light of the lamp (*dīpasantānasya iva jñānasantānasya uparama*). The Śankara-Vedāntists again describe it as the realisation of the essence of *Brahman* as Consciousness and Bliss by the cancellation of the dreamworld we call empirical life. All these in Kumārila's view are open to the common objection that they suppose that the world is unreal and can be sublated like an illusion. But this is an untenable assumption. We cannot cancel the world ; we can only cancel the phenomenal bonds that bind us to a world. Our attachment to the world is threefold being due to our connection with (1) a body as the abode of experiences, (2) sensibilities as the instruments of experiences and (3) objects (sounds and the like) as the objects that are experienced. (*Tredhā hi prapañcaḥ puruṣam badhnāti—bhogāyatanam śarīram, bhoga-sāadhanāni indriyāṇi, bhogāḥ śabdādayaḥ viṣayāḥ*). Through this threefold connection the individual is a subject of experiences of pleasure, pain, etc. The freedom of the individual means the absolute destruction of this threefold

connection with the world (*Tadasya trividhasya bandhasya ātyantikah vilayah mokṣah*). Bondage is the individual's connection with the world in the threefold form—a connection which is the cause of empirical pleasure, pain, etc. Freedom is the cessation of this connection and thereby the cessation of pleasures, pain, etc. Whether the cessation of the latter implies the absolute negation of experience is a point in respect of which interpreters are not agreed. In fact there are two interpretations of Kumārila's position as regards this question.

(1) According to one view, in the state of *Mokṣa* merit (*dharma*) is completely exhausted and there is no fresh acquisition of merit and thus there is also no happiness as the effect of religious merit. Since such happiness has a beginning in time it must also perish in course of time. But there is another kind of happiness which is not an effect in time. This is the natural happiness of the Self (*svābhāvika ātmānanda*) which remains over-powered (*abhibhūta*) in the empirical life but will come to manifestation in the state of metempirical freedom. This natural happiness of the Self is experienced through the organ of the mind alone without the aid of the external senses. In the state of transcendental freedom the mind persists though all the external senses (*bāhyendriyāṇi*) cease. Consequently consciousness or intelligence also persists in this state.

(2) Others among the Bhāṭṭas hold that there is no experience of happiness because there is no organ of the mind in the *Mokṣa* state; neither is there any intelligence (*jñāna*), but there is only *śakti*, capacity for intelligence, which is natural to the Self. This is Pārthasārathimiśra's interpretation of Kumārila's *Mokṣa*.

N.B.—(1) According to Pārthasārathimiśra therefore the *Mokṣa* of Kumārila and of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are the same. But they differ in one essential point. According to Kumārila either course is optional, i.e., the pursuit

of happiness in heaven through the path of the conditional duties or the pursuit of *Mokṣa* through the path of unconditional duties. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas however pursuit of happiness in heaven is to be abjured as necessarily involving pain along with happiness.

N.B.—(2) The view of the Prābhākaras, it may be noted, does not correspond to the Bhāṭṭa conception of *Mokṣa* either as realisation of happiness or as freedom from experience. The Prābhākaras define *Mokṣa* as *Niyogāsiddhi* or realisation of the Moral Imperative as duty. For the Prābhākaras therefore *Mokṣa* is the accomplishment of duty for duty's sake, *i.e.*, the discharge of the unconditional duties as moral verities.

N.B.—(3) The Jainas do not accept the negative conception of *Mokṣa* as the cessation of experience. Malliṣeṇa's criticism of the Nyāya view in the "Syādvādamāñjarī" deserves notice in this connection. Malliṣeṇa observes that (a) if in the *Mokṣa* state the *Ātman* were to be reduced to a condition in which it is indistinguishable from material objects such as pebbles, etc., what is the use of striving after such a state? Better far is this phenomenal life (*samsārāvasthā*) in which happiness comes to us at least at intervals tainted by suffering though it be. A state of absolute indifference in which there is neither pleasure nor pain, a dead level of emotional uniformity, is the negation of spiritual life. (b) The pure happiness which results from self-restraint and from indifference to things that are temporal is not only worthy of a spiritual being but also capable of being realised even in this life as is proved by the testimony of experienced men. It is an exquisite happiness, this satisfaction (*nivṛttaja sukha*) which results from self-restraint, a pure pleasure as distinguished from ordinary pleasures which are mixed with suffering. It is known to those who practise self-restraint and it has to be accepted on the testimony of such spiritual experts

or judges. (c) Even those who refrain from drinking the honey from the knowledge that it is mixed with poison, do so only in the expectation of a better pleasure or satisfaction. (d) If pleasure be a good and pain be an evil in this life, they must be so in every other life. Contrary-wise the absence of pleasure is an evil and the absence of pain a good in all conditions. If the *Mokṣa* state were to consist in the absence of pleasure or happiness, it would be an evil and an undesirable consummation instead of being a desirable condition of the Self. (e) The contention that the prompting of pathological pleasure would be inconsistent with the Self's autonomy and freedom in the *Mokṣa* state is based on a misconception. While the attraction of earthly objects is heteronomous, there is a higher pleasure which is not inconsistent with the Self's autonomy. It is based on a pure desire (*spṛhāmātra*) which does not bind for the simple reason that it does not point beyond itself to anything that is external. It makes its appearance when one has ascended the penultimate stage and at last disappears in the ultimate perfection of the *Mokṣa* state. There is therefore at least one desire which is pure and not pathological—it is the desire which seeks the perfection of the *Mokṣa* state, and is not directed to anything external. Because it seeks nothing that is external, it cannot bind the individual, and it ceases of itself when the object, *viz.*, perfection of the individual in the *Mokṣa* state, has been attained or realised.

ŚANKARA'S VIEW OF MOKṢA

The conception of *Makṣa* as a positive satisfaction is also a special feature of the Śankara-Vedānta system. The Śankarites also distinguish between relative and empirical pleasures and a higher pleasure or satisfaction which is absolute. But the essential feature of the Śankarite view

is the conception of this higher satisfaction as something which eternally is and does not come into being through the instrumentality of Self-restraint and the like. The Śankarites contend that it is this eternally accomplished felicity that manifests itself in empirical pleasure, and the realisation of this felicity is thus the accomplishment of the accomplished, the lifting of the veil that conceals this realised essence from view. The position of the Śankarites is very clearly explained in the "Vedānta-paribhāṣā" in the last chapter. The author first defines an end, *pryojana* or *puruṣārtha*. According to his definition, whatever being known is desired as a function or qualification of the Self is an end (*yadavagataṃ sat svavṛttitayā iṣyate tat prayojanam*). Ends are of two kinds : (1) direct and proximate (*mukhya*), and (2) indirect or remote (*gauṇa*). The direct ends are either happiness or absence of suffering while indirect ends are those which are conducive to the direct ends (*Tatra sukhaduhkhābhāvau mukhye prayojane, tadanyatarasāadhanam gauṇam prayojanam*).

Happiness again is of two kinds : (1) empirical happiness which is limited and relative and which arises from connection with external objects, and (2) transcendental happiness which is the Unexcelled Bliss that constitutes the essence of the Absolute. Empirical happiness is a partial manifestation of the latter through the mould of a mental function or psychosis. Transcendental Happiness is the essence of *Brahman*, the realisation of which ends the miseries of life by cancelling the illusion which is their cause. *Mokṣa* is the realisation of this highest satisfaction and it implies in its negative aspect the cassation of all suffering. (*Sukham ca dvividham, sātīṣayam niratīṣayam ca. Tatra sātīṣayam sukham viśayānuṣaṅgajanitāntaḥkaraṇavṛttitārātamyakṛtānandaleśāvirbhāvaviśeṣaḥ. Niratīṣayam sukham ca Brahma eva. Ānandātmakabrahmāvāptiśca mokṣaḥ, śokanivṛttiśca.*)

With reference to the objection that since this Transcendental Satisfaction as being the essence of the Absolute is an eternally accomplished fact and therefore cannot be accomplished over again by human effort, the Vedāntapari-bhāṣā points out that this is not impossible. As a matter of fact fruition (*siddhi*) may be either of two kinds: (1) fruition consisting in the realisation of the unrealised (*aprāptaprāpti*) and the rejection of the unrejected (*aparihṛta-parihāra*), and (2) fruition consisting in the realisation of the realised (*prāptaprāpti*) and the rejection of the rejected (*parihṛtaparihāra*). In the latter case there is only either a re-realisation or a simple cancellation of an illusion. Consider for example the case of the person who in an excited state misses the necklace which is on his own neck. What is his feeling when he learns the truth? There is only a sense of re-realisation, of realisation of the realised, or possession of that which was never lost possession of. Consider again the case of the man who mistakes a garland of flowers for a snake. What is his feeling when he recovers from the illusion? There is only a sense of re-rejection, of rejection of the already rejected, of cancellation of the cancelled, of negation of what is not. So is it also in the case of *Mokṣa* which consists in the realisation of the Absolute. The Absolute is self-accomplished from all eternity, and the desire to realise the absolute is prompted only by a temporary illusion that it is unrealised. So too is it with regard to the cancellation of the empirical world. The world as mere illusory stuff is cancelled of itself, and the cancellation of it in *Mokṣa* is the cancellation of the cancelled, the rejection of what is rejected already. (*Tathā Brahmarūpasya mokṣasya asiddhatvabhramena tatsādhane pravṛttiḥ, evam parihṛtasyāpi anarthasya nivṛttiḥ mokṣaḥ.*)

According to Śāṅkara therefore *Mokṣa* requires not merely the Self's detachment from the world but the cancellation of the world itself. This distinguishes Śāṅkara's

Mokṣa from the Sāṅkhya, Nyāya as well as the Mimāṃsaka conception thereof. Further according to Śāṅkara the freedom of the *Mokṣa* state is not the realisation of the Self as a distinctive reality, but the realisation of it as nondistinct from, or identical with, the Absolute. Here also Śāṅkara differs from the Sāṅkhya and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. Lastly, the realisation of our identity with the Absolute implies, according to Śāṅkara, not merely the realisation of our essence as accomplished consciousness or intelligence as the Sāṅkhya supposes, but also the realisation of the *Ānanda* or Bliss which constitutes the essence of an accomplished reality. The *Mokṣa* state is thus one in which the individual becomes merged in the Absolute essence as accomplished Consciousness and Bliss—a state therefore of essential felicity as distinguished from the mere absence of suffering and misery as the Sāṅkhya supposes.

RĀMANUJA'S VIEW OF MOKṢA

The Rāmanujists agree with Śāṅkara in this positive conception of *Mokṣa* as a state of felicity and blessedness as distinguished from a state of indifference. But they differ from him in two respects. In the first place, they reject Śāṅkara's conception of *Mokṣa* as self-annihilation in the Absolute in the sense of merging of the individuality of the individual. Secondly they differ from Śāṅkara as regards his conception of the Self as Impersonal Consciousness and Bliss holding as against him that the Self is not intelligence itself but only an intelligent substance, a substance with intelligence as one of its many auspicious qualities. Intelligence is however not an adventitious quality of the Self which it may be with or without as the Nyāya thinks, but an essential quality (though a quality only) and therefore inseparable from the Self and necessary

attribute of it. The state of *Mokṣa* is the realisation of the Absolute in the sense of a restoration of our harmony with it as factors occupying subordinate places in its life along with other factors of co-ordinate rank and subordinate to the whole. It is therefore not a state of self-annulment in the Absolute but only of self-surrender and renunciation with a view to the realisation of our true individuality as factors in the Absolute life.

The Self, Rāmānuja points out, is the thinking subject, the "I" that thinks, and not pure consciousness or thought as Śankara holds. Śankara thinks the Self to be nothing but pure, impersonal essence of Consciousness, the thinking subject (*jñātā*) and the object thought (*jñeya*) being illusory superimpositions on Pure, Impersonal Consciousness which is the Self's true nature as identical with Brahman. Rāmānuja contends that this is an inversion of the true facts. The thinking subject is not an attribute of the Self as pure consciousness, an illusory superimposition on its essence. It is the "I" or thinking subject that constitutes the Self and consciousness is only an attribute of it. We cannot suppose the Self to exist in its own nature even if the "I" or "thinking subject" were not. It is therefore a mistake to suppose that the Self ceases to be the thinking subject and disappears in the *Mokṣa* state. If that were so the realisation of the ideal life would mean the extinction of the Self itself. (*Yattu mokṣadaśāyāmahamartho nānuvartate iti tadapeśalam. Tathā satyātmanāśa evāpavargāḥ prakārantareṇa pratijñātaḥ syāt. Na cāhamartha dharmamātram, yena tadvigame' pyavidyānirvṛttāviva svarūpamavatiṣṭhate; pratyuta svarūpamevāhamartha ātmanah, jñānastu tasya dharmah—* "Śribhāṣya.")

Rāmānuja thus distinguishes between the essence (*svarūpa*) of the individual Self and its intelligence (*jñāna*) which he regards as its attribute (*dharmā*). Both are eternal (*nitya*), immaterial (*ajada*) and of the nature of felicity or

bliss (*ānandarūpa*). But while the essence (*svarūpa*) is subject (*dharmā*), monadic (*anu*) and self-manifesting (*svasmai svayamprakāśaḥ*) in the sense of being manifest to itself by itself, intelligence (*jñāna*) is an attribute (*dharma*), which is ubiquitous (*vibhu*) though subject to limiting conditions, capable of expansion and contraction (*samkocavikāśayogya*), is non-manifest to itself (*svasmai svāprakāśaḥ*), and is the manifesting agency of things other than itself (*svavyatiriktaprakāśakaḥ*).

The Self therefore is the "I" known as the subject of knowledge and it is this Self which reveals itself in the state of *Mokṣa*. Since it is manifest to itself by itself it is essentially an "I" or a thinking subject, and it is as this self-revealing "I" or subject that it manifests itself in the *Mokṣa* state. It is an unwarranted dogmatism to suppose that because the Self reveals itself as an "I" therefore it must be implicated in error or ignorance. The Self in its true essence is an "I" and therefore there can be neither error nor ignorance in the apprehension of it in its essential nature as an "I." (*Ato'hamarthasyaiva jñātṛtaya sidhyataḥ pratyagātmavam. Śa ca pratyagātmā muktāvapi ahamityeva prakāśate, sa sarvataḥ "aham" ityeva prakāśate. Na ca "aham" iti prakāśamānatvena tasyājñatvasamsāritvādiprasangaḥ..... Ajñānam nāma svarūpājñānamanyathājñānam viparītajñānam va. Aham ityevātmanaḥ svarūpam iti svarupājñānarūpo' hampratyayo nājñatvam āpādayati kutaḥ samsāritvam.—"Śribhāṣya."*)

Hence for Rāmānuja there is no such thing as the merging of individuality in *Brahman* in the *Mokṣa* state. Such merging is not merely the negation of individuality but also the negation of the Self itself. *Mokṣa* is merely the restoration of our harmony with the Absolute, the abnegation of individual self-will in order that His Will may prevail and realise itself through our lives. We are not isolated beings but factors in the life of the Absolute having distinctive reality of our own, and our highest destiny is to

realise ourselves by realising God's purpose in our lives. This is the essence of true freedom as distinguished from the false freedom of the assertion of individual self-will which leads only to discord and misery. The highest end is the life in harmony with the Absolute, the life of self-surrender to the purpose of the Lord in creation. It is a life of essential felicity and blessedness, a life in which the individual persists as a self-revealing thinking subject within the life of the Absolute and realises the *Ānanda* or satisfaction which is natural to consciousness as revealing the true nature of things. Consciousness is by its very nature of the essence of felicity or *Ānanda*. Its function is to reveal objects to the thinking subject, and in so far as such enlightenment of the Self through consciousness or knowledge is favourable (*anukūla*) to the Self, there is *ananda* or bliss. The *ānukūlya* or favourableness is natural (*svābhāvika*) since all objects have their being in the Lord. The *prātikūlya* or unfavourableness is adventitious (*aupādhika*) being due to the illusory identification of the Self and the body (*dehātmaabhrama*). Consider, for example, the instruments of destruction such as weapons, poisons, etc. What does their unfavourableness consist in? They are unfavourable only to the body, and yet since the Self is illusorily identified with the body, they are also supposed to be unfavourable to the Self. In the *Mokṣa* state there is no such illusion and there is only the felicity or bliss that is natural to enlightenment by thought. If favourableness were not natural to objects, the same things would not present themselves as favourable after having presented themselves as unfavourable in another place and time. (*Ānandarūpatvam nāma jñānasya prakāśāvasthāyāmanukūlatvam viśaṣaṣṭādi prakāśanāvasare pratikūlatvasya heturdehātmaabhramādayaḥ. Īśvarātmakatvāt sarveṣāṃ padārthānām ānukūlyameva svabhāvaḥ, prātikūlyam aupādhikam*—Lokācāryya's "Tattva-traya.")

According to the Rāmānujists therefore the Self is not pure essence of consciousness but a thinking subject with consciousness as its essential attribute. Secondly, it is not absolutely identical with the Absolute life having a distinctive reality. Thirdly, *Mokṣa* is neither the realisation of the Self as an isolated being nor the merging of the Self in Brahman but the realisation of its true essence as a distinct but subordinate factor in the Absolute life. It is thus a restoration of harmony by the renunciation of self-will in favour of the will of the Lord. Lastly, this *Mokṣa* is essentially a state of felicity which follows as a consequence of the enlightenment of consciousness without any taint of error or illusion. The nature of such enlightenment is felicity since it reveals objects in their true nature as having their being in God and therefore as favourable to or conducive to the good of the Self.

N.B.—There are a few other schools of the Vedānta such as the Śuddhādvaita school of Vallabhācāryya and the dualistic school of the Mādhvas whose views of *Mokṣa* may also be considered here. According to Vallabha there are two kinds of *Mokṣa* suited to two kinds of temperament. Thus for the philosopher who chooses the path of knowledge *Mokṣa* is self-dissolution in Brahma, but for the pious devotee who prefers the path of faith and devotion *Mokṣa* is a tasting of the Lord's sportive activity in creation (*yetu jñānaikasanniṣṭhāḥ teṣāṃ ca laya eva hi, bhaktānāṃ bhavati līlāsvādaḥ atidurlabhaḥ*.—Śuddhādvaitamārtanda" of Giridharamahārāja). According to the Mādhvas however, the essence of *Mokṣa* is neither self-dissolution nor mere enjoyment of the Lord's sport, but becoming united with the Lord through the acquisition (by virtuous life) of a non-natural body whose essence is pure, unmixed bliss. Similarly another Vedānta commentator, Appayadīkṣita, describes *Mokṣa* as becoming one with the Lord and becoming possessed of the perfections of the Lord (*aiśvarya-guṇas*).

Thus the Lord is the Governor of the world and has the perfections not only of omniscience and omnipotence but also of effective desires (*satyakāmatva*) and of effective resolutions (*satyasamkalpatva*). For the individual to be realised means acquiring these perfections of effective will, effective desires, etc., and thereby becoming free from limitations. The released individual does not become reduced to pure consciousness (*śuddhacaitanya*) as Śaṅkara holds, but only becomes infinite and perfect. This *Īśvarabhāvāpatti*, this becoming God or becoming one with Him by inducing His infinitude and perfection in oneself, is, according to Appayadīkṣita, the release taught in the Śāstras (cf. "Siddhāntaleśa"). Yāmūnācāryya's brief summary in the "Siddhitraya" of the various conceptions of *Mokṣa* as the realisation of the Absolute (*Brahmaprāpti*) may also be noticed in this connection. Says Yāmūnācāryya: *Tathā paramapuruṣārthabhūte brahmaprāptilakṣaṇamokṣe' pi svarūpocchittilakṣaṇaḥ, avidyāstamayalakṣaṇaḥ, niḥśeṣavaiśeṣikātmagunocchedalakṣaṇaḥ kaivalyarūpaḥ, tadbhāvasādharmyalakṣaṇaḥ, tadguṇasamkrāntilakṣaṇaḥ, tacchāyāpattilakṣaṇaḥ, sāmsiddhikānandādisvarūpāvirbhāvalakṣaṇaḥ, tadguṇasambhavanīraniratisāyasukhasamunmeṣopanitātītyantikatatinkaratvalakṣaṇaḥ iti tathā tathā vivadyante*. Hence *Mokṣa* as the absolute life may be conceived, according to Yāmūnācāryya, as

(1) *Svarūpocchitti*, self-annihilation, *nirvāṇa* or extinction of the individual.

(2) *Avidyāstamaya*, dispelling of *avidyā*, cancellation of nescience.

(3) *Niḥśeṣavaiśeṣikātmagunocchedalakṣaṇaḥ kaivalyarūpaḥ*, the freedom of the soul by the destruction (*uccheda*) of all its *vaiśeṣika* or specific qualities.

(4) *Tadbhāvasādharmya*—approximation to or imitation of *Brahman* by the realisation of a state marked by resemblance to his being or essence.

(5) *Tadguṇasamkrāntilakṣaṇaḥ*—assumption by induction of the qualities of the Lord, the inducing of His qualities in the soul.

(6) *Tacchāyāpattilakṣaṇaḥ*, attainment of His glory, splendour and light, the reflection of His grandeur, lordliness or majesty in oneself.

(7) *Sāmsiddhikānandādisvarūpāvirbhāvalakṣaṇaḥ*, the realisation of the self's true essence as consisting in pure, natural bliss.

(8) *Tadguṇasambhava, etc., lakṣaṇaḥ*, the state of being his sole and devoted servant as brought on by the emergence of unexcelled bliss due to the experience of His excellences or perfections.

Hence according to Yāmunācāryya, *Mokṣa*, even as the realisation of the Absolute, may be conceived either negatively as self-extinction or as a positive realisation of absolute essence. The latter again may be conceived as a merging of Self in the absolute or as being the absolute oneself. This latter again may be conceived either as mere freedom of the Self from empirical life, or as the realisation of its essence as bliss, or as imitation of the Absolute in the Self, or as inducing of certain absolute perfections in oneself, or as reflecting the majesty and glory of the Absolute in the Self, or lastly as realising the Absolute by surrendering oneself to it and becoming its sole and devoted servant.

The above is a fairly complete presentation of the Hindu doctrine of the Ideal Life as conceived in the different systems of Hindu philosophy. It will be noted that a common feature of these doctrines is the conception of the Ideal as a negation or, at least, as a transcendence of the empirical life proper. It is thus a super-moral spiritual ideal rather than a strictly moral ideal which the Doctrine of *Mokṣa* sets forth. Some systems, *e.g.*, the Rāmārujist and the Vaiṣṇavite, ascribe a religious signi-

ficance to this ideal by interpreting it as a life of devotion and worship of the Lord. But the general tendency is to regard *Mokṣa* merely as the realisation of the absolute life of freedom from the bonds of experience and *samsāra*. The question as to how this ideal is to be realised by the empirical individual is also discussed in all orthodox Hindu systems in their theories of *mokṣasādhana*, i.e., theories of the practical spiritual discipline or training which is held to be necessary in order to realise the transcendental life of freedom from all limitations.

The Doctrine of Mokṣasādhana

As we have said above, the question of the *Sādhana* or right means of realising Spiritual freedom is also very fully treated in Hindu philosophy as being of direct practical import as distinguished from the purely theoretical question of the nature and essence of this freedom. The controversy here centres round the question of the relative importance and efficacy of works, knowledge and faith as means to the realisation of the absolute life. The main issue in this controversy is as to whether one of these courses can be held sufficient for the spiritual life or whether an organisation of different courses is necessary. This is really the question of the organisation of the personal life, i.e., as to whether one of these courses can be held sufficient for the spiritual life or whether an organisation of different courses is necessary, in other words, as to whether one ideal is to be the supreme or absolute ideal in terms of which all other ideals are to be valid, or whether there is to be a balancing and equilibration and harmonious cultivation of the different ideals. The latter is known in Hindu Philosophy as *samuccayavāda* or doctrine of co-ordination as distinguished from the doctrine of a single and exclusive ideal.

It will be observed that the possible logical alternatives are :—

- (A) Only one course.
- (B) One with the other two as preparatory and ceasing after preparation.
- (C) One with the other two as auxiliaries
- (D) Two and two (*samuccaya*), both being co-ordinate.
- (E) All the three as co-ordinate.

Of these (A) comprises the three possible alternatives of

(1) mere works (*Karma*), (2) mere knowledge (*Jñāna*), and (3) mere faith (*Bhakti*). Similarly under (B) and (C) we have (1) works as primary with knowledge and faith as (i) preparatory or (ii) auxiliary (2) knowledge as primary with the other two as subsidiary and (3) faith as primary with the other two as subsidiary. Lastly, under (D) and (E) we have the various forms of the doctrine of co-ordination (*samuccaya*), i.e., the co-ordination (1) of works and knowledge, (2) of works and faith, (3) of knowledge and faith, and (4) of works and knowledge and faith, all the three.

It is however recognised that mere works without knowledge or faith are of no use. Therefore the alternatives of (1) mere works and (2) of works with knowledge and faith as preparatory are not considered.

The Sāṅkhya insists on the course of mere knowledge as the proper means of *Mokṣa*. It is *vivekakhyaṭi* or the discriminative knowledge of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* that leads to freedom of the Self by destroying *Puruṣa's* attachment to *Prakṛti*. Works are of no avail, neither secular works nor scriptural works. Both are perishable and both involve the impurities of destruction of life and the like (*dṛṣṭavat ānuśravika sah hi kṣayātiśayayuktaḥ*—*Vijñānabhikṣu*). They therefore cannot lead to any lasting fruition, nor to any satisfaction which is pure and unmixed. This holds good

also of the conditional (*kāmya*) as well as the unconditional (*akāmya*) scriptural duties (*kāmye akāmye'pi sādhyatva aviśeṣāt*—Vijñānabhikṣu). The Patañjala Sāṅkhya however recognises some other forms of works as necessary for purification and for destruction of the subtle tendencies and dispositions which disturb the practice of meditation. These are the works of self-restraint (*yamas*) and of self-regulation (*niyamas*). Certain physical aids such as postures (*āsanas*) are also useful for meditation. Besides these, meditation on the Lord's glory and perfection is also an aid to dispassion (*vairāgya*) which is necessary for the proper discrimination of *Puruṣa's* essence. These are the pure works which lead to the knowledge through which freedom is realised. According to Patañjali therefore works are not to be abjured altogether, but the *Sāttvika* works as conducive to true knowledge must be performed duly till knowledge is attained.

Śankara also recognises a certain efficacy in works for *Cittaśuddhi* or purification of mind, but works are not absolutely necessary in every case. Thus men may be born pure of mind or may attain purification independently of works. In such cases works are not necessary, and knowledge of *Brahman* leads to *Mokṣa* without the aid of works. In all cases works cease with the attainment of the knowledge of *Brahman*, though in some cases works may prepare for such knowledge through purification of the mind.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Rāmānujists however emphasise the necessity of works as well as knowledge. The unconditional scriptural works are to be duly accomplished even when knowledge has arisen. They supplement knowledge by training the individual to disinterestedness and dispassion. Such dispassion with the knowledge of the vanity of things temporal quenches the will-to-live according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and thereby

leads to freedom of Self. According to Rāmānujists dispassion is an aid to divine knowledge which by attaining its consummation in *Bhakti* or Faith and *Prema* or Love secures freedom by subduing individual self-will and reconciling the individual to the will of the Lord.

The controversy thus centres round the question of the place and relative significance of works, faith and knowledge in the spiritual life. The issues are between Intellectualism and Voluntarism, Activism and Quietism, Rationalism and Pietism. The familiar controversies amongst the medieval mystics, the scholastic disputes between the Thomists and the Scotists will furnish apt analogies to the Hindu discussions of these questions. But the Hindus, it will be noted, consider the question more from the philosophical and transcendental than from the purely religious standpoint.

The efficacy of works in conducing to freedom is variously explained by the Hindus in this connection. In the "Bhāmati-ṭikā" on Śankara-bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtras four different viws of works as being conducive to knowledge are considered. Thus (1) according to one view, works have only a negative efficacy in conducing to *Mokṣa*. The unconditional scriptural works remove the taint of sin which is an obstacle to *Mokṣa*. By removing this taint it becomes conducive to *Mokṣa* through knowledge and meditation. (*Atra ca yajñādīnām śreyahparipanthikalmaṣanivarhaṇadvāreṇopayoga iti kecit*). (2) According to others, the efficacy of works is not merely negative but also positive. Thus works become conducive to *Mokṣa* through an intervening merit (*samskāra*, *punya*) which it generates in the agent. Thus moralised and righteously disposed through the accomplishment of the works enjoined, the individual turns to unceasing and earnest meditation on the nature of reality. Such meditation at last destroys his nescience (*avidyā*) and the tendencies in the

self generated by nescience. Thereby the Self reveals its purity, its freedom and its blessedness. (*Puruṣasamskāradvāreṇaiti anye. Yajñādisamskr̥to hi puruṣa ādaranairantaryadīrghakā-lairāsevamāno brahmabhāvanāmādyavidyāvāsanām samūlakāsam kaṣati... Tato'sya pratyagātmā suprasannaḥ kevalo viśadī bhavati.*)

(3) According to a third view, the efficacy of works consists in the cancellation of the debts or obligations (*ṛṇa*) that stand in the way of *Mokṣa*. (*Apāre tu ṛṇatrayāpākaranena brahmajñānopayogam karmaṇāmāhuḥ.*) Thus an individual is under a threefold obligation in the empirical life. He has obligations to the Gods, to the forefathers and to the religious teachers or sages. All these obligations are sources of bondage and the effect of works is to ensure freedom through the fulfilment of these obligations. (4) According to a fourth view, it is not merely the unconditional works or duties that are efficacious in conducing to *Mokṣa* in the ways explained above but also the prudential works or duties enjoined for the satisfaction of empirical wants. It is true they lead to no other than empirical ends. But in the case of those who aim at *Mokṣa* they also are useful as being conducive to the meditation which leads at last to *Mokṣa*. (*Anye tu—"tametaṁ vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena" ityādiśrutibhyastatphalāya coditānāmaṇi karmaṇām saṁyogaṇṇīkṛtva brahmabhāvanām pratyāṅgabhāvamācakṣate.*)

While therefore according to some only unconditional works are conducive to *Mokṣa*, according to others the efficacy of unconditional as well as conditional works consists in conducing to the meditation which leads to *Mokṣa* either (1) by removing the accumulated sins, or (2) by generating a merit which removes the taint of sin by leading to earnest meditation, or (3) by cancelling the bonds of the obligations. It will be observed that according to this view the lines of works and knowledge do not run concurrently as in the doctrine of *samuccaya* or co-ordina-

tion. In the *samuccaya* doctrine works (*karma*) and knowledge (*jñāna*) are equally contributory to, *i.e.*, co-ordinate causes of, *Mokṣa*. Here works are made subordinate to knowledge as conducive to the latter. Hence in this view works are conducive to knowledge and knowledge is conducive to *Mokṣa* while in the *samuccaya* doctrine works and knowledge are jointly conducive to *Mokṣa*. This view also differs from Śankara's. For Śankara works are not necessary in every case. In some cases they may be conducive to knowledge by producing purification of the spirit, but the latter, howsoever attained, is the cause of *Mokṣa* through the knowledge of reality. Hence according to Śankara though works may be serviceable in some cases, they are not always required, while according to this view works are required in every case as being conducive to knowledge. In Śankara's view, as well as in this, works must cease with the appearance of knowledge, but while in this view works are indispensable for knowledge, for Śankara they are not always necessary. The view of "Vedāntaparibhāṣa" may be noticed in this connection. According to it works are mediately required for purification or removal of the taint of sin in the self. Without this self-purification there can be no knowledge of reality which leads to *Mokṣa*. *Mokṣa* has thus for its immediate cause the knowledge of reality, but in so far as this knowledge is mediated through works which cause the removal of sin, *i.e.*, of the sin which is an obstacle to knowledge, works are also indirect or remote causes of the realisation of *Mokṣa* (*Tacca jñānam pāpakṣayāt bhavati, sa ca karmānuṣṭhānāt, iti paramparayā karmanāmapi viniyogaḥ*). Hence according to "Vedāntaparibhāṣa" works are necessary and not optional as in Śankara's view, though indirectly or remotely necessary as causing the removal of the obstacle of sin. Hence this view is the same as No. 1 of the four alternatives of "Bhāmati-ṭikā".

We have already seen that the *samuccnya* doctrine is essentially different from the doctrine enunciated in these alternatives. According to the *samuccaya* view, the unconditional duties are obligatory for the purpose of self-purification and cultivation of dispassion or ethical disinterestedness. Hence they are to be performed duly in all stages till *Mokṣa* is attained, *i.e.*, their performance should continue even when knowledge has resulted from self-purification. This, for example, is the view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Rāmānujists, etc.

Yāmunācāryya in the "Siddhitraya" considers the various alternative courses recommended for *Mokṣa* in the different systems. He considers five different alternatives in this connection. (*Tatsādhanato'pi karmayogalabhyaḥ, jñānayogalabhyaḥ, anyatarānugṛhītānyataralabhyaḥ ubhayalabhyaḥ, ubhayaparikarmītasvāntasyaikāntikātyantikabhaktiyogalabhyaḥ iti*). Hence according to Yāmunācāryya *Mokṣa* may be regarded as attainable through (1) *Karmayoga* or discipline of the duties, (2) *Jñānayoga* or the practice of meditation, (3) *Anyatara*. etc. *i.e.*, either of the two alternatives of (a) works as principal with knowledge as auxiliary (*sahakārin*) and (b) knowledge as principal with works as auxiliary, (4) the co-ordination of works and knowledge, (5) *Bhakti* or faith with works and knowledge as preparatory disciplines. A special feature of Yāmunācāryya's enumeration of the various courses is the recognition of the doctrine of the *Anyatara* or optional courses. According to this view, the choice is optional between the two courses, *i.e.*, the individual is free to choose one or the other according to his own personal aptitude and inclination. According to Pārthasārathimīśra's interpretation of Kumārila's view the individual is free to choose not merely the courses but also his *summum bonum* which is either *Svarga*, happiness in heaven, or *Mokṣa*, freedom from experience. The means is *jñānasahakṛtakarma* for *Svarga*, *i.e.*, works as principal with

knowledge as auxiliary in respect of *Svarga*, and *Karmasahakṛtajñāna* for *Mokṣa*, i.e., knowledge as principal with works as subsidiary, in the case of *Mokṣa* or the realisation of freedom. Thus both knowledge and works are required in either case, but for happiness in heaven works are primarily necessary and self-knowledge is only an aid to the proper accomplishment of the works. In the pursuit of *Mokṣa*, however, self-knowledge is primarily necessary and the discharge of the unconditional duties is only an auxiliary aid to self-knowledge. Such self-knowledge with the aid of ethical disinterestedness as produced by the discharge of the unconditional duties leads to freedom in the sense of *Prapañcasambandhaviḥaya* or severance of connection with the world.

The objection that *Mokṣa* is by its very nature an unattainable ideal is also discussed by the Hindus in connection with the question of the practical realisation of the ideal. The “*Nyāyamañjarī*” considers this objection in detail and concludes that such criticism is based on a shallow and superficial view of the circumstances that constitute our bondage in empirical life.

Critics indeed often express the view that *Mokṣa* is nothing but a pragmatic fiction. In their view it is a subjective construction which may be good merely for consolation in moments of sorrow and bereavement (*śoka*) and of anxiety and trouble (*udvega*), but it is useless and even harmful in the enterprise of life (*udyamasamaya*). There cannot be liberation according to them in the sense of freedom from the cycle of life or *saṃsāra* and therefore there can also be no *puruṣārtha*, i.e., spiritual end or good in the sense of freedom from experience. Those who allow themselves to be deluded by thoughts of *Mokṣa* forget that life has certain necessary accompaniments which cannot be got rid of.

Thus life involves the accompaniments (*anubandha*) of

(1) certain specific obligations (*ṛṇa*) to be fulfilled, (2) the series of unavoidable miseries (*kleśa*), and (3) the cycle of works and activities (*pravṛtti*). (1) The obligations include obligations to the sages (*ṛṣiṇa*), obligations to the parental stock (*pitṛṇa*) and obligations to the deities (*devaṇa*). These obligations have all to be discharged. Thus obligations to the sages or spiritual experts have to be fulfilled by the practice of sexual abstinence and study (*brahmacharya*). Similarly obligations to the parental stock have to be fulfilled by the begetting of children and thereby securing the preservation and continuation of the stock. Lastly the obligations to the deities have to be fulfilled by the proper accomplishment of the sacrificial ceremonies as laid down in the *Śāstras*. The discharge of these obligations will thus absorb all the time at one's disposal and hence there can be no leisure (*avasara*) for *Mokṣa*. As is pointed out in *jarāmaryaśrutih*, our obligations (*ṛṇa*) continue all our life and cease only with death (*mṛtyu*) and illness and physical incapacity (*jarā*). (2) Secondly, there are the miseries (*kleśānubandha*) as necessary accompaniments of life. They are the natural and necessary consequences of the *doṣas* or faults, i.e., the faults of attraction (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and delusion (*moha*). These faults lie at the very root of empirical life and the chain of miseries is only a necessary effect of the chain of the faults that underlie experience and birth into *samsāra*. Since birth into *samsāra* involves these tendencies or dispositions in the Self and since there are objects (*viśayas*) to stimulate them, there cannot be destruction of these *doṣas*, faults or evil propensities. As a matter of fact there is lapse even after they have been conquered and subdued : even sages and saints have been known to succumb when their dormant propensities have been stimulated by their proper external objects. There is therefore no real freedom from the inherent propensities and therefore also none from the

miseries which are their natural consequences. (3) Thirdly there is the cycle of *Karma*, merit-demerit (*dharmādharma*), birth, etc. Thus birth (*janma*) leads to *karma* or works of righteousness and unrighteousness, works generate merit and demerit, and merit and demerit result in a fresh birth with works, merit and demerit, etc. Thus the cycle goes on repeating itself without cessation, so that the chain of activity (*pravṛtti*) is a necessary accompaniment of life because of the effects of merit and demerit in all *karma*. Our deeds must necessarily mature into their proper effects. There can be no doing without reaping the consequences thereof. There is *Karmopasama*, cessation or suspension of *karma*, only by its exhaustion through fruition (*phalopabhoga*). There is a natural causal relation (*Kāryakāraṇabhāva*) between works (*karma*) and their proper effects (*phala*) and this holds good independently of the knowledge (*jñāna*) or the ignorance (*ajñāna*) of the agent or doer. *Karma* thus cannot be exhausted by knowledge and the cycle of deeds, rebirths and fresh accumulation of deeds, etc., is thus an unending cycle that goes on revolving according to a fixed moral law in an unchangeable moral order. There is therefore no freedom from *Karma* just as there is no freedom from the miseries and the obligations.

It is customary indeed to distinguish four kinds of *Puruṣārthas* or ends, viz., *Dharma* or righteousness. *Artha* or material wealth, *Kāma* of happiness and the absence of unhappiness and *Mokṣa* or freedom from life and its experiences. It is also customary to distinguish between righteousness and material wealth as mediate or indirect ends (i.e., as means to ends) and happiness and *mokṣa* as direct and immediate ends. Lastly, it is also usual to distinguish *mokṣa* as *summum bonum*, *Paramapuruṣārtha*, or end *par excellence*, from righteousness, wealth and happiness as relative ends. But all these distinction are open to the objection that they make of *mokṣa* a possible end or good

which is capable of being actually realised. As a matter of fact there can be no such ideal as *mokṣa* because it can never be realised, and the right course is to seek the other three ends, *viz.*, righteousness, material prosperity and happiness (*i.e.*, one or other or all three) without bothering about any fictitious freedom from life and experience. As there is no such freedom, the individual should give up all thoughts of *mokṣa* and should think only of the proper ordering of life with a view to realising happiness therefrom ; (*Mokṣacarccām parityajya sve gṛhe sukhām āsyatām*).

This view of the opponent to the *Mokṣa* doctrine is thus based on the impracticability of *Mokṣa* ideal, *i.e.*, the impossibility of its practical realisation. It is assumed that the three accompaniments of life, *viz.*, the obligations, the miseries and the deeds, cannot be got rid of. As against this contention the "Nyāyamañjarī" points out that there is no sufficient basis for such an assumption. (i) Obligation to the sages (*ṛṣiṇa*), the forefathers (*pitṛiṇa*), etc., is only a metaphor. There is no contract and therefore no obligation. (ii) Man is born free : the boy (*bālaka*) has no *ṛṇa* or obligation (*cf.* *Rousseau*). (iii) Old age, death, etc., give us release from these obligations, debts or *ṛṇas*. This is the real purport of "*jarāmarya*" texts. It follows therefore that theso-called obligations are only aids to self-discipline. They have reference to the different stages (*āśrama*) of life and are laid down in view of the special aptitudes and capacities of the different stages. Ordinarily there is a certain order in the unfolding of these aptitudes and capacities in the successive stages of the growth of the individual. The order of the disciplinary codes of the duties is devised in view of the ordinary, general run of men. But there are also exceptions to this rule, men of exceptional, supernormal spiritual capacity, and in such cases the order of the moral codes is not binding. Thus the order is binding on *aparipakkakaṣāya*, *i.e.*, on

him whose *Kaṣāya* or taint of *samsāra* has not been purified, but for *Paripakkakaṣāya* or the person, who is pure from birth, there is no *apekṣā*, necessity, of *āśramakarma*, i.e., of the order of the different codes as suited to the different stages. The order is not binding in such cases: because of an inherent freedom from taint in such cases there is no special need of additional purification in successive stages. Hence for these there may be a direct transition from *brahmacāryya* or stage of learning to *pāribrajyā* or stage of renunciation and universal life, i.e., an intervening discipline of *gṛhastha* or family life is not necessary. But this holds good only in the exceptional cases and not in cases of ordinary men of average capacity in all which the order of the successive stages is compulsory. Hence there are two kinds of *brahmacārī* or learners, i.e., those who require no family life after the stage of learning and are learners as well as renunciants or mendicants all their life, and those who require family life after the stage of learning and sexual abstinence. In the case of the latter, according to some, a subsequent recluse life (*vānaprastha*) is not necessary provided that there is due discharge of the duties without desire for the consequences (*karmaphalābhisandhirahita-kartavyānuṣṭhāna*) besides practice of self-knowledge (*ātmajñāna*), i.e., with the disinterested accomplishment of the duties combined with self-knowledge there may be *Mokṣa* even in the stage of family life without a succeeding life of retirement and hermitage being necessary. According to others however, after family life (*gṛhasthāśrama*) he may take either to hermitage (*vānaprastha*) or mendicancy (*bhikṣācāryya*) according as he is qualified by the family training (*gṛhāt vanāt vā pravrajat*). Hence in this view the necessity of the order of the different codes is relative to the agent's spiritual growth, the order being binding on the immature and unnecessary for the mature. Some however think that the order is compulsory in all cases without

exception. Whatever view may be entertained about the obligatoriness of the different codes, it is clear that their main object is the spiritual discipline of the individual with a view to his ultimate freedom. It is therefore a mistake to suppose that these obligations are a perpetual source of bondage and leave no spare time (*avasara*) for *Mokṣa*. (2) The assumption that there is no release from the chain of miseries (*kleśānubandha*) is equally untenable. Release from this chain is possible by *Pratīpakṣabhāvanā*, i.e., by *Pratīpakṣabhāvanā* or contrary meditation and *abhyāsa* or repetition. Thus contrary meditation is meditation on the vanity of the pursuits of life, i.e., realisation of their true nature as incapable of yielding lasting and real satisfaction. It is contrary meditation as being contradictorily opposed to the usual erroneous idea of these as capable of yielding real fruition. It leads to *viṣayadoṣadarśana* or realisation of the vanity of earthly things and constitutes the negative aspect of the meditation on the ultimate transcendental nature of things. Supplemented by *abhyāsa*, practice, of dispassion (*vairāgya*), it leads to *doṣānubandhani-
vṛtti*, i.e., cessation or eradication of the evil propensities that lead to misery. It is a mistake to suppose that our propensities are indestructible. They cannot be indestructible as they are (1) not accidental or uncaused (*ākasmika*), (2) not eternal (*nitya*), (3) not due to unknown and unknowable causes (*ajñātatahetuka*), (4) not irrepressible or ungovernable (*aśakyapratīkriyā*), (5) nor of such nature as to be unknown in respect of the means of repression thereof (*ajñātaśamanopāya*). As a matter of fact, the propensities, viz., attraction and aversion, have their ultimate root in *moha*, Delusion, arising from *mithyājñāna* or erroneous cognition. Error being the root of these propensities (*doṣas*), right knowledge (*samyakjñāna*) is the counteracting agency (*pratīpakṣa*). Thus right knowledge strikes at the root of the propensities by dispelling

mithyājñāna or the illusory idea of the worth or value of temporal things. With this illusion dispelled, there is evaluation of things at their true worth, *i.e.*, there is full realisation of their utter worthlessness as means to fruition. This is *viṣayadoṣadarśana* or perception of the vanity of external objects, and with this disillusionment as regards the true nature of objects there is also a cessation of attraction as well as aversion. The "Nyāyamañjarī" notes that such perception of the vanity of things must be supplemented by meditation (*cintā*) and realisation by concentrated thought (*bhāvanā*), *i.e.*, there must be realisation of the perception by means of earnest and prolonged meditation in order that the propensities may be destroyed with their roots. It is also pointed out that realisation implies mental equipoise and not *viṣayadveṣa*, there must be no antagonism and aversion to the objects in order that they may be realised as worthless. He that shows irritation at the natural imperfections of things is as foolish as he that is angry with the fire that burns the fingers on contact. (*Sprīyamāno dahatyagniriti ko asmai prakūpyate.*) The wise man therefore does not lose his mental balance either before the *anukūla* or favourable objects or before the *pratikūla* or unfavourable objects, but ascribes his happiness as well as unhappiness to the inevitable effects of his own doings. Thinking of the nature of things and of his own nature as determined by his own doings, he acquires an insight into the chain of causes and effects, and this insight (*samyak-jñāna*) produces mental equipoise. (*Svakarmaphalamaśnāmi kaḥ suhṛd kaśca me ripuḥ.*) The meditation on the worthlessness of empirical pursuits is thus a sort of self-hypnotism which acts upon the forces of the subconscious and unconscious and thereby brings about the transformation of our nature or will. This is no casual or occasional remedy but *ātyantikoccheda* or extinction of the passions with their roots. The epicurean remedy by *upabhoga* or enjoyment is

absolutely useless : it only stimulates or fires the passions. (*Tṛṣṇākhanirāgadheyam duṣpūra kena pūryate mahadbhirapi kṣīpraiḥ pūraṇaireva khanyate*) The course of meditation is thus the only proper course and the course of surfeit and cessation by fruition is bound to fail (*na tu kāmāḥ kāmānām-upabhogena śāmyati*). Through meditation on the true nature of things there is cancellation of the illusion of the value of worldly pursuits, and this quenches the thirst for life and its desires and aversions which are the causes of misery. Thus comes release from the chain of the miseries.

(3) Nor is release from the chain of activities impossible as contended. With the extinction of the passions (*doṣas*) the will (*pravṛtti*) ceases to accumulate *Karma* and thus there is cessation of *uttarakarma* or future possible actions. This is clearly stated in the *Gautamasūtra* : *Na pravṛtti pratisandhāna hīnakleśasya*—which means that for him whose *kleśa*, i.e., passions and miseries, are *hīna*, quiescent, there is no reaction (*pratisandhāna*) of the will (*pravṛtti*). But this applies only to *uttara* or future possible actions. Besides these there are also *Prāktanākarma*, i.e., accumulated actions of the past with their effects including the part of the accumulated actions which is *Prārabdha* or in the process of fruition. The question therefore is : how is release possible from the *sañcita* or accumulated past actions and from the *prārabdha* part of the accumulated actions, i.e., from the part which is already in the process of fruition in the life-time in question ? As regards the *prārabdha* part it is in all cases understood that it is to be exhausted only by actual experience (*bhoga*) in the particular life-time. (The idea underlying this view is that the actions which are in the course of fruition are part and parcel of the natural order of causes and effects. Any non-natural suspension of the course of these actions would mean a miracle which snapped the natural link between causes and effects and upset the natural order.). The

remainder of the accumulated actions, *i.e.*, the part which is not in course of fruition in a chain of natural causes and effects, is suspended by a different process. The Mimāṃsakas of course reject all ideas of the suspension or extinction of our actions holding that the cycle of *Karma* and birth into life as a consequence cannot be ended so that neither in this life nor hereafter is there release (*mukti*) from experience and *Karma*. Others however accept release as a fact holding either (1) that our accumulated actions are consumed by the fire of knowledge (*jñānāgni*) even before fruition (*bhoga*), or (2) that since *Karma* produces its effects with the passions (*doṣa*) as *sahakāri*, therefore when the passions (*doṣas*) are destroyed, the *karmika* potencies cannot mature, or (3) that the effects of our deeds are exhausted through a specific fruition in the *yogin* who has attained true insight, *i.e.*, through the happiness produced by mental equipoise and contentment (*śamasantoṣādijānitasukha*) and through the suffering of the hardships of physical heat, physical cold, etc., (*śītātapa-kleśādidoṣārakaduḥkha*), or (4) that the *Yogin* may consume the effects of his deeds quickly by simultaneous experiences through the assumption of different bodies, or (5) that even for the *Yogin*, *Karma* must exhaust itself through its natural course of happiness in heaven (*svarga*) and suffering in hell (*naraka*), after which there will be *Mokṣa*. Hence neither the accumulated past actions nor the future possible actions are indestructible, nor also the chain of the passions and inherent tendencies which cause the miseries, nor again the obligations of life. Our miseries can be ended by knowledge and meditation just as our obligations can be transcended by the accomplishment of the duties. Lastly the chain of deeds and their effects can also be suspended by the extinction of the passions which prompt the deeds and lead to the miseries.

It will be observed that the cycle of life and its miseries, according to Nyāya, is : error (*mithyājñāna*), passions (*doṣā*), activities (*pravṛtti*) with merit and demerit (*dharma* and *adharma*), birth into life (*janma*), misery and suffering (*duḥkha*), error (*mithyājñāna*), etc. The crowning folly is therefore Error, *Mithyājñāna*, *Moha*, which is the root, as we have already noted, of the attractions and aversions. Just as the cause of bondage is error of judgment, so also the means of release is intellectual insight, the knowledge of the true nature of things (*tattvajñāna*). As realists the Naiyāyikas define this knowledge as the knowledge of objects in their true nature, including even the Self within the category of objects having *objective* essence or nature. In this respect the Nyāya intellectualism differs from that of the Śāṅkara-Vedānta according to which the highest knowledge is not the knowledge of Self as an object distinct from other objects but the knowledge of it as the sole ultimate reality as pure consciousness or thought. The Naiyāyika points out that since there cannot be contradiction (*dvairūpya*) in the heart of reality, *Mithyājñāna* or error must necessarily cease with the appearance of *Tattvajñāna* or true knowledge of things. It is assumed that knowledge itself is distinct from the object of knowledge and since true knowledge has the confirmation of the *viśaya* or object while erroneous cognition has none, the former necessarily displaces or removes the latter. The former has moreover additional confirmation from inference and the other sources of knowledge. It will thus be observed that the assumption throughout is that the valid cognition displaces the erroneous cognition through the aid of the object and other extraneous means. This is in keeping with the realistic standpoint of Nyāya and distinguishes the Nyāya view from that of Śāṅkara-Vedānta. For the latter the cancellation of error is rejection of the rejected, the negation of what is not, a negative negation. But for

Nyāya the error is a positive judgment and the negation of it is a real negation (*aparihṛtaparihāra*) through a positive realisation (*aprāptaprāpti*) of the true nature of things, i.e., a realisation of the unrealised as distinguished from the Vedānta intuition which is realisation of the already realised. The process of the realisation of knowledge is explained by Nyāya as follows: *Pramāññānaviṣayabhāvanā-prakarṣadhyānavipākadhyānabhāvanāyām tasminnarthe tattvapratibodhiññānam pratyakṣam utpadyate*. In other words, there must be *Pramāññāna* or knowledge of the true nature of things in the first instance. But this is not all. After attaining such knowledge the individual must meditate thereon. This is *Bhāvanā* or meditation. When this meditation reaches its culminating point through a process of *Dhyāna* or continued, uninterrupted and arduous concentration thereon, there is not merely a bare cognition of things in their true nature but a realisation of this cognition in the form of a presentation or intuition. The bare thought or intellectual apprehension thus becomes transformed into a perception or intuition, and the process by means of which this is accomplished is a heightening of thought-power by continued meditation and concentration of mind-energy. This is how conceptual knowledge is raised to the intuitive plane, and till this is accomplished there is no cessation of error nor the extinction of the passions. Hence according to Nyāya it is a positive intuition of the true nature of things which cancels illusion which is also a positive judgment. The cancellation of the illusion means not the cancellation of things or objects but only their transvaluation, i.e., the realisation of their real value in place of their face-value. This is *Viṣayadoṣadarśana* or realisation of the worthlessness of things and not *Prapañcavilaya* or cancellation of things as mere illusory stuff. There is only cancellation of the face-values and not cancellation of the things, the cancellation of the significance attached to

them in the empirical state by the realisation of their true significance from the transcendental standpoint. The moments therefore in the intellectual intuition which conduces to *Mokṣa* are :—the realisation of things in their true nature implying realisation of what is really substantial and valuable as well as the realisation of everything else in its true nature as unsubstantial and worthless. The latter constitutes *Pratīpakṣabhāvanā* or counter-meditation and leads to cancellation of the illusory values ascribed to things in the empirical state. From the realisation of the true nature of things and the consequent perception through counter-meditation on the vanity of worldly pursuits arises dispassion (*vairāgya*) which is a disinclination for experience and fruition (*bhogānabhiṣvaṅgaḥ*). The essence of the counter-meditation consists in the endeavour to realise all things as productive only of pain and suffering. This is the Nyāya method of cultivating dispassion which is the effort to realise things as essentially evil even though actually they may lead to partial happiness in some cases. It thus differs from the Buddhist view according to which things objectively are nothing but painful stuff and not merely to be subjectively realised as such for ethical purposes. By this the passions are extinguished and the thirst of life (*trṣṇā*) is quenched, and the individual, dispassionate and calm, becomes qualified for *Mokṣa*.

Hence according to Nyāya, meditation on the nature of things is the cause of *Mokṣa*. Through this meditation there is extinction of the passions and release from the miseries. Since the passions are auxiliary conditions of our past deeds maturing into effects and also of future possible deeds, the extinction of the passions leads also to cessation of *Karma*, i.e., both accumulated past *Karma* and future possible *Karma*. It is therefore knowledge that effects our release from *Karma*, i.e., the knowledge of the

true nature of things which destroys the passions. It is true that there is *Karma* even after knowledge, but according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas (as well as the Rāmānujists) there is no merit acquired by these *Jñānottarakarmas* or works done after the attainment of true insight. The Mādhvas also accept *Karma* after knowledge, but according to them such *Karma* generates eternal merit (*nityapunya*). The Śankara-Vedāntists hold on the contrary that there is no *Karma* for the man of true insight, *i.e.*, no ceremonial duties, not even the unconditional duties. This is the doctrine of *naiṣkarma* or cessation of duties after knowledge. Of course, the fourfold discipline (*sādhana-catustaya*) and the ethical virtues implied therein which have been acquired, continue, but they become natural and spontaneous, and consequently no merit is acquired thereby. Hence there is also no bondage as a consequence. Thus in the Śankara-Vedānta there is no obligation, no code of injunctions and prohibitions, no duties after knowledge. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas (and the Rāmānujists) however, the unconditional injunctions are *duties*, *i.e.*, obligatory, even after knowledge, but there is no merit acquired thereby and no effect or consequence (*phala*), for they must be done without any desire for the consequence. The prohibited actions as well as the conditional duties cease after knowledge, and even the unconditional duties are hypothetical imperatives in the sense that they are to be done according to one's capacity (*yathāśakti*). Only the *Prārabdhakarma*, the actions that are in course of fruition in the system of natural causes and effects, remain. With the exhaustion of these and consequent death of the individual, there is cessation of all *Karma*, and the individual becomes free in the true sense. Hence (1) according to Mādhvas, there are duties after knowledge with eternal merit, (2) according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, there are duties after knowledge, but no merit, (3) according to Śankara

there is cessation of all duties with the attainment of knowledge.

The Rāmānujists agree in the main with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in their view of *Karma* as a means to the realisation of *Mokṣa*, holding in common with the latter that the unconditional duties are to be performed without desire for the consequence even after the attainment of knowledge. They however go beyond the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas by insisting on the necessity of *Bhakti*, Faith, and *Upāsana*, Devotion, in addition to *Karma* and Knowledge. Thus according to them, *Karma* and Knowledge must culminate in Faith (*Bhakti*) and Love (*Premā*) before there can be release in the true sense. This is in keeping with the Rāmānujist positive ideal of restoration and reconciliation with the world through resignation to the Absolute as distinguished from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ideal of mere negation of experience and absolute self-autonomy. For the negative ideal of the latter, dispassion is the only proper course, a positive resignation or surrender with a view to reconciliation with life by a process of transfiguration through the Absolute being unnecessary. For the Rāmānujists however this is the very essence of true, concrete freedom as distinguished from the formal freedom of a negation without content. Hence according to them, the discipline of *Karma* and the discipline of knowledge are not in themselves sufficient: it is only as they culminate in the discipline of *Bhakti* or Faith that they attain their true end by being conducive to *Mokṣa*. (*Karmayogabhaktiyogaprabhṛtīnām bhaktidvāraiva sādhanatvam.*) The nature of *Bhaktiyoga* is defined as follows:—*Bhaktiyogānām yam-anīyamāsanaprāṇāyāmapratyāhāradhāranādhyānasamādhirūpāṣṭāṅgavān avicchinna-smṛtisantānasya rūpaḥ.*—“*Yatindramatadīpikā*” of Śrīnivāsa). Hence it is of the nature of *Smṛti* or representation, an unintermittent stream of representations which is characterised by the eight *Āṅgas* or

organs of *Yogika* discipline, viz., (1) *Yamas* or virtues of self-restraint, (2) *Niyamas* or rules of conduct, (3) *Āsanas* or certain postures with a view to concentration of the attention, (4) *Prāṇāyāma* or control of the vital forces through the regulation of the breath, (5) *Pratyāhāra* or mental rejection of all distracting agencies, (6) *Dhāraṇā* or apprehension of the object of meditation, (7) *Dhyāna* or meditation, on the apprehended object without break or interruption, (8) *Samādhi* or becoming merged into the object as the result of continued meditation. These are the eight *Yogāṅgas* or essentials of *Yogika* meditation, and *Bhaktiyoga* is the practice of faith in the manner set forth in those essentials. *Bhaktiyoga* again presupposes certain auxiliaries, the auxiliaries of Faith or Devotion. These are purification of the body (*viveka*, *kāyaśuddhi*), dispassion (*vimoka*, *kāmānibhiṣanga*), repetition and habit (*abhyāsa*), the accomplishment of the sacrificial duties according to one's capacity (*Kriyā*, *Pañcamahāyajñānuṣṭhānam śaktiṭaḥ*), certain auspicious virtues such as veracity, straightforwardness, kindness, charity, harmlessness, indifference, etc. (*satyārjavādayādānāhimsānabhidhyā-kalyāṇāni*), freedom from elation in prosperity (*anuddharṣa*) and from depression in adversity (*anavasāda*). These are the auxiliary aids to the cultivation of Faith, and aided by these and cultivated in accordance with the essentials of *yoga* or meditation, faith becomes transformed into a living experience. Such faith again is twofold, faith which is only a means to an end, viz., the end of Mokṣa, and faith which is an end in itself. (*Sa ca vivekavimokābhyāsakriyākalyāṇanavasādānuddharṣarūpasādhanasaptajanyaḥ. Evam sādhanasaptakānugrhitabhaktiḥ darśanasamākārā. Sā dvividhā, sādhanabhakti-phalabhaktibhedāt.*) Faith is thus the means and faith the end. Through faith in which knowledge and actions culminate the individual attains that living experience of unity with the absolute which constitutes true freedom

and which is itself nothing but a living faith and love, an atonement in devotion and a restoration through surrender.

According to the Rāmānujists therefore the steps in the realisation of *Mokṣa* are :—

(1) The abjuration of *jñānotpattivirodhikarma*, i.e., of actions which are obstacles to divine knowledge. These are the unrighteous actions (*pāpa*) as well as the prudential actions (*kāmyakarma*) prompted by desire. Through the preponderance of the factors of inertia (*tamas*) and of energy (*rajas*) they are obstacles to that mental equanimity which is a condition of true knowledge, and are therefore to be abjured.

(2) The proper accomplishment of the unconditional duties without desire for the consequence. These duties are the auxiliaries of divine knowledge (*anabhisamhitaphalāni karmāṇi brahmavidyopādānāni*). These auxiliaries of absolute knowledge (*brahmavidyā*) and faith (*bhakti*) which is the transfiguration of such knowledge are purification, dispassion, etc. Hence *karmas* are binding in all stages of life (*sarvāśramakarmāpekṣā*), only for *Mokṣa* they must be done without desire for the consequence.

(3) Knowledge (*jñāna*) which is *Brahmajñāna* or knowledge of the absolute. N. B. Lokācāryya holds that this is *Tattvatrayajñāna*, i.e., knowledge of the three *tattvas* or categories, viz., *Brahman*, the individual soul (*īva*), and material objects (*ajīva*).

(4) Faith (*Bhakti*) which is defined as the true representation of the ultimate reality (*dhruvānusmṛti*) which by continued and intense meditation (*bhāvanā-prakarṣa*) becomes transformed into a presentation or intuition (*darśanarūpā*). Such faith is also termed devotion or worship (*upāsana*). This is the direct cause of *Mokṣa*, though indirectly *Karma* and knowledge are also presupposed. Faith is thus a species of knowledge (*jñānaviśeṣa*), viz., knowledge of the form of an intellectual intuition or

realised thought, *i.e.*, thought transformed into a presentation by means of unceasing and arduous meditation. Through such faith the Lord is gratified and pleased and releases the devotee by His grace (*bhaktiprapattibhyām prasannah īśvaraḥ eva mokṣam dadāti*).

It will be observed therefore that with the exception of the *Bhakti* school of Theism (*e.g.*, the Rāmānujist and the Mādhva schools) and the atheistic school of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, there is general agreement among the Hindu systems as to the negative conception of the ideal life as essentially a state of quiescence. In this respect the Hindu ideal furnishes a contrast not only to the Jaina ideal of eternal progress but also to occidental ideals generally. According to Plato and Aristotle, the contemplative life is indeed the goal, but still it is life and not quiescence. Medieval Christianity however has laid more stress on the element of contemplation than on the element of life in the Greek view. Thus it has tended more and more to a negative view regarding the ultimate beatific vision as a state of contemplation bordering on quiescence. The West however has rejected this doctrine of negation in favour of a more positive view. Thus the ideal of quiescence has given way to that of struggle for existence, and the element of life in the Greek view has prevailed more and more while the element of contemplation has receded. This is quite in accordance with the Teutonic consciousness, Kant's doctrine of infinite asymptotic progress being virtually the philosophic reflexion of this Teutonic will-to-be. In orthodox Hindu systems, on the contrary, the negative ideal has generally predominated, the goal of *Mokṣa* being regarded as a transcendental state of deliverance from all activity or stress of life. This quietistic ideal has permeated even some of the theistic *Bhakti* systems whose conception of the final state differs very little from that of the beatific vision of Christianity. The

heterodox Jaina system however preaches a doctrine of endless upper motion (*anantagati*) from *Loka*, empirical condition, to *Aloka*, transcendental condition,—motion which becomes infinite (*ananta*) after *Mukti* or freedom.

APPENDIX

THE MORAL STANDARDS IN HINDU ETHICS

An appendix on the Moral Standards is a necessary supplement to the presentation of the ethical systems proper. The subject is capable of a twofold treatment, *viz.*, (1) with reference to the *Svarūpa* or definition of the Standard which is the question of the standard proper, and (2) with reference to its *Prāmānya*, evidential value and validity, which is a question of logic, epistemology and psychology. Both these questions are considered in the Hindu systems, and the epistemological and psychological issues are clearly distinguished from the ethical question proper. In the "Nyāyaratnākara," *e.g.*, the author (Pārthasārathimiśra) notes that with reference to the question of right or wrong (*dharmādharma*) two kinds of *vipratipatti* or doubt have to be resolved, *viz.* (1) as to the *Svarūpa*, nature or definition of right and wrong, and (2) as to the *Pramāṇa* or evidence in the matter of right and wrong (*kimpramāṇako dharmah kimsvarūpaka iti*). We propose to deal here with the definition of the Moral Standard as being the ethical question proper.

There are many definitions of the moral standard in Hindu Philosophy, some from biological, some from social and some from internal and other standpoints. For the purposes of the following exposition we shall follow the undermentioned classification as far as practicable :—

- I. The Standard as Custom and Tradition.
- II. The Standard as a Social Category.
- III. The Standard as an End.
- IV. The Standard as Law.

1. THE STANDARD AS TRADITION (LOKOPADEŚA) AND AS CONSENSUS (LOKAPRASIDDHI)

In the "Nyāyamañjarī" in discussing the moral standards the author, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, refers to *Lokopadeśa*, Tradition, and *Lokaprasiddhi*, Consensus, as the criteria of right and wrong. *Lokopadeśa*, Tradition, is the standard according to those who hold that morality consists in the longstanding customs and usages that obtain amongst peoples. It thus differs from *Lokaprasiddhi*, Consensus, which is the standard according to those who insist on universal agreement of belief as the criterion of right and wrong. A distinction is thus made between Tradition and Consensus, the assumption being that as there are conflicting traditions obtaining amongst different peoples there cannot be anything certain or fixed in them to ensure their universal validity as the standard of right and wrong. Hence it is not enduring or long-standing customs that constitute the criteria of morality, but customs that are universally accepted as authoritative, *i.e.*, in respect of which there is consensus or universal agreement of belief.

In respect of consensus however there has been considerable divergence of views as to its ultimate character as a moral standard. Thus some have held Consensus in itself to be the test of right and wrong, while others have tried to resolve it into something more ultimate such as wellbeing and ill-being. Thus—

(a) Some hold that Consensus as a standard is only secondary and derivative. The real standard is Well-being (*upakāra*) and Ill-being (*apakāra*), and Consensus or universal acceptance is the standard only as being conducive to this Well-being and Ill-being.

(b) Some again think that the ultimate standard into which Consensus is to be resolved is not mere Happiness

or Unhappiness in the psychological sense but includes also the biological criteria of *anugraha*, Organic Well-being or Increase of Life and *pidā*, Organic Ill-being or Decrease of Life.

(c) Others think that there is a specific revelation behind Consensus, the Revelation of the Moral Law as produced by *Śāstra* or Scripture. Consensus is based on this Revelation and derives its authority from the latter.

(d) Others again think that Consensus is not secondary or derivative as the standard of morality but is authoritative in itself and independently of any extraneous support.

II. THE STANDARD AS A SOCIAL CATEGORY

The Standard as Social Good including Lokasthiti or maintenance of the Social Equilibrium and Lokasiddhi or Realisation of the Social End.

In the preceding section we considered the moral standard regarded as Tradition and Custom. It was assumed that established usage of long standing has an authority in itself which validates its acceptance as the standard of right and wrong in the moral life. There is however no appeal here to social good as the ultimate criterion of the validity of custom though such reference may be indirectly implied. There are others however who insist on this test of social utility as the essential factor in the determination of right and wrong so that custom, tradition, etc., are authoritative only in a secondary sense as being resolvable into this ultimate test of social good. Thus the "Nyāyamañjarī" notices also the following conceptions of the moral standard, viz.. (1) the standard as *Lokasthiti* or Maintenance of the Social Equilibrium, and (2) the standard as *Lokasiddhi* or Realisation of the Social Good.

It is to be seen that the conception of *Lokasthiti* or Social Stability is more compatible with moral order than

moral progress while that of *Lokasiddhi*, i.e., Realisation of the Social End or purpose provides both for order and progress. It is also to be noted that the standard of *Lokasthiti* or Social Stability implies a relativism in the moral life which impairs its authority by depriving it of its absoluteness and necessity.

This relativism in the conception of *Lokasthiti* is very clearly brought out by Āryadeva in the "Catuḥśatikā." It is pointed out that there being nothing durable or immutable in popular morality, it hardly inspires confidence in men's minds. (*Anavasthitatvāt laukikasya dharmasya tatrāsthā na jyāyati*). Why? Because as righteousness (*Dharma*) is nothing but what maintains social stability, the social life is evidently superior to morality and determines the nature of the latter. Thus whatever is laid down by society for the regulation of family ties and relationships and of citizenship within specific territorial zones, e.g., what is laid down in regard to marriage and the like, is regarded as constituting morality. Morality and immorality are thus social conventions varying from zone to zone and age to age. There is nothing constant or eternal in righteousness, nothing that is fixed immutably by Nature, morality being merely a means of social conservation, the content of which must vary according to the changing circumstances, conditions and the particular organisation of the society which is to be conserved.

Yā yā lokasthitistām tām dharmāḥ samanuvartate. Dharmādapi tato loko balavāniva drśyate. Loko hi yām yām sthitim vyavasthāpayati deśakūlagotrācāravyavasthayā kanyādānodvāhanādikam tām tām dharmāḥ samanuvartate. Tasyāḥ Tasyāḥ sthiteḥ dharma iti prasiddhigamanāt. Na ca eṣaḥ svabhāvavyavasthitasya nyāyo yujyate, yat deśakālabhedayoh anyathātvāt anyathā syāt.

On account of this relativism in the conception of *Lokasthiti*, the "Mahānirvāṇatantra" recommends *Lokā-Śreya*, Social Good, as the moral standard, as distinguished from

Loka-Sthiti or Social Stability. An attempt is thus made not only to get beyond the limitations of communal and regional morality but also to provide for moral progress besides moral order.

N.B.—It is to be noted that the conception of *Loka-sthiti* appears also in the “Mahābhārata” but there it is interpreted as *Lokapālana*, Preservation of Living Beings, and not as mere Social Stability, *i.e.*, *Sthiti*. Stability, in the “Mahābhārata”, is interpreted to mean *pālana*, or *rakṣana*, *i.e.*, Preservation.

III. THE STANDARD AS END

The Standard as End of Sukha or Pleasure

The hedonistic standard of pleasure also occupies an important place in the ethics of the Hindus. It is the Cārvākas that are credited with this sensualistic standard of pleasure as the guiding principle in morality. The Cārvāka motto of life is : live for pleasure as you can, and even if life is a blend of pleasure and pain the wise man should so regulate his life as to enjoy the maximum of pleasure with the minimum of unavoidable pain. It is sheer folly to forego pleasure because it is mixed up with pain just as it is folly to give up eating fish to escape the trouble of removing the scales and fishbones, or to give up cooking the meal to escape the annoyance of beggars infesting and disturbing us. On the contrary, we should be reconciled to life as it is and should endeavour to curtail our suffering as much as possible. This is true morality which consists in so regulating life as to make it yield the maximum of pleasure. Similarly immorality consists in unnecessarily increasing the amount of avoidable suffering or pain. Hence rightness and wrongness are to be determined by reference to *upakāra*, Well-being and *apakāra*, Ill-being, *i.e.*, by egoistic pleasure or happiness and egoistic

pain or suffering, and as the body as consisting of the elementary particles of matter is all that we mean by the self, soul or spirit, it is the bodily or sensual pleasures that count, and it is only the fools that sacrifice physical pleasures in anticipation of supersensuous pleasures to come in a future life. In fact there is no future life, the soul perishing with the disintegration of the body so that the wisely-regulated life is that which has made the most of this life so as to make it yield the maximum of pleasure. It is necessary therefore to live prudentially so as to increase our happiness and reduce our suffering in this life, and it is even proper to purchase the pleasures of life by incurring debts, and other similar means. (*Rṇam kṛtvā gḥṛtam pibet.*)

It is to be seen that the Cārvāka hedonism is gross and sensualistic as well as egoistic. It is the happiness of the self that counts in the last resort and a prudential and tactful regard for others with a view to self-gratification is the only form of altruism that is recommended as rational and proper. Similarly any discrimination between sensual and refined pleasures in view of qualitative superiority is condemned as foolish.

N.B.—It is doubtful however whether the Cārvākas really preached this gross hedonism which has been ascribed to them. The *ślokas* ascribed to Brhaspati or some other Cārvāka teacher may be nothing but a caricature of their doctrine by their opponents, or they may be only exaggerated tirades of some Cārvāka controversialist against the conventional teaching then current. As a matter of fact we hear of different classes of Cārvākas such as the *Susikṣita* or refined Cārvākas and the *Dhūrta* or astute Cārvākas besides the usual run of the *Lokāyatikas*. They must have represented different grades of refinement in hedonism in their ethical teaching just as they are actually reported to have taught materialism, naturalism

and scepticism in their metaphysical and psychological doctrines.

Criticism of the Cārvāka Hedonism

The Cārvāka sensualism has been severely criticised by all the orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy. The Nyāya, the Sāṅkhya, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and the Vedānta systems are all at great pains to refute the dangerous creed of these free-thinkers. Thus Kumārila in the "Śloka-Vārttika" criticising the pleasure-theory, observes :

If rightness of conduct follows from well-being and wrongness from the opposite, how can contemplation be an act of merit or drinking be an act of demerit? (*Anugrahāt ca dharmatvam pīdataścādharmaṭā, vadato japaśiddhā-dīpānādaṭ nobhayam bhavet*—"Śloka-Vārttika," Second Adhyāya.) Or take the case of the dissolute rake. His sensualism may cause some little pain in the nature of compunction of conscience, but this is more than compensated by the intensity of the sensual pleasures he enjoys. Hence with the pleasure-theory as the standard of rectitude, the sensualist must be considered to be acquiring considerable merit by indulging in his sensualism (*krośato hṛdayenāpi gurudārābhigāminam bhūyāndharmaḥ prasajyeta bhūyaś hyupakāritā*).

The above is a refutation of the pleasure-theory on the ground of the comparative feebleness of the pleasure in virtuous or meritorious actions and its superior intensity and strength in wicked and immoral actions. Others again refute the Cārvākas by dilating on the transitoriness of pleasures and their impurity on account of their being mixed up with pain.

Thus Vijñānabhikṣu in his commentary on the Sāṅkhyasūtras condemns indiscriminate seeking of empirical pleasure as incapable of bringing lasting satisfaction to the individual. There is no lasting relief from the possession of wealth and other worldly advantages, for these are

liable to perish or to exhaust themselves in the course of time and with the loss of these there is a recurrence of the pain. (*Laukikādupāyāddhanāderatyantaduḥkhanivṛttisiddhirmāsti dhanādinā duḥkhe nivṛtte paścāddhanādikṣaye punarapi duḥkhānuvṛttidarśanāt*—Vijñānabhikṣu.)

It cannot be denied that these material advantages bring some kind of relief, but it is neither absolute nor lasting relief, the pain recurring after an interval like hunger which revives sometime after appeasement. Moreover the relief which is thus earned by empirical means is like that of the elephant wallowing in the mud : just as the latter obtains relief against its bruised skin by soiling itself so does the person seeking relief from suffering through worldly gain and material advantages. (*Dṛṣṭasāadhanajanyāyām duḥkhanivṛttāvatyantapurūṣārthatvameva nāsti, yathākathañcit purūṣārthatvam tvastyeva. Kutah ? Prātyahikasya ksudduḥkhasya nirākaraṇavādeva tena dhanādinā duḥkhanirākaraṇasya cestanāt Atah dhanādyarjane pravṛttirupapadyate iti bhāvah. Kunjaraśaucādikamapyāpātaduḥkhanivartakatayā mandapurūṣārtho bhavatyeva iti*—Vijñānabhikṣu.)

Moreover this kind of relief earned by empirical means does not essentially differ from suffering. Why ? Because there is no cessation of all kinds of suffering thereby. Again, even where these worldly means are effectual in giving satisfaction, they implicate their possessor in sin because of the deprivation of others' claims. Lastly there is also pain in the effort which it is necessary to put forth for the acquisition of these advantages. (*Sarvaduḥkheṣu dṛṣṭasāadhanaiḥ pratikārāsambhavāt. Yatrāpi sambhavastatrāpi pratigrahapāpādyutthaduḥkhāvaśyakatvamāha. Sambhave'pi dṛṣṭopāyanāntariyakādiduḥkhasamparkāvaśyambhavāt*—Vijñānabhikṣu.)

It is to be seen that this is also the refrain of the Śankarite criticism of the Cārvāka Hedonism. In the "Mahābhārata" it is also pointed out that desire is insatiable because it grows by indulgence and hence there is no

end to desiring and the consequent strife, pain and disappointment in the pursuit of pleasure (*cf. Schopenhauer*).

The question why pleasure is to be shunned like pain is also elaborately discussed by the Naiyāyikas.

Thus *Uddyotakara* in the "Nyāya-Vārttika" in defining the highest ideal of life as *Duḥkhena Ātyantikaviyogaḥ*, i.e., complete and absolute freedom from suffering, points out that there are altogether three views as to the relation between pleasure or happiness and pain or suffering :—

(1) It might be supposed that whatever is, is of the nature of pain : pleasure or happiness as a positive experience does not exist. (*Sarvam svarūpataḥ duḥkham, sukham svarūpataḥ nāsti*). This is the Buddhist view—a form of ontological pessimism which follows as a corollary from their doctrine of Universal Impermanence. *Uddyotakara* rejects this view because experience contradicts it (*pratya-kṣavirodhāt*).

(2) It might be supposed that our so-called pleasures are only subtle forms of pain (*duḥkhavikalpa*), that happiness as an original positive experience does not exist (*svārūpataḥ sukham nāsti*). *Uddyotakara* rejects this view (1) on the psychological ground that it is incompatible with the twofold reaction of the will (*pravṛtti*), viz., as pursuit of the good and as avoidance of the evil, which supposes the existence of both pleasure and pain as original and positive experiences ; and (2) on the moral ground that the purpose of righteousness (*dharma*) would be frustrated if happiness did not exist as a positive experience (happiness being the moral fruition or reward of righteousness).

(3) It might be supposed that pleasure exists as an original positive experience just as pain (*svārūpataḥ sukhamasti*) for it is so experienced by every individual (*pratiteḥ*), but there is no pure pleasure or happiness, i.e.,

pleasure unmixed with pain. *Uddyotakara* accepts this view. According to him pleasure exists just as pain, but they are *samānopalabhya*, mixed up or involved in one and the same experience. Hence there is *abīnābhāva*, inseparableness, of pleasure and pain, and this relativity of pleasure-pain consists in their—

(a) *Samāna-nimittatā*, being produced by the same cause so that the causes that produce pleasure also produce pain (*yānyeva sukhāsāadhanāni tānyeva duḥkhasāadhanāni*).

(b) *Samānādhāratā*, having the same *ādhāra*, substrate or locus so that the conscious state which is regarded as the locus or *āśraya* of pleasure is also the locus, *ādhāra* or *āśraya* of pain (*vatra sukham tatra duḥkham*).

(c) *Samānopalabhyatā*, being experienced by one and the same instrument of experience so that the experiencer (here the *manas*, mind specifically) of pleasure must also be an experiencer of pain (*yena sukhāmupalabhyate tena duḥkhamapi*).

Hence *Uddyotakara* concludes, *vivekahāna* or judicious selection of pleasure (as the *Cārvāka* recommends) by sifting it from pain with which it is mixed up, is impossible. Therefore if pain is to be shunned, the wise man must be prepared to give up happiness along with it. Not that there is no happiness as a psychological reality, only it does not exist unmixed with pain and should be treated as pain for purposes of ethical discipline. This is ethical pessimism as distinguished from the ontological pessimism of the Buddhists. Pain and evil are not constitutive principles of experience as the Buddhists think. On the contrary, the psychological reality of pleasure is a matter of immediate experience; only it should be treated as pain by the wise man because of its inseparableness from the latter.

*The Standard as Ātma-Santoṣa, Self-Satisfaction, and
as Ātma-Lābha, Self-Attainment or Self-Realisation,*

In this section we shall consider Transcendental Satisfaction as the moral standard as distinguished from empirical pleasure which is the Cārvāka view, *i.e.*, we shall consider the standard regarded as the *Śreyah* or Good as distinguished from the *Preyah*, the merely Attractive, Tempting or Pleasant. It is to be seen that the conception of Transcendental Bliss is a necessary supplement to the negative criticism of the Cārvāka Hedonism without which the latter would continue to hold its sway over the mind inspite of the pain and evil which it may bring with it.

This conception of Transcendental Bliss occurs not only in the Upaniṣads, but is also to be found in Manu and Śankara. Thus in the Upaniṣads a distinction is made between *śreyah* or what is intrinsically excellent and good for the individual, and *preyah* or what is merely pleasant. *Śreyah*, the Good, consists in *ātma-santoṣa*, Self-contentment and Satisfaction, while *preyah*, the Pleasant, is connected with *viśayasukha* or empirical pleasure. Every other pleasure is a reflection of *ātmaprīti* or Bliss that characterises the self, and hence *ātmaprīti* is the highest good and the standard of all good and evil. In fact whatever is done is done with a view to *ātmaprīti* or Self-satisfaction so that *ātmaprīti* is the highest good and the standard of all good and evil. It is this *Ātmakāma* or Love of the Self, says the "Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad", that reflects itself into all other forms of *Kāmanā*, Attraction or Desire. Thus the husband is dear to the wife not because of the wife's love for the husband but for the love with which the wife loves her own true self. Similarly riches are desired not because riches are themselves objects of love but because of the love with which the individual loves his own self, (*Na vā are patyuh kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavāti, ātmanastu kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati. Na vā are vittasya kāmāya vittam priyam bhavati ātmanastu kāmāya vittam priyam bhavati.*)

Every particular desire is thus a reflection or mode of the desire for the realisation of one's true self which is the highest good, and this Good, *Śreyah*, is to be distinguished from Empirical Pleasure, *Preyah*, which arises from external objects. Thus in the "Kāthopaniṣad" we have : The good, *Śreyah*, is one thing, and the pleasant, *Preyah*, is another. They attract the *Puruṣa* or individual in different ways by drawing them to different objects or ends. He who chooses *Śreyah* attains his highest good, and he who chooses *Preyah* is deprived thereby of his ultimate good or end. (*Anyacca śreyo'nyadutaiva preyaste ubhe nānārthe puruṣam sīnītaḥ. Tayoḥ śreya ādadānasya sādhu bhavati hiyate'arthād yaḥ preyo vṛñte.*)

Śankara commenting on the above points out :—

Good, *Śreyah*, means *summum bonum*, *Niḥśreyasam*, Highest Good, and is to be distinguished from the merely pleasant. These two, *viz.*, the good and the pleasant, being directed to different ends or objects, bind individuals in different ways with reference to their station in life. Of these, the good is constituted by truth, *Vidyā* or knowledge or reality while the pleasant is a mode of Nescience, error of *Avidyā*. Every individual is actuated to perform his duties under the influence of either of the two forces of *Vidyā* or knowledge and *Avidyā* or Nescience. The individual that desires immortality is actuated by the idea of the good to eschew the path of pleasures, because without eschewing the pleasant there is no attaining the good. By seeking the good the individual realises the perfection and nobility of his soul. But the short-sighted fool that chooses the path of pleasures is deprived thereby of his ultimate good.

(*Anyat prthageva śreyah niḥśreyasam, tathā anyat utaiva preyah priyataram api. Te preyahśreyasī ubhe nānārthe bhinnaprayojane puruṣam adhikṛtam varṇāśramādiviśiṣṭam sīnītaḥ badhnītaḥ. Tābhyām vidyāvidyābhyām ātmakartavyatayā prayujyate sarvaḥ*

puruṣaḥ. Śreyahpreyasorhi abhyudayāmyatavārthi puruṣaḥ pravartate... Anyataraparitṛyāgena ekena puruṣeṇa sahānuṣṭhātum aśakyatvāt. Śreyah kurvataḥ sādhu śobhanam śivam bhavati. Yastū adūradarśi vimūḍho hīyate viyujyate arthāt puruṣārthāt pāramārthikāt. Ko'sau? Yau preyaḥ vṛṇite upādatte.)

It is to be seen that the original passage speaks merely of a moral struggle as arising from two different possible ends which man may propose to himself—*Śreyah*, the Good, and *Preyaḥ*, empirical pleasure. Śankara however reduces this struggle to the metaphysical conflict between the Principle of Knowledge (*Vidyā*) and the Principle of Nescience (*Avidyā*). The choice of right as against pleasure brings in good while the opposite makes man lose his real good.

In Śloka 2 the psychological process underlying the choice of the good or the pleasurable is described. It is pointed out that the good and the pleasurable come to man in mixed forms, but the clear-sighted individual separates the good from the pleasurable, and then chooses the good in preference to the pleasurable. But the dull intelligence chooses the pleasurable for the sake of material gain such as the attainment of the unattained (*yoga*) and the preservation of the attained (*kṣema*). *Śreyaśca preyaśca manuṣyam etah tau samparitya vivinakti dhīraḥ. Śreyohi dhīraḥ abhipreyaśo vṛṇite; Preyo mando yogakṣemāt vṛṇite.* *Śreyah*, the Good, is therefore mixed up in experience with *Preyaḥ*, the Pleasant: in other words, in the same situation there are possibilities of *Śreyah* as well as *Preyaḥ*. The wise man therefore considers both sides carefully, weighs or estimates the relative worth of the virtuous and the pleasurable course, and thus separates the one from the other. When the two different courses draw him different ways, the wise man chooses the virtuous course in preference to the pleasurable one. The foolish choose, on the contrary, the latter for prudential reasons.

Commenting on the above Śankara points out :—

Though *Śreyaḥ* as well as *Preyaḥ* are under the control of the moral individual, yet owing to cloudiness of the intelligence they come to us mixed up. But the wise man knows how to separate the one from the other even as the swan knows how to drink away the milk by separating it from the water. In short, the wise man discriminates the good from the pleasant and after comparing their relative worth chooses the former. But the dull in intelligence, being incapable of discrimination, is led away by prudential considerations and chooses the pleasurable course as consisting of physical comfort and material prosperity such as possession of cattle, joy of family life, etc.

Yadi ubhe'pi kartum svāyatte puruṣeṇa kimartham preya eva ādatte bāhulyena lokāḥ? Satyam svāyatte, tathāpi sādhanataḥ phalataśca mandabuddhīnām dūrvivekarūpe satī vyāmiśrībhūte iva manuṣyam etaḥ prāpnutaḥ śreyaśca preyaśca. Ato hamsa ivāmbhasaḥ payaḥ, tau śreyaḥpreyaḥpadārthau sampārītya samyak parigamya samyak manasā ālocyā gurulāghavam vivinakti prthak karoti dhīraḥ dhīmān. Vivicya śreyaḥ hi śreya eva abhivṛṇīte preyaśo abhyarhitatvāt. Yastu mando'lpabuddhiḥ sa sadasad vivekāsamarthāt yogakṣemanimittam śarīrādyupacayarakṣaṇanimittamityetat, preyaḥ paśuputrādīlakṣaṇam vṛṇīte (Śankarabhaṣya on śloka 2).

Hence there are two kinds of satisfaction : (1) Transcendental Satisfaction arising from *Ātma-lābha* or Self-attainment which is *Ātma-santoṣa* or Self-contentment and (2) Empirical Pleasure arising from the possession of external objects.

In the "Sarvavedāntasiddhānta-saṅgraha" the relation between empirical pleasure and one's true self whose essence is self-contentment, is explained in detail. It is pointed out that empirical pleasure is desired only as it is believed to be a means to the realisation of one's true self. In fact, it is the self which is the dearest of all objects to

sentient beings. The self is one's own (*paramāntaraḥ*) as distinguished from other objects which are external ; its essence is *Ānanda*, Transcendental Bliss, and it is the most beloved of all objects of love.

*Ātmātaḥ paramapremāspadaḥ sarvaśarīrīṇām
Yasya śeṣatayā sarvamupādeyatvamṛcchati.*

(“Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasangraha”, śloka 627).

Tasmādātmā kevalānandarūpo

Yāḥ sarvasmādvastunaḥ preṣṭha uktāḥ. (Śloka 632.)

In the “Upadeśasāhasrī” (ascribed to Śankara) it is similarly pointed out that the Self is the end of all our activities, that there is no higher or better attainment than Self-attainment or Self-realisation, that all scriptural prescriptions and duties have this Self in view as the ultimate end.

Ātmalābhāt paro nānyo lābhaḥ kaścanaḥ vidyate.

Yadarthā vedavādāśca smārtāścāpi tu yāḥ kriyāḥ.

(“Upadeśasāhasrī.”)

But this is true not merely of scriptural actions and duties, it also holds good in the case of empirical actions from material motives. Even these latter have self-attainment (*ātmalābha*) as their ultimate end. But such actions whether prompted by motives of empirical pleasure or by the sense of duty or *dharma*, do not lead to unqualified happiness ; the resulting happiness is impure, i.e., mixed with its opposite, viz., unhappiness (*viparyayaḥ*) ; also such happiness is *anitya*, non-eternal, perishable. But the satisfaction arising from Self-attainment (*ātmalābha*) is eternal. Again the satisfaction of self-attainment is autonomous, *svayamlabdha*, while all other satisfactions are *Anyāpekṣa*, dependent, adventitious, heteronomous.

Ātmārtho'pi hi yo lābhaḥ sukhāyesto viparyayaḥ

(“Upadeśasāhasrī.”)

*Svayamlabdhavabhāvatvāt lābhastasya na cānyataḥ
Anyāpekṣaṣtu yo'lābhaḥ so'nyadr̥ṣṭisamudbhavaḥ.*

(“Upadeśasāhasrī.”)

Hence the satisfaction in Self-realisation is (1) Pure, (2) Eternal, and (3) *Svayamlabdha*, i. e., Autonomous, Self-evidencing and Self-dependent, while other satisfactions, whether of pleasure-seeking or of performances for the sake of merit, are (1) Impure, (2) Transitory and (3) *Anyāpekṣa*, Dependent and Adventitious, and also (4) result from *Anyadr̥ṣṭi*, Attention to Things that are Non-spiritual.

This, it will be seen, is a new type of Edaemonism, a kind of Transcendental Edaemonism which radically differs from the Aristotelian Edaemonism of the co-ordination of empirical pleasures. Similarly the conception of Self-attainment or *Ātmalābha* is an original and unique form of the conception of Self-realisation which is to be distinguished alike from the Hegelian and Kantian conception of it in European Ethics.

Thus *Ātmasantoṣa*, Transcendental Satisfaction, is neither empirical pleasure nor the organisation of pleasures but represents the essential content and bliss that accompanies the eternally accomplished reality of the Self. Similarly *Ātmalābha* is neither the positing of the Self as empty Law of Reason (without presentation in experience), nor the realisation of it by the co-ordination of conflicting impulses but the rediscovery of an eternally fulfilled Self which was missed only under the influence of an original Illusion (*Māyā*).

There is thus an essential difference between Śankara's Transcendentalism and Kant's. Kant conceives the noumenal self as realising its rational freedom in Moral Consciousness as the Categorical Imperative of the Moral Law. Because the self cannot realise itself in the blind matter

of sense which will never express its unity completely and fully, it presents itself as self-determining reason in the Categorical Imperative of Moral Consciousness, independently of and despite the opposition of our sensuous nature. Hence the autonomous self realises itself as a supersensuous reality as the Moral Law or Ought of Moral Consciousness and not as a fact sensuously presented in experience. At the same time this Law or Imperative is not an arbitrary fiat or command but is the Law of Reason and thus implies rational necessity and not the freedom of indetermination. If now we compare Śankara's Transcendentalism with Kant's we find that in Śankara the negative attitude to empirical life is scarcely as pronounced as in Kant. In fact we shall see that some of the commentators have even tried to relieve the antagonism between the transcendental and the empirical by the conception of Pratibimba, reflection or copy, as we have in Plato. We thus see that in Śankara the transcendental is not merely the negation of the empirical but also in a sense its consummation and completion so that empirical values are the reflections, the imperfect and limited expressions, of the fulness of the transcendental self. Hence the transcendental self is an accomplished reality from eternity and does not require to realise itself as Law in a specific act of the Self-legislating Reason. It is also autonomous in being essentially and independently real, *i. e.*, in being non-dependent on anything other than itself. It follows from this that it is of the nature of an eternally fulfilled experience whose essence is this consciousness of complete realisation or fulfilment as expressed in the feeling of contentment or self-satisfaction, and which is therefore to be distinguished from the self-realising ought or law of moral consciousness which is the reality of the Rational Self according to Kant. And just because it is eternally fulfilled absolute experience embodying the quintessence of all reality it is the ultimate

ground of all empirical reality, the source or fountain from which all other objects derive their reality.

This positive relation of the transcendental self to empirical life is brought out, as we have already stated, in the doctrine of *Pratibimba*, reflection or copy by Śankara's commentators. Thus in the "Vedāntaparibhāṣā" we have a very interesting exposition of the doctrine as arising from the question of the true nature of *Sukha* or happiness. *Sukha*, happiness, says the "Vedāntaparibhāṣa", is of two kinds ; (1) *Sātiśayasukha*, relative or limited *sukha*, i. e., *sukha* or happiness which is capable of being exceeded, and (2) *Niratiśayasukha*, Unexcelled Bliss or unlimited happiness. The latter is the essence of *Brahman* or the Absolute. The former, i. e., empirical pleasure, is a limited or partial manifestation of the latter, i. e., a limitation of Transcendental Bliss or Happiness. This limitation is due to the defects and inequalities of the psychic modes through which the latter has to reveal itself in empirical life—defects and differences which are themselves determined by the dissimilarities in the objects with which the *Antahkaraṇa* or mind is connected on different occasions. (*Sukham ca dvividham, sātiśayam niratiśayam ca. Tatra sātiśayam sukham viśayānuṣaṅga-janitāntahkaraṇavṛttitārātamyakṛtānandaleśāvirbhāvaviśeṣaḥ. Niratiśayam ca sukham Brahmaiva.*)

The "Śikhāmaṇi" commenting on the above observes :—

Just as a particular psychosis, owing to the predominance of the essence of *Sattva* or medium of illumination, partially reflects the intelligence which constitutes *Caitanya* and thereby itself appears as a form of knowing, so also such a psychosis, by appropriating or reflecting in its essence of *Sattva* a ray of the Transcendental Bliss that constitutes *Brahman*, itself appears as a partial or limited manifestation of happiness. It may be proved by agreement and difference that these psychic modes characterised by happiness are

connected with specific objects of enjoyment (*Yathā kācit antaḥkaraṇavṛttiḥ sattvagunaḥanyatayā caitanyagatajñān-āmsapratibimbagrāhityena jñānam. tathā tādrśi vṛttiḥ tadgatā-nandaleśapratibimbagrāhakatvāt sukham iti vyapadiśyate : taṣvām sukhalaakṣaṇāyām vṛttau anvayavyatirekābhyām srakcandanavani-tādiviśayasambandha hetuḥ. Ata eva tattāratamyāt sukhātāratamyam*). Hence differences either in the degree or in the nature of all empirical happiness must be ascribed to differences in their objective causes or conditions.

An objection however may be raised. If empirical pleasure is thus the psychosis that reflects into itself the Transcendental Bliss that stands near it, why does it not reveal the transcendental felicity in its fulness in every case ? But this does not happen as a matter of fact, for all pleasures would then be identical in nature and degree. The “Śikhāmaṇi” disposes of this objection by pointing out that though this undivided Bliss always stands near the mind or *antaḥkaraṇa*, yet it cannot be reflected by the latter in its fulness and purity on account of the influence of *mūlā avidyā*, an original Illusion. (*Nanu yadi ānandapratibimbagrahāt vāt antaḥkaraṇavṛttireva sukham, tadā sannihitaparipūrṇānandasya api grahaṇasambhavaṇa sarvamapi sukham ekarūpam (ekarasaṁ nyūnādhikyarahitam iti yāvat—Maṇiprabhā)*) *syat, iti cet na, paripūrṇajñānavāt akhandānandasya mūlāvidyāvṛttatvena idāṇīm tadbhānāyogāt.*)

As we have already pointed out this affords an interesting parallel to the transcendentalism of the Platonic metaphysics. Plato also recognised an essential conflict between the pleasurable and the good, but instead of sharpening this conflict into positive opposition he sought to overcome the dualism by his theory of copies and his distinction of a sensuous and a supersensuous world. Thus the sensuous world is an imperfect copy of an ideal supersensuous world, and the transitory pleasures of this life are the reflections in matter of the Ideal and Perfect Satis-

faction that constitutes the good which is the governing principle of the supersensuous world. It is on account of union with matter that there arise the conflict and incompatibility of pleasures and the consequent strife and wickedness of this world. But in the ideal world there is perfect harmony, every Idea in the ideal world being completely in agreement with the Idea of the Good and all pleasures being thus moments in the absolute satisfaction that constitutes the Good.

Hence with Plato as with Śankara empirical pleasure is a partial and imperfect manifestation of transcendental satisfaction, but while with Plato there is a harmonious co-ordination of specific pleasures in the supersensuous *Summum Bonum* or the Good which is thus a satisfaction constituted by a synthesis of individual pleasures, a synthesis which is lacking in the sensuous world of experience, with Śankara Transcendental Happiness is not a republic of pleasures with the element of conflict and discord resolved into harmony but is the infinite essence of the self representing its unqualified and undivided reality in its completeness and perfection. Hence the Infinite Satisfaction of Transcendental Bliss is a homogeneous undifferentiated infinite essence and not an organisation of partial pleasures—an infinite essence which is itself only imperfectly and partially manifested in empirical pleasures through the veil of *Avidyā* or Nescience. It is to be observed that Śankara ascribes the limitation of this transcendental happiness to *Mūlā Avidyā*, i.e., an Original Principle of Illusion, a Power of Irrationality which limits the true essence of the Self and thereby causes the appearance of the empirical world of evil and imperfection, while Plato ascribes all Limitation to *hylé* or matter which is an inert and inactive principle of division in which the ideas reflect themselves.

In the preceding section we have considered the standard as *Ātmalābha* or Self-Realisation and as *Ātma-santoṣa* or Self-satisfaction and we have also considered the refutation of the Cārvāka Hedonism from the standpoint of these theories. We have seen that Transcendental Satisfaction as being pure and autonomous is conceived as incapable of being attained by empirical pleasures, and hence the wise man's life is one of rigid self-restraint and freedom from desires. The defect of this view consists in its failure to appreciate the element of truth contained in the hedonistic standpoint. Because undue self-indulgence will entail suffering and misery, therefore all empirical pleasure-seeking is to be condemned. The objection to this ascetic morality is sought to be removed indeed by the offer of a purer non-empirical satisfaction in return, but the fact remains that in this view even innocent pleasures can have no place in the moral life, not to speak of the happiness arising from the higher sentiments and emotions such as patriotism, benevolence, humanism, etc. In the "Ātmānuśāsana" by Guṇabhadra, an attempt is made to remove this defect in the ascetic view without however encouraging indiscriminate pleasure-seeking as the Hedonists do. Thus it is argued that sin (*pāpa*) does not result from the experience of pleasure itself, but from that particular kind of pleasure which destroys the righteousness of the individual (*dharmaghātaka*). This righteousness is the moral cause or condition of happiness. Hence pleasures that destroy *Dharma*, which *Dharma* is the cause of pure *Sukha* or happiness, are to be condemned as evil; and such pleasures always go beyond measure (*mātrādyatikrama*),

Na sukhānubhavāt pāpam, pāpam tadhetughātakārambhāt.

Na ajīrṇam miṣṭānnāt nanu tatmātrādyatikramat

(“Ātmānuśāsana”)

Thus indigestion is not caused by the mere eating of sweetmeats, but by their being taken in excessive quantity. Similarly pleasures as such are not evil, but pleasures indulged without moderation such as will upset the equilibrium of the moral life and destroy its true happiness are certainly evil. Hence immoderate pleasures are evil because (1) they destroy the soul's righteousness and (2) by destroying righteousness destroy the soul's true happiness. Hence all pleasures that are inconsistent with the soul's moral equanimity and true happiness are evil, and such pleasures always go beyond measure (*cf.* Aristotle). It follows therefore that neither the natural appetites nor the higher impulses and emotions are to be suppressed, but that they are all to be co-ordinated, systematised and regulated in the perfect moral life.

The Standard as Purity of the Motive (Viśuddhyangābhisandhi) as distinguished from the worth or excellence of the consequence.

This is the theory of morality as enunciated by Samantabhadra in the Jaina-Kārikās and elaborated by Vidyānanda in his commentary thereon called the "Aṣṭasāhasrī". It is pointed out that righteousness cannot consist merely in the happiness of others and unhappiness of the self just as unrighteousness cannot consist in the unhappiness of others and happiness of the self.

Thus if righteousness were equivalent to happiness of others and unrighteousness to their unhappiness, then should we suppose that *acetana*, the non-sentient object, and *akaśāya*, the taintless saint, are also in bondage, *i.e.*, have moral bonds or obligations, as arising from their righteousness and unrighteousness, because in them there is also the *nimitta*, cause or ground, of happiness and unhappiness to others.

Again if righteousness consist in self-mortification, and unrighteousness in self-indulgence, then the dispassionate

saint (*ṡitarāga*) as practising self-restraint will have the bond of righteousness (*puṇyabandha*) and the seer or sage (*vidvān*) as enjoying self-contentment (*ātmasantoṣa*) will have the bond of unrighteousness (*pāpabandha*).

Hence happiness and unhappiness, whether of self or of others, cannot of themselves constitute righteousness and unrighteousness. It is only when such happiness or unhappiness arises from the purity and impurity of the motives prompting the actions which cause them, that there is righteousness or unrighteousness. Otherwise the *Arhat* or Sage himself would be frustrated of his purpose, *i.e.*, would not be free (*mukta*) as he would then be involved in the moral order by coming under the law of righteousness and unrighteousness.

The “*Aṣṡasāhasrī*” commenting on the above points out :—

At two ends of the scale of being, there are no merit and demerit, even though there may be benefit or injury to others. Thus some are below merit and demerit, *e.g.*, non-sentient objects (*acetanah*), and some are above merit and demerit, *viz.*, the dispassionate saints (*ṡitarāga*). Only sentient beings that are not free from desires are subject, through their activities, to merit and demerit.

It is therefore not the mere fact of causing happiness and unhappiness that constitutes merit and demerit. They must also be intentional in order that there may be merit or demerit. In the case of the dispassionate saint though there may be causes of happiness or unhappiness, yet the intention to cause them being absent on account of *tattvajñāna* or knowledge of reality, there are no merit and demerit.

Abhisandhi, intention, is thus a necessary condition of righteousness and unrighteousness, and not merely the consequences of happiness and unhappiness.

What, then, is the nature of this *Abhisandhi*, i.e., this intention or subjective attitude, as distinguished from objective consequences of happiness and unhappiness? It is pure (*viśuddhyāṅga*) in the case of *punya*, merit or righteousness, and impure (*samkleśāṅga*) in the case of *pāpa*, demerit or unrighteousness.

Samkleśa, impurity (of the mind) again is either

- (1) *Ārta*, i.e., of an afflicting, distressing character, or
- (2) *Raudra*, aggressive, violent,

(1) As *ārta*, *samkleśa* or subjective impurity manifests itself in

(a) The effort to escape from contact with the unpleasant ;

(b) The effort to attain the pleasant (*manoḥṇa*) when separated from it ;

(c) Absorption in the experience of pain and suffering (*vedanā*) ;

(d) *Nidāna*, the desire for the acquisition of power which is not yet acquired (*aprāptaiśvarya-prāpti-samkalpa*).

(2) As *raudra* or aggressive, *samkleśa* takes the forms of

(a) *Himsā*, cruelty.

(b) *Anṛta*, mendacity.

(c) *Steṇa*, unlawful appropriation.

(d) *Viśaya-saṁrakṣaṇa*, aggressiveness in the maintenance of one's property.

Viśuddhi, purity (of the mind), is also two-fold being—

(1) Either of the nature of contemplation based on the consciousness of duty (*dharmadhyānasvabhāvaḥ*).

(2) Or of the nature of contemplation of the ideal of purity or perfection (*śukladhyānasvabhāvaḥ*).

Hence right and wrong are to be determined not by the objective consequences but by the nature of the subjective intention of the agent. This therefore is an attempt to go beyond merely consequential morality to the intuitionā principles of right and wrong with a view not merely to

their enumeration but also their classification, and the basis of the two-fold classification is not anything external but is a state of internal determination of the self or *Ātman* or that which the *Ātman* becomes. The ultimate goal however is the realisation of the true nature of the self (*ātmani svarūpeavasthānam*), a consummation which is to be attained by purification through the successive phases of the contemplation of duty and perfection. Hence this is to be distinguished from the European goal of life which is one of ceaseless movement or progress as distinguished from rest in the self.

IV. THE STANDARD AS MORAL LAW (*Vidhi*, IMPERATIVE OR COMMAND)

The moral Standard is also conceived by the Hindus as a Law or Command which again is regarded either as a Personal Prescription of a superior to an inferior being (*pauruṣeya*) or again as impersonal Law (*apauruṣeya*) without a lawgiver.

A.—*The Standard as Personal Moral Law*

i.e., as the prescription of a superior to an inferior spirit. This is how the Standard is conceived by the Cārvākas, the Jainas, the Bauddhas, the Rāmānujists and the Naiyāyikas Thus—

(a) According to the Cārvākas, the standard is the law imposed by the king, who is the highest earthly authority. The king's injunctions constitute duties just as the king's prohibitions constitute the opposite.

Thus according to the Cārvākas the will of the sovereign determines right and wrong, but this is analysed further into the pleasures and pains of the individual. As pleasure is the only real good and pain is the only real evil,

the will of the sovereign is the Moral Law, for the sovereign is the highest earthly authority and the dispenser of all happiness and suffering. (*Sukhameva puruṣārthaḥ, duḥkhameva narakam, lokasiddho rājā parameśvaraḥ.*)

(b) According to the Jainas and Bauddhas however, it is not the prescriptions of the king, but the injunctions and prohibitions of Arhats and Buddhas that constitute right and wrong. The earthly sovereign is an imperfect being like ourselves and his authority is based on brute force. Obedience to such authority is prudential and not moral, being based on the hope of reward and fear of punishment. But the authority of the Moral Law is spiritual and not physical, and can be vested only in the Seer, *i.e.*, the Spiritual Expert that has attained perfection by self-culture. The earthly king is as much subject to the prescriptions of these moral experts, Arhats or Buddhas, as other imperfect beings.

It is to be seen that the appeal here is to the verdict of spiritual experts and not merely to sheer authority. It is thus to be distinguished from the prudential morality of the Cārvākas which is based on the hope of reward and fear of punishment. At the same time no eternally perfect being is recognised as in theism. The authority of the Moral Law arises indeed from the spiritual perfection of the Arhats and Buddhas who possess the proper insight into things and thus are able to prescribe the right modes of conduct, but this spiritual perfection is itself an acquisition in time and not an eternally accomplished fact as theists assume. The objection that on this assumption the Arhats would be themselves without spiritual preceptors to guide them is met by the conception of a chain of Arhats and Buddhas which is without beginning in time—a chain in which the preceding Arhats act as preceptors to their successors.

(c) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Rāmānujists and other

theists however contend that the Moral Standard is the law of righteousness as prescribed by God who is the Creator and Moral Governor of the world. Thus in the "Nyāya, pariśuddhi" of Venkateśa we have :—

Right and wrong are determined by the injunctions and prohibitions of scripture. Like the commands of the earthly king, these scriptural injunctions and prohibitions are prescribed by God with a view to the governance of sentient beings and represent His beneficent purpose. Hence right and wrong embody the conscious purpose and intelligence of God, *i.e.*, they are not arbitrary prescriptions of the Divine Will but represent God's rational purpose and end in this world. Right is that which the Divine Intelligence recognises as good and beneficent and wrong is that which it considers pernicious and evil. (*Dharmādharmau vihitaniśiddhakriyāsādhyatayā abhimatau āgñāvato rājña iva sarva-praśāsituḥ īśvarasyānugrahanigrahākhyabuddhivīṣeṣarūpau.*)

Right and wrong are thus *buddhivīṣeṣas*, *i.e.*, forms of the divine purpose and not objective categories. Further the divine purpose is not an arbitrary fiat of the divine will, but the revelation of the divine intelligence. Hence *Vidhi* as the command of God does not constitute the Moral law but merely reveals it—it is not law-making, but law-revealing.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas however the Divine Command as embodied in scriptural prescriptions is not merely declaratory (*jñāpaka*) of the moral code but also constitutes it (*kāraka*). The analogy is drawn from positive law which depends on the will of the sovereign. Moral causation is thus conceived after physical causation and the authority of duty is regarded as a form of physical impulse or force.

Thus far we have considered the following theories of the Moral Standard regarded as Personal Moral Law, *viz.*,

(a) *Vidhi* as the command of the king.

(b) *Vidhi* as *anuśāsana*, i.e., as declaratory of the Seer's experiences in the *Pāramārthika* plane.

(c) *Vidhi* as the Command of God conceived, after positive law, as constituting and not merely declaring or revealing what is right or wrong.

(d) *Vidhi* as God's command regarded as merely revealing and not constituting the Moral Law.

(e) There is yet another conception of *Vidhi* as the Moral Standard, the view which finds favour with a certain class of Vedāntists. According to these *Vidhi* is *Brahman* or the Absolute itself and not the mere prescription of a superior or perfect person. For the essence of *Vidhi* lies in its obligatoriness as Moral Law which means that *Vidhi* has *Prāmāṇya*, validity or self-evidencing authority as Law which makes it binding on the individual moral agent. But *Vidhi* could not validate itself without being itself a self-validating experience, for the validity of the valid is only this that it posits itself in consciousness. *Vidhi* as *Pramāṇa* is thus *Cidātmaka*, i.e., a self-establishing experience whose authority on the moral agent is nothing but its self-accomplished character reflecting itself in the consciousness of the individual as something to be accomplished. Hence *Vidhi* is *Brahman* itself which is accomplished (*Siddha*) from eternity. In the consciousness of the individual it appears indeed as *sādhyā*, as a thing to be accomplished, but in so far as it validates itself it is essentially *Pratibhāṣamātra*, mere position in consciousness. As a matter of fact, the essence of *Prāmāṇya*, validation, is nothing but this position in consciousness and *Param Brahma*, the self-positing Absolute Consciousness, is thus the only *Pramāṇa*, the various cognitive processes being regarded as *Pramāṇa* only by courtesy, their validity being ultimately nothing but this self-evidencing Consciousness which is the Absolute in the light of which they appear. In so far therefore as *Vidhi* has *Prāmāṇya*, validity or

authority, it is nothing but the self-accomplishing Absolute Experience which presents itself as something to be accomplished.

This is a new form of the conception of *Vidhi* as the Moral Standard which is to be distinguished alike from the conception of it as the prescription of a personal being like God and from that of an Impersonal Law without a lawgiver. It identifies *Vidhi* with the Absolute which is not a personal being but the self-establishing suprapersonal consciousness that lights up all experience. The authority of the *Vidhi* is nothing but the self-fulfilled reality of the Absolute Thought presenting itself in empirical consciousness as a thing to be realised in time. The close analogy of this view with Śankara's Transcendentalism is obvious enough. But while Śankara conceives the Transcendental Life as the negation of the empirical, the latter being annulled altogether in the consciousness of *Brahman*, it is urged here that the validity which attaches to *Vidhi* in empirical consciousness is nothing but the self-affirmation of the Absolute as self-validating experience. Hence according to this view the empirical moral life reflects the nature of the Absolute in a way though it does not manifest it in its completeness and purity, while according to Śankara the empirical life is the negation of the transcendental life in *Brahman* which is to be reached only by total cancellation of the moral life in the state of *Karmasannyāsa* or freedom from the bond of duty. It is remarkable however, that in spite of this underestimation of the empirical life, the Śankarites not only recognise the value of morality in empirical life but also offer the original and novel conception of a gradation of moral standards and moral codes in accordance with the ascending stages of the spiritual life of the individual.

(f) Thus according to Śankara, the moral code as constituted by the Vedic prescriptions is impersonal in the

sense that the Communicator (*vaktā*) of the Vedas only declares the Law and does not create it by his fiat. This Communicator is *Īśvara*, *Brahmā* or the Lord and is thus to be distinguished from the Spiritual Expert or *Āptapurusa* of Jainism and Buddhism. In fact, it is eternally omniscient (*nityasarvajña*) and is also *Sṛṣṭi-Sthiti-Laya-Kartā*, the Creator, Maintainer and Destroyer of the world, which theistic characters are lacking in the *āptas* and *arhats* of Buddhism and Jainism. But the *vaktā*, the Communicator, of the Vedas, does not create but merely promulgates the Vedas as they existed in a previous cycle. Some of the Śāṅkarites admit that some of the scriptures have a personal source such as Manu, Mahābhārata, etc., but they are all traced back ultimately to the impersonal (*apauruṣeya*) Vedas. But even the Vedas themselves are empirical, i.e. true in a *vyāvahārika* or relative sense and untrue in a *pāramārthika* or absolute sense. They are thus all *mithyā*, untrue, and are to be cancelled, but the Vedic *mithyā* is to be used in overcoming the grosser or lower untruths, and the Vedas themselves are to be transcended by *Brahmātmaikatvavi-jñāna*, the realisation of the identity of the Self and *Brahman*. Now in the course of this process of *sādhana* or discipline for liberation the ethical standard may assume a different character according to the particular stage of the *sādhana* or training of the individual. In the stage of the worship of *Saguṇa-Brahma* or Qualified Absolute, the standard is *Īśvarājñā*, the Command of the Lord. In the more advanced stage of *sādhana-catustaya* when external codes and external authority give way to internal sanctions *ātmasantoṣa* and *ātma-lābha* may take the place of *Īśvarājñā*.

Thus according to Śāṅkara even though ethical codes and disciplines are relative and empirical, there is an order obtaining in this sphere of illusion to which the moral agent must conform through a gradation of the moral standards according to the different stages. The ultimate

goal indeed is the transcendence of the empirical moral life of the Absolute, but this is to be realised by cancellation of the illusion of the phenomenal life in successive stages in which the lower illusion is to be annulled by the higher and subtler ones and the highest to be cancelled at last by the intuition of the absolute. This, it will be seen, implies at once the transcendental unreality of the ethical codes as well as their metaphysical and moral necessity within the sphere of Illusion. It further implies a gradation in the sphere of the illusory empirical life in which specific codes with their specific moral standards have validity according to their proper sphere. It thus differs from the Hegelian conception of a progressive unfolding of the spiritual life in which the higher stage does not simply annul the lower but re-affirms the latter in a new synthesis by absorbing the element of truth contained in the lower view. It further differs from the Hegelian view in that while recognising a certain order in the empirical life which must be conformed to in subduing it, it makes it the absolute negation of the transcendental which is therefore to be reached not by the transfiguration of the empirical but by its total cancellation in the intuition of *Brahman*.

B.—The Standard as Impersonal Moral Law.

The moral standard is also conceived as Impersonal Prescription in some systems of Hindu Philosophy. Thus the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas interpret *Vidhi* as Impersonal Law, which does not derive its authority or force from the will of a Personal Being, but is authoritative in and by itself independently of any personal origin. In fact, according to the Mīmāṃsakas the reference to a Personal source is absolutely unnecessary : *Vidhi* need not be presented as the command of God in order to be authoritative and may simply be verity of the supersensuous order, a law without a lawgiver.
